

THE

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## ART. I.—IRELAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I.

*Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, of the reign of James I., 1603—1606; preserved, in Her Majesty's Public Record Office and elsewhere. Edited by the Rev. C. W. RUSSELL, D.D., and JOHN P. PRENDERGAST, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Longman & Co.*

EVERY man, a great authority has told us, is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. That remarkable saying, like many other sayings of its author, is somewhat esoteric and requires translation. It means that one half mankind has a tendency to take things for granted, and the other half (which, being Irish, we may say is very much the smaller) has a tendency to restrict its beliefs to what it has proved. Plato, rightly or wrongly, is supposed to be the representative man of the first class,—that class of people who speak of the *depth of a man's consciousness and the reach of a man's intentions*. Aristotle is the ruler and leader of the second class, that class of people, who, no matter how splendid a stranger's appearance, suspect him at first of being a thief in disguise, and never think of offering him a seat in their house, till he has satisfied them of his honesty and told them the story of his life. Whether the Coleridgian principle holds with regard to all men, or whether, if it does, it is anything more than a dropsical truism, we shall not undertake to say. But it certainly holds with regard to all historians. Every historian is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. The methods of writing history are all reducible to two, the method creative and the method inductive. The former has been adopted by persons of such eminence as Titus Livius, Oliver Goldsmith, and James Anthony Froude. Writers of this class proceed as was the custom with those geographers who, says Swift,

In Afric maps  
With savage pictures fill their gaps,  
And o'er uninhabitable downs  
Place elephants for want of towns.

When they cannot find facts or will not find facts, they make them; and they have a very natural and very amiable preference for their own progeny. The writers, on the contrary, who follow the inductive method, deal with fact only, and that not of subjective origin. Their number is not large, and their success has not been striking. Their productions are generally wanting in literary completeness and are rarely glorified by the vision and the faculty divine. But they are content with incompleteness as long as they retain certainty, and resign fancies without a murmur if they are permitted to possess truth.

If those who have undertaken to write the history of Ireland have generally adopted the creative method, we are not disposed to think them very much to blame. They could hardly help it. The most important of the real facts of Irish history were, till very lately, either altogether unknown, or known only under deceptive shapes. And it was next to impossible to know them, face to face, and in their natural form. They were hidden away in all manner of almost inaccessible corners and almost undecipherable parchments; and the unlucky wight who went in quest of them, was likely to retire discomfited at last, with, possibly, an exhausted purse, and probably an exhausted patience. But a better time has come. The thoughts of men have been much widened by the process of the suns. The liberality of contemporary statesmen has brought to exhumate the materials of Irish history what alone was equal to the task—State interference. The history of Ireland since the time of Henry II. is little more than the history of its relations with England. The true condition of those relations would be most credibly described in the State documents of both countries; and, by the publication of those documents, the student would have an opportunity of getting a true glimpse of the Ireland of the past. These documents, as is known, are being published now, at the public expense, and with the best editorial aids which the country possesses. In the volume now before us we have all the procurable official papers referring to the first three and a half years of the reign of James I. And these supply us, we may say at once, with abundant materials for at least one chapter in the history of Ireland.

When we mention that the present collection has been made and edited by Dr. Russell, of Maynooth, and Mr. John P. Prendergast, the editors of the Carte Papers, we say enough to make the reader aware that, in so far as editorship is concerned, the volume is faultless. In this department of literature, as in many others, Dr. Russell's character stands so high



that his name as editor is a sufficient guarantee that the edition has had all the advantages which the most extensive learning and the best culture can impart. And the reader's highest expectations will be more than realized by the present volume. In the preface, which extends over more than a hundred pages, he will find an extent and minuteness of historical, biographical, and archæological knowledge which are truly wonderful; and in the general index he will find a completeness and conciseness and precision of reference which are not the less valuable because they are so rare. But it is not in the preface, nor in the general index, that the literary ability of the editors becomes most conspicuous: it is in the papers themselves. These, often the offspring of very roving and very irregular minds, are so excellently managed, everything worth keeping being undisturbed, nothing that would be impertinent being retained; the peculiar manner and phraseology of the original writers are so well preserved; and the selections for full verbal quotation are so judicious, that the documents possess, apart from their historical value, a large amount of dramatic interest. They have not lost in Dr. Russell's hands what they would have lost in the hands of less gifted editors, the pathetic marks which remind us that they are the utterances of men dead and buried and judged for more than two hundred years.

The labour of making and editing the collection must have been immense. Had the editors confined themselves to the papers in the Public Record Office, their work, though in itself sufficiently serious, would have been comparatively slight. But, with the sanction of the Master of the Rolls, they have resolved upon publishing "a complete Calendar of all the State Papers relating to Ireland under James I, wherever they are deposited"; and the present volume is the first instalment of the fulfilment of their undertaking. To give the reader a faint idea of the mere physical editorial toil of which this Calendar is the result, it is only necessary to name the sources from which the papers have been derived. These the editors in their preface modestly refer to under a few general heads,—“the Public Record Office, the Library of the British Museum, the Lambeth Library, the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, and other less accessible quarters.” But these are merely the localities where the documents are to be found; and in each of these localities there exist various separate collections every one of which had to be visited and examined. In the Public Record Office, London, there are the Conway Papers and the General Collection; in the British Museum, there are the Cottonian MSS.,

the Lansdowne MSS., the Harleian MSS., and the Sloane\* Collection; in the Lambeth Library there are the Carew Papers; in the Bodleian Library there is the Carte Collection; in the Public Record Office, Dublin, there are the Philadelphia Papers; in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, there are the Ussher MSS., the Stearne MSS., the Alexander MSS.; and, besides all these, there are numerous private collections, each with its fragment, more or less precious, of Ireland's past. The mere mention of these names will, as we have said, give some faint idea of the toil and ability which the Calendar represents. But, for the general reader, the idea must be only a faint one. It is the initiated alone who will be able to appreciate properly the work of the editors. None but they who have some time or other engaged in work of a similar kind can form anything like a just estimate of the vast knowledge, the solidity of judgment, and the delicacy of discrimination which that work required for its proper performance. It is very little certainly for the editors to say, in sketching their labours, that "the task of bringing together the materials of a work so comprehensive has involved considerable difficulty and research," and that "it is often a work of much difficulty to bring into harmony and assign to their proper chronological order documents so miscellaneous, so widely dispersed, and in some cases with so few extrinsic notes of date or authority." To do all that is indeed a difficulty, but to do it as it has been done by Dr. Russell is also a triumph.

Whatever we say we cannot exaggerate the historical importance of the documents themselves. It is true that they cover, as we have already remarked, only three and a half years of a single reign. But that reign is of such moment in Irish history, and its first years are so surrounded with historic suspense,—their ultimate aim remaining so long in such sustained uncertainty,—that perhaps there is no other period of the same duration in the annals of Ireland more curiously and variously interesting than those three and a half

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\* Sir Hans Sloane. It was of him that Young wrote:—

"But what in oddness can be more sublime  
Than Sloane, the foremost toyman of his time!  
How his eyes languish! how his thoughts adore  
The painted coat that Joseph never wore!  
He shows, on holidays, a sacred pin  
That touch'd the ruff that touch'd Queen Bess' chin."

No one will be likely to doubt that most of the old collectors were little better than toy-men in intent. But, in effect, they were very frequently among the best servants of science. What their contemporaries looked on as toys, our contemporaries have often to look on as treasures.

years with which the present Calendar is concerned. The editors promise in their preface to point out on a future occasion the bearing of the documents before us on the whole reign of James I; and to the performance of that promise we look forward with much expectancy. Meanwhile, we shall, we think, be doing the reader a service if we prepare him to profit by the performance of the promise. We may do so by sketching for him the history of Ireland from 1603 to 1606, and by sketching it for him as it is told in the Calendar. We shall take especial care to adhere to our text. For the most part we shall set the Calendar to speak for itself. We ourselves shall say nothing which is not authorized by the papers published in the volume before us, we shall keep as far from irritating subjects as we find feasible; and, if we have to speak about them, we will take care to speak as temperately and respectfully as shall be permitted by human infirmity.

"James, the sixth of that name, King of Scotland" became "King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland,"\* on the 24th of March, 1603, the day on which Queen Elizabeth died. On that day, six hours after the Queen was discrowned for ever, his Scottish Majesty's accession to the throne was proclaimed in London. But the parallel proclamation in Ireland did not take place till the following 5th of April,† the delay, it is thought, being occasioned by the difficulties of communication between the two countries at the time. On the 5th of April, however, the Queen's death, and the King's succession, were publicly announced at the High Cross, in Dublin. Lord Mountjoy was Lord Deputy at the time of the Queen's demise, and when news of that event arrived he was elected (9th of April) Justice and Governor of Ireland till such time as the will of the new sovereign should be made known. On the 17th of April it was announced in Dublin that Mountjoy had been reappointed Lord Deputy. Shortly after he was made Lord Lieutenant; and "on the 26th of May he was called over to England and continued to reside there assisting the Council with his great experience of the affairs of Ireland (as appears by his signature attached to the papers from the Council), until his death, on the 3rd of April, 1606."‡ In his absence

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\* Calendar, p. 1. Our references, when they are not made to the date of the documents, will be made to the page of the Calendar.

† It is said in the preface (cx.) that "the Queen's death does not seem to have been known in Ireland until the 5th of April. Father Meehan, on the authority of Fynes Morrison, maintains that Deputy Mountjoy knew it on the 27th March. (*Fate and Fortunes, &c.*, p. 5.)

‡ Preface, p. cxi.

Sir George Carey and Sir Arthur Chichester were successively Lord Deputies, deputies, however, not of the Lieutenant, but of the King. Sir George Carey continued in office till the 24th of February, 1605, when he resigned the sword to Sir Arthur Chichester. Sir Arthur was Lord Deputy from that time till his retirement from public life in the end of 1615. But the papers in the present volume go no further than the end of October, 1606. The present volume, therefore, accounts for a little less than two years of Sir George Carey's rule,\* and a little more than a year and a half of Sir Arthur Chichester's.

Besides those three just mentioned, Chichester and Carey and Mountjoy, the most remarkable characters of whom the papers speak are Cecil (known also in the Calendar as Viscount Cranbourne and Earl of Salisbury), Sir John Davys, Sir Jeffrey Fenton, Sir George Carew, Sir Henry Brounker, Lord Clanrickarde, the Duke of Ormond, Sir Patrick Barnewell, the Earl of Tyrconnel, and the Earl of Tyrone. But these are only a few of the more prominent political actors. We have numberless others who, though politically of less importance, are often quite as interesting, and sometimes distinguished by a more admirable originality. In fact our drama, as is generally the case in real life, has many more characters than the stage can conveniently accommodate. But they are so beautifully diversified, that, in an artistic sense at least, we cannot wish one of them away. Even Lieutenant Downing, who hanged two poor idiots for pastime on a Sunday morning; Sir Toby Caulfield, who, in the service of his royal master, tempts Tyrone's wife to enter into a charming little conspiracy against her husband; and the Protestant Bishop of Limerick, who asks his Majesty to make him bishop of Dromore as well, because Limerick and Dromore are conveniently contiguous; even these, and others like these, have their artistic charms. Mr. Froude has lately told us that we never produced a single national drama, and he has advanced that fact as a crowning justification of his unconcealed contempt for the Irish race. We could, if we chose, assign special causes for our want of a worthy national drama, just as we could assign general causes for our want of a worthy national literature. But we do not choose to enter upon that subject here. We only ask permission to say that, if we have no great drama, it is not because of a dearth of characters, and

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\* Sir George was Deputy for two-and-twenty months. F. Meehan (p. 51) restricts the period of his deputyship to nine months. That is an obvious error, but perhaps it is a printer's error for "a year and nine months," which would be sufficiently accurate.

that, thanks to Mr. Froude's countrymen, an Irish dramatist will for the production of tragic incidents require no large amount of originality.\*

And, not only the characters introduced, but the documents themselves rejoice in a most interesting variety. We have a proclamation from the sacred pen of King James, in which his Majesty indignantly repels the atrocious suspicion that he would tolerate popery; and we have a connubial note from Lady Carew, in which she announces to her absent spouse that "ther hatheben gret shuting at the castel, and I amnot a frade." We have very learned but very lengthy legal arguments from Sir John Davys, in which he shows that the English kings had from the beginning an instinctive predetermined antipathy to the popes; and we have an equally learned and far more lengthy argument from Chief Justice Saxey, in which, while his knowledge of Zorababel and Nehemias, and his anxiety for the reformation of the reformed Church in Ireland make one think him a saint fresh from the celestial mint, his intense malice against the Irish Catholics suggest the very opposite of a heavenly origin.† But, with all their variety, the documents are in one or two respects somewhat monotonous. We have a little too much mendicancy, and rather an over-supply of hounds and hawks. Most of the letters from the Irish side of the Channel are addressed to Cecil; most of them are begging letters; and most of them offer the sporting secretary a dog or a falcon. The communications of the city of Waterford, and of Sir George Carey, are honourable exceptions. The city sends a present to Cecil, but, wisely remembering that nights of comfort are quite as necessary as days of sport, it elects to offer him, not a bird or beast, but "two coverings for his bed, and two run-dells of aquavitæ." Sir George writes to Cecil very often,

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\* It has amused us not a little to meet in the Calendar a charge against the Irish analogous to that preferred by Mr. Froude. Sir Henry Brounker tells us (p. 545) that "there was never yet any Irish martyr." And yet, as we shall have to show hereafter, this same Sir Henry was daily hanging both priests and people because they would neither attend the Protestant service nor abandon the Catholic. Mr. Carlyle has said that of the two it is better to live an heroic poem than merely to write one. It might be added that people whose lives are heroic poems rarely think of writing heroic poetry. And it might be suggested that Ireland has written no tragedy because her own life is so terribly tragic. She may yet do something even in the literary way to satisfy Mr. Froude. But she may be excused from doing it till her sorrows are made nothing more than a memory.

† At a later period (Calendar, p. 482) Saxey sought to be Lord Chief Baron. Chichester opposed his appointment on the ground that he was "very corrupt and unfit."

and never that we remember asks Cecil "to carve for him."\* But Sir George, as we shall see, very wisely helped himself. All the other officials of Government are beggars. Nor is it the government officials alone who cringe, and wriggle, and whine, and look for the crumbs from their master's table. The same or similar conduct is patronized by even the Earl of Tyrone; and many of the other Irish chieftains excel their conquerors in meanness and servility. It must, however, be allowed in defence of these latter, that the wretched state to which they and their country were reduced, was enough to break any but the strongest spirit.

Indeed, when King James succeeded to the sovereignty of Ireland, he did not succeed to a prosperous or promising inheritance. Both the country and the people were reduced to the extreme of misery. All the woes that afflict humanity had gathered together in league against an unhappy land:—war, famine, pestilence, a brutal soldiery, a malignant executive, laws which the devil himself would be ashamed to sanction, and a king whose life is an everlasting argument of the vast extent of popular patience. From the beginning of the Calendar to its end, the tale it tells of the state of Ireland is a tale of lamentation and mourning and woe. In page 9 we read that the country lies waste in all parts, save where his Majesty is outwardly obeyed; and, in the very next page but one, we have a petition from the Council in Ireland to the King, asking his Majesty to send over at once victuals, munitions, and money. In page 26 the Deputy Mountjoy makes the pregnant remark that all the garrans in Ireland would not be able to draw a single cannon. Further on we learn that the soldiers—even they! have victuals for only a few days, and that the officials are unable to divine what will become of them for want of supplies. Connaught, we are told, is in such a condition of distress that the Government may, without a sin, allow the O'Rourkes to hold it, "for none but devils could live in such a hell."† When Sir John Davys comes to Ireland for the first time, he finds pestilence and famine raging around him, and he cannot call the kingdom a commonwealth, but is forced to call it a common misery. Sir John arrived in Ireland about the middle of November, 1603, and the plague was then only just beginning.‡ It became so serious after-

\* Vide Calendar: Sir Randall McDonnell to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 518.

† Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, p. 25.

‡ This same plague had already done much damage in England. It afterwards visited Scotland, and almost decimated that kingdom in 1606. "The printed histories of Scotland take no notice of a most dreadful pestilence that broke out there this year, which according to the Chancellor's letter to the



wards that through the whole of 1604, and the greater part of 1605, it scattered the Council of State, interrupted the course of public business, and at one time looked as if it meant to settle the Irish question for ever. On December 28th, 1603, just two months after it had made its first appearance, Sir George Carey is sorry to write that "the plague increaseth in the city, and is much dispersed in the country." In the same letter Sir George says that they are in great distress for want of victuals. There were at the time 5,000 soldiers in Leinster, 2,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and Sir George assures us that for three months there has been nothing to maintain these 5,000 men and 3,000 horses. We cannot, however, believe, even on the word of a Lord Deputy, that for three months they lived upon nothing. And we begin to have an idea that, with a famine in the land, and 5,000 soldiers quartered upon them, the people of Leinster were not likely to suffer from fulness of bread. Sir George goes on to tell us that the case of Leinster is not exceptional. "The kingdom," he says "is in famine and great scarcity, and victuals are not to be had here, but must be supplied from England." Chichester, writing shortly afterwards, compares Ireland to Pharaoh's lean kine; not only is it a skeleton itself, but it eats up the flesh and fatness of England.\* About the same time Sir John Davys informed Cecil that even the priests have to live in "a sluttish beggary"; and he expresses his decided conviction that the priests, if they had means, would run away from that miserable country, "for," says Sir John, "they get nothing but bacon and oatmeal, the people are so poor."† Nor do matters improve as our Calendar proceeds. On July 13th, 1604, Sir Theobald Dillon writes to Cecil that there is no news worth troubling him with except the great scarcity of food, and that the plague is very hot; that great quietness is enjoyed, and will be enjoyed, adds Sir Theobald, "until the race of thieves is able to live." In September of the same year the English Lord Chancellor, Ellesmere, writing to Sir John Davys, prays God to stay His hand from further afflicting that wasted kingdom of Ireland. "They have," he goes on, "already felt the scourge of war and oppression, and now are under the grievous scourge of famine and pestilence."‡ On August 8th, 1605, the country is, according to Chichester,

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King, infected all corners of the kingdom to such a degree that there was a suspension of all public business." And yet frequently in our Calendar we have the Irish plague represented as the God-sent punishment of Irish disloyalty.

\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 149.

† Sir John Davys to Cecil, p. 162.

‡ Lord Chancellor Ellesmere to Sir John Davys, p. 195.

"waste and full of misery"; and on the last day of September of the same year, the same Chichester has to announce, after travelling through the whole of Ulster, that no composition or tax can be levied in that province in consequence of its "exceeding great waste and desolations." And so does it continue throughout the whole sickening story. On January 16th, 1606, Sir Charles Wilmott writes that the Irish are just as stubborn and self-willed as ever, except that they are reduced to quiet by the most extreme poverty, and by their "utter weakness of body"; and on the 27th of July following, Sentleger sends a mewed goss-hawk to Cecil; intimates that "this poor kingdom" is quiet; but expresses his belief that it is quiet simply because it is hard for people dying of starvation to be anything else.

There is one little incident recorded in connection with the poverty of the people, which has appeared to us to be peculiarly moving. After a spice of his wonted irresoluteness and even after a refusal, the King gave his Irish subjects permission to serve in the foreign wars. Immediately, there ran from Ireland, as from a doomed land, not only the men that were fit for soldiers, but large numbers of those whose sex or age excluded them from military service. Many of these latter, for want of means to complete their journey, were obliged to abide awhile in London. But, such was their miserable appearance, so plain upon them the marks of persecution and pestilence and famine, that the King and Council, fearing perhaps that London might be kind and inquisitive, gave instant orders that the starving people should be shipped at once, not to the land of exile which they sought, but back to Ireland, where their nakedness could give no scandal, and their wayside deaths could evoke no revenge. A good deal has been written of the murderous way in which the poor are sometimes bandied about from parish to parish, till at last in pure pity Death takes them to his own. But not even in parochial annals is there anything so piteous as the story we have just told. A nation flying from starvation, driven back to starve! A nation flying from pestilence, driven back to die! God's command to feed the hungry forbidden fulfilment! Irishmen brought down so low as not to be worthy of being even beggars! With this evidence before us we no longer wonder at the other ghastly tales told of that terrible time. Even such fearful cannibalism as that of mothers eating their children, and children devouring their dead mothers, however it might shock, would not surprise us in the Ireland of 1605. Before hunger kills man it kills his humanity.

Nor was the famine caused, as it might be thought to be caused by a failure of the crops. Several times both Davys and Chichester assure their correspondents, not only that the Irish soil is naturally fertile, but that, wherever they have seen specimens of the crops, they are unquestionably excellent. The fact is, there were hardly any crops sown. This must be admitted to be, in some measure, a consequence of the fearful war through which Ireland had just passed, and, in some measure, a consequence of the pestilence that followed the war. The rebellion of Hugh O'Neill which at one time gave such splendid promise, but which ended so disastrously at Kinsale, had taken the peasantry from their employment and deprived the farmers of the means of continuing to cultivate their lands. The men who could work were either dead or hiding. The men who had land had no money. Even Tyrone, whom the Government seems to have been desirous to oblige, and who, strangely enough, could and did lend the Government considerable sums of money, was never so poor, and was utterly unable, the Calendar tells us, to cultivate the one-twentieth part of his lands. We are not therefore surprised to find the Council of Dublin, when asked by the Council of London to put a stop to Irish emigration, replying that they promised to do their best; that they have no great hope of entirely succeeding; that the people are desperately bent on getting to the "regions abroad"; and yet that one of the greatest wants of Ireland was the want of men to "manure the ground." The men had mostly manured the ground already. But it was with their dead bodies.

Apart, however, from the want of labourers, we are not left without knowledge of very sufficient causes which made the famine a physical necessity. Throughout this Calendar each one of the officials of the Irish Government expresses his unalterable conviction that there is no efficient way of ruling Ireland except the way of stripes and starvation. Even Sir John Davys, whom we do not believe to have been as bad a man as Father Meehan tries to make him, appears, at least in his later letters, to be of the same opinion. Chichester's first principle is that the Irish will submit to English rule just as long as they are physically incapable of giving it opposition, and therefore they must by all means be kept on low diet.

To what would he on quail and pheasant swell  
Who even on tripe and carrion could rebel!

When poor Oliver Twist fought in defence of his dead mother's name, a course in which he had not James I. for an example, the starved little creature was quickly overpowered

by those brave big people, Mr. Noah Claypole, Miss Charlotte, and Mrs. Sowerberry. But Oliver was not submissive. Mr. Bumble was sent for. "Ain't you a trembling while I speak?" said Mr. Bumble. "No!" said Oliver, stoutly. Mr. Bumble stood aghast. Mrs. Sowerberry suggested that Oliver must be mad. "It's not madness, ma'am," replied Mr. Bumble, after a few moments of deep meditation; "it's not madness, ma'am, it's meat." Sir Arthur Chichester was only the Bumble of a bigger parish. His general policy was so to impoverish the country, and so to weaken the people as that the Irish would have died out before they had an opportunity for another rebellion. A similar policy, but with much more of manly candour about it, had been pursued by Carey and Mountjoy. That was the policy, too, sanctified by the approval of the Protestant clergy. For instance, at p. 58 there will be found a letter to the King from the reverend fathers in God, the bishops of Dublin and Meath. In this letter their lordships, among many other remarkable bits of information which they offer his Majesty, treat him to these two; that it was the intention of the Catholic party, if they had succeeded in the late rebellion, to put all his Majesty's loyal subjects to the sword; and that peace and posterity are two things which the Irish nation, of all others, cannot endure. We can guess the object in making such charges.

Father Meehan tells us, on the authority of an eye-witness, that the troops of Mountjoy, when off duty, were accustomed to uproot the growing crops with their swords, and to set fire for amusement to the haggards and barns.\* We do not read in the Calendar any statement precisely identical. But we read many statements extremely like that of F. Meehan's; and these go far to account for Irish starvation under James I. The soldiers are throughout described by their own commanders as murdering and robbing without mercy or remorse. One of the very first things we read is a spicy letter (p. 6) from Captain Thomas Boyd to Sir Charles Wilmott. The gallant captain reports to his chief that he has blocked up the castle of the O'Sullivans, at Ballingarry; that the inmates, mostly women and children, are not less than a hundred; that he has taken care not to leave them even water to live on; and that "not one creature that comes shall live except for intelligence." Now, up and down the country, in

\* "Fate and Fortunes of Tyrone and Tyrconnel," pp. 14, 15. See also the note in page 17, where Fynes Morrison says that "Mountjoy spent five days in the neighbourhood (of Tullaghoge), 1602, and after spoiling the corn of the whole country, smashed the chair whereon the O'Neills were wont to be created."

all the provinces, and in most of the towns, were scattered bands of soldiers, filled with the same zeal as Captain Thomas Boyd. These we would not expect to be very nice in their notions of honesty. Their chiefs tell us how they acted. On November 23rd, 1603, Chichester writes to Cecil that the army is forced to range upon the country for want of victuals in the King's store. He does not blame the soldiers, but he cannot conceal that some stress must be laid upon them to reduce them to discipline and order. "Their carriage as it is now is," he says, "brings to the grief and discontent of the poor inhabitants."\* But three days before the letter of Chichester was written, Sir George Carey had furnished Cecil with more precise information.† He tells the Secretary plainly that, until the soldiers are brought to order, there is no hope of raising the tax from the people. The soldiers devour all. Even the Commissioners, he says, are guilty of wholesale robbery. They take up cattle at 15s. the head, a pork at 4s., and a mutton at 2s.; which Sir George pronounces to be so unjust, that neither he nor the Lord Lieutenant had ever ventured to do it. That last remark of the Deputy's is a fine proof of his modesty. He and Mountjoy did not indeed take up a "mutton" for 2s.; they took it for nothing, and we shall see hereafter that, however little the Commissioners paid for what they seized on, they were only a few months before their age, and were really only anticipating the law.

But the fullest and, as a matter of course, the most felicitous account of the conduct of the soldiery, comes to us from the pen of Sir John Davys. Sir John is writing to Cecil, February 20th, 1604; he has been describing the abuses in the Irish Church, in the Irish Law Courts, and, generally, in the Irish executive. He winds up the first part of his letter in this way:—"But the loss and misery of the subject grows in so many ways that he hears many of them say that hitherto the peace hath been more heavy and grievous to them than the wars, for, besides the famine and pestilence, they suffer the 'cesse' (as they call it) of the soldiers, which they think the worst plague of all; for the soldier will not be satisfied with such food as the country farmer hath in his house, but will kill his pig, his lamb, his calf, and so destroy (*spem gregis*) the hope that he hath to restore his flock again, or otherwise doth extort old sterling money from him to save what he hath from havoc and spoils." In "Old Mortality," Scott does his

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\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 108.

† Carey to Cecil, p. 108.

very best to give his readers an idea of the manner in which the people of Scotland suffered from the "cessing" of Claverhouse's dragoons. But even the Wizard of the North never could conjure up in fancy such a scene as Sir John Davys knew to be a very vulgar matter of fact. And as things were when Sir John wrote the passage we have quoted, so they continued. Every day, Sir John himself assures Cecil, complaints of that kind came to the Lord Deputy. Further on, Lord Barry Buttevant tells the Chief Secretary, that the people are daily expecting some measure for the repression of the extortions of Government troops, soldiers, sheriffs, and cesses, "who impoverish this poor kingdom and commonwealth."\* But the people expected relief in vain. More than a year afterwards (March 12th, 1605), Chichester briefly tells Cecil that the soldiers render it impossible for him to raise the tax; they keep no garrison, but live as they please upon the people. And about the same time the King's Majesty is informed by Richard Hudson that, "the whole country is depopulated, wasted, and rent asunder by the daily extortion of the soldiers taking meat and money at their pleasure, whereas by the statute of that realm"—James care for statutes!†—"the soldiers should pay for their meat, whereby great numbers of the subjects perished."‡ After hearing all this we are prepared for what Chichester afterwards tells Cecil, that the very sight or name of a soldier is odious and hateful to all the country.§

But, perhaps, worse than the cessing of the English soldiers was the rapacity of the English commanders. On this matter we should not expect the Calendar to be very communicative, for the Irish officials would naturally not tell tales on themselves. But, fortunately, some of the most common passions of man expose bad causes as well as good causes to suffer from traitors. In the volume before us we have indications of squabbles among the thieves, and one of the ordinary consequences of such squabbles occurs. In p. 203 we have a letter to Cecil written by Sir Jeffrey Fenton. Fenton had been lately across

\* Lord Barry Buttevant to Cecil, p. 153.

† The very first official act of James, after his accession to the throne of England, was a direct violation of English law. It happened on his journey from Edinburgh to London. A thief, caught in the act of stealing, was brought before his Majesty; his Majesty had him hanged at once, without any form of trial whatever. And in this he was, for once, self-consistent; for in his philosophy the King was the speaking law. See Guthrie's "History of Scotland," vol. ix. p. 7.

‡ "A Discourse presented to the King's Majesty touching Ireland," by Richard Hudson, p. 230.

§ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 279.



the Channel to see the Secretary, and the Secretary had roundly charged him with wholesale robbery in Ireland. Cecil appears, for once in a way, to have been seriously indignant. When Sir Jeffery pleaded his innocence, Cecil would give him no hearing; but, in so far as we can gather, ordered him peremptorily to the door. Sir Jeffrey's wife was then at Lichfield. Thither the worthy knight betook himself, and, with Lady Fenton's assistance, drew up, for Cecil to read, the defence which that minister was too disgusted to hear. It is no present concern of ours whether or not Sir Jeffrey's statement of his affairs is veracious. We are content to suppose that it is, for we do not like to doubt a man who speaks so finely of "God's justice, which sleepeth not," and who is so charitable to his adversaries that he leaves them utterly to the Divine will. But there is a part of Sir Jeffrey's plea which we ask the reader to look to. He knows, he says, that he has been informed upon by some of his fellow-officials. But he defies them all. He is the one clean-handed, white-souled seraph among them; "for," says he, proudly, "what I have got is mine by no unlawful or dishonest ways, *and there are not many of my informers who can in like safety of conscience avow the same for themselves.*" That we venture to consider a very suggestive remark, and Salisbury might be expected to regard it as calling for further inquiry. But the subtle Secretary did not so regard it. Fenton he believed to be a scandalous robber. Fenton's accusers he believed to be as bad as Fenton himself. But both were only doing their duty, for both were only acting as the policy of England taught them to act. And so the matter dropped. Sir Jeffrey Fenton returned to Ireland; his accusers held their places still; and both accused and accusers went on to rob and lie and quote Scripture as before.

But that the members of the Irish executive were guilty of the grossest embezzlement, and that if there was one honest man amongst them he had missed his vocation, rests on evidence much more definite and decisive than a general charge made by a known rogue. The Calendar leaves no room for doubt on the matter. No Englishman took service in Ireland except with the understanding that he might act both as a royal cruiser and as a privateer. Elizabeth had declared that office in Ireland was *per se* a preferment, and that when she gave a man an appointment in that country she expected that, no matter what had been his previous services, he would come to her for no further reward. The English officials of James remembered the hint of the Virgin Queen. They came to Ireland, as Mr. George Montgomery,

bishop, save the mark, tells us he came, to make a fortune. On the 12th of March, 1605, Sir Arthur Chichester tells Viscount Cranbourne that the Government surveyors are monstrously corrupt; that they give away the lands to their friends at the smallest assignable fraction of their real value; that these abuses, however, have been connived at so long that it is next to impossible to amend or prevent them; that, in fact, Chichester's Government is disgraced and nullified by the conduct of the other officials, "most men," says he, "applying their employments here to enable themselves after a few years spent in that service (as they unjustly term it) to live better elsewhere."\* More than half a year afterwards† he makes the same complaint in terms still stronger. He laments the unabated corruption of the under officers. He insinuates that the corruption extends even to the Council, and that the very men who have been appointed to advise and assist him in governing the country are occupied solely in receiving the pay and "sucking the sweets of Ireland." He is evidently disgusted with the conduct of his fellows; he evidently foresees that that conduct will ruin the country; his own position is hopeless; and being as yet, though a tyrant, something of an honest man, he tells the Chief Secretary that he would like to retire. But, unhappily for himself, he was left in office. And the corruption which annoyed him in the beginning annoys him even to the end. On the 14th of August, 1606, we have Sir Henry Brounker complaining to Cecil of the juggling of the treasurer and the corruption of the paymaster, "who enrich themselves," &c;‡ but, one fortnight before, the unfortunate Chichester had to make a similar though far more serious complaint. The money, he says, which the English Council sends him is embezzled on the way. And that will be the case, he thinks, as long as it is left to the fingering of Sir George Carey & Co. "If," says he, "you were to send me £20,000 to-morrow, and to send it through that channel, I would never see the half thereof."§

The lofty opinion which Chichester entertained of his predecessor's powers of embezzlement was amply merited. Among the rogues who had ruled Ireland for James I., Sir George Carey is a giant among pigmies. Father Meehan speaks of him as a grinding money-lender and thorough adept in sordid peculation.|| That is all thoroughly true. But

\* Calendar, p. 267.

† October 2nd, 1605. Chichester to Salisbury, p. 325.

‡ Sir H. Brounker to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 537.

§ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 533.

|| "Fate and Fortunes of Tyrone and Tyrconnel," p. 48.

F. Meehan does not do Sir 'George proper justice, and the tone he employs is not, as it ought to be, reverential and solemn. Sir George was a man of genius. It is one of the characteristics of genius to be exhaustive. Sir George was exhaustive. He robbed Ireland so well that when he retired to his native country he did not leave even a respectable greyhound behind him.\* And he had the reward of genius even in his own days. Officials who had won high honours in roguery looked up to him with boundless awe, and spoke of him with the hush of voice and indefiniteness of language with which the instincts of humanity do homage to the vast and sublime. We can produce only two testimonies to Sir George's eminence, and one of these has the disadvantage of being somewhat lengthy. But both will be found very interesting, and both will throw great light on these years of Irish history of which we are writing.

The Earl of Clanrickarde supplies our first testimony. The earl himself is one of those characters whom men now call "queer." For services rendered to the cause of loyalty he was made President of Connaught, with extensive emoluments and possession of the castle and crown lands of Athlone. He was also honoured with a place in the Irish Privy Council; and when the army in Ireland was reduced by the King's order to about one-tenth of its number, he was allowed to retain his troop entire. He himself is so moved by the King's bounty that in a letter of thanks which he sends to Cecil he protests that Cecil may do with him whatever he pleases. And yet in a few months after that gushing epistle was written, he complains that there is no man in Ireland treated half so badly as he. But his great desire is to get over to England. We may say here that Cecil was not very long in procuring for him the necessary permission—Clanrickarde's wife had been Countess of Essex—and that thenceforward we hear no complaints of ill-treatment. But in one of those letters which Clanrickarde wrote before his departure from Ireland the following passages occur:—

He is weary of this unhappy Ireland, that yields no contentment to any except such as take pleasure in corrupt actions and make a merchandise of justice. He (Clanrickarde) is none of these, and therefore desires to be in Ireland as little as he can. Deplores the conduct of the late Deputy (Carey),

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\* "Endeavours his best to get fair dogs for him, of which the country is very scarce, the Lord Deputy having already sent as many as he could get into England."—Sir A. Chichester to Viscount Cranbourne, 4th January, 1605. Cal. p. 243.

but will be silent till he comes over. Fully believes that this gentleman who now is Deputy (Chichester) will carry himself very worthily.\*

We shall not stop to remark on the instances in this letter of the Clanrickarde character. It was nothing extraordinary to be blind and dumb while Carey was doing the harm ; nothing extraordinary to be suddenly alive to Carey's corruption when Carey was leaving office ; and nothing extraordinary to predict that the rising sun would be a magnificent luminary. But let the reader observe the earl's unconscious admission of Sir George's excellence as a rogue. The very thought of that excellence overpowers Clanrickarde. It is so great, and has been shown in such multitudinous ways, that only over the wine and walnuts can Clanrickarde describe or Cranbourne understand it.

Our second testimony is a correspondent of the Earl of Northumberland, one of his Majesty's English Privy Council. The references which the writer makes to Carey cover a considerable space ; but we do not think that the reader will be sorry if he reads them through. We give them as they are found in the Calendar, pp. 245, 246 :—

About three weeks past the Lord Deputy embarked the most part of his money, plate, jewels, and stuff, and sent them away for England. It is believed that the goods were of great value, and that his lordship made such a hand for enriching himself in this land as the like was never done by any other that supplied his place. Is well assured that he had all the means to enable him so to do ; for, first, being treasurer and master of the exchange of both the realms, he and his paymaster made a great hand that way, especially in passing many bills of exchange in the names of divers (persons) that were never privy to them, and in paying the army and others in mixed moneys ; and, secondly, himself being Deputy, disposed the money as pleased him, no one daring to question his doings, having both the sword and purse in his own hands. His lordship disbursed £1,000 or thereabouts, at the rate of the mixed moneys, to certain provost-marshal's appointed for the five shires of the English Pale to weed out loose people and masterless men. This was to be borne by the inhabitants of the five shires ; and the money is now levied by him, after three or four for one, upon the country—a very grievous matter ; but yet the people know not to whom they may complain,

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\* Earl of Clanrickarde to Viscount Cranbourne, p. 262. In the same letter the noble earl gives us a touch of description, which, though he never meant it to be so, may be almost called tragic. Dr. Russell, with his wonted discrimination, gives us here the writer's exact words :—"Good, my lord," says Clanrickarde, "hasten my leave, for there is great difference between the sound of Cormac's harp and the tune and harsh sound of a cow or garran, as here is no other music." Alas, no ; the heart of Ireland was in no mood for music just then ; but "no music but the sound of a cow or garran"—for the "Land of Song" what a picture of desolation !

such is their small hope of redress. It is reported that a privy seal came for £26,000, but, as he understands, half of it came not hither, but was divided between the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Deputy in satisfaction of such entertainments as were due to them. . . . The Lord Deputy has sent his man Bingley over (to England). . . . This Bingley within these five years was but of mean estate, but is now deemed (having helped to serve the Lord Deputy's turn and his own) to be worth 20,000 marks; he (Northumberland) may therefore easily guess what a hand the master made when the servant got so much in so short a space.

That passage neither needs nor permits a comment. One thing only let the reader consider. For the one Bingley and the one Carey who are here pilloried for ever, how many other rascals in their time were plundering Ireland, whose names, until the history of the world is published in Jehosaphat, men will have no chance of visiting with loathing and execration?

The mention made above of Sir George Carey's turning to his personal profit the peculiar state of the coinage in Ireland, introduces another of the agencies which desolated Ireland in the time of James I. On this subject, however, which is a very wide and very curious one, we can touch but lightly here. In Ireland at the close of Elizabeth's reign, there was a species of coin current which was extremely base, the piece, for instance, that pretended to be 12d. worth of silver, containing, at most, no more silver than was value for 3d. This coin the people very generally refused to accept in exchange for their goods; or, if they did accept it, they endeavoured, by selling at prices nominally higher, to procure prices which would not really be ruinously lower than what was just. A "pork," for example, was estimated by the Commissioners to be worth four shillings, and (whether the price was just or not) for four shillings the Irish farmer was obliged to give it. But the soldier who bought it offered in payment four coins, which he called shillings, but which were really not worth more than 3d. a piece. The farmer, either declined to take the coin at all, or insisted that in the bargain it should take four of the pieces to count for a shilling. Nothing could be more reasonable; even the English officials admitted as much, and constantly expressed their opinion to their English correspondents that the coin should be changed. The people, perceiving that their demands were not entirely disapproved by their masters, grew loud in asking for a change of the coinage. All the cities of the south were in a ferment of popular excitement, and at Cork a Government proclamation was torn down by the populace. On the 25th of April, 1603, a month after the King's accession, Mountjoy apprises Cecil that the dis-

content of the people, because of the coinage, is infinite and insupportable. But Cecil need not be afraid. Mountjoy is equal to the occasion. There is no way, he thinks, of making the coin current but by the cannon, and that is a way which Mountjoy rather admires. "Rather," says he, "than let the King's service suffer, I will coin the cannon too, and make them take it."\* But the Lord Deputy was not destined to demonstrate his loyalty in such a remarkable manner. On the 27th of the following September the King communicated to Sir George Carey the royal resolution to accede in some measure to the popular will. The royal resolution embraced two points:—the base shilling which (as we have said) pretended to be value for 12d., was declared reduced to 4d.; and a new coin was introduced, also called a shilling, which pretended to be value for 12d., but was really value for 9d. only. On the 11th of October following, the Dublin Council issued a proclamation explaining and enforcing the royal decree. We select a few passages from the proclamation:—"They therefore (the Lord Deputy and Council) in his Majesty's name do hereby proclaim and publish his express will and pleasure to be that from the 11th day of this October, 1603, each piece of the new standard bearing the name of a shilling shall go current and be taken of all persons in this kingdom for 12d. sterling; . . . and that the said mixed moneys be now called down to a third part, the piece of 12d. to be now current for 4d. . . . And forasmuch as this his princely care of the welfare of his subjects deserveth on their part all dutiful obedience and thankfulness, this they can no way better express than by rating their commodities at such reasonable prices as, upon the alteration of the standard, and *reducing the mixed moneys to their true value*, is now expected; which they doubt not will be by the well-minded subjects willingly performed; and for others that shall show themselves obstinate, either in disobeying any part of this his Majesty's proclamation, or in holding such commodities as they have to sell at unreasonable prices, they hereby straitly command all mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, and all other his Majesty's public officers, to have a special care that this his Majesty's proclamation be in all points observed and kept, and to use their best diligence in setting of reasonable prices, as well upon all manner of victuals as all other commodities, and to apprehend all such as shall either impugn the same or shall keep these commodities at higher rates than they shall be reasonably prized at; and the party or parties

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\* Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, p. 26.



so apprehended to be committed to jail till their pleasure therein shall be further known."\* That is to say : a justice of the peace has power to determine the market prices in his own district; the butcher must sell his justiceship a leg of mutton at whatever price his justiceship is pleased to name !

Nevertheless, despite its threats and its pomposity, the proclamation did not achieve success. The people still refused to take the base money, even at its decreased value; and, when the Deputy committed some of them for their refusal, the consequence was that the people shut up their houses and refused to sell their wares at all. This we have on the authority of Sir John Davys. Sir John, moreover, lets it appear, that, in their proclamation, the Deputy and Council told an untruth. They put the true value of the base twelve-penny piece at 4d. But Sir John says that the piece contains at least three parts copper; that every man who is unfortunate enough to have it offers it for 2d.; and that it really contains not more silver than is value for 2½d. or 3d. Sir John immediately adds, with a scarcely explicable tinge of disloyal irreverence, that it would be "more honourable, as well as more profitable, for the King to resume the money at the same rate." Whether Davys' method of tendering his advice was worthy of his high literary character, is questionable; but it is unquestionable that his advice was taken. On the 22nd of January, 1604, a royal proclamation, published at Dublin, reduced to 3d. the base shilling which his Majesty had already reduced from 12d. to 4d. The proclamation, we must warn the reader, is not to be found in the Calendar before us; nor does any mention of it occur on or about the date which we have mentioned as the date of its publication. But a paper of much later date (June 12th, 1606) makes it certain that such a proclamation as we have mentioned was issued, and was issued on the day to which we assign it. In that paper there is a summary of the legislation with regard to Irish moneys during the reign of James I.; and in that summary the issue of the proclamation of which we have spoken is distinctly mentioned. But between that proclamation of January 22nd, 1604, and the Council's proclamation in October, 1603, King James had made another venture in the regions of Irish finance. His Majesty is full of paternal anxiety for the new coin introduced by himself, the coin namely, which, though it was value for only 9d. he rated at 12d. He is anxious also that all parts of his vast dominions should be thoroughly united. And because he

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\* "Ireland, the Moneys there," p. 93.

† Mr. Davis, solicitor of Ireland, to Cecil, p. 111.

wants his new coin to pass and his new subjects to be as brothers, he issues, on the 3rd of December, 1603, a proclamation to the following effect:—His kingdom of Ireland was in want of a new coin when he became king. He gave it a new one. This was of such a character that “in every 12d. by name” there was really 9d. His kingdom of Ireland has another want now: its new coinage should be current in all the kingdom. He hereby makes it so. And he makes it so in these words:—“We have therefore thought it fit hereby to publish that the said moneys being coined into pieces of 1s., 6d., 3d., and marks, being our lawful monies for our said realm of Ireland, are by us appointed and ordained to be lawful and current in others our dominions for the just value which they are worth in fine silver, that is to say, the piece of 12d. for 9d. sterling, and the pieces of 6d. and 3d. after the same rates.” Which comes to this:—King James, in his unspeakable love for his Irish subjects, and with that wisdom which so distinguished the modern Solomon, puts into the pockets of Englishmen and Scotchmen 3d. out of every Irishman’s shilling. An Irish trader has to give 12d. worth of commodity for a coin for which, when he has himself to buy in England, he will be able to get only 9d. worth of the same commodity! Such a piece of kingcraft was not likely to make the Irish contented. They were not contented. And so on May 29th, 1606, we have the Lord Deputy and Council, after allowing the injustice to continue unquestioned for two and a-half years, writing to the English Lords in this fashion:—“They suggest a reducing of the coin, namely, by decrying the new silver shilling to 9d. sterling, and so the other smaller parts of the new coin, proportionably according to that rate; whereby all degrees of subjects would receive great satisfaction when they should see the coin of both realms brought to an equality in value, the want of which had theretofore bred no small grudge in the hearts of many of them, especially when they considered that by that diversity in the coin his Majesty seemed to put a difference between his subjects of England and Ireland, they both being equally natural members of one crown.” How the English Privy Council must have stared! Put England and Ireland on an equality! As a matter of course the suggestion of the Irish Council was scouted. The swindling of Irishmen in 3d. out of every shilling, by the mere corruption of the coinage, proceeded right royally “as had been found convenient for so many ages before.”\*

We cannot leave the subject of Irish moneys in the reign

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\* Lords of the Council to Lord Deputy and Council, p. 547.

of James I., without drawing the reader's attention to the miserable poverty of the then Anglo-Irish Government, as it is described by our Calendar. James was at once both a spendthrift and a screw. He wasted more money than would suffice to purchase a whole wilderness of Scotchmen; and yet, when money was really wanted for the fulfilment of his most obvious duties, he held it hard and fast with all his countrymen's proverbial tenacity. Elizabeth, in a glorious reign of nearly half a century, had gathered into the English treasury the sum—vast for the times—of £400,000; of this, James had in two years spent a little more than £350,000; and yet, he allowed his own daughter, the soi-disant Queen of Bohemia, to become a common beggar at the courts of the continent. He was brought up in penury, and was cursed with an inheritance of unmerited wealth; and, like every one in the same position, he, in one moment squandered a pound, and, in the next moment, higgled about a penny. But, except in ways that we shall touch on hereafter, he did not care to squander his pounds in Ireland. From the very beginning of his reign his Irish Deputy is calling for money, and from the very beginning of his reign, the King sends it in such dribblets that Chichester at last loses patience, and says that he had rather get no money at all. In June of 1605, Sir Arthur had not £20 in the treasury, and at that very time the King owed the soldiers, for arrears of pay, as much as £40,000. The soldiers are described as having lost all military seeming, their uniforms being worn out, and only beggarly rags being at hand to replace them. Further on Chichester is afraid that the warriors will have to go naked, and live upon nothing; and further on still the Lord Deputy, after receiving £12,000 from England has, in order to keep the soldiers *in life in some fashion*, to borrow £4,000 more. This recourse of Chichester to the raising of loans supplies a very entertaining comic touch to the Calendar. To keep up the army the Lord Deputy has, in fact, to become a rather fine specimen of a sponge. And his creditors are such unexpected people! In page 534, we have “a docquet of borrowed money for the army since the 1st of July, 1606;” and in the list of lenders we find the names of the Earl of Tyrone, one Francton a printer, and one Dromgold a haberdasher! But that is not the climax. Sir Arthur Chichester, Lord Deputy of Ireland, went to Ulster on a grand Government visitation. The inhabitants of the north looked upon the Vice-royal pageant with barbaric awe. How these same inhabitants would have winked and giggled had they been in possession of the truth! Before Sir Arthur could leave Dublin, he had to go around, borrowing sixpence

from his shoemaker, and twopence from his tailor, to enable him to pay his travelling expenses !\*

These hardships of the Lord Deputies have one beneficial effect. They make their excellencies angry, and in their anger their excellencies blab out how the Irish money is wasted. As early as November 20th, 1603, Carey tells Cecil that his Majesty is giving the money away so bountifully that, if a change does not take place, he, Sir George, will have very little trouble in collecting the revenue. On October 2nd, 1605, Chichester informs Salisbury that the "multitude of pensioners, patentees, and other extraordinary entertainments" is eating up his Majesty's money ; and he adds grimly, that, if he gets authority to do so, he will not be long in putting a stop to the plunder. But he did not get the authority ; and he himself on maturer consideration had to admit that the number of the pensioners was too great to make it politically safe to disturb them. He only asked that the number be not increased ; but he asked in vain. On the 29th October, 1605, he writes to Cecil, with a disgust which he does not try to disguise, that "every passage that comes brings new letters from his Majesty for pensions or other gifts." It is, however, reserved for the King himself to supply us with the crowning revelation. On the 24th April, 1606, his Majesty writes to Sir Arthur Chichester. He gives the Lord Deputy various directions for lessening the royal expenses. Among other things, there is an ill custom in Ireland that he for the future prohibits. Henceforward when a pensioner dies, let his pension be given to some other deserving servitor. But the "ill custom" is now brought to an end. And what was the "ill custom" ? "*Pensioners, when they grow old, dispose of their pensions to younger persons, whereby seldom any become void !*" Was there ever a man to deny that the Muse of History is, when one comes to know her, the funniest muse of all ! The fierce fancy of Swift found nothing in Liliput equal to that fact immortalized by the pen of King James ; but no one who understood Gulliver can, even when laughing at the fun on the surface, help seeing and weeping as he sees, the fierce grim truth which the surface reveals. And no one who reads the royal words we have quoted can, even while laughing over the venerable pensioners, help seeing and weeping as he sees, the unhappy land that paid the pensions, and that paid along with them, as everlasting curses on them and their possessors, her blood and tears.

And if the money was given away lavishly, still more

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\* Sir Jeffrey Fenton to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 536.

lavishly were the lands given away. Upon this subject it is unnecessary to speak at any great length. It is notorious that James I. disposed of the lands of the Irish without a semblance or pretence to a semblance of shame. And if it were not notorious, it would be made so by this Calendar. The King's conduct in this matter was, the Calendar tells us, such as to scandalize even his Irish executive. Davys says the land is disposed of by his Majesty as prodigally and carelessly as if it were barren as Greenland, whereas, says Sir John, it is as fertile as Essex.\* Carey has conscientious scruples about remaining in Ireland; for, while he is there, his whole time is consumed in ministering to the King's mania for bestowing estates.† Chichester complains that as his Majesty gets older, he gets more bountiful in bestowing his lands; and that his Majesty does these things with such a majestic carelessness, that he sometimes, forgetting his former favours, bestows the same property on two different persons.‡ The King was certainly extremely generous. He gives a Mr. John Wakeman, "in regard of a sum of money to be paid by the King's order to an ancient servitor in Scotland," land to the clear yearly value of £100, without rent, duty, or service of any kind, except some titular acknowledgment such as a rose.§ With one stroke of his pen he bestows on his "cousin," the Earl of Ormond, the monasteries of Jeripoint and Kilcoole and Leix, and the friaries of Callan, Carrick, Thurles, and Tullaghphelim, and the temporal lands to them all belonging.|| Of course, however much they might object to the King's prodigality in disbursing what they supposed to belong to themselves, the King's officers could not avoid occasionally following the royal example. Chichester gives a whole townland in freehold for ever, at 12d. per annum rent, to Mr. Denis O'Mullan, "for spying and guiding in the late rebellion;"¶ a specimen of the kind of service by which the ancestors of many Irish landlords won the power of mounting on horseback and riding — home.

But famine, pestilence, the cessing of soldiers, the rapacity of the chiefs, the corruption of the coinage, the wholesale bestowal of lands and money on rogues and spies and panders, do not exhaust the list of items which stand in Ireland's account against James I. With all these there was abso-

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\* Mr. Davys, Solicitor General of Ireland, to Cecil, p. 112.

† Carey to Cranbourne, p. 202.

‡ Chichester to Salisbury, p. 295.

§ The King to the Earl of Devonshire, p. 104.

|| Sir G. Carey to any of his Majesty's Council, p. 210.

¶ Lord Deputy and Council to the Lords, p. 321.

lute insecurity of property and life. In the first year of the King's reign, orders were given to disband and discharge 4,000 soldiers at Michaelmas. Sir George Carey, writing on the subject in the September of that year, looks forward to Michaelmas with considerable alarm. He prays the King to find some foreign employment for the 4,000 warriors, and, at all events, the moment they are discharged, to take them out of Ireland. "For," says Sir George, "here will they live upon spoil and to do mischiefs; labour will they never and rob will they still."\* But James I. did not want soldiers; and, for any of his Majesty's subjects who happened to be robbers, there was no place so suitable as Ireland. The 4,000 were discharged and remained in the land of their adoption. Between them and the undischarged soldiers and the provost-marshals—of whom by and by—an Irishman found it a rather a nice thing to keep his life. He found it a much nicer thing to keep his lands. Here is something on the subject from Sir John Davys:—"It were too long to recite the particular mischiefs; but touching the escheator, he hath a deputy in almost every county. These deputies make a suggestion that they are able to find many titles for the King in their several counties; and thereupon, desire to have a general commission to inquire of all wards, marriages, escheats, concealments, and forfeitures, and the like. If this commission were well executed or returned, these were good servitors. But what do they? They retire themselves into some corner of the counties, and in some obscure village execute their commission; and there having a simple or suborned jury, find one man's land concealed, another man's lease forfeited for non-payment of rent, another man's land holden by the King, and no livery sued, and the like; this being done, they never return their commission, but send for the parties and compound with them, and so defraud the King and make a book and spoil upon the country; so that it may be conjectured by what means one that was lately an escheator clerk is now owner of as much land here as few of the lords of Ireland may compare with him."† Of course the reader sees that if the escheator's deputies were rogues the Irish who compounded with them were not much better than fools. They ought to have kept their money and let their land go. Pay as they would the land was sure to go sooner or later. This, after a little observation, was clearly perceived by Tyrone and Tyrconnel; and, acting upon that knowledge, if upon no other, the chiefs were wise in abandon-

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\* Carey to Cecil, p. 78.

† Sir John Davys to Cecil, from Castle Reban, p. 144.



ing, of their own will, what they were sure to have to abandon after a little by the will of some rogue with a turn for swearing. Their property, and the property of every Irishman in Ireland, was quite at the mercy of the escheator's clerk.

But perhaps the principal peril to life and property lay in that quarter whence they might reasonably expect protection—the law and its administration. We have already seen that against the injustices of Sir George Carey the people asked no relief, because they saw no utility in asking. Sir John Davys bears repeated testimony to their freedom from crime, to their love of justice, to their docility when justice speaks; but Sir John hints that up to his time justice had not troubled them with her speech very often. "If justice be well and roundly executed here for two or three years," he writes to Cecil, "the kingdom will grow rich and happy, and, in good faith, I think, loyal."\* Six weeks afterwards, Sir George Carey beseeches the Secretary that certain law officers be sent over, so that the people may *begin to taste of justice*.† It was nearly time to make a beginning. But when the people had tasted, it is pretty probable they did not violently like the flavour. As late as the middle of April, 1606, Chichester has to confess to Cecil that the Irish people regard the Irish executive with hate and abhorrence.‡ And even the best members of the Irish executive appear to have little merited kindlier feelings. During the Lent vacation of 1606, Sir John Davys and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas made the tour of Munster as justices of assize; and on the 4th of the following May Sir John gives Cecil a charming account of his tour. Munster, he says, had its own judicial fixed stars—one of the stars was called Brounker, of whom anon—and Sir John and his colleague were only occasional auxiliary planets. The planets in the course of their orbit came to Waterford. Sir John naively tells us what manner of legal light they diffused there. We were obliged, he says, "sometimes to threaten them (the jurors) with the Star Chamber, in order to get a verdict for the King." After reading that statement, we begin to suspect that Sir John's idea of justice, "well and roundly executed," was somewhat peculiar. Some remarks made at a later period by Sir Henry Brounker, Lord President of Munster, tend to strengthen the suspicion. Sir Henry is recounting his wonderful exploits in the way of persecuting the Catholics. He has deposed mayors,

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\* Sir J. Davys to Cecil, p. 155.

† Sir George Carey to Cecil, p. 163.

‡ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 451.

§ Observations made by Sir John Davys, Attorney of Ireland, after a journey made by him in Munster, p. 465.

forced lawyers to go to church, hunted priests, hanged many "fat ones" lately, and done numberless other things that prove him to be a man of very strong character. In fact, he says, winding up, "the judges are weary of my company, seeing I disappoint their harvest." The judges (one of whom was Davys) must certainly have been disgusted to find their sport so effectively spoiled. But then their lordships should remember that Sir Henry was practising on his own preserves.

Illustrative of the abstract principles of justice which guided the Irish lawyers of James I., the Calendar supplies us with several samples of the manner in which these principles were applied. We can refer only to two. One of these we have glanced at already. For the reader's sake we are glad that its chronicler is Sir John Davys; he shall speak of it in his own graceful way. The quotation is rather lengthy; but the sole unpleasantness about it is the burthen of its transcription, and that falls on ourselves. Sir John is continuing his narrative of the planetary tour in Munster referred to above; the story has got as far as Limerick. He then goes on to say:—

We began the session of the county of Limerick a day or two before my Lord President's arrival there. Among other malefactors, one Downing, who had been a lieutenant in the late wars, and dwelt not far from Limerick, was indicted for murder, on the procurement of my Lord of Thomond; and the case stood thus:—Downing having obtained a commission from my Lord President of Munster to execute by martial law vagabonds and masterless men,\* and such as had borne arms in the late war, it happened that an idiot fool belonging to my Lord of Thomond, with another of the same quality, that followed Sir John M'Nemara, a Knight of Thomond, came straggling into the village where Downing dwelt; he, meeting with them on a Sunday morning, took them and immediately hanged them both. My Lord of Thomond assuring himself that Downing knew the idiot, and knew he belonged to him (for he was a notorious fool known to all the country), and that therefore he did execute the poor creature maliciously, caused an indictment of wilful murder to be exhibited against him before my Lord President came to the town; upon this my Lord President conceived some unkindness, because, having received his authority from him, and the fact being done within his province, he expected that my Lord of Thomond should first have acquainted him with the matter before he had proceeded in this manner. Notwithstanding, the bill was found, and we proceeded to trial, but with this protestation—that we would not call the authority in question, but allow it him as a justification in law; but we would examine whether he had exceeded his authority maliciously or no, pronouncing this withal, that if he knew him to be a natural idiot, or knew him to belong to

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\* That is to say, Downing was a provost-marshal. There were as many of these in Ireland as the executive desired. Chichester, however, wished to be systematic. February 26, 1606, he advises one for each shire. They are to be selected from among the discharged captains.

my Lord of Thomond, he had transgressed his commission maliciously, and consequently had committed murder. We chose the most indifferent jury we could to try the prisoner, who was found guilty upon some evidence that was given that he knew the idiot, and knew him to belong to my Lord of Thomond. Upon the giving up the verdict some few words of passion and heat passed between my Lord President and the Earl. . . . But, in the meantime, we for our parts, though the fact was foul, and though our provost-marshals are sometimes too nimble and too rash in executing their commissions, so that it were not amiss if one or two of them did smart for it and were made an example to all the rest, yet because we would not utterly discountenance the martial law, and because Downing had been a tall soldier, we thought good to reprieve him, to the end my Lord Deputy may grant him his Majesty's pardon if it so please his lordship.

When a story is well told we can pardon some want of truth in the teller. We shall not therefore make much of Sir John's suppression of two serious particulars, first, that the idiot at the very time he was seized by Downing had a pass, and, second, that the most of Downing's jury were English.\* But taking the story as it is told by Sir John, it is a pretty story and a suggestive one. The reader sees that Downing's authority to hang any one whom it could not be proved that he personally knew, was unquestioned; that if he merely hanged Peter in mistake for Paul it was no harm; and that, if he strung up every stranger that entered his district he was only fulfilling a sacred mission. And the reader sees, moreover, that his having been a tall soldier in the late wars not only got him a pension,† but covered any number of his sins. And, of course, the reader knows that Downing was pardoned. But perhaps there is an interesting fact which the reader either does not know or does not remember—the fact, namely, that this Lord President of Munster, who gave Downing his commission, and would not let Downing be punished, is that very same Sir Henry Brounker whom we found further back hanging the “fat ones,” and interfering materially with the sport of the judges. We have already expressed our admiration of the intense earnestness with which Sir Henry pursues his pleasures. He would not lose a hanging for £1,000.§ But it is a beautiful trait in his character, that for a fellow-sportsman in difficulties he can be so admirably heroic as when the blood-cup is at his lips to dash it away.

One other instance of the administration of justice in Ireland had not the good fortune of being reported by Davys. It is

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\* The Earl of Thomond to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 444.

† List of Pensioners, p. 427.

§ A copy of a letter from my Lord President of Munster, p. 551.

the case of Mead, the recorder of Cork. In the beginning of James's reign there was some disturbance in the southern capital, which was supposed to have been caused by the conduct of Mead. Mead was forthwith charged with treason. He was indicted at Youghal, but we are told that, were it not for the industry of the Commissioners and others, the indictment would not have been found. The Lord Deputy and Council, fearing that they would not be able to procure a conviction by an Irish jury, advise that Mead be brought over for trial to England. Mead, however, was tried by a jury of the county of Cork. He was acquitted; and acquitted, though the prosecution used not only the most illegal but the most ruffianly means to ensure his conviction. Chief Justice Saxey tells the story in a letter to Cranbourne. He has been saying that the Irish ought never to be either councillors of state or ministers of justice; and he supports his view in the following fashion:—

"As appeareth," says his lordship, "by an unjust acquittal of a notable Irish traitor, the recorder of Cork, notwithstanding such violent and unlawful courses were taken, as well upon his indictment as upon his arraignment, as no precedent of former times can warrant. For the grand jury were severally dealt with, every man by himself, giving his own verdict, not knowing the mind of his fellows. And upon his arraignment the evidence against the prisoner was enforced to the jury by the deposition, *viva voce*, in open court, of them that were his judges upon his trial, wherein they were the more eager for that they had undertaken the conviction of the party. But all would not serve."\*

Further on we are told that the executive have resolved upon prosecuting the jury. But that course was not eventually taken. It would have entailed vast expense, which the King would not like, and would probably have made the previous disgrace worse by ending in failure. Besides, there was a better way of handling the jury. It was a way, too, which the then Lord Deputy, Sir George Carey, strongly advised. Accordingly, in April, 1604, he announces to Cecil that he is about to bring the recalcitrant jurors into the Star Chamber, there, he says (not to try them, but) to inflict upon them some "exemplary punishment." Sir Patrick Barnewell tells us that the Star Chamber was a place where the Government made a good deal of money. From what we know of Sir George Carey's character, we can infer what inspired him to bring the Cork jurors to Dublin Castle.

Hitherto we have called upon this Calendar for informa-

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\* Chief-Justice Saxey to Viscount Cranbourne, p. 227.

tion with regard to the civil condition of Ireland. And that condition we have found to be sufficiently pitiable. But the religious condition of the country was worse. We do not think there is anywhere a more pathetic story than the story of the religious life of Ireland in the first years of James, as that story is told in the formal official documents which Dr. Russell and Mr. Prendergast have brought together. One rises from their perusal with a first idea that he has been wandering mid the ruins of an extinct Christianity and among the bones of a perished people. Dead and gone, he says, dead and gone, are that Irish religion, and that Irish race.

Adhering, as we have proposed to adhere, to the text before us, it is no part of our intention to say anything harsh of Queen Elizabeth. Nor is it necessary. It suffices to say that, whatever be our opinions of her Majesty, the opinion of her entertained by the Irish Catholics of her time was that she was a masterpiece of malignant evil. They came to regard her at last as the sphinx was regarded by the Thebans till Œdipus appeared and solved the riddle. And, as the Thebans rejoiced for the ruin of the great sea-monster, so the Irish rejoiced when the great she-dragon succumbed to death. We do not indeed lay much stress on the fact that James was "the son of a martyr," for, without saying a word to disparage the unfortunate Queen of Scots, we think it very clear that, whatever else she was, she was not much of a martyr; but we lay stress on the fact that he was the son of a mother certainly Catholic; for a good while even the Anglo-Irish officials doubted what religious policy James would favour; and that he had himself given certain indications that religion was not with him a serious subject for statesmanship, but a mere matter for amicable scholastic disputation.\* We find, accordingly, that immediately after the announcement of James's accession the Irish began to practise their religion in public, as if Elizabeth were but the ogre of a dreadful dream.

But they were soon undeceived. We do not, indeed, find the King himself formally speaking his mind to them till a much later period; but, from the very beginning, we find Mountjoy showing them that they have been premature in their rejoicings. Still neither Mountjoy nor his successor takes any course that may be termed decisive. Carey, writing to the Lords in July, 1603, tells the reason. "The Deputy and Council," he says,

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\* To clear himself of the suspicion that he was secretly coquetting with the Pope, James made Sir John Elphinstone (Lord Balmerino) perjure himself in the most flagitious manner.—See Guthrie's *Scotland*, vol. viii. p. 354, and vol. ix. p. 52.

"apply the authority of the State with as great discretion as they can, *not knowing as yet what will be his Majesty's course on the point of religion.*"\* It is not till July 4th, 1605, that, after two and a half years' cogitation, his Majesty speaks his mind. He does so in a document headed "Proclamation against Toleration in Ireland." He has been informed that some Irish thought he would tolerate popery. He declares to his loving subjects that the idea never entered the royal brain. No religion will find favour in his eyes except that which is agreeable to God's word and established by the laws of the realm. Therefore must his subjects, all and several, worship every Sunday in the Protestant temples. All priests must quit the realm before the 10th of next December; they must never return; and, after the aforesaid date, no one must give them support or shelter. But any priest who shall present himself before the Lord Deputy, conform, go to church duly and soberly, will be treated as a loyal subject, as long as he continues to give similar satisfaction. On November 13th a supplement to this proclamation appeared in the shape of a royal mandate to the citizens of Dublin. The citizens are ordered to attend on Sundays and holidays each in his own Protestant parish church; and whoever disobeys the order is to be fined and imprisoned. The order was disobeyed, and the law took its course. Before the month was ended some of the principal citizens of Dublin were mulcted in ruinous fines, and were committed to the jailers of Dublin Castle.

This conduct of the executive caused great confusion and alarm. The Catholics, however, did not as yet believe that James was serious. They made large allowances for the fright which Guy Faux's plot had just given his Majesty; but they thought it incredible that the son of Queen Mary would walk in the red tracks of her murderer. In this faith the principal recusants of the Pale drew up a petition to the Lord Deputy, asking him to suspend the execution of the King's mandate till the King, whom they believed moved by some sinister information, was better instructed. The petition was signed by 68 gentlemen of Meath, 42 of Kildare, 36 of Dublin, 36 of Louth, 26 of Westmeath, and 14 of the corporation of Naas. This petition was followed by another of a similar character, addressed to Cecil by the Lords of the Pale, Gormanstown, Trimletstone, Killene, and Howth. The immediate consequence of these petitions was that their principal authors were seized and imprisoned. Eventually, however, only Sir P. Barnewell was detained, and he was sent over to London.

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\* Deputy and Council of Ireland to the Lords, p. 66.



Chichester, and the rest of the Irish Council, insisted hotly that Sir Patrick should be signally punished. They omitted nothing which could blacken him in the eyes of the English Lords; and even Sir John Davys loads him with accusations which are little better than monstrous lies. But the English Lords were cautious; they were beginning to fear that the Irish officials went a little too fast, and that rapidity might lead to ruin. Accordingly, on 24th January, 1606, they address a private letter to Chichester. It is a letter entirely characteristic of their royal master; it breathes braggadocio coloured by cowardice. Catholicity is to be stamped out, but with prudence; priests are to be banished, but a too curious search after them is to be forborne. The principal recusants are to be arrested, but the multitude must not be startled by any general compulsion. Chichester did very well in imprisoning the merchants of Dublin, but for the present it is expedient that they be released. In replying to this letter the Lord Deputy does not attempt to conceal his chagrin; but he has to follow his English directions. Sir Patrick Barnewell was kept in London for over half a year; but he was at last, to Chichester's inexpressible annoyance, restored to liberty.

Such was the general policy pursued by the Government of James I. towards the Catholics of Ireland in the commencement of his Majesty's reign. But while they were trying to get rid of the old religion, what was the state of the new one? While the priests were hiding in the hills, what were the ministers doing? The answers which the Calendar gives to these questions are sad answers. The churches were all in ruins; the abbeys were turned into shops, session-houses, stables. The new clergy were brutally ignorant, and were often nothing better than jockeys and horseboys. Among the Protestant bishops not three could be found in anywise fitted, even in the easy Anglican way, to fill the episcopal office. The documents before us convict the "novel hierarchy" of containing in its ranks some of the most grasping and most lying of the English adventurers. The Bishop of Waterford has really four dioceses for his share of the plunder; he appropriates to his own personal profit the principal incumbencies of each; and yet he has not a scrap of learning or honesty.\* The Bishop of Limerick has the brazen effrontery to ask the King for the diocese of Dromore in addition, because, he says, these two dioceses are in convenient contiguity. But let the

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\* Sir Richard Morrison to Cranbourne, p. 197.

documents speak. On February 20th, 1604, Sir John Davys writes to Cecil:—

“First, touching the state of religion here, there are ten archbishops, and under them are, or should be, twenty bishops at least. Has perused the book of first-fruits, and finds the dowry of the church to be very great; but the Churchmen, for the most part throughout the kingdom, are mere idols and ciphers, and such as cannot read; and yet the most of those, whereof many be serving-men and horseboys, are not without two or three benefices a-piece. . . . But what is the effect of these abuses? The churches are ruined and fallen to the ground in all parts of the kingdom. There is no Divine service, no christening of children, no receiving of the sacrament, no Christian meeting or assembly—no, not once in a year; in a word, no more demonstration of religion than amongst Tartars or cannibals. Has heard of a commission appointed by the Lords of the English Council to report on the state of the Irish Church. Has heard that the bishops of the Pale are to form the Commission. Knows well that none can certify the abuses of the Church more truly than they, for some of them are party and privy to them; but doubts whether they will not deliver such a verdict as the county churchwardens are wont to do when they are visited by the archdeacon:—*omnia bene*, when the verdict should be *omnia pessime*.”

On December 30th of the same year, Saxey tells Cranbourne that the Protestant bishops of Ireland are not after Aaron, and that they are more fit to sacrifice to a calf than to intermeddle with the religion of God. They all enjoy pluralities, and retain in their hands great number of benefices without care. Of these benefices there are no incumbents, but only proctors, to take up the profits for the bishop, “leaving the poor parishioners to starve both in body and soul, because these prelates *‘non curant de ovibus.’*” Later on, Chichester, writing to Salisbury, says that “the sluggish and blockish security and ignorance of our unworthy bishops hath been the cause that this people are so misled by the doctrine of Rome;” \* and he adds, that in all the kingdom there are not three bishops worthy of the name. The notorious George Montgomery, having been appointed Bishop of Dury, Clogher, and Raphoe, was two years in office before he thought of visiting his charge, all the while taking good care to receive his rents; and Chichester thinks it probable that, if his lordship be not found, he will continue to treat Ireland, rents excepted, as a place in *partibus* all his lifetime. Immediately before, Sir Arthur is unusually candid. The Protestant clergy, he says, have excited among the Irish disgust and contempt; and, in a special manner, the Protestant bishops are untrustworthy, self-seeking liars.† And it was

\* Chichester to Salisbury, p. 346.

† The same to the same, p. 510.

to make room for such men as these that Sir Arthur would brand and banish the poor priests against whom his bitter pen, and his friend Davy's, could write nought but praise.\*

We have now before us some small means of forming a judgment of the state of Ireland in the introductory portion of the reign of James the First. Famine and plague were carrying off the people in scores. What the famine and plague chanced to spare, the judge and the provost marshal did much to account for. The men remaining were unable to keep the land from being waste and desolate. They were too weak to work; and if, with infinite pain, they sowed a crop, or reared a lamb, the crop was burned and the lamb was eaten by the English soldiers. If they had anything to sell, they had to sell it at the buyer's own price, and to take bad money for it into the bargain. They had no hope of redress by law, for the law was so one-sided, and the judges were so corrupt, that for a wronged Irishman to seek his rights in an English law court would be just as wise as it was for Rabelais' young gentleman to go to the devil for religious instruction. Their lands and money were at the mercy of the English officials, and both were given away with a munificence in the givers and a worthlessness in the receivers of which we find no proper parallel nearer in history than Caligula and his famous steed. The grand old religious buildings, which a Catholicity of a thousand years had raised, were either torn down by the soldiers, or quite as effectually surrendered to ruin by being handed over to the new apostles. The priests of a faith that had made the land prosperous and happy had nowhere to lay their heads, and the ministers of a fiction that kindled hell's fires over all the earth sat in the chair of Moses, hardly caring to conceal that their sole God was themselves, and their sole whiteness the whiteness of leprosy. The people were forbidden to practise the religion for which nevertheless they were prepared to die—though they are not heroes in the Carlyle calendar; and they were forced to listen to some holy horseboy whom God had, in very mockery, pricked on to put himself in the Protestant pulpit. Denis O'Mullan, spy and priest-setter, had wealth and honours; while the great O'Neill had to lick the dust before Mountjoy.

Now in such a state of things the people, as a matter of course, simply because they were flesh and blood, were rebellious. That they were not more rebellious resulted from the fact that their stock of flesh and blood was exceedingly small. But they were discontented; and, when-

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\* The 2nd paragraph, p. 476, "Observations made by Sir J. Davys," &c.

ever they could, they manifested their discontent. Still, they manifested it very respectfully at first; and, only when hope was dead, did they resign themselves to the silent sullenness or fierce frenzy of despair. The Calendar makes it abundantly evident that kind treatment, even bare justice, would have made the Ireland of James the First contented and loyal. But it was not the scheme of her rulers to treat her kindly or to give her justice. From beginning to end of the Calendar the members of the Irish Government—Sir John Davys excepted—aver repeatedly that the one way of ruling Ireland is to put her beyond the necessity of rule. While Mountjoy lived he was the Irish dictator, and he gives us a specimen of his feeling in his notable declaration about coining his cannon. When Mountjoy is dead and Chichester is virtually in his vacant place, Sir Arthur tells us that the Irish are as nettles, which sting by being tenderly touched, but by hard griping will cause less annoyance. And lest there should be a doubt as to how he handles his nettles, Sir Arthur adds that before his time the Irish were dandled and pleased, but that he is no nurse-maid, and is Lord Deputy. Sir Arthur's notions of dandling and pleasure were a little peculiar. But since he considered that the treatment of Ireland in the time of Elizabeth was meant to give the Irish amusement, we are at no loss to divine what treatment they got when Sir Arthur meant their correction.

But had the modern Solomon himself no spare wisdom for his loving realm of Ireland? No one who knows that monarch's history will accuse him of consistency in anything but the prate of prerogative, the pomp of pedantry, and the pursuit of pleasure. One of his best panegyrists is found to say of him that he had "power without dignity, learning without utility, craft without wisdom, and religion without morality." Loud as he talked, and wise as he esteemed himself, he was nothing better than a coward and a dupe.\* He had no fixity of principle and no force of will; was at the mercy of every foreigner that talked to threaten, and every favourite that talked to praise. We have not, therefore, expected to find in this Calendar a royal policy for Ireland with signs about it of definite thought and sustained purpose. But we have tried hard to discover if his Majesty had any Irish idea at all.

\* M. de Rapin Thoyars (*Hist. d'Angleterre*, tom. vii.) quotes an epigram current in France in the time of James. We give it with its translation:—

Tandis qu'Elizabeth fut roi  
L'Anglais fut d'Espagne l'effroi.  
Maintenant, devise et caquette  
Régi par la Reine Jacquette.

While King Elizabeth did reign,  
At England's voice did shudder Spain.  
The sceptre now Queen Jemmy sways,  
And England cackles and obeys.

And we find that he had. The medicine which his Majesty prescribed for the ailments of Ireland was compounded of four ingredients. First, a learned ministry was to be sent to Ireland, of which a sample was Mr. George Montgomery. Second, all the priests were to be banished and all the people were to worship in the Protestant churches. Third, the Irish judges should get, in addition to their salaries, twenty marks a year to buy twelve yards of cloth and to pay their tailors for the construction of suitable judicial robes. Fourth, Ireland was to be planted or colonized by his Majesty's countrymen of the realm of Scotland. On the first two ingredients we have spoken at some length already, and the third requires no explanation. We shall, therefore, ask the Calendar to speak on the fourth alone.

The project of planting Ireland with aliens was not novel. Under another name it had been entertained and acted upon for years before. Every one has heard of the undertakers. We have a rather full account of them and of their defection given in the Calendar by Chief Justice Saxey. They received, he says, large tracts of land from Queen Elizabeth, with the obligation of peopling these lands with English tenants alone. These tenants, too, were to be of various classes, as farmers, freeholders, copyholders for life, and cottagers; and each was to have from the undertaker a quantity of land proportioned to his condition. Three main benefits were expected by her Majesty from this arrangement: the presence of the English tenants would force the Irish either to emigrate or die; the colonists would form an ever-ready and ever-willing permanent garrison; and a jury could be always found who, if the Government wanted a verdict, would patriotically sacrifice their conscience to their country. But Saxey tells us that the Queen's expectations were not realized. The undertakers did not stick to their bargain. Whether it was that they pitied the poor Irish, or whether it was that they distrusted their own countrymen, they preferred to have the natives for tenants. Saxey tells us that, whereas the undertakers of Munster ought to be able to supply 600 English foot and 300 English horse at a moment's notice, there were not, at the time he wrote, on all the estates of Munster, ten Englishmen fit for service. And we learn from a letter of Carey's,\* and from a letter of the Irish Council,† that the undertakers broke their compact in another way. Whereas they should reside

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\* Carey to Cecil, p. 108.

† Lord Deputy and Council of Ireland to the Lords of his Majesty's Privy Council, p. 114.

in Ireland, each in guardianship of his garrison, they lived in England and visited their Irish property only for the purpose of collecting their rents. They were in advance of their age. They were the absentees of an earlier spring.

But, notwithstanding its initial failure, the system of undertaking, under the name of planting, was a great favourite with the officials of James the First. The Irish were regarded either as the Canaanites were regarded by the children of Israel, or as the Choctaws were regarded by the early American settlers. It was agreed upon by all, that only in the extinction of the natives could the colonists find security. On the 26th Marth, 1603, two days after the King's accession, Sir Charles Wilmott thanks Carew for getting him the custodian of Dunboye, and gaily assures him that he will make "a very brave plantation there;" and on the 15th of April following, Sir Henry Docwra, writing to Cecil, thinks that one way, and probably the only way of rendering the condition of Ulster more satisfactory, would be his Majesty's sending over some Scots to people that province. On June 13th, 1605, we have Captain Edward Blayney inviting his "verie worthy frende," Mr. Thomas Wintoun, to see him in Ireland, and entreating him to "import some of his starling and Lowe Country naves;" and on September 30th of the same year the Deputy and Council recommend the planting of some Scots at Coleraine. In the following December, we have, among the State Papers, "An Advice concerning the Plantation of Upper and Lower Ormond," in the course of which advice the writer prays that the planting commission be extended to Limerick, for, there, he assures his correspondent, much escheated land may be found. On June 14th, 1606, Chichester, writing to Salisbury, recommends Mr. Hamilton, who has already a patent of the lands of Upper Clandeboy and Great Ardes, as a person worthy of especial countenance in his efforts to plant them. On July 27th, Sir Anthony Sentleger recommends the wisdom of Salisbury, to people Ireland with well-affected English persons; and on the following 22nd of August, the Earl of Thomond assures Cecil that he daily endeavours to make a plantation in his own county; and "would to God," he adds, with pious patriotism, "would to God that all my neighbours did the same."

These aspirations of his "Servitors" fall in nicely with his Majesty's views. We are not aware that he had as yet determined on that notable scheme which resulted in the "Plantation of Ulster;" but his thoughts were fast turning in that direction. Plantation, indeed, appears to have been an old favourite with his Majesty. He had tried it in the Western



Highlands, when he was only King of Scotland. That experiment, however, was not quite successful, most of the gentlemen adventurers whom he sent to supplant the Gael being disposed of by the claymore in very effective fashion; but it is with measures as it is with men, initial failure is wisely regarded as a prophetic sign of ultimate success. And so we find James hopefully applying his scheme to Ireland. On the 30th of last April, the royal resolve is intimated in a letter from the Lords of the Privy Council. The concluding paragraph of the letter as found in the Calendar stands thus:—"Lastly, whereas his Majesty, for the better quietness of the middle shires between England and Scotland, thinks it convenient to have some families, especially of the surname of Græmes, transported from thence into Ireland, they have thought it good to advertise his Lordship of it, and to require him to advise with the Council how the same families might be conveniently dispersed, and what Lords or persons would be willing to entertain them."\* It will throw some light on the line of thought which the noble writers of that letter were really following, if we mention that the paragraph immediately preceding the one we have quoted, speaks of the starving Irish who, on their way to Spain or France or Flanders, were forced to stop awhile in London, to be what his Majesty calls an eyesore to his kingdom of England, and to disturb his English subjects by coming 'twixt the wind and their nobility.

The project so intimated by the London Council was not received by Chichester and his colleagues with the avidity which would be naturally expected. They reply that they will do their best, but that the matter is one for very grave consideration. Secretary Fenton, they hope, will find some place suitable to the Græmes; but they must guard against creating inconveniences in the body of the kingdom. We are at first surprised to find the Irish Executive so cold in welcoming his Majesty's order for the application of their own favourite scheme. But a little further on in the Calendar our surprise ceases. It turns out that the King's project was a project for turning Ireland into a convenient Botany Bay. The Græmes were every soul of them rogues and murderers, holding their lives only by the King's mercy. Mosstroopers euphemism styles them, but they were really the vulgarest of vulgar cowstealers, burglars, highwaymen, who, despite the varnishing that Scott has given them, were only an older species of the ruffian bush-rangers of New Holland. The men with whom James would favour Ireland were men whom the poor people of Cumberland

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\* Lords of the Council to Sir Arthur Chichester, &c., p. 462.

and Westmorland had good reason to abominate. And how they did abominate these Græmes! They subscribed large sums of money to have the clan transported; they went about congratulating one another, when news came, that the transportation was arranged; and they prayed King James not to let the robbing gang return to the borders any more. We can therefore easily understand Chichester's coolness. Such men as the Græmes were no very acceptable addition to the Lord Deputy's subjects. Men who had been brought up to reiving and raiding were not likely to prove eminent exemplars of obedience to the law. Men whose whole lives had been spent in the saddle were not likely to settle down suddenly and seriously to tilling of the soil. The Græmes, instead of forming a new garrison, were far more likely to require new gibbets. But Chichester was too much of a courtier to give any opposition to the will of his King. Accordingly we find that in a very short time he satisfactorily fulfilled the command of the Council. Under the date of September 12th, 1606, the Calendar gives us "Articles of Agreement touching the Transportation and Transplantation of the Græmes, &c., concluded upon between the Bishop of Carlisle, &c., on the one part, and Sir Ralph Sedley on the other." Of these articles we need only say, that they virtually give all Roscommon to the border rogues and pay them for taking it. The last the Calendar says of the Græmes is, that some of them have arrived in Dublin; that Sir Arthur Chichester has deputed Sir Oliver Lambert, Sir George Fullerton, and Sir Jeffrey Fenton to see that Sedley treats them well; and that as the Calendar closes the Græmes are attended to in the capital of Ireland with all the respect due to such distinguished strangers. And all the while from all quarters of the land the wails of the starving Irish, of whom even Chichester has to testify that they steal only from want of sustenance,\* were borne on every breeze!

The evidence which we proposed to ourselves to place before the reader in the present article closes here. It must be borne in mind, however, that we have referred only to the prominent subjects of which the Calendar speaks, and that it speaks of many other subjects not quite so prominent, but to the full as interesting. The writer of the History of Ireland will often find in these latter little lines of countenance and involuntary tricks of expression, signs of character elsewhere hidden under official immobility; and he will reckon it his duty not to leave these signs unknown to his readers. But

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\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 178.

we have been tracing a sketch, and have not been writing a history. Besides, our limits necessitated selection; and we selected what we thought the reader would like best as bearing most directly on the leading historical controversy of our time. Mr. Froude has systematically tried to show that Ireland has been on the whole the author of her own misfortunes; that England has never treated Ireland cruelly except when cruelty was a political necessity; and that (which is true on Mr. Froude's principles) the great error of English policy towards Ireland was its not carrying cruelty out to the vanishing point of extermination. We have yet to deal with Mr. Froude; but we confess that in the selections we have made from the Calendar we had an eye to his last performances. We have tried to make the documents in the book before us explain two things with regard to the period in which they were written—(1) the causes of Ireland's misery at the time; and (2) the Irish policy which the then English Government followed. Upon the first point, after the evidence which we have adduced, we see no room for diversity of opinion. If the Calendar proves anything at all, it proves that the misery of Ireland in the early part of the reign of James the First was due to the English and the representatives of the English who were on her soil. Nor on the second point can opinion be very divided. The policy pursued by James I., if policy it can be called, was under the circumstances the worst and the absurdest possible.

When James succeeded to the sovereignty of Ireland he required no very deep reflection to discover how that country should thenceforth be ruled. He entered upon the government of it under circumstances which seem to us to have been peculiarly favourable. The ignorance of Ireland's character, which may be fairly advanced in defence of his predecessors' Irish policy, did not descend to James. Elizabeth had solved a problem for him whose solution would have been worth a thousand counsellors to a wise king. The problem was, "Can these Irish be made to embrace Protestantism?" and fifty years of experiment, unsparing and exhaustive, answered unmistakably, No! The dead Queen had proved for her successor that, in these Irish, life and Protestantism could not co-exist. And the Queen had done more for her loving cousin; she had broken down the sole barrier which could have restricted James's perfect freedom to select his own policy for Ireland. That barrier was the Irish nation. Elizabeth had simply rendered it helpless. It was once announced to her Majesty that now she had nothing to rule over in Ireland but carcasses and ashes. That was never quite true literally; but in the figure

it was true as Gospel after Kinsale. After Kinsale, therefore, two things were evident—that the Irish could be easily got rid of, and that they could not be got to embrace the Protestant religion. If James wished to banish the Irish or to murder them, the task was easy. If he wished to leave them where they were, and to make them conform, the task was impossible.

If, therefore, James sought a reasonable policy for Ireland, he had not far to seek. Two were at hand—Freedom, principally Religious Freedom, or Extermination. Which of these he would take obviously depended upon his own religious views. But one of these he should take if he wanted to rule Ireland peaceably. To try to convert the Irish was only a waste of time. It was ignoring the invaluable Elizabethan experiment. It was producing and perpetuating Irish disloyalty. A disobedient people is not a loyal people; people who disobey their King in religious matters are not likely to be very obedient to him in matters secular; and it was as certain as proof could make it that in religious matters the Irish people would not show King James the smallest iota of obedience. His course then, if he wanted Ireland to be inhabited by a loyal population, was either to let its present inhabitants practise their own selected religion, or to put its present inhabitants, all and several, out of it—the speedier the means the safer—and to fill their places with a more accommodating race. We believe that occasionally there is “falsehood” in political “extremes.” But we believe, too, that in politics the “golden mean,” as they call it, is very often the refuge of mediocrities. In James’s case, at all events, the matter was clear. He had his two courses, with never a third, before him. He should either give the Irish freedom in their own land or send them to seek it elsewhere. A man with a clear head, determined will, and with a fixed resolve to have the inhabitants of Ireland Protestant; a great, bad man, like Prince Bismarck, would have taken the second course. He would have done what Elizabeth would have done—in youth, had she known the Irish—in old age did not her dauntless courage begin to desert her as the facts of the future began to draw near. A man of parts, firm will, reliance on God, and too respectful of his own conscience to disrespect the conscience of another, would have bid justice be done though the skies should fall.

Now, that James was a lover of bloodshed we do not believe. He was mean, sensual, irreligious, dishonest; but that he had anything of Domitian about him is, we think, untrue. Neither can we regard James as a zealot for Protestantism. We even

think it probable that he had a kind of sneaking secret regard for the faith of his mother; but that he was moved neither by any intense love for the Protestants, nor by any intense hate of the Catholics, is, we think, certain. The fact is, that, except in the matter of tobacco and witches, James had no strong conviction whatever. All the accounts that have come to us of his personal character represent him as one of those men who never can quite make up their minds, and never can quite get up the fixedness required for faith. We infer, that if Ireland were under the personal government of James, there would have been no serious persecution of the Catholics. Not from love of them, but from pure carelessness about their religion, assisted by love of his own ease, he would have let them alone. As long, at all events, as he had money enough to spend upon cock-fights and courtesans, they would not have much to fear. Probably he would, to air his prerogative, give them occasionally some little annoyance; and their bishops he would be sure to bore now and then with very lengthy but very harmless theological monologues. But that the poor fat fool would of himself be a persecutor is simply incredible.

But, speaking only of the years to which this Calendar refers (though the same is true of the entire reign), Ireland was not governed by James the First; it was governed by the English garrison that held it, not so much for James as for themselves. The King hardly thought of Ireland as a part, and, after all, not a very distant part, of his kingdom. It was to his mind a remote province where money could be raised, lands given away, and dangerous characters sent to develope at leisure. And his Majesty's idea of Ireland was not very unlike that entertained by his Majesty's Privy Council. Ireland, the Council thought, would never become a proper subject whereon to engage the hereditary wisdom of English legislators, until it was peopled by Englishmen alone; and for the accomplishment of that desirable issue they had to wait till the garrison had fulfilled its mission. To the English garrison, then, it may be said broadly, the government of Ireland was entirely committed. That garrison practically meant the Lord Deputy of the time; and, for three years of the three and a half with which we are concerned, it meant, our Calendar tells us, Lord Mountjoy. Mountjoy's policy we know already; Chichester's we know too. We have had some evidence as to Sir Henry Brounker's, Sir George Carey's, and Sir Jeffrey Fenton's. In fact we are in a position to know what was the policy of the garrison in the first years of James's reign. And there can be no doubt about it, that the men

who formed that garrison were fully and fixedly resolved upon the policy, pure and simple, of extermination. Nor can we pay them the compliment of allowing that their motive was religious, that they wanted Ireland for the professors of a faith which they considered true. They wanted Ireland for themselves. The Irish were the owners of the soil, and as such were in the way; for that reason the Irish should go. Cato was not more intensely and persistently bent upon the destruction of Carthage than were the members of James's English garrison upon the utter expulsion or utter extinction of the Irish race. We should be sorry to say that the English policy in Ireland has always been directed to the same end. We should be still more sorry to say that the English people themselves have always prompted and patronized such a policy. Most of all should we be sorry to say that even now the English people would prefer such a policy to any other. We believe that for the one brutal blockhead who can chuckle over the yearly decrease of the population of Ireland, there are one hundred Englishmen who see in the necessitated emigration of the Irish people one of the greatest losses, as well as one of the greatest dangers to the British empire, and who deplore the causes, whether of the present or of the past, which make it only too likely that if the Irish are going with a vengeance they will try to return with abundance of the same commodity. Still, however just be the English people of these times, the Calendar makes it evident that the Englishmen who ruled Ireland for James the First made up their minds that in one way or other, by banishment, or by starvation, or by the sword, the Irish then in Ireland would have to disappear. We say nothing of the malicious delight with which they contemplated this extinction of a people. We only put down the fact that in their intent, determinate and fixed, the people was doomed.

But why was not the purpose realized? Of course it is to the providence of God that the result is in the first instance due. And though often in the events of history traces of the Divine interference are difficult to discover, they are not difficult to discover here. It was a clear mercy to both peoples to preserve the weaker in its ancient home. It was well for the Irish to be still possessors of the old isle, to whose very soil there clung the sacred and strengthening memories of a thousand years. It was well for the English to have beside them that strange, unselfish people whose whole life showed what England wanted so sadly to see—faith which was never conquered by sense or sensuality, loyalty which was never traitor to the cause of the absent King, courage which had



never succumbed to a little hunger or a little burning, and a grand contentedness of heart which made merry in the sunshine, and was not saddened in the storm. But, under the providence of God, the Irish Executive were deterred from realizing their purpose by two circumstances. One was that these men were mediocrities, and that, though mediocrities might resolve upon a policy of extermination, it requires, as long as public opinion lasts, something different from mediocrity to carry such a policy through. The influence of public opinion is often denied, but it is denied without reason. It often saves many an oppressed province, and it often saves many a collier's wife. The wastes of the province will be seen by the nations, and the black-eyes of the collier's wife will not escape neighbourly observation. But if either Sir Arthur Chichester or Bill the collier could only get his "impediment" out of the reach of restriction for a while—up, say, in a Ring of Saturn or a Field of Mars,—ah! how soon and silently, even to the satisfying of Mr. Carlyle, would the thing be done!

But the other cause which prevented Mountjoy and Mountjoy's successor from attempting directly (we have seen that indirectly they did their best) to rid Ireland of its native population was much more efficacious. Without it, too, we do not think that public opinion would have been equal or nearly equal to saving the Irish. This second cause was the state of affairs in England and on the Continent. In England the King's position was, even a year after his accession, extremely critical. On the Continent the English interests were not prospering. The Catholic powers, with the sanction of the Pope—we may say with his encouragement—were manifesting some soreness about the position of the Catholics of England. Great fear possessed all the kingdom that the Spaniards had not given up the idea of invading Britain; and it was, not unwisely, judged that there might not be always a hurricane at hand to win a victory for the British fleet. Our Calendar shows that this fear of a Spanish invasion was especially rife and strong among the members of the Irish Executive. They thought they had special reasons for being afraid. It was reported that the expected Spanish expedition would aim at the seizure of Ireland, and the servitors of Mountjoy could not expect much mercy from the soldiers of the orthodox King, the more especially as, under the Spanish banners and clad in Spanish mail, were many of those very Irish whose lands the garrison had wrenched away. In whatever way the garrison argued, this much our Calendar makes certain, that the state of affairs abroad saved the inhabitants of Ireland. We wish the reader to remember all along that these men were, like

the King, mediocrities, and that it was their mediocrity which made them so appreciative of danger. Had they been great bad men, they would, with Cromwell's dauntless impudence, have slaughtered the Irish, and if necessary flung Irish heads into the Catholic courts of Europe. But they were only bad men of the middling sort. They were certainly not after the heart of God; they were just as certainly not after the heart of the devil. They were selfish men to the backbone; and selfish men are invariably cowards. Their cowardice saved Ireland.

What a difference it would have made in the subsequent history of the Empire if James himself had tried to govern Ireland, and tried, in his mediocre way, to do a little good for the Irish people! He might, for instance, have convoked an Irish Parliament with full freedom of debate and full power of legislation. Sir John Davys, in his earliest Irish letter, written before his fellow-officials had taught him his lesson, looks to such a parliament as one of the first means of turning Ireland into a commonwealth from being a common misery. But James the First held parliaments useless, unless it was to hear himself speechify; and a sea-voyage, even across St. George's Channel, was as hateful to him as were sucking-pigs. Kindly treatment of the Irish, even on a small scale, would have done much to move them, with their memories of Queen Elizabeth; they were just then in a position to appreciate the smallest act of friendliness very keenly; but the infamous Somerset and his more infamous paramour had the royal treasures—blood-drops wrung from the heart of Ireland—lavished for their luxury; the King himself drank and dribbled,\* gabbled and gormandized, stuttered and swore and slept, and the famine-stricken people of Ireland were left to die! Religious freedom would have done most of all, depriving Irish disloyalty of its strongest sanction and its sharpest sting; but James the First, who knew little of any religion and valued none, yet sat among the doctors and solved doubts, ordered the burning of witches, and permitted the banning of priests as if he were, in his own ridiculous person, the latest and loftiest manifestation of the Divine!

We are well aware that James's position was not without its difficulties. The anti-Catholic and anti-Irish parties in his kingdom were very strong. It would be hard for him to favour either Ireland or Catholicity without giving great

\* "His tongue was too large for his mouth, which ever made him speak full in the mouth, and made him drink very uncomely, as if catching his drink which came out into the cup, on each side of his mouth."—Balfour's "Annals," ap. Guthrie, vol. ix. 142.

offence to many who would be only too ready to take him at a disadvantage. Still, this is no defence of James. Justice to Ireland, and freedom to the Catholic religion would have been, not only his honestest, but his safest policy. His Spanish troubles, and his Irish troubles would then, in all likelihood, have had no existence. Nor do we think he would have been in serious danger from England or Scotland. It has always appeared to our minds simply impossible for either one country or the other to have become really Protestant in fifty years. Putting aside the large number of the nobility and gentry who, both in England and Scotland, clung on in despite of all to the old Faith, and made no secret of their fidelity, it seems to us a certainty that, not only was the heart of the nation Catholic, even in the times of James the First, but that many of those noblemen who publicly professed Protestantism at that time, nay, many even of those who pricked on the King to persecute the Catholics, did so, in some cases to save the property which they had inherited from their fathers, in some cases to save the property which they had wrung from the monks. But if James had ensured to them the permanent peaceful possession of their lands; if he assured the nation that he himself desired the past to be passed and forgotten; and if he proclaimed that henceforth no man should, either in person or fortune, suffer for his religion, we have no doubt whatever that, after nine days of unusual clamour among the clergy, and unusual hesitation among the laity, James would have had to support him both the mass of the people and the mass of the nobility. In any case he would have gathered round him the hearts and hands of that gallant people—who, even when he slept with his sins about him, forgot his worthlessness, and fought still on for his worthless progeny; who, when they had a man like Montrose to lead them, alone brought victory to his worthless son, and who owe to the leadership of his worthless grandson the bitterest memory of their bitter past. And with all Ireland, strong and united, aiding the Cavaliers—if it came to that—there would have been no disgrace at Naseby, and no murder at Whitehall.

But "*quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*" That lying, lustful line of Stuarts was doomed, and God Almighty marked it with utter imbecility. A Pretender, and the father of Pretenders, James the First lived and died. Verse is generally exaggerative, but there is no exaggeration in the lines of Churchill, descriptive of that "wisest fool in Europe," the "Modern Solomon"—

False friend, false son, false father, and false King,  
False wit, false statesman, and false everything.

It were very well if the evil that he did did not survive him ; but both to England and to Ireland he left a legacy of woes. For England, he left that disastrous civil strife which spilled the blood of his unhappy son, and which was never quite ended till duplicity and debauchery extinguished the Stuarts. In Ireland he fixed and established that fatal policy which has made the loyalest people of the earth disloyal, and the warmest-hearted people of the earth full of rancour and revenge. Better times, indeed, we live in ; and with the more genial season, the better products of the Irish nature begin to appear. But, whenever his ear is vexed by sounds that savour of Irish disaffection, the wise statesman, remembering Ireland's history, will not forget her patience in the past ; and if he finds her cold and unconfiding now, he will know well where to place the blame. And among the many foreigners who will have to bear it, there is no one on whom it will press more heavily than James the First.

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## ART. II.—THE LABOURERS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

*Reports of the Meeting held at Exeter Hall on Tuesday Evening, Dec. 10th, 1872.*

*Enigmas of Life.* By W. R. GREG. London : Trübner & Co.

ON a former occasion (April, 1872, p. 422) we expressed our agreement with Father O'Reilly "that the tendency, in our countries and in some others, is rather towards an excess of education, for the masses of the people : an excess of imperfect education, which serves to communicate to a great many knowledge not needed by their position, and at the same time incomplete and (in consequence) not unfrequently mischievous." But in making this general remark, we did not sufficiently bear in mind one circumstance ; viz., the political importance of such education under a constitutional government.

For more years than can easily be counted, the clergy and philanthropists of every denomination have admitted as undeniable, that the agricultural labourers of this country are in a physical condition, which is truly deplorable and heart-rending, whether one considers their temporal or their eternal interests. Yet these philanthropists have felt themselves obliged to be content with interfering to alleviate misery in this or that particular

case; and they have not so much as contemplated the notion of any large legislative movement, which shall benefit the class on a large scale. There was doubtless one special reason for this inertness, which we shall presently mention; but its main cause has been, that the labourers could not *agitate* in their own behalf. And so it has happened that,—while the keenest political interest has been felt, and political parties have stood or fallen on questions of immeasurably less real importance,—by tacit consent all care of the agricultural labourers has been left, either to literary disquisition or to private and isolated benevolence. The nearest approach to any organized movement in their behalf which has existed previously to the existing agitation—and this dates only a very few years back—has been the admirable and sustained exertion of a zealous Anglican clergyman, Canon Girdlestone, for the purpose of facilitating the migration of labourers, from those parts of England where wages are lower, to those parts where wages are higher. Even this was violently opposed by the farmers of his neighbourhood, and has been quite a solitary and exceptional enterprise. Now, however, what is called “education” has in some sense penetrated the lowest stratum of society; and the labourers are thus enabled to combine with each other, to agitate, and to become a political power. From this moment it has become possible to make political capital out of the question. Accordingly it seems as if scales had dropped from the eyes of some public men, and as though now for the first time they saw the real magnitude of the interests involved. Such is the practical working of modern constitutional government. “Never,” says Bentham, “except by making the ruling few uneasy, can the oppressed many expect to obtain relief.” Striking contrast to those centuries when *the Church* was able to exercise her divinely given authority in the political order!

We are convinced that the present movement is substantially just; and that the Legislature cannot, without great culpability, allow the lot of the agricultural labourer to remain what it now is. The Archbishop of Westminster, since his appointment, has rendered the Church service of quite a new kind and of singular importance, by his habit of politically co-operating with Protestants, in whatever may be common ground between him and them, against the enemies of religion and of social amelioration. And never in our judgment did he act more wisely, than when he identified himself with this labourers’ movement, and attended their demonstration at Exeter Hall. We have no thought on the present occasion however of exhibiting their case in full; of attempting a photographic picture of the English labourer’s life, throughout the day and throughout the year: for such an enterprise would be quite beyond the present writer’s power. Far less have we any thought

of speculating on the political future ; of considering the effect which may probably be produced on the course of social and public events by this agitation, which as yet is, not so much beginning, as immediately proximate. We believe indeed that the most sagacious statesman would be at fault if he attempted any such augury ; unless indeed so far as he might safely pronounce, that its effects must be very momentous in one direction or another. In the present article we have no higher aim, than to throw a little light on one corner of the subject ; but then that corner has hitherto been very dark, while it may not improbably be the battle-ground on which the coming controversy will be chiefly waged.

There is one argument then in particular, which every one who dislikes this labourers' movement at once discharges against its supporters : he complains that they disregard the lessons of *political economy*. Accordingly the "Times," on the very day after the Exeter Hall meeting, represented Archbishop Manning as having exhorted his hearers to treat that science with contempt ; though a writer in the "Spectator," who had evidently been present, promptly corrected this mistaken impression of the Archbishop's meaning. Now there are two opposite reasons, which would lead us to regret extremely, if many persons came to think that such a movement as we are considering conflicts in any kind of way with the genuine lessons of political economy. On the one hand, many are led to resist the movement by unconscious promptings of mere cowardice or selfishness ; but they might easily disguise from themselves their true state of mind, if they had such a support to fall back upon as the utterances of an important science. On the other hand, Christian and other philanthropists would be led by such an opinion to hold political economy in light estimation : whereas it is certain that no amount of zealous philanthropy will enable them to effect the noble purpose on which they are bent, unless they guide their steps from first to last by the light of that science. Our purpose then, in the present brief article, is to defend two propositions. Firstly we wish to show, that those who think it possible that any objection drawn from political economy could be valid on such a matter, fundamentally misunderstand the true character and place of that science. Secondly we wish to show, that that particular *doctrine* of political economy, which is commonly alleged in objection, is no true doctrine at all, but altogether false.

Firstly then, we say that Archbishop Manning, or any other philanthropically disposed person, may have fullest grounds for demanding large legislative measures in the labourer's favour, though he may neither have studied political economy nor consulted those who do study it. Our reason is, that political economy is not



*supreme*, but *subordinate* to moral and social science. We will not attempt any methodical exposition of this statement, though in its place such exposition would be of great value ; but we will give a sufficient notion of our meaning by an obvious illustration.

We would point out then, as illustrating what is meant respectively by a "supreme" and a "subordinate" science, that the science of *cookery* is "subordinate" to that of *medicine*. The man skilled in medicine lays down, e.g., that food, possessing certain qualities A, B, C, is eminently wholesome to some particular person or to mankind in general ; while food possessing certain other qualities D, E, F, is universally prejudicial to health. Here the subordinate science steps in, accepting the dicta of the higher. The science of cookery, we say, investigates how, by means of accessible materials, food may be most easily and largely prepared, which shall possess qualities A, B, C, and shall be exempt from qualities D, E, F. But suppose some one were to lay down, that no practitioners, however learned in medicine, had a right to pronounce qualities D, E, F unwholesome till they had studied the science of cookery. All the world would be amused by the quaintness of such a notion ; and yet this is exactly a parallel case to the one before us.

Let us draw out, then, this parallel. Moral and social science,\* we will suppose, pronounces (1), that a certain condition of the labouring classes is an intolerable evil which the Legislature is bound to redress ; (2), that property by God's Law possesses certain indefeasible rights ; (3), that certain imaginable laws, on marriage and kindred subjects, are immoral and anti-Christian. We assume for our present purpose that these *are* genuine pronouncements of moral and social science ; for our argument is directed only to this, that *political economy* cannot sit in judgment on them at all. It is *after* these dicta have been sufficiently established by the supreme science, that the subordinate science is called in. The proper work of political economy, is to investigate certain fundamental laws which predominantly regulate the production and distribution of wealth. On the present occasion it accepts those three dicta of moral and social science which we have just recounted ; and it proceeds to consider how, by help of those laws with which it is itself conversant, the first of the said three dicta may be carried into practical effect, without opposition to the other two. The science, e.g., may imaginably decide, that no relief worth mentioning can be given the labouring classes except by some large and systematic scheme of emigration : or it may decide that large remedy (whether or no altogether sufficient) may be

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\* The Catholic, of course, considers moral and social science again subordinate to theological ; but we need not speak of this at length.

obtained, by better methods of cultivating the land at home; \* by some different adjustment of taxation; by some alteration in the legal attributes of property, which shall not interfere with its indefeasible rights. All these are questions entirely within the limits of the science, and which the political economist with great **advantage** may pursue; but he has no right whatever, *as* political economist, to call in question the determinations of the higher science.

We must by no means forget however, that one important supposition is *imaginable*, though we shall proceed to maintain that it is not *possible*. Imaginably, political economy, when legitimately consulted, may respond, that there is *no* means of practically harmonizing the three dicta of moral and social science; that there is no means of effectually relieving the labourer, without tampering either with the indefeasible rights of property or the divinely given laws and counsels as to marriage. But we contend, that in the judgment of every Theist such a supposition must be accounted impossible. If the three dicta mentioned above be genuine utterances of the higher science, it follows, in the Theist's judgment, that God commands legislators to redress the evils commemorated in the first dictum, without violating the principles declared in the other two. But God does not command impossibilities; and we know therefore with certainty, that He must have given man means for obeying His precept.

Here it may perhaps be worth while to repeat a remark, which we made in an earlier number. Several piously disposed persons are under an impression, that political economy is an anti-Christian science; and they think so, because its very purpose is to facilitate the increase of personal and national wealth, whereas wealth is regarded by the Christian religion as a snare and peril. Now we certainly think that a ruler, animated by the true Christian spirit, would aim so far as possible at adapting his legislation to the diminution at once of extreme private wealth and extreme poverty. But so far would this be from bringing him into conflict with political economy, that on the contrary he could not effect his pious purpose except by *help* of that science. Then as to *national* wealth in particular,—is there really any spiritual danger to be dreaded from its increase, if that wealth were distributed very far more equally than now it is? As things are now in England, the labouring class suffer grievous calamity even in spirituals, by their deplorable destitution. Is there really any opposite danger? Is there any danger lest the poorest class of any country—through any possible increase and distribution of national wealth—be so

\* Here it uses again another science, subordinate to itself—the science of agriculture.

well off as to injure their religious interests? We shall be greatly surprised if this question can be answered in the affirmative.

So far as we have gone, our conclusions are these. On the one hand a person, who has neither studied political economy himself nor taken counsel with those who have, may nevertheless have amply sufficient ground for urging confidently, that the Legislature is under an obligation of amending the labourer's position. But on the other hand, as to the *means* of effecting this important purpose, he must put himself into the hands of genuine political economy; and should he fail to do so—however otherwise accomplished he may be, however zealous, however self-sacrificing—he will but injure those interests which he most desires to serve.

But now secondly, what is that particular teaching of political economy, of which any one can allege that it is contravened by those who plead for legislative relief to the labouring class? The doctrine commonly alleged in this point of view, is the Malthusian doctrine of *population*. It is with special reference to this doctrine, that we have named Mr. Greg's work at the head of our present article. It is a volume of unusual ability; but animated throughout by a spirit profoundly opposed to what Christians in general regard as Christian.\* Our present concern with it, however, relates only to Mr. Greg's treatment of Malthusianism; and this is to our mind the most complete and satisfactory with which we happen to be acquainted. We the more regret on that account, that the chapter, to which we refer, is as objectionable in its pervading tone and spirit as the rest of the volume; and that it is especially repulsive to a Catholic, where it treats of marriage and kindred themes. But it is on our points of agreement with Mr. Greg, not on our points of difference, that we propose here to dwell; and though we do not think he has *arranged* his matter quite so clearly as he might have done, the matter itself seems to us of extremely great value.

Mr. Greg sets forth with great effect (p. 54) the shock given to philanthropists by the first appearance of Mr. Malthus's famous Essay in 1798; and he adds (p. 57) that there is no substantial difference of doctrine, between that author's first and last publications on the subject. Mr. Malthus built his argument on an alleged tendency of population in every age to outrun its means of subsistence; and Mr. Greg states his doctrine with much clearness and precision, from p. 57 to p. 59. It will suffice for our present purpose, if we explain generally that, according to Malthus, the mass of population tends always and everywhere to endure constantly increasing pain and privation; and that

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\* We express ourselves thus circumlocutorily, because we find that Mr. Greg takes exception to our having called him in our last number (p. 232) an "anti-Christian writer."

this tendency is absolutely irresistible, unless the great mass of men will abstain from marrying and producing children, in a degree to which history does not present the remotest parallel. Those who are imbued with this persuasion, have of course an answer ready at hand to Christians and philanthropists. All other schemes for ameliorating the labourer's lot, they exclaim, are but shams and delusions, which at best can but produce temporary alleviation at the cost of much greater subsequent suffering; the one only true remedy is, to dissuade or prevent him from marrying and producing children.

We suppose that all other causes put together have done much less to discredit political economy with right-minded men, than has the frightful practical superstructure which political economists have built on the above foundation. The doctrine itself has been accepted, says Mr. Greg (p. 57), by "nearly all political economists of position and repute, as a fundamental and established maxim of the science." But this is not the worst. Very many of them have forgotten, that (as we have explained) theirs is not a supreme but a subordinate science; and on this Malthusian doctrine they have based certain practical counsels and rules of life, which no considerations of mere political economy could by possibility justify, and which genuine moral and social science premissorily denounces.

Let us begin then with supposing, that Malthus had proved all which he had made the least *show* of proving; and let us inquire what would have been the duty of any Christian statesman, who should have accepted his reasoning. And, in the first place, it is most important to point out, that all which he even *appears* to prove falls very far short indeed of that theory of his which we just now set forth. His arguments, had they been valid, would have established a certain conclusion; but such conclusion, if rightly expressed, falls vastly short of that which his language conveys. Thus there is not a syllable in his arguments, which would even *tend* to invalidate the following statement of Mr. Greg's:—

Since a man can produce from the soil a great deal more than is needed for his own subsistence, and since, in consequence, food will and may increase faster than population,—*granted only an unlimited supply of available land*,—it is obvious that there can be no *necessary* pressure on the means of subsistence, until all the available surface of the globe is taken up and fully cultivated. Any pressure that occurs before that extreme point is reached, it is clear, can only be caused by impediments to expansion; and all these impediments are to civilized man artificial, not natural—of human, not of Providential origin. It is obvious that a single family or a single tribe, surrounded by an unlimited territory of uninhabited and productive soil, might go on multiplying indefinitely and without restraint, on the sole condition of *spreading as they multiplied*; and that, so long as they fulfilled this con-

dition, they would never have an idea of what pressure of population on subsistence meant, till they had reached the bounds and exhausted the resources of the habitable earth (pp. 76, 77).

And how many years would elapse before any such result would ensue? Mr. Greg gives various data, from which he draws the following most important inference. These data, he says—

Demonstrate that even the most densely populated countries in Europe are probably not peopled up to the full numbers they might comfortably maintain; that many of them fall vastly short of the maximum actually reached by others not more favoured by nature; and that as a whole there is every reason to believe that *the European continent could support three or four times its present numbers*. They show that a similar conclusion may be adopted with almost equal certainty in reference to a great part of Asia, and perhaps the whole of Africa; that probably in Africa, and certainly in the two Americas, there are vast tracts of fertile land, with fair, if not splendid climates, which are scarcely inhabited at all, and others which contain a mere sprinkling of human beings; and that in Australasia the case is even stronger. In fine, while Belgium and Lombardy, which are the best peopled districts in Europe, contain about 400 souls to the square mile, Paraguay contains only 4, Brazil only 3, and the Argentine Republic only 1. From the aggregate of these facts we are warranted in concluding that *an indefinite number of generations* and long periods of time must elapse before the world can be fully peopled,—that before that consummation shall be reached we have *cycles of years* to traverse, ample to afford space for all the influences which civilization may develop to operate to their uttermost extent.

But this is not all. Not only are few countries in the world adequately peopled, but none even of the most peopled countries are adequately cultivated. England has the best tilled soil in the world, though by no means the best climate; yet in England the average produce of the soil is not half—perhaps not a third—what it might be, and what in many districts it actually is. But the average yield of France, usually regarded as a very productive country, is only half that of England; nay, the average yield of the splendid grain-growing provinces in America, which ought greatly to exceed that of England, falls short of it by one-half. Without bringing a single additional acre under the plough, the production of the world, by decent cultivation, might be easily trebled or quadrupled. In addition to this hopeful prospect, we see ample ground for expanding still further our conception of the amount of human life that might be maintained in comfort on the earth's surface, in the wasted or neglected riches of the sea, in the utilization of lands now devoted to the production of needless or noxious superfluities, in the more skilful extraction from the materials of our food of the real nutriment they contain, and in the transfer of much land from pasture to cereals, and in other economies too numerous to mention (pp. 81, 83).

But further, as Mr. Greg points out (p. 64), Malthus himself admitted "that as long as good land was attainable, 'the rate at which food could be made to increase would far exceed what was

necessary to keep pace with the most rapid increase of population which the laws of nature in relation to human kind permit." Mr. Greg adds (p. 63) that "there can be no question that a very moderate amount of regular industry, whether applied to the production of one article or of many, would secure to man an abundant supply of all the necessaries, and most of the comforts, of life—at least in all temperate or tropical climates." And he very reasonably concludes, that "since, given the land and the labour, food can be made to increase incomparably faster than population, and would naturally do so,—all that is wanted to put man at his ease is a field whereon to bestow his industry. It is not that population has a natural tendency to increase faster than food, or as fast; but simply that the surface of the earth is limited, and portions of that surface not always nor easily accessible" (p. 64).

We will still suppose then, for argument's sake, that Malthus's reasoning was in itself valid; and in order that we may see the true Catholic way of dealing therewith, we will suppose that it has entirely convinced some pious and loyal Catholic statesman, who is able to influence as he pleases his country's legislation. What will be his course of practical action? He has before him such data as the following: The Church teaches that God has laid down a certain assemblage of laws concerning marriage; and there are various counsels also, concerning that sacrament, which her experience in every age has taught her to urge as most conducive to her children's spiritual welfare. The weight of such authority immeasurably preponderates over every possible number of antagonistic considerations; and our statesman would do everything in his power to promote the observance of those laws and counsels. At the same time he would regard it as among his most sacred duties, to organize a comprehensive and well-considered scheme—whether by means of emigration or otherwise—in order that the cultivation of land shall increase so much more rapidly than the growth of population, as to place the labouring class in a constantly improving position. As to what may happen after vast "cycles of years" shall have elapsed, and when at last that period shall arrive, which (he has learned from Malthus to think) will introduce inevitable conflict between population and its means of subsistence,—our Catholic statesman will rest secure, in faith. He cannot even guess that God intends *the world to last* beyond this period: and even if God does intend this, he knows that the Divine resources are inexhaustible; that God can *change* the laws of nature as easily as He once *appointed* them.

We have spoken of a Catholic statesman: but a Protestant, who believes the inspiration of Scripture, should be led by its study to a similar practical conclusion. In fact, Dr. Arnold, many years ago, pointed to God's command (Gen. i. 28) "*crescite et multiplic-*



mini et replete terram et subjicite eam," as the stand-point of his opposition to the practical counsels of Malthusians.

We have been proceeding on the supposition, that Malthus really proved what his arguments on the surface appear to prove. But Mr. Greg, apparently with excellent reason, denies that there has been even an approximation to such a proof. Malthus's arguments have literally no force whatever, unless it be *assumed* (p. 60) that there are no physiological influences or laws, of which he was ignorant, which counteract and control those which he perceived so clearly." But he did not make the faintest *attempt* to prove this; and it is evident therefore, that his conclusion is a purely arbitrary and gratuitous hypothesis. But Mr. Greg goes further. He adduces various considerations, based on indubitable phenomena, which tend to make it *positively* and indeed very highly probable, that there *are* such laws; and that Malthus's doctrine therefore is in every sense absolutely false.

In the first place Malthus drew a highly coloured picture, as to the *inevitable* increase of population, wherever such increase should be unchecked, either by "vice or misery" on one hand, or by severest "moral restraint" in the matter of marriage on the other. But Mr. Greg points out, adding statistical facts in large corroboration:—

That the *actual* fecundity of the human race has never equalled, and scarcely ever even distantly approached [what Malthus regards as] its *possible* fecundity: and that this difference is observable, where there is neither vice, misery, nor moral restraint to account for it; that in the midst of the most ample supply of food, where there need and can be no anxiety as to the future, where parents are healthy, where the climate is good,—where, in a word, every circumstance is as favourable as possible to the unchecked multiplication of the species, where everybody marries, and where marriages are as early as is compatible with vigour,—the population does not increase nearly as fast as [according to Malthus] theoretically it might do (pp. 60, 61).

Mr. Greg quotes against Malthus the well-known political economist, Mr. Nassau Senior:—

It was pointed out by the late Mr. Senior, as another very suggestive fact, that, taking the world as a whole, and history so far as we are acquainted with it, food always *has* increased faster than population, in spite of the alleged *tendency* of population to increase faster than food. Famines, which used to be so frequent in earlier ages and in thickly-peopled countries, are now scarcely ever heard of, while, at the same time, the average condition of the mass of the people has on the whole improved, that is, that they have more of the necessities of life than formerly. Probably the only cases in our days of scarcity of food amounting to actual famine are to be found where the staple crop of a whole country has been destroyed by locusts, as sometimes in Asia; or by drought, as occasionally in Hindostan; or by vegetable disease, as in the potato rot of Ireland. In sparsely-peopled Australia famine has often supervened; in densely-peopled Belgium, never. "I admit (says

Mr. Senior) the abstract *power* of population to increase so as to press upon the means of subsistence. I deny the habitual *tendency*. I believe the tendency to be just the reverse" (pp. 63, 64).

Mr. Greg thus continues :—

Another class of facts which I shall do no more than allude to, because, though often examined casually, they have, as far as I know, never been thoroughly sifted or brought into a focus, points even more distinctly to the existence of some cause operating, under certain circumstances, to limit human fertility, even beyond what is consistent with the multiplication or preservation of the race, or class, or type. I refer to cases in which a family or set of families, or a whole variety, dies out where no deficiency or difficulty of subsistence can be alleged as the explanation, and where, therefore, some other cause, almost certainly physiological, must be pre-supposed. Such is the case of baronets, whose titles are perpetually lapsing from the failure of male heirs—assuredly not from abstinence from marriage, nor from lack of food. Such, again, is the frequent extinction of peerage families, of whom plentiful sustenance may at least be predicated. I am aware of Mr. Galton's ingenious explanation, based upon the fact of peers so often marrying heiresses, who of course *ex vi termini* come from comparatively unfertile families ;—but the explanation itself is a collateral confirmation of the fact I am pointing out,—for whence arise these many unfertile but rich families ? If the wealthy, who have every facility for prolonging life, and no motive to abstain from marriage, are so often barren and liable to see their families die out, or dwindle down to one heiress, does not the circumstance point to the operation of some influence other than Malthus' "pressure on subsistence," almost antagonistic to it, and especially potent in the most civilized and comfortable forms of life ? (pp. 66, 67).

There are many other parts of Mr. Greg's Essay well worthy our readers' attentive consideration, but we have adduced enough for our purpose. The argument against Malthus comes to this. His reasoning was utterly worthless, unless he had either proved, or at least given probable grounds for supposing, that there are no natural laws at work to limit human fecundity, except those with which he was acquainted. But he never attempted to do anything of the kind ; and his Essay is, therefore, pervaded by a fallacy which stultifies the whole. Even had Mr. Greg left the matter here, he would have rendered most important service. But he has gone much further. He has given much positive reason for holding that there *are* such natural laws as those of which Malthus virtually denied the existence. Lastly, if Malthus had proved the whole which his arguments have any *appearance* of establishing,—they would not have afforded the very slightest reasonable basis for those practical counsels, which he and so many other political economists have pressed on mankind.

We are not aware of any other doctrine, even *alleged* or as apper-

taining to political economy, which has any appearance of telling against those, who press on legislators the labourer's cause. And our general conclusion is this. If Archbishop Manning or any other Catholic is invited to join such a movement as this in behalf of the labouring class, it is his business to measure the case proposed to him exclusively by the standard of Catholic doctrine and morality. Our Blessed Lord says, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His Justice, and all these things shall be added to you" in such degree as shall suffice for your spiritual needs. We may extend this principle to the speculative order. Let Catholics submit their intellect absolutely, in full confidence, without reserve, to the Church's teaching, whether explicit or implicit, throughout the whole sphere of moral action. So far as any alleged conclusions of secular science are really at variance with this teaching,—it is infallibly certain, that they are no genuine conclusions even of that science to which they are regarded as appertaining; and it is highly probable, that in due time this will be made manifest to all candid thinkers. Those only possess the true key to secular knowledge, who retain Divine doctrine in its position of simple supremacy.

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### ART. III.—A STUDY OF RELATIONS.

[COMMUNICATED.]

[This article is by the author of the paper on "Relativity," which appeared in our number for last July; and is intended as supplementary to that paper.]

**WE** all have had a father and a mother. We have received our several allotments of brothers, sisters, cousins, and connections by marriage. These facts afford a field for a study of relations. We may consider the mutual obligations of parents and children, husband and wife; how brothers and sisters ought to regard one another as they grow up; at what point in the fireside circle the cousin's chair should be placed: uncles and aunts—maiden and married,—stepfathers also and stepmothers, hold positions which it behoves us to scan. The question of primogeniture might be handled. Dowers, divorces, female inheritance, are possible subjects to discuss. Or if we shrink from sounding these horrid depths of law and conscience, we are invited to meditate the more homely theme of the advantages and disadvan-

tages of family parties. Calculating spirits may find work in determining relationships; as, for instance, supposing A's first cousin has married B's uncle, and B's great-grandfather was brother-in-law of A's grandfather, what relation is B to A? They who can solve such problems are eligible to have banns of marriage published in their hearing, provided they possess, over and above their faculty of calculation, sufficient acquaintance with history to tell who married the fifth daughter of Sir Launcelot Lapwing in the year 1828, and what became of their eldest girl, and what alliances the Dibsons have contracted with their neighbours the Vains since the commencement of this century. The present paper, however, is not concerned with genealogy, nor degrees of kindred, nor family ties. It treats, not of related persons, but of what it is to be related, by consanguinity, affinity, friendship, similarity, neighbourhood, or otherwise howsoever. It is an attempt to ascertain the metaphysical import of *relation*.

I conceive that this is a useful attempt. When exercised reasoners, masters in Israel at this day, publish for a demonstrated truth the announcement that

"The world, our sense, ourselves are nought  
But one long fitful dream;"—

that there is no mind, no matter, no body, no soul, no God, but only a weird dance of all these nonentities hand in hand with each other; when, as the principle of that demonstration, we hear the doctrine cited that relation alone is a possible object of knowledge: then surely it becomes a worthy enterprise to examine whether that doctrine be true, and, in the first place, accurately to adjust the definition of what a relation is. For as he would be incapable of observing whether the viper was the only venomous serpent in England, who did not know a viper when he saw one, so he to whom *relation* and *relativity* are obscure terms, must be removed from the bench when the case comes on for trial, of "the relativity of human knowledge." This ignominy may readily be avoided by any man who, to average powers of understanding, unites a moderate store of patience. Metaphysics are, or should be, a methodization of common sense. The unpremeditated thought of the vulgar is the metaphysician's meditation. To speak a parable—the vulgar man plays billiards, while the metaphysician spies out the theory of impact: now it is not difficult to convey some notion of that theory to the mind of an intelligent player. The subsoil of metaphysics lies few feet deep below the surface of daily life. They are odious metaphysicians who make a mystery of their

craft. Turn we, then, hopefully to the search into the metaphysics of relation.

When the first Atlantic Cable was laid, people exclaimed,—“See the new relation between England and America.” What new relation? The facility of prompt interchange of messages. The fact that England could give and America receive, and America give and England receive, an immediate communication, was the new relation that sprang up between the two countries when the Cable was gloriously laid in the summer of 1866. Allow me to call that fact of mutual communicativeness a *being*, by which I mean simply a *real fact*. The fact is not a being, as a stone or a soul is a being; it is not a substance. It does not exist upon its own basis apart from other beings; it does not, in scholastic phrase, *exist in itself*. Were England sunk under the seas by an earthquake, were America blown to the skies by a volcanic eruption, or—a more natural supposition—were the Cable to snap, the relation of mutual communicativeness would be destroyed. As it is, however, that relation is an objective reality,\* not a mere figment of the mind. I call it a *being* accordingly.

I here feel my further progress barred by a prejudice. This is its cry:—“Your talk is all about abstractions, as is evident from your using the abstract name, *relation*. Now, abstractions have no existence in nature. Your whole discourse, therefore, conversant as it is with abstractions and not with things, is an unmeaning series of intellectual antics, barren of real instruction. Tell us, if you please, what the Atlantic Cable is made of, you will then have told us a fact; but, by the shade of Locke we conjure you, cease to prate of the relation that sprang out of the Cable, for that is a fiction.” I put it to these lovers of facts to consider, whether the relation be not just as much of a fact as “what the Cable is made of,” i.e. as the constitution of the Cable. For, observe, *constitution* is an abstract name; shall we therefore say that the Cable has no constitution in nature away from our minds? I am aware that philosophers are found who talk such nonsense; but nonsense, even when great men talk it, is nonsense still. All this folly of philosophers, and prejudice of the non-philosophical public, comes from not remarking two widely different senses in which abstract terms are used—sometimes standing

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\* I understand by “objective reality,” a reality which endures even when no created mind is contemplating it. There cannot be a reality that is not subject to the contemplation of some mind. Enough, however, that the Divine Mind contemplates anything as actually existing, for that thing actually to exist, an objective reality, *in rerum naturâ*.

for an attribute of a particular thing, and sometimes for an attribute in general, which is an attribute of no thing in particular. When I speak of "the constitution of the Atlantic Cable," I do not speak of an attribute in general. It is then vain to urge upon me that generalities do not exist. The remark is correct, but irrelevant. As well remind me that the thirteenth book of Euclid does not exist. When I speak of "the telegraphic relation between England and America," again my theme is something particular, not a generality; but if I entitle a book, "On the Constitution of Cables," or fix upon "Relation" as a subject for a philosophical dissertation, then I use the words *constitution* and *relation* as general expressions, to which there are no general things corresponding. Nowhere is there a constitution of a cable which is not the constitution of any cable in particular; nowhere is there a relation which does not lie between two particular related terms.

When we hear of "the strength of the current of the Mississippi threatening New-Orleans," we think of a perfectly definite individual "strength," no mere generality, or form of the mind; but an attribute objectively existing in the Mississippi itself. The thing thought of in such an instance is termed by some philosophers a "direct universal." I prefer the term "metaphysical universal." But observe that—according to the definition of an *universal*, "one apt to be in many" (*unum aptum inesse multis*)—a "direct" or "metaphysical" universal is not formally an universal at all; but is the material by consideration of which the mind may form within itself an "universal idea" or "general concept." For "the strength of the current of the Mississippi" is not apt to be anywhere save only in the Mississippi. A similar strength is in the Missouri and Amazon; but not numerically the same strength. Each river has its own strength, one and indivisible, which no other river can share. Whereby we may judge of the absurd position of those physicists, who, confounding motion with force, its cause, teach that the force or motion of one body—say a stream of water—passes identically into another body—a waterwheel. As well speak of the height of Mount Blanc passing into the Matterhorn.

Sometimes the phrase "strength of current" is employed without any river being named in connection. It does not, however, follow that no particular river is thought of, because none is named. There are, I believe, inhabitants of London, all whose aquatic notions are founded on the Thames. That is their standard of comparison; every other body of water is a *mirage* of their civic stream. You gather this from their



Cockney remarks, "the lake is three times the breadth of the river at Blackfriars, and twice as deep; its water some shades clearer"; and so forth. However, just as men know their letters without thinking of the primer in which their childhood first learnt them, so it is possible to conceive a "strength of current" apart from Thames, Orontes, or Ohio. The "strength of current," thought of then, is what is styled a "logical universal," or better, a "metaphysical universal." In so far as it is not an individual thing, but a generality—not the strength of any one certain current, but "strength," no matter of what current—it is a true universal, "apt to be in many," and in that capacity not apt to exist anywhere out of the conceiving mind. There is no "strength of current" actually existing apart from all actually existent streams. But it must be added that "logical universals" have their foundation in actual existences—they have what the school of S. Thomas of Aquin denominate *fundamentum in re*. "Strength of current" in general, itself a bare concept, is founded upon the actually existent strength of the Missouri current, and that other actually existent strength of the Amazon current: upon these and the like "direct universals," upon these metaphysical entities, which have being *in rerum natura*, is founded the "reflex universal," the logical entity, which has being in thought alone. Furthermore, take notice that these logical entities have yet another foundation in fact, in the Ideas, or rather in the Idea, of the Divine Mind, the Infinite and Omnipotent Creator's Archetypical Idea of Himself, and of all the being that He can work to the likeness of Himself. I should never, indeed, have conceived "strength of current," had I not had experience of actual rivers; but, now that I have had the experience, the concept thence extracted abides objectively true in my mind, though water should flow no more; for flowing water remains an eternal possibility before God.

This lengthy digression has not been thrown away, if the reader consents henceforth to avow that, when I speak of the relation of A, an actually existent thing, to B, another actual existence, the relation in question, being a "metaphysical universal," actually exists apart from my mind, and is worth study, even as a lump of rock-crystal is worth study, although the crystal is a substance, and the relation is not.

A and B, the two related things, are called the *terms* of the relation. When A and B are *physical* beings, the relation between them is *predicamental*; when A and B are *metaphysical* beings, their relation is *transcendental*. For the understanding of these names, it is needful to revert to one

of the earliest teachings of formal logic, how Aristotle, the inventor of that craft, sorted all things in ten large boxes; that is, he formed them into ten classes. These he called the ten *karnyopíai*, "categories," which word his Latin translators rendered *prædicamenta*, "predicaments." Hence the phrase, "to be in a predicament," meaning to be in one of Aristotle's boxes, especially the wrong one. The ten predicaments are, *Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Place, Time, Attitude, Dress*. There are two varieties of Relation. One variety the Aristotelian logicians regarded as coinciding with the fourth of the above predicaments; they called, therefore, that variety "predicamental" relation. The other *transcends* the bounds of any one predicament, and hence got the name of "transcendental" relation. The growth of philosophy has ruptured the ten boxes, and poured out their contents in a medley which awaits new arrangement. I shall not then again refer to the exploded "predicaments." Only keep this in view, that *predicamental* relation intercedes between *physical* beings, and *transcendental* between *metaphysical* ones.

But when is Being *physical*? when *metaphysical*? Physical Being is complete Being, metaphysical incomplete. Physical Being can exist by itself, metaphysical cannot. A physical being is naturally a substance; no metaphysical being is a substance. Physical Being is Matter or Spirit, Metaphysical Being is a belonging of either. Physical beings are such things as *this cart, this horse, this man, this angel, God*; metaphysical beings are, *the size of this cart, the age of this horse, the character of this man, the rank of this angel, the power of God*, and so forth. In a word, a metaphysical being is a partial aspect of a physical being. The aspect is no baseless fabric of the beholder's vision; the physical being as really presents it to him as a cathedral presents a view to a photographer.

We may either mentally break up a physical being into parts, or we may regard the whole being on different sides. The former process yields the *metaphysical constituents*, the latter the *attributes* of the being. Metaphysical entities are thus divided into *constituents* and *attributes*. Of attributes, such as *justice, value, candour*, I have little to say. When a relation is mentioned between an attribute of one subject and the attribute of another subject, physically distinct from the former—as between the *long-suffering* of God and the *impotence* of man; the proper terms of that relation are the two physical beings, *God and man*, and the relation is *predicamental*. If both attributes belong to the same subject,—as when we compare God's justice with His mercy,—the relation

is transcendental. But it is not a real relation, but one of thought only; for justice and mercy are identical in God, though we think of them as different. Real transcendental relations are those that intercede between the metaphysical constituents of a physical being. The terms of such relations are really opposed to one another by the fact that they are constituents of the same thing; whereas attributes of the same thing never bear a real mutual opposition. Things are made up of opposite constituents, not of opposite attributes. The diverse constituents blend into one light, whence the attributes radiate as one brightness.

The edeclaration of the metaphysical constituents of every physical being is the most important truth in philosophy: the proof thereof is subtle in proportion to the importance: the discovery was a grand effort of intellect, and needs some intellectual effort to appreciate it. I can only repeat the proof "as it was told to me." The first step is the assertion that everything that exists is knowable. Where scrutiny absolutely breaks down, there is absolutely nothing to scrutinize. A mystery which no mind can fathom is an unreality. Let us suppose for a moment that God is, what a preacher of Lay Sermons inculcates Him to be, "Unknowable and Unknown."\* In that case, God should never be the subject of any proposition that issues from human lips. It were rashness to predicate anything of the Unknown. Yet the Preacher† avoids a downright denial of God, for he admits the limitation of the human faculties. May be, then, this Being, unknowable in our regard, is known to Himself. So atheism is escaped. Suppose, however, we append to the lay text just quoted, a philosophical comment, written by an author of fashion: "Every opinion delivered by every man is true to that man himself. . . . Truth absolute there is none."‡ That is, there is no truth for a man outside of what he knows. Comment and text together become the major and minor of a syllogism, thus: *God is nothing that I don't know of: but I know nothing of Him.* The conclusion follows, "by order of good consequence": *Therefore God is nothing.* An irrefragable conclusion, if we admit the premises.§ But,

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\* "Lay Sermons," p. 16.

† Not Solomon.

‡ "According to Protagoras," and according to Mr. Grote. See Grote's "Plato," vol. ii. pp. 347-8 *seq.*; also Grote's "Aristotle," ii. p. 148, and his editor's "Emotions and Will," p. 265.

§ Besides the saying, "Man is the measure of all things," Protagoras had another, "Respecting the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist." If, then, the measure of Protagoras could not take in the

letting the minor pass, I find the major premise at fault. The reasoning of that fashionable philosopher establishes, not what he asserts, that there is for a man no truth—nothing which he ought to believe—outside of the knowledge of *his* mind, but that there is absolutely no truth out of the knowledge of a mind. Hence we immediately infer that the truth which no mind knows of, is no truth, and the being that is unknown to all mind, is non-existent, nay impossible. Everything, therefore, is knowable.

Now, a mind knows a thing when it knows *what the thing is* (*quid est*), and that *the thing is* (*quod est*). The former is the knowledge of the *essence* (*essentia*), the latter of the *being* (*esse*), of the thing. A thing is cognized *through essence and being* (*per essentiam et esse*). But a thing is, according as it is cognized. Therefore, *through essence and being*, the thing exists. We have thus found two metaphysical constituents of everything—*essence* and *being*. That they are metaphysical, and not physical constituents, is clear, for neither of them can stand apart from the other. *Essence* without *being* is not, and *being* of no definite character or *essence*, equally is not. Of the two questions—*Is it?* and *What is it?*—which may be asked with respect to everything, a positive answer to one involves the possibility of a positive answer to the other. But one answer will be simple, while the other answer will have two terms. “Is there a God?” “Yes,” you reply. There is no duality there—nothing twofold in the *being* of God. “What is God?” I continue. Here an answer in a single term will not do. You may of course reply with a synonym, saying that God is *Dieu*, or *Deus*, or *Jehovah*; but that is mere putting off of the question. You must analyze the *essence* of God, really to tell what He is; you must separate His *essentia* into two metaphysical constituents. How should you do that? Let me explain. One nut may be broken against another, and one difficulty may often be solved by starting a new one. God is called, in the language of theology, a *pure act*. If I can succeed in expounding what those two hard names mean, the metaphysical analysis of *essence* will give us no further trouble.

Active Power then is the first mark of Substantial Being. We know that we are, when we appreciate ourselves as active. The *I am* is never thundered forth with such intensity of conviction, as when it emanates from a strong man, a being of stout heart and vigorous understanding. *I am* and *I can* are

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gods, there were no gods for Protagoras; in other words, Protagoras was an atheist.

twin brothers. In weakness and inability we enter upon the ideas of sleep and death—"I am no more," we say. We know that other substantial beings besides our own exist, when we find effects produced upon ourselves that proceed not from our own power. A substance without activity cannot be. The name *activity* bears reference to possible things outside of the agent, subject to the agent's action. Now, for a thing to act upon another thing, it must have some principle within itself, by virtue of which it can act, and whereby it substantially is, according to the aphorism, "by what a thing is, by that it acts" (*quo aliquid est, eo agit*). That by which a substance is and can act, is called the *act* of that substance, and often the *substantial form*. Substances are divided into two kinds according to the difference of their substantial *acts*. If the *act* is one of motion, the substance is matter; if the *act* is one of understanding, the substance is spirit. But if the act eminently comprehends all manner of ability, pure of defect, it is styled a *pure act*; and the substance so actuated is divine. The object with which the substantial *act* is conversant, such, is called the *term*, or, in corporeal things, the *matter* of the substance. *Act* and *term* constitute the *essence*. Thus have we analyzed every physical thing into *essence* and *being*, and *essence* has undergone a further analysis at our hands into *act* and *term*.

Allow me, for example's sake, to endeavour to set forth the *act* and *term*, first of material substance, and then of that which is spiritual. I warn the reader that I make the attempt only for example's sake. If he refuses the account here rendered of the constitution of matter, let him state to himself, clearly and distinctly, how he believes matter to be constituted; then let him look for *act* and *term* there. I roundly assert my own view of the subject, because I believe that no honest and thorough-going metaphysical speculation can be conducted except upon the foundation of physical data definitely and decidedly laid down. Physicists will recognize, in the theory which I lay before them, the dynamism of Father Boscovich, modified by Father Bayma.\* We start from the negation of the continuity of matter. Every material body, we consider, consists of *elements*, which are inextended points. Let the reader look at the particles of dust floating in the air, with the sun on them; let him conceive each particle dwindling, dwindling, till it loses all magnitude, and approximating to

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\* For the connection of this doctrine on matter with Catholic theology, see F. Franzelin's treatise "De Eucharistia," and the notice of that treatise in the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1869.

each other particle, not into immediate contact—for then they would make but one point—but till the distance between them becomes insensible; let him further add that some of these elemental points are centres of attraction, and others are centres of repulsion, which attraction or repulsion varies inversely as the square of the distance between the attractive or repulsive point and the point which is attracted or repelled: he will then have a sample of what to our eyes is the physical constitution of a deal board, a marble slab, a nugget, a bone, or any other body, solid, liquid, or gaseous, which he chooses to particularize. Every one of these elements is a *substance*, in which it behoves us to inquire for *act* and *term*. For simplicity's sake, I will consider attractive elements only; but what I say applies equally to repulsive ones. The element may be emblemized by a sphere of infinite radius, decreasing in density inversely as the square of the distance from the centre outwards: this decrease signifies the decrease of the intensity of the attraction. The attraction of the element upon its own centre will be marked by  $\frac{1}{0} = \infty$ ; the element is infinitely self-attractive. Here we have the *act* and the *term* of material substance plain before us. The element, so far as it attracts itself, is the *act*; so far as it is attracted by itself, it is the *term*.

My language betrays an apparent ignorance of the first law of motion—*corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus illud a viribus impressis cogitur statum suum mutare*.\* How should a body, composed of self-attractive elements, be determined to motion entirely by forces outside itself? how should matter be *inert*, when it is self-attractive? Naturally enough. I flatter myself that the system which I set forth is at once a grand extension of the Newtonian law of gravitation,† a grand justification of the Newtonian laws of motion, and a grand following up of the old maxim of the schoolmen,—*quo aliquid est, eo agit*. This is hardly the place to develop the first of these statements, but I will say a word on the other two. Let my last full stop represent an attractive point; call it A; and suppose there is no other material substance in creation. Call the intensity of the point's attraction, at one inch distance,  $a$ : at two inches it will be  $\frac{a}{4}$ ; at three inches,  $\frac{a}{9}$ ; and so on. But as, by hypothesis, there is no element at one inch distance from A, nor at two inches, nor at any other distance, there will be

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\* Newton, *Principia*.

† Newton, indeed, did not embrace under his law the cases of repulsion. But if elements are all attractive, how should a stone be hard?



nothing outside of A to be attracted, and all the attraction of A will lead to no motion. The infinite attraction of A upon itself is not exerted in any direction. There is no line of action, and never can be. Consequently no spontaneous motion on the part of A results from that point's infinite self-attraction. A point pulling itself along is as heroic an absurdity as Mr. Punch's wheeling himself on the tight-rope.

I have demonstrated from first principles, upon our grounds, the fact which the first law of motion embodies, the *inertia* of matter. Next I turn—round, indeed, some people will think—from Newton to the schoolmen. They, too, were spokesmen of a truth, mighty in metaphysics as are the laws of motion in mechanics,—“by what a thing is, by that it acts.” The solitary element A, which we have just supposed, *is* by this, that it is attractive to an intensity varying as the inverse square of the distance between attractor and attracted. A is so attractive, independently of the being of any other element. While, however, no other element exists, A cannot be said to *act*, for *action* requires a *patient* physically distinct from the *agent*. Let then a second element B appear, one inch off A. A at once acts upon B, drawing that element towards itself with the intensity of action which we agreed to represent by *a*. By what, in this case, does A attract B? Surely by nothing else than by that by which A is attractive to the amount *a* at the distance of one inch; that is to say, by that by which A *is*, or by A's substantial act. Put B within the sphere of A's activity, and, without any change in A, that element, inactive before for want of an external object, hastens to perform an action. This is the proof of the scholastic dictum, *forma est id quo agens agit*, “the form (or act) is that whereby the agent acts.” The *act* is the principle of activity. Reciprocally, the *potential term* is the principle of passivity. The *term* of a material element is the element itself as attracted by itself. In consequence of that attraction, the element keeps to one point of space. There the *term* is chained by the *act*. But the *act* is not infinite. It does not chain the term to every point of space, but to one point only, and not immovably there. The act not being infinite, the term is not actuated so much as it might be; it is *potential*, open to an increase of actuation. The *terms* of all created substances are *potential*; they receive being from their *acts*, but not infinite being, and consequently not immutability. When a second element is set beside the first, forthwith the *potentiality* of the *term* of the first element, or the fact that the element is not self-attracted to all the extent possible, exposes it to suffer an ulterior attraction, according to the

saying, "Every patient suffers to the amount of its potentiality,"  
—*Omne patiens patitur in quantum est in potentia.*

I find myself doing what it is hard to avoid when one writes metaphysics, delving down at every step deeper into mysteries. That I may not get buried under the *débris*, I will rise towards the surface, and treat very lightly of that most profound subject, the constitution of spiritual substance. The *act* of a pure spirit is the spirit's understanding of itself. The *term* is the spirit's being understood by itself. The spirit understands other things by understanding itself, either because itself is the Archetype of all of them, or because they work changes upon it, and through those changes manifest their activity and being. None but Infinite Being is infinitely intelligible to itself. A created spirit, in understanding self, understands a finite object, a field of intellect not the greatest possible. In this way, the *term* of every angel is *potential*, and the angel is liable to suffer a change, which will be something new for it to understand in itself, over and above what it understood there before. Thus, in spiritual substance, our brief survey has found traces of *act*, *potential term*, *activity*, and *passivity*, answering to what we saw in material substance—a marvellous analogy.

Starting from a study of relations, we have arrived to deal with the constitution of matter and the nature of understanding. It is high time to return *à nos moutons*. We were led away by a desire to investigate the transcendental relation which obtains among the metaphysical constituents of a thing. We found those constituents to be at first *essence* and *being* (*essentia et esse*), and then *act*, *term*, and *being*. We have exemplified *act* and *term* both in matter and in spirit. It remains to seize upon their transcendental relation. Is not the relation this, that the *act* is in the *term* and the *term* in the *act*—the attractor in the attracted and the attracted in the attractor, the intelligent in the understood and the understood in the intelligent—together conspiring to form one physical thing. The union of the two is the relation between them. But the union of the *act* and *term* is the *being* of the thing. Therefore *being* (*esse*) is the transcendental relation between the *act* and *term*, the two parts of the *essence* of everything. Forasmuch as this *being*, the result of the *act* and *term* conspiring, is the completion of the thing, we name it the *complement*. Everything consists metaphysically of *act*, *term*, and *complement*; and the *complement* is the transcendental relation between the *act* and the *term*.\*

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\* The constituents *actus* and *terminus*, or *forma* and *materia*, are recognized in the schools. The third constituent is not expressly mentioned

This *complement* will be written down for an idle intruder, unless I vindicate in the concrete its claims to admission. They are most evident in spiritual substance. The *complement* there is the being of the spirit knowing (the *act*) in the spirit known (the *term*). The knower and the known in this case are mutually congruous and satisfactory; for they are one and the selfsame physical being, and no two things are so congruous and so satisfactory, one to another, as self is to self. True, we are often displeased with ourselves; but then it is some accidental mode of our being, not our substantial existence which provokes our displeasure. It is always satisfactory to exist—out of hell. Since the *act* of spiritual substance satisfies the *term*, and the *term* the *act*; the actual being of one in the other will be *that whereby the spirit is complacently enamoured of itself*. Such is the *complement* of spiritual substance. It is the root and origin of the spirit's affection for external things. Self-love embraces whatever the mind discovers in harmony with self. Self-love is of the essence of every person. It may grow up a noisome weed, it may bloom into the sweet flower of charity. That depends on how it is cultivated. In the heart where self is vilified, charity cannot dwell. They are philosophic proverbs—"Charity begins at home," and, *Qui sibi malus, cui bonus?*

Enough, for the present, of *transcendental* relations. Of the relations styled *predicamental*, which lie, not among the metaphysical constituents of the same physical being, but between distinct physical beings, I shall not speak at length. The *properties* of a thing spring out of the thing's *constituents*, as I have declared them; and out of the *properties* of co-existent things, the *relations* between thing and thing take their rise. Thus, from the constituent which is called the *act*, come the properties of *activity* and *position in time*: from the *term*, come the properties of *passivity* and *position in space*: from the *complement*, come *unity* and *position in number*. The properties of activity and passivity occasion the relation of *agent* and *patient*: the property of having position in time puts a thing in the way of relations to the *past*, *present*, and *future*: having position in space, a thing has relations of *distance*: and being one, a thing enters into relations of *number*. It is not opportune to evolve these heads.

Having thus far examined the Relative, I proceed to the

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there. But you hear of *essentia* and *esse*; and *esse* is the *complementum*. I have a fancy that the much-canvassed distinction between the *ἐνέργεια* and the *ἐντελέχεια* of Aristotle is really this, that *ἐνέργεια* is the *actus*, and *ἐντελέχεια* the *complementum*.

examination of the Absolute. What is the Absolute? The non-Relative. *Is there, then, a non-Relative? Is it knowable?* I shall divide this question into three, and return a threefold answer.

I. *Does any substance exist devoid of predicamental relations?* No; none whatever. For existent substance is either created or uncreated. If it is a creature, it is predicamentally related to its Creator, as effect to cause. There is, moreover, a complexity of predicamental relations binding all parts of creation together. Consider, for example, a human soul. I say nothing of the supernatural affinities of that soul. Who, indeed, should describe the all but hypostatic union of a soul in grace with God, its Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier? Who should count the threads of that mystic web, the communion of saints? Who should follow those electric impulses of divine benediction, lighting on one head, and thrilling through to thousands? I set aside the supernatural and the divine, and address myself to the natural relations of a soul with creatures. And first with its own body. Have you marked the joints and fastenings which bind spirit and matter together, so close that one can neither act, nor suffer, nor be, in its present state, without its fellow? Then, look abroad, and see the soul in its attractions and repulsions, its loves and hates, among other souls: see how it grinds against them in daily intercourse, wearing off their angularities of character, and parting with its own. See it in its relations of likeness. It is like the angels, diminished a little less than they; it is like the animating principle of brutes, over whom it is queen. It is braver, wiser, more generous, truthful, and free than this human soul; and less brave, wise, generous, truthful, and free than that. The soul is like an element of matter; who has sufficiently explored that likeness? Moreover, it is a thing to number, counting one in the rank of substances. It has its past history, its work in the present, its destiny to come. It is localized after the manner of spirits, its place being marked by what it thinks of. If any life were long enough, I might stock a library describing the relations of one soul, and I should die ere the description was complete. Yes, so numerous are the streams of reciprocity flowing to and from the soul, not of an Augustus or a Charlemagne, but of the meanest negro, that, "if they were written one by one, I think the world itself could not contain the books that would be written."

Even God has not disdained to enter into predicamental relations. To eschew a verbal dispute, I explain the sense in which I understand that God is really related to His creatures.

He would be the selfsame Being, without diminution, or increase, or alteration, had He never stretched forth His hand to create. The relation with creatures is free on His part, and makes no difference in Him. Creatures, on the contrary, by the fact of their existence, must be related to God. They never could have come to be from any other source. All that is in them over and above negations, all that they positively are, is His work. But they do not react upon Him. In this sense I affirm that God has contracted predicamental relations. He essentially possesses the power of contracting them, though He might have abstained from exercising it.

II. *Does any substance exist devoid of transcendental relations?* No, again; none whatever. The denial here is stronger than in the former answer. Nothing can physically exist that does not contain a transcendental relation—the complement, which, as I have shown, everywhere results from the conspiring of the *act* and *term*. *Act*, *Term*, and *Complement* have place in God Himself. The argument which manifests their presence in an angel, applies to Deity. The difference is, that the divine *Term* is not *potential*—not open to any more actuation than it receives. An angel, learning the conversion of a sinner, understands in his own mind an impression which was not there before. His *term* is more fully *actuated*. But the fulness of God cannot increase, for He eternally fills the amplest compass of possible being. Whatever exists in creatures, exists in Him more perfectly. God is infinitely existent, infinitely intelligible, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely understood by Himself. So the *Term* in Him is not *potential*. He cannot be understood otherwise than as He is understood. He outdoes passivity. When the waters covered the earth, they could abate but not overflow. God fills heaven and earth. He can neither rise to a new perfection, nor fall from an old one.

My readers will not expect from me a dissertation on the Blessed Trinity. They are aware that, while the existence of God is a truth both of reason and revelation, the Trinity is a truth of revelation which reason is incompetent to discover. Apart from faith we never should have known that the *act*, *term*, and *complement*, which constitute created spirits, are in God represented by three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. But now that we do know it, we find therein a confirmation of our philosophy, and much cause to admire the triune impress of their Maker which all creatures wear.

Creatures are physical beings, metaphysically composed of *act*, *term*, and *complement*. The *physical being*, as such, is something *absolute*; the *act* and the *term* are *correlative*; while

the complement, that is, the actuality of the act in the term, is the relation between them. It follows that *metaphysical relativity* precedes the *physical absolute being*; inasmuch as the act and the term must be related for the thing to be. The Relative precedes the Absolute in that sense. Yet it is plain that we cannot think of the act as related to the term, unless we conceive first the act itself as the subject of its relativity; in other words we must conceive a metaphysical being as something absolute, before we can speak of its being related. This remark introduces my third and last and most important inquiry.

III. *Can any substance be known out of all relation, as well transcendental as predicamental?* A thoughtful person will not be in a hurry to answer *yes* or *no* to this question. If he answers *yes*, he fears the further demand: "Pray, what predicate does your knowledge attach to the Absolute?" If he takes refuge in a *no*, he stands face to face with the following difficulty:\*

"We will suppose your answer correct. A man then does not know things in themselves, or Absolutes, but only relations of things to one another, relations, that is to say, of Absolute to Absolute. The Absolutes may be likened to letters, the relations to syllables. The syllables, according to you, are known, while the letters are unknown. We ask whether any syllable, SO for instance, is the same as the letters S and O which compose it, or is it aught besides? If you say it is the same, then, since the letters S and O are unknown, the syllable SO is likewise unknown. If the syllable is aught besides the letters which compose it, call whatever it is besides *a*. Then *a* is some one entity, that is to say, an Absolute, equally unknowable with either of the two other Absolutes S and O. Therefore, on your showing, nothing is knowable."

That is the difficulty, and to me it appears very formidable. On the other hand, I am not insensible of the difficulty of the alternative, that of knowing an Absolute. For a man knows a thing, when he is able to make the thing which he knows the subject of assertions; and what we chiefly assert is relation; hence we can hardly know the Non-Relative. I think, however, I see a way of escaping both difficulties. My escape is this. A thing, I say, is known to us *inchoatively* as an Absolute; and that *inchoative knowledge* gets its development from subsequent study of the thing in relation. We know a thing *inchoatively* when we know that it is, in simple contradistinction to its not being. Let me borrow an example from the earliest

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\* Propounded by Plato, *Theatetus*, pp. 202—206.



cognition which man compasses, the cognition of self. *I am* is the utterance of the understanding, as soon as ever the understanding becomes available. At that moment, the child, an infant no longer, knows *self* as opposed to *not-self*, and it knows nothing further. As the light of reason gains in brightness, the young reasoner recognizes *not-self* in external things. This experience reacts upon the idea of *self*, and clarifies that. In like manner, *good, right, beautiful, white*, and all other positive qualities, are first known dimly in their own absolute being, as opposed to the absence of them, and then are brought into greater distinctness by the experience of things from which those qualities are conspicuously absent, things that are *bad, wrong, ugly, or black*. Without this *inchoative grasp* of the Absolute, I am at a loss, with Plato, to conceive how the human mind could take the first step on the road of learning.

Not only is an *inchoative* knowledge possible of the Absolute, but also a *precisive* knowledge. That is, having known a thing in relation, we can mentally *prescind* from the relation, and know the thing by itself. Having read of *Hannibal as the conqueror of Varro*, we may leave Varro out of thought, and regard his conqueror simply as *the victorious Hannibal*. To be sure, *victorious*, when we follow it up, means *victorious over some one*; still the *over some one* is a very nebulous appendage to the main body of the concept *victorious*. We may form other concepts more *precisive* still. When we sing with the Psalmist, "Confess to the Lord, for He is good," we do not mean *good to Israel*, but *good in Himself*, away from all creation. The Absolute then is cognizable *precisively*, by dropping relations out of mind.

So far I have treated of the Relativity of Knowledge with respect to created intelligence. The inquiry remains—*Is the Absolute known to God?* It cannot be known *inchoatively*, for God does not *begin* to know. It cannot be known *precisively*, for God never *drops out of sight* any fact that is. However, the *precisive* knowledge, obtainable by man of the Absolute, gives a clue to the manner in which God knows things. Consider what is accomplished for us by the processes of Precision and Abstraction. By Precision we take a partial view of a thing; we generalize that view by Abstraction. Precision, for instance, yields us the concept of *the weight of this fish*, and Abstraction, the concept of *weight* in general. By the aid of general concepts we erect propositions. One proposition signifies a multitude of facts. Thus, asserting that *weight results from one body attracting another*, we have pronounced why a teacup is heavy, and why a star is. The more we know, the fewer and the more pregnant do our

propositions become. In this sense the wise man speaks little, for words to him mean much. Without general names, and concepts thereto corresponding—that is, without Abstraction—we should have to describe every fact in terms of its own. Our knowledge would be crushed beneath that pile of unsorted details. Now, Abstraction is not a faculty of the Divine mind, and yet God knows all things. Has He then a separate idea of each? That would be needful, if no two things were anywise alike. But such utter dissimilitude in creatures would be inconsistent with the unity of the Creator. All things are made to His one image; how should not one pattern run through them all? The idea of Him, therefore, from whom the pattern is taken, virtually amounts to a separate view of each separate thing; it is one Idea equivalent to many. That is God's sole Idea, His Word, in which He beholds Himself. There He discerns what He is and can do, and what He will do. All science is founded upon the former discernment, all history upon the latter.\* Science and history—the one the story of the possible, the other, that of the actual—embrace all that is knowable. Therefore God knows all things in knowing Himself.

Does He then know the Absolute? I now hope to answer that question clearly under four different heads:—

1. If *Absolute* means *Being*, devoid of predicamental relations, God does not know the Absolute, for no such being is.

2. If *Absolute* means *Being*, devoid of transcendental relations, God does not know the Absolute, for no such being is or can be.

3. If *Absolute* means *Being*, thought of out of all relation, as well transcendental as predicamental, God does not know the Absolute, for He does not think of beings otherwise than as they are.

4. But if *Absolute* means *Being*, competent to exist without aught else existing, containing all things possible within the compass of Its knowledge and power, then God does know the Absolute, for He is the Absolute, and He knows Himself.

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\* I do not wish, at the tail-end of a recondite argument, to start another about *scientia media*.

## ART IV.—THE QUEEN'S COLLEGES IN IRELAND.

*Report of the Queen's Colleges Commission and Minutes of Evidence annexed,*  
1858.

*Report of the Endowed Schools Commission and Minutes of Evidence annexed,*  
1857.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Belfast, and Appendices,*  
1850-72.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Galway, and Appendices,*  
1850-72.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Cork, and Appendices*  
*annexed,* 1850-72.

*Regulations of the Queen's University in Ireland.* 1850-72.

*Returns moved for and obtained by the O'CONNOR DON, M.P., June 24,*  
1870.

*Returns moved for and obtained by the Hon. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE,*  
*M.P., July 5, 1870.*

*Wayside Thoughts ; a Series of Essays on Education, read at the Lowell*  
*Institute, Boston, U.S., in the Spring of 1868.* By D'ARCY W.  
THOMPSON, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway.

*Competition, Endowment, and Trinity College, Dublin.* By EDWARD HOWLEY,  
Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, 1872. Dublin : W. B.  
Kelly ; London : Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

THERE can be no doubt that Parliament intended to establish a system of University education in Ireland, and that in conformity with this intent an Act was passed, which authorized the establishment of seats of University education in Belfast, Cork, and Galway. We have simply an inexhaustible supply of testimony upon this point. We have the original Act itself "*Anno octavo et nono Victoriae Reginae*," entitled, "*An Act to enable Her Majesty to endow new Colleges for the advancement of learning in Ireland*," and overflowing with all that potential eloquence about "*lands, tenements, and hereditaments*," which must remove every suspicion as to the good faith of the document. We have the speeches of distinguished statesmen, such as Sir James Graham and Lord Palmerston, who were plainly contemplating with perfect seriousness the execution of the design. We have Sir James Graham speaking quite fervently about "*the common arena in which the youth of Ireland may assemble*

and contend in honourable and honest rivalry for those exhibitions and prizes, and those honours which are consequent upon, and result from, superior intellect and superior attainment." We find Lord Palmerston soaring into the future, and seeing in the illustrious institutions which were to spring up from the fiat of the Legislature, the germs of a yet wider and greater University system. "I agree entirely," he said, "with those who consider this bill as only a foundation which requires a superstructure in order to make the plan complete. It will be found absolutely necessary to establish some central point, probably in connection with Trinity College, Dublin, which will combine these different colleges into one university, and will, if possible, connect Trinity College with it as a component part." We have letters patent expressly designating the proposed colleges as "the Queen's Colleges in Ireland," and somewhat later we have the Royal Charter purporting to combine and co-ordinate the said Queen's Colleges of Belfast, Cork, and Galway, into a "Queen's University in Ireland." Even if we had not the further and conclusive fact that under an obvious supposition Parliament annually votes large sums of public money for the support of the institutions in question, we believe that no impartial student of recent affairs can entertain a reasonable doubt that a quarter of a century ago, Parliament actually proposed to endow Ireland with a new university system, under the well-known title we have mentioned.

Nor are we without several indications that the project had some commencements of realization. Thus we have Queen's College Calendars and Queen's University Regulations, dating back to a time very shortly subsequent to the passing of the Act of Parliament referred to above; and in these documents there is, as far as paper goes, provision for substantially collegiate and university studies. There are the respectable titles of senators, and presidents and professors, registrars and bursars. There is a matriculation examination set down as comprising Greek, Latin, English, and mathematics. The undergraduate course for the degree of A.B. is, indeed, decidedly brief, not requiring an attendance of more than three sessions; but still, with fair pre-collegiate training, secured by an honest matriculation examination, a good deal can be done in three sessions. Of course, without a matriculation examination, or what amounts to the same thing, with a sham one, three times three sessions might be hardly adequate. It may, indeed, be said, that in university matters the matriculation examination is everything. Matriculation is the starting-point of university studies. According as you

lower the standard of matriculation you lower the standard of university studies, at least during the period which must be occupied in imparting, within the university halls, that secondary or primary instruction, which would have been secured by a good standard—a university standard, of matriculation. If you make the matriculation examination of a university a true university entrance-examination, you can forthwith set the freshman at true university work. If, so to speak, you make your university matriculation in reality an infant-school matriculation, you must only resign yourself to see your nominal university turned into an infant-school. Granted that you can make a graduate within three or four sessions out of a young fellow who has been required to get a good secondary education before you allowed him to enter your university halls, it does not at all follow that within three or four sessions you can make a graduate—at least it can be only a sham graduate—out of a lad or boy or bumpkin whom you let in before he was fit to enter a university, who does not really go to college but to school, when you allow him to go to you, and to whom, if you are to be anything, you must be a schoolmaster instead of a professor, for just as many sessions as may be necessary to supply the deficiencies your sham matriculation so culpably overlooked or so deliberately and dishonestly condoned. A university does not undertake the charge of boys or the first steps in education. It professes to continue, and in a certain sense to complete, the education of those who have already done with school, but are not yet fully prepared for the business of life and intercourse with the world. It must have the assurance, if it is conscientiously to fulfil its promise, that the students whom it takes in charge are already well grounded in the elements of the studies it professes to teach. Of course it may be considered politically expedient, in an unpopular institution, to imitate the conduct of some hard-pressed commanders of beleaguered citadels, who are reported to have made a show of soldiers with sentinel scarecrows and stuffed dummies. We are not talking at present, however, about such masqueradings, but about University education.

To return to the proposed Queen's University system in Ireland, and to the documentary indications we are considering, we find in calendars and such-like, the description of a moderate course of undergraduate studies, generally presenting the usual features of undergraduate studies in universities. There is also copious reference to the interesting incidents of prizes and scholarships of various kinds and values. There are sessional examinations prescribed for the termination of

each session, and, as we have intimated, there is a degree examination. There is indeed a considerable fault discernible in the scholarship regulations, which might, in certain circumstances, be productive of most grave and mischievous consequences. This is a certain bifurcation of studies encouraged from the very commencement of the first session of the undergraduate course by the separation of the scholarships proposed for competition at the commencement of each session into a literary division and a science division. We mean that from the very first day of entrance into the proposed university, the student was led to devote himself either to what we may generally call mathematical pursuits or to classical pursuits. The candidate for a science scholarship was apparently tempted to neglect the general studies, in order to devote himself exclusively to mathematics, and the literary student was subjected to similar pressure. Now, there is a time for all things, provided that all things are at their proper time. It is good for special literary genius to be encouraged; and it is good for special scientific genius to be encouraged, but the first object of university education is general education; and the one-sidedness which may be admirable in a senior Sophister or Wrangler, is by no means admirable in the junior freshman; and when rigorously maintained, as in the Queen's University prospectus, from the first day of matriculation to the last day of graduation, it might, as we have said, amount to something very pernicious indeed. We should, accordingly, have preferred to see the bifurcation of studies deferred for two or three sessions. Young fellows are not sent to a university to ride a particular hobby to death, but to acquire a broad groundwork of general information and knowledge, resting upon which, in riper years, their minds can turn to the indulgence of special tastes or the employment of special capacities. It may readily occur, besides, that premature onesideness is not a mark of bent at all, but of mere deficiency. Not even an honest matriculation examination could at all counterbalance the mischievous results of a premature and undisciplined one-sidedness; for if an honest matriculation examination is a necessity of a university, a general education is the fundamental and essential object of a university. The University is the grand vestibule and ante-chamber of all the nobler professions or specialties of life, and if you enthrone specialization on its threshold, you practically abolish the University. Of course, with premature specialization superposed on a sham matriculation, it may happen that you practically abolish the School. But of this, more hereafter.

The great fault of the Queen's University prospectus of



undergraduate studies being already what we have said, it remains to consider the crowning of the original design in the degree examination. And it may be admitted that, in this respect as well, the original design continued to present those general features of University education which we have observed throughout. Following the curriculum, and omitting some indications that absolute uniformity was for some time prescribed, it appears that the Baccalaureate of the Queen's University was to have been solely obtainable by passing at the termination of the undergraduate course in some one aggregate of three aggregates of subjects. There was a considerable scope for selection, but at the same time there was much uniformity. The following were the optional aggregates of subjects:—

1.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
English Philology and Criticism.  
Logic.  
Metaphysics, or Political Economy and Jurisprudence.

2.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
Chemistry.  
Physics.

3.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
Zoology and Botany.  
Physical Geography.

For our own part we freely confess that we would prefer absolute uniformity of graduation examination, even at the cost of extending an undergraduate curriculum from three sessions to four. We cannot say that we sympathize with three-session curricula. If there are to be graduates, let them be graduates; and if it takes four sessions to make a graduate, a three-session graduate is only a three-fourths graduate. If some young men must go to business or idleness sooner than others, why, let them, if it must be so. If they can only wait for half or three-fourths of a graduate's education, they will not lose their half or three-fourths by having to

content themselves with the title of sophister instead of graduate. The graduate will lose a great deal, however, by the mania for making out that the whole is not greater than its part. To be a graduate or not to be a graduate, that surely ought to appear to be the present question. If there must be four-penny bits, let there be four-penny bits; but there is no use debasing the sixpences to comfort the consequence of the four-penny bits. And we hardly love "optional" graduation better than piecemeal graduation, and, in good truth, what is "optional" graduation but piecemeal graduation? We are most strongly inclined to hold that for the A.B. examination at any rate, the system of option, root and branch, is intrinsically bad. It may be that whatever views are taken about the precise function and utility of the superior degrees, the Mastership, the Doctorate,—for the A.B. degree, which is the proper and peculiar test of that general education which is so indispensable to future culture of any kind, and which in respect to that future culture may be called the primary education of the man, the examination should not be optional, but should be absolutely and compulsorily uniform in all its details. If, however, we cannot have absolute uniformity, it is well to have considerable uniformity; and in this point of view the degree examination of the original Queen's University prospectus promised that there would not be more than three ambiguities, that there would not be more than three sorts of education included under the common term graduation. When, indeed, the ambiguities came to be interminable, when anything and everything was called a graduate—but again we must not anticipate. Our readers will observe that in this original prospectus of a degree examination there was no word of history. Physical geography was very well, but history was invisible. At that time, however, as President Pooley S. Henry, of Belfast, subsequently told a Queen's Colleges Commission, there were "some doubts as to the introduction of history into colleges established in Ireland!!" Still, on the whole, it cannot be gainsaid that the original plan of studies for the Queen's University fulfilled the general conditions of University studies, and if it had been fairly practised, though we might say that the Queen's University was a numerical failure and a grievance, at least it would not have been in our power to say something much more discreditable.

As soon as the A. B. examinations had been passed, there were proposed to the competition of the new graduates several prizes and medals in various specialties: the Greek and Latin Languages; English Language and Literature; Modern Continental Languages; Mathematics; Natural Philosophy;

Chemistry and Chemical Physics; Natural Sciences; Logic and Metaphysics; Jurisprudence and Political Economy; Keltic Languages; Sanscrit; and Arabic. Against these special prizes we have only to make our former objection, that we would prefer to see the era of specialization less close to the A. B. examination. Within a twelvemonth from the A. B. examination the A. M. examination awaited the progressive student. Of the A. M. examination it is unnecessary to say more than that its regulations were on the model of the A. B. examination. Such was the general outline of the curriculum in the original Queen's University in Ireland, which, as Sir James Graham hoped, was to be "the common arena in which the youth of Ireland were to assemble in honourable and honest rivalry, &c.," and which Lord Palmerston already saw in vision comprehending "Trinity College, Dublin," in the circle of its expansive utility.

As we have said, there are good grounds for the belief that there were some commencements of a realization of this University scheme, and as we desire above all things to fix with accuracy the exact condition of a subject of disquisition which has exercised the speculative abilities of so many ingenious persons, we shall endeavour to proceed with the utmost caution and circumspection. We are, besides, fully aware of the light which the fortunes of the Queen's University scheme are calculated to throw on the whole question of Irish education. Coming then to particulars we ask: What was the duration and development of this ambitious and comprehensive design? How long did it last? How wide did it extend?

In the first place, it is tolerably certain that at present, at any rate, the Queen's University has not absorbed or comprehended Trinity College, Dublin. And for one very sufficient reason. Although Trinity College, Dublin, be the reverse of an absolutely perfect institution, it is at least a University College, and for it to enter into line with the Queen's Colleges it would be necessary for the Queen's Colleges to be University Colleges also. Now, whatever the Queen's Colleges may have been designed to be, or whatever they may have been at some primeval stage of their creation, it is simply certain that they have ceased to be colleges—except in name of course—since some years, at any rate. Thus as far back as the year 1868 at least, we have the clearest and distinctest evidence that the so-called Queen's University had become an ordinary aggregation of mere secondary schools, or an extraordinary aggregation, if our readers see reason to prefer the expression. We shall afterwards inquire at what date beyond 1868 the transformation was completed.

The evidence which we call upon the state of the Queen's Colleges in 1868 is supplied by no less trustworthy a witness than an actual member of the Queen's University professoriate itself. We shall continue to use the words "College," "University," "Professor," &c.; but our readers need not be biassed by such epithets. In 1868 Mr. D'Arcy Thompson, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway, had been invited to deliver a course of lectures before the Lowell Institute at Boston, in the United States. Mr. Thompson was the author of some entertaining sketches, entitled "Day-dreams of a Schoolmaster." He had been master of a grammar-school at Edinburgh previous to his appointment to a "professorial chair" in the Queen's University. He is an attached supporter of the secular system of education, and, conducting one of the very principal courses of liberal studies known to scholarship, he must be considered to be in every way qualified to interpret the nature of the institution he describes. We do not know the origin of Mr. Thompson's invitation to the United States, no more than we can explain the happy impulse which set him to gossip so pleasantly before the good folks of Boston about the sort of affair that was called a University in Ireland. It is sufficient for us to follow his interesting revelation. The reader will see in it a graphic description of school education, and nothing but school education, commencing with the most elementary stages, and ending, as might be expected—what more could be done in a curriculum of three sessions?—at a stage no higher than secondary. Indeed, Mr. Thompson compares the finished "graduate" of the Queen's University at the close of the three years' curriculum, not with the finished graduate of any university in the world, but merely with himself (Mr. Thompson) years and years before he became a graduate, and when he was only leaving school for the University of Cambridge. We are reminded of Vice-President Andrews, of Belfast, when telling the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, ten years before, the sort of degree that would fit the Queen's University to a nicety. "It is essential," he observed, "that you should have a university degree, or a degree," he sagaciously added, "*corresponding in name and appearance with the old title.* Not that you must uphold the old Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course." Oh! dear, no! "Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course, but a course prescribed by a university, and which, being pursued in these colleges, leads to a university degree." Most candid Vice-President Andrews, of Belfast! We fear that you have thrown some light on the school—we beg pardon, the "University"—of

the Presbyterian ministry in Ireland. But really we are again anticipating, as well as delaying Mr. Thompson's revelations. We quote from the volume "Wayside Thoughts," in which Mr. Thompson published his Boston lectures on his return.

Once a priest, always a priest ; once a schoolmaster, always a schoolmaster. Not so—at least nominally—with myself. *I have been kicked upstairs.* I have been one of the favoured few allowed to emerge from the routine duties and unworthy thralldom of scholastic life to the more congenial duties and almost perfect freedom of the life professorial. I have, furthermore, had the good fortune to be called to a chair in a university where the professoriate is in full (!), vital (!!), vivifying (!!!) action. *Have my duties been essentially altered? Not in the very slightest degree. I have been for the last three years fulfilling the identical duties performed for twelve previous years with my senior classes in Dunedin.*

Evidently Mr. Thompson thinks it extremely nice to be called a Professor in the Queen's University for what the canny Dunedin folk called him only a schoolmaster. However, it would appear from his own words that this pleasing effect of full, vital, vivifying action rather astonished himself until he got used to it. In proof of this, the reader will hear him describe his own emotions of agreeable surprise. His account of the development of his ideas upon the subject is marked at once by a gentle facetiousness and a charming candour, and we have much pleasure in reproducing it.

*When first elected to my present chair, I had stereotyped in my mind an ideal character of a professor. . . . I feared it would be requisite for me to give elaborate dissertations upon such unfamiliar and not very practical subjects as the "Architecture of the Parthenon"; the "Dikasteries of Athens"; the "Sophists of Antiquity"; the "Exports and Imports of Corinth"; the "Greek Particles"; the "Achaean League." I considered it would be incumbent upon me, at least once in three years, to annotate a Greek play in Latin, to wrangle about microscopic trivialities, and to make facetiously scurrilous remarks in my footnotes about all previous and contemporary annotators. . . . I was reassured to find that the chair I was called upon to fill was just such a chair as I had filled to my own comfort for twelve long years. In fact I was still—what I am to this day—a schoolmaster.*

Our readers will hardly be so "reassured." Mr. Thompson goes on to exhibit in detail the thorough parallelism between his present "professorial" and his past "scholastic" experiences. Nobody will assert that Mr. Thompson underrates his own capacity for producing the greatest possible amount of improvement in the shortest possible space of time. He goes so far as to say that after *three* years under his tuition a Queen's University pupil knows, if anything, a little more than

a pupil of any other school after *twelve* years under the tuition of anybody else. Our readers will join in hoping that this may be the case, since one thing appears certain at any rate, that at the *beginning* of their three years the pupils of Mr. Thompson are in as elementary a condition as the pupils of anybody else at the beginning of their twelve.

The youths I had now under my charge, were of the same age as those attending the two senior classes of my Dunedin school. *The majority of them had been very poorly prepared. . . .* I had only three hours a week severally with my new pupils, and only some twenty hours a year; and yet, *strange to say*, I have for the last year been reading with pupils *who learned their elements with me not three years ago* entire books from the best Greek authors, with a facility of understanding on their part that I had never myself experienced when, between nineteen and twenty, after twelve years of almost exclusively classical instruction, I left St. Edward's for the University of Cambridge, &c. &c. . . . *Many of my first year's students*

[we are almost ashamed to continue our quotations]

*come to me almost utterly innocent of Greek. . . . For a few weeks they are engaged in mastering declensions and conjugations. . . . As soon as the acquaintance is tolerably well mastered, I begin to read some such easy work, in vivâ voce translation, as the "Apology" of Plato. . . . By-and-by they will hear me read a book of Homer. . . . After a little while I exact, so far as I can exact, three carefully written exercises weekly. . . . I have been enabled to achieve what many will think impossible results, &c. &c.*

Good heavens! Is this what the Queen's Colleges have sunk to, and is this all that remains of the realization of the Queen's University scheme which was to thrust a despised and hostile secularism on an intellectual and Catholic nation?

Elsewhere, in "Wayside Thoughts," Mr. Thompson says:

*During the last three years I have had in the management of an Alpha-Beta class one-fourth part of my professorial duties.*

What a flood of explanation is poured upon the whole working and position of the so-called University by these astounding confessions, not more astounding, however, as our readers will shortly perceive, than the confession on other occasions of almost the entire body of Mr. Thompson's colleagues and associates. What must be the shifts, what must be the nature of the Matriculation examination which admitted all these "students, almost utterly innocent of Greek," all these "Alpha-Beta classes"? Our readers are aware of the all-important influence of a university upon the secondary education of a country. It is the University which sets the standard of the secondary education. Boys cannot be expected to remain at school much beyond the time



when they are fit for college; and what sort of schools can they be whose standard is set by Mr. Thompson's University? We have heard of university training-schools. What sort of training-schools can they be whose function is the preparation of students fit for the Queen's Colleges? Is this the manner in which the annual sums voted from the moneys of the taxpayers, the scholarships, and exhibitions of the Queen's University operate to develop the school system of Ireland? Ten years previously Professor Melville, of Queen's College, Galway, had confessed to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners in 1858, "I must honestly state that if we had no scholarships and no exhibitions we might as well shut the doors." And is it for this state of things that "the doors" are kept open?

How terribly in consonance with Mr. Thompson's narrative is the evidence which the Endowed Schools Commission in 1857 managed to get out of a teacher of the Galway Grammar-school of Erasmus Smith, upon the subject of the influence already exercised by the Queen's Colleges upon such of the secondary education of the country as came within their reach. When the Commissioners of Inquiry into the state of Endowed Schools in Ireland visited the Galway Grammar-school of Erasmus Smith, they found it their duty to describe it in their Report as "one of the most depressed and backward schools in the kingdom." And yet out of a total of *twenty-six* Galway Erasmus Smith pupils who matriculated in the local Queen's College from 1849 to 1857, no less than *twenty-four* were rewarded with scholarships *immediately on entrance*. How explain the apparent anomaly? The Rev. J. W. Hallowell, the head master, happened to be absent when the Endowed Schools Commissioners paid their visit. Mr. Thomas Killeen, the second master, was present, however, and the Commissioners proceeded to extract from him, in spite of the most evident reluctance and apprehension, an account of the reasons for the decline of the school. But let us follow the minutes of evidence, omitting nothing but the most absolutely extraneous matter.

MR. THOMAS KILLEEN sworn and examined.

The CHAIRMAN.—What situation do you hold in the Grammar-school?

WITNESS.—Second Master.

The CHAIRMAN.—Can you assign any reasons for the falling off in the number of pupils?

WITNESS.—I am placed in a critical situation. *If I get blame from the Governors, it is at my own risk; they can dismiss me when they like.* I could assign some reasons.

MR. STEPHENS.—Will you be pleased to assign the reasons for the decline of the school?

WITNESS.—In general, I think the terms are rather high.

MR. STEPHENS.—Are those the only reasons you can assign for the decline of the school?

WITNESS.—Roman Catholics, generally, when I solicited them to send their sons there, said, Why should we not give a preference to the Roman Catholic schools, where they would be taught their own religion. Another reason is, it is too far to go to the school, particularly for those who live at the other side of the town, for they would have a good mile to walk.

MR. STEPHENS.—Can you assign any other reasons for the decline of the school?

WITNESS.—I cannot at present.

MR. STEPHENS.—*I think you said that if you were to assign the reason for the decline of the school you would offend the Governors; did you not say so?*

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

MR. STEPHENS.—*Are the reasons you have assigned now for the decline of the school likely to offend the Governors?*

WITNESS.—*I believe not.*

MR. STEPHENS.—*Then you must have some other reasons?*

WITNESS.—*Perhaps so.*

MR. STEPHENS.—*State them.*

WITNESS.—When the Queen's Colleges opened, I consider the principal reason for our scholars falling off is, *they were admitted there before they knew their grammar at school.* I can say the professors themselves gave it as their opinion—and some of them are listening to me at present—that they had to teach the pupils grammar after being admitted as scholars of the Queen's College; instead of being professors they had to teach them just as we do at school. *They got scholarships when they ought to have remained two or three years longer at school.*

Our readers will observe that Mr. Killeen and Mr. Thompson, the schoolmaster who has not “been kicked upstairs,” as well as the schoolmaster who has experienced that enjoyment, the dependent teacher who is half-divided between the obligations of his oath and the fear of the Governors, and the communicative lecturer to Transatlantic audiences, are found to be substantially in accordance with one another and, though separated by a distance of ten years, to strongly corroborate each other. We must allow Mr. Killeen to conclude, however. He has a little more to tell to the astonished Commissioners.

MR. STEPHENS.—Did they get scholarships with emoluments?

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

REV. DOCTOR GRAVES.—When so imperfectly instructed as you say?

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

MR. STEPHENS.—What is the value of a scholarship?

WITNESS.—£24 a year, and about £4 pays their fees; so they generally have £20 a year, and a good many premiums. They leave our school before

they are finished. *I have a son myself at school that might get a scholarship at the Queen's College, perhaps a better scholar than some of those who have got scholarships, and I would not let him go in till he is better finished; for if a boy does not know his grammar, a professor cannot teach him these things.*

We do not expect that our readers will much longer hesitate to agree that for a good many years already it has been proved of Queen's College, Galway, at any rate, that the proposed Queen's University scheme, which was to have made such a figure in the world, has pretty well returned to grandmaternal chaos and congenial nothing. And Queen's College, Galway, be it remembered, in no way, except in numbers, falls below the kindred institutions at Cork and Belfast. As far as numbers go, it is usually trebled or quadrupled by the Belfast establishment; but considering that the superiority of Belfast is solely a superiority in the matter of tag-rag-and-bobtail, Galway equalling Belfast in culture—such culture!—and only yielding to Belfast in the exceeding horde of pass-men, Alpha-Beta students and such like, whom the Presbyterian atmosphere and nominal matriculation of the “Northern Athens” attract to its Calvinistic embraces, Galway must be taken as a remarkably favourable sample of the extraordinary Queen's University. Professor Craik, of Queen's College, Belfast, was anxious to impress upon the Queen's College Commissioners that “possibly I could hardly go the length of saying that if a person came entirely ignorant of the English language I should pass him.” Possibly, however, our readers may not consider this remarkable severity precisely satisfactory. We shall have occasion to speak of Belfast, however, at greater length further on. For the present we would only quote, in confirmation of our statement that Galway College is an extremely favourable sample of the Queen's University, the following paean of triumph in which that respectable provincial journal the “Galway Vindicator” indulged at the special expense of Belfast College only the year after Mr. Thompson's revelations as to the abject plight of Galway College studies. “The result of the last annual inter-collegiate competition for the Peel Exhibitions,” writes the “Galway Vindicator” of December 11th, 1869, “has been announced. We are happy to state that Galway is *facile princeps*. In the Faculty of Arts the Galway candidate is first of the whole University, the Belfast champion coming in a very distant second, and Cork being absolutely nowhere. *This is the third time in four years that Belfast has been thoroughly well beaten by Galway.* The second Galway candidate equals the first of Belfast . . . In the Faculty of Engineering, a candidate from Galway College, *similarly following the uniform example of his Galway predecessors, gains*

the very first place in the whole University. In the Faculty of Medicine again, the candidate of Galway College likewise distances all competition. When we remember that another student of Galway College has recently carried off the gold medal of the Diploma of Elementary Law, it will be seen that *the local Queen's College has completed the round of all the prizes in all the Faculties, and has swept away everything in its course, we may say, with the most perfect nonchalance.* As we have said, Cork is nowhere. And Belfast is next to nowhere. Remembering that these colleges probably quintuple in numbers Galway at the least, the state of Mixed Education, both north and south, may be better imagined than described." Of a certainty, the state of Mixed Education, north and south and west, may be better imagined than described.

We are engaged upon a work of investigation, however, and it cannot content us to note the disappearance in practice of that Queen's University scheme, which in theory looked so imposing to parliamentary projectors. At what date can we decidedly fix the disappearance? What caused the failure? Has the theory disappeared along with the practice? that is to say, has the Queen's University ceased to exist not only as *fact* but as *plan*? Has, not alone the actual *matter* of studies, but the original *outline* of studies, fallen a victim to progressive Alpha-Betaism? Or, putting the question another way, supposing that the elements of numerical success were to be present to the Queen's University, supposing there were no longer the temptation to bribe schoolboys with scholarships before they had learned their grammar at school, would the Queen's University begin to be a university even then? *Does even the outline of studies remain, or has the original design itself been sacrificed to the miserable necessities of a losing struggle with appearances?* In a word, does the Queen's University in Ireland exist even on paper? We have seen that its courses of study existed on paper twenty years ago. Do they as much as exist on paper to-day? The documents of the Queen's University, its calendars and regulations, will supply the answer.

We know that the Queen's University has wandered widely in a good many things from the design of its founders. As Sir Robert Kane, of Queen's College, Cork, told the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, "the idea was in the first instance to develop the Faculty of Arts on a large scale." Naturally the professional schools were little thought of in comparison, since it was not professional training but University education that was required. Subsequently, "events made me sensible," continued Sir Robert Kane, "that it was necessary to the

success of the educational system and its favourable reception by the country that the Faculties of Medicine, &c., should be constituted." Subsequently also our readers are aware that the Professional Faculties have come even numerically almost to constitute the University. During the session 1868-69, and according to returns obtained by the O'Connor Don and Mr. Fortescue, there were in the Queen's Colleges, 465 Medical, Law, and Engineering students, to the 228 Arts or University students; and of these 228, be it observed, only 37 were Catholics. We do not, however, propose to dwell upon the transformation. It is sufficient to know that of the poor total of 600 or 700 students described to be in attendance at the Queen's University, hardly a third, and sometimes hardly a fourth, have an atom more to do with the Queen's University, except in the sense of local contiguity, than if they were articulated to a civil engineer or walking the hospitals of Dublin or Edinburgh. From the time the medical student enters the Queen's University to the time he leaves, he takes no part in even the Alpha-Beta classes of the Arts Faculty. He patronizes Mixed Education merely in the sense that he conducts his anatomical and other experiments in an annex of the Queen's College buildings; and when the advocates of the Mixed System count him to the credit of the system's success, they are simply guilty of a very discreditable juggle so far as they are acquainted with the real connection of the Professional Faculties with the so-called University. Leaving out of calculation, accordingly, the four or five hundred professional students whom the extreme lowness of the fees, and the entire freedom from any educational curriculum, attract within the annexes of the Queen's Colleges, we can only concern ourselves with the so-called Arts Faculty of the Queen's University. If the University is anywhere, it is in the Arts Faculty. If the University is not there, it is nowhere, and in the Queen's University the University is nowhere. But to our documents.

Our readers remember that Baccalaureate examination of the original Queen's University to which we directed attention at an early stage of our article. We were inclined to quarrel with its optional character, by which a candidate could elect to take his degree in any of three groups of subjects. At the same time, while expressing our preference for a more thorough uniformity in the recognized test of University education, we admitted that the original design of the Queen's University Baccalaureate, as of its general course of studies, was fairly consonant with a university character. We had likewise our doubts about the expediency of placing the prizes and medals

for distinction in specialties so close to the general examination. We should have preferred to have seen the prizes and medals awarded for distinction in the general or degree examination. Still our first impulse must be to see how the original design can have come to fare amid the exigencies created by Alpha-Beta undergraduates and scholarshipped schoolboys, who got scholarships before they had learned their grammars. Who knows but we may find that the optionality of the degree examination has been considerably increased, has perhaps been doubled. The difficulty of making graduates out of the sort of students admitted by a sham matriculation must be rather extreme when there is a curriculum of only three sessions for the performance of the operation. There may have been temptation at work to facilitate the manufacture of graduates by breaking up the degree examination more and more into optional bits and fragments. It would be so much easier, we can understand, for a hopeful Alpha-Betist to pick up a knowledge of a bit, rather than of the whole of any examination, and, as we know, the Queen's University was dreadfully embarrassed by the want of graduates. The Queen's University was, unfortunately for its projectors, neither in Borrioboola-Gha nor Fiji, and a supply of visible converts was indispensable. As the Rev. President Henry, of Queen's College, Belfast, had told the Queen's Colleges Commissioners: "*What I desire to see, and what the Council desire to see, is the number of our degrees increased; because it will become very painful, if the present state of things continue, to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and be able to present to the public no degrees.*" Or perhaps,—let us be charitable—the Queen's University will be found to have extended its original curriculum from three sessions to six or nine, in order to provide for the education, elementary, secondary, and university, of the sort of students its numerical exigencies drive it to admit at the most elementary stage. It is true that Mr Thompson's revelations hardly support this charitable view. But, at any rate, let us consult the existing regulations.

Consulting the Regulations of the Queen's University in Ireland for the present and recent years, we certainly find no trace of an extension in the duration of the curriculum, and our readers will be led to suspect that perhaps the desired facilitation of graduate manufacture has been achieved by some moderately mischievous *morcellement* of the degree examination. What if the degree examination be discovered to be broken up into five or six optional fragments or groups. The expedient would not have been very creditable; but still expedients will sometimes be tried notwithstanding. Consider



the "painfulness" of "having our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and being able to present the public with no degrees."

Let us consult the Regulations again for the exact condition of the Queen's University degree. But what on earth is this we discover? Broken up "into five or six fragments" did we say? A hundred fragments rather. Innumerable fragments rather. Alpha-Betaism has done its work. The sham matriculation has done its work. There is no longer a degree examination. The "Graduates" that must be presented to the public at "our assemblages in St. Patrick's Hall," have had to be manufactured by other means than degree examinations. Degree examinations are not for grammarless schoolboys after a course of three sessions. But let the Regulations of this monstrous institution speak for themselves.

There are "Honour" graduates and "Pass" graduates, and not even the handful of "Honour" graduates pass the old degree examination. Nowadays the "Honour" graduates of the Queen's "University get their degrees for less than the specialties which used to be the subjects of medals and prizes subsequent to the degree examination. There used to be a dozen of such specialties. There are *seventeen* varieties of "Honour degrees" Any one of *seventeen* bits of education, at the termination of a curriculum of three sessions, is the sufficient qualification of even the "Honour graduate" of the Queen's University. The schoolboy can become an "Honour graduate" in

1. The Greek and Latin Languages ; or
2. Mathematical Science ; or
3. Experimental Science ; or
4. Natural Science ; or
5. The French and German Languages ; or
6. The German and Italian Languages ; or
7. The French and Italian Languages ; or
8. English Language and Literature, Logic and Metaphysics ; or
9. English Language and Literature, Logic and History ; or
10. English Language and Literature, Logic and Political Economy ; or
11. English Language and Literature, Metaphysics and History ; or
12. English Language and Literature, Metaphysics and Political Economy ; or
13. English Language and Literature, History and Political Economy ; or
14. Logic, Metaphysics, and History ; or

15. Logic, Metaphysics, and Political Economy ; or
16. Logic, History, and Political Economy ; or
17. Metaphysics, History, and Political Economy.

The Ancient Classics of a Queen's University curriculum ! "I do not think," confessed upon oath Vice-President Ryall, of Queen's College, Cork, to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, "we have sent out more than one man who would get honours in the English universities in classics." A couple of years ago a classical Master of Arts, and gold medallist of the Queen's University was only able to obtain, a few months after his Queen's University distinctions, a fourth or fifth *sizarship* in Trinity College, Dublin. The History of a Queen's University curriculum ! The Metaphysics of a Queen's University curriculum ! So much for general education and regular academic training among even the "Honour graduates" of the Queen's University in Ireland !

As might be expected, the vast majority of the Queen's University graduates are not even such honour men. And if the manufacture of the Honour graduates was astounding, the manufacture of the Pass graduates beggars description. It is no longer *seventeen* bits of education amongst which the Alpha-Betist can choose. Anything, literally anything, qualifies the Pass graduate of the Queen's University, the luminous Queen's University, whose radiance is too dazzling for the malevolent obscurantism of the Catholic Church. Thus there is a Pass degree to be got for

1. English Language and Literature, and Mathematics ; or
2. English Language and Literature, and Experimental Physics ; or
3. English Language and Literature, and Chemistry ; or
4. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Botany ; or
5. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Greek ; or
6. English Language and Literature, and Botany and Greek ; or
7. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Latin ; or
8. English Language and Literature, and Botany and Latin ; or
9. Logic and Metaphysics, and History and Political Economy ; or
10. Chemistry, Political Economy, and French ; or
11. French, German, and Chemistry ; or
12. Chemistry, Political Economy, and French ; or
13. Chemistry, History, and Logic ; or

14. Logic and Metaphysics, and English Language and Literature; or
  15. Mathematical Science, Political Economy, and French; or
  16. German, Experimental Physics, and Botany; or
  17. Italian, Botany, and English Language and Literature; or
  18. French, German, Italian, and Zoology; or
  19. History, Italian, and Experimental Physics; or
  20. Political Economy, Italian, and Chemistry; or
  21. History, Logic, and French and German; or
  22. Logic, Mathematical Science, and French; or
  23. Botany, Zoology, Italian, and History; or—
- But it is better to transcribe the Regulation on the subject. Our readers may then construct "degrees" *ad libitum* for themselves.

EXAMINATION FOR THE DEGREE OF B.A. WITHOUT HONOURS.

Candidates who seek the Degree without Honours may select for their Examination any group of subjects from the following list, provided the sum of the numbers attached in this list to the selected subjects be at least four :—

English Language and Literature, 2	Latin, - - - - - 1
Mathematical Science, - - - 2	Each Modern Continental Lan-
Experimental Physics, - - - 2	guage, - - - - - 1
Chemistry, - - - - - 2	Logic, - - - - - 1
Zoology, - - - - - 1	Metaphysics, - - - - - 1
Botany, - - - - - 1	History, - - - - - 1
Greek, - - - - - 1	Political Economy, - - - - 1

There are Permutations and Combinations! Do our readers dimly comprehend how "a degree," as the Belfast Vice-President observed, "corresponding in name and appearance with the old title" can be managed in these days of enlightened secularism? It may be as well, however, to illustrate the sort of erudition which is required for these precious "degrees." Let us take the examinations in Ancient Classics, in Modern Languages, and in History, as easily understood specimens, and for the sake of uniformity we shall quote from the University Regulations of the session which saw Mr. Thompson's American confessions. For the cost of a shilling or thereabouts, our readers can supply themselves with the Regulations of any other year they may fancy. But to our quotations :—

The Examination in GREEK will comprise—

In 1868.

Xenophon—Cyropædeia, Books 1, 2.

Homer—Iliad, Book 9.

with prose composition in Greek.

The Examination in Latin will comprise—  
In 1868.

Sallust.

Horace—Satires and Epistles.

with prose composition in Latin.

In MODERN LANGUAGES the candidate will be required to translate an easy passage from an English author into the language or languages he selects. He will also be expected to possess an elementary knowledge of the literature of those languages.

The portion appointed for the examination in HISTORY is English History from 1603 to 1702.

Perhaps on another occasion we may describe other distinctions of the Queen's Colleges course. "Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity Colleges course," as we have learned from the canny North, "but a course prescribed by a University, and which being pursued in these colleges leads to a University degree." *Voilà de l'esprit!*

We have promised, however, to state, at least approximately, when the Queen's University definitely ceased to exist, or, in other words, fell into its present condition. We had serious thoughts of commending this portion of our narrative to the attention of Mr. Bret Harte, Mr. Mark Twain, and similar gentlemen, whose vocation is to deal with humorous subjects. We felt that in a steady-going Quarterly Review it was hardly in keeping to venture on a topic which we knew to be so utterly hostile to all sedateness and gravity. Perhaps the recollection of what the Queen's University has meant to Ireland will aid us in an endeavour to describe with some sobriety the thing as it was in itself.

It was in the year 1857 that a commission, consisting of the Marquis of Kildare, the late Sir Thomas Redington, Messrs. James Gibson and Bonamy Price, inspected the three Queen's Colleges of Belfast, Galway, and Cork. A glance at the report which they prefixed to the Minutes of Evidence is sufficient to give a broad inkling of something excessively curious. Amid the usual cloud of sentimentalities about the incalculable advantages of education, and of auguries about the part which the Queen's Colleges, *if properly managed*—your *If* is a great save-all, as well as a great peacemaker—were calculated to play, &c. &c., it is evident the commissioners have seen and heard quite enough to astonish them out of their official optimism. With regard to the Queen's Colleges Matriculation, they write that "*nothing could, we conceive, be more injurious to the interests of education than a low standard of matriculation examination. . . . the tendency of such should always be to elevate, and never to depress, the general standard*

of school education throughout the country." Had, then, the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, like the Endowed School Commissioners, heard that the tendency of the Queen's Colleges Matriculation was to depress that general standard? With regard to the Queen's Colleges Scholarship system, the commissioners write—"On comparing the number of scholarships in the Faculty of Arts with the number of students attending in the same faculty in the colleges, we are of opinion that it is desirable to diminish their number." Had, then, the commissioners heard that the Queen's Colleges scholarships were not the rewards of ability but the bribes of attendance? With regard to the curriculum of studies, and especially with regard to the degree examination, the commissioners write that "there is presented to the authorities a constant temptation to excuse inattention to the general course," and that "a general education forms the soundest basis on which pre-eminent merit in particular branches of literature or science can rest." Had, then, the commissioners met with evidence that general education was being already silently sacrificed, as it has since been avowedly discarded, in order to make sham graduates within three sessions out of schoolboys who had not the time to graduate in a general course, who had been admitted to college before they had learned their grammar at school, who had been bribed with scholarships when they ought to have remained two or three years longer at school? We have seen the radical change which has since been effected in the original curriculum. Was it with the approval of the commissioners—although that would have been no excuse—that this destruction of the original scope and constitution of the Queen's University has taken place? On the contrary, the commissioners distinctly write that they "cannot think a radical alteration desirable"; and that, on reviewing the evidence, they had come to the conclusion that the "suggestions" of "the great majority of the presidents and professors in the three colleges" had "in a great degree been influenced by the deficient state of preparation in which the students enter the colleges." Had, then, "the great majority of the presidents and professors" the self-possession to adduce the sham matriculation as a reason for the legalization of a sham Baccalaureate?

In simple truth, this was the literal fact.

"It is essential," said Vice-President Andrews, of Queen's College, Belfast, "that you should have a University degree, or a degree corresponding in name and appearance with the old title. . . . Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course, but a course prescribed by a University"—that

is, a Queen's University—"and which, being pursued in these colleges, leads to a University degree."

"What I desire to see, and what the Council desire to see," said President Pooley Henry, D.D., of Queen's College, Belfast, "is the number of our degrees increased, because it will become very painful, if the present state of things continue, to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and be able to present to the public no degrees. . . . I think conscientiously," continued the reverend President, "now as there is a commission sitting, and sitting for some purpose, it would be an Unfortunate Thing if the opportunity were allowed to pass without something being done to rectify the present system."

Ah, gentlemen of the General Assembly of the Presbyterians of Ulster, who affect to take so much interest in Catholic education, it was an Unfortunate Thing that you did not take more interest in your own. It was an Unfortunate Thing for your reputation, that resolution of yours of October, 1849.

Whereas one of our ministers, in whose capacity and paternal care we have entire confidence, has been appointed Dean of Residences, and whereas the qualifications and character of the persons appointed in Queen's College, Belfast, for those classes which the students of this Church have been hitherto required to attend, are such as to justify this Assembly in accepting certificates and degrees from that college, we now permit our students to attend the classes in the Queen's College, Belfast.

And it continues to be a very Unfortunate Thing for your reputation that your Divinity students continue to form the bulk of the attendance at Queen's College, Belfast, to-day as much as when Professor MacDonall deposed to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners that the bulk of his class consisted of "gentlemen contemplating Presbyterian Orders." Without the Presbyterian Divinity Students, Queen's College, Belfast, would, like the kindred institutions at Galway and Cork, be the most utter *numerical* failure. With the Presbyterian Divinity students, it is only an educational failure, the mass of the "gentlemen contemplating Presbyterian Orders" being everything the matriculation practices would lead the reader to expect. It is certainly an Unfortunate Thing, when only thirty years ago, their distinguished co-religionist Sir William Hamilton had to describe the churchmen of the Scottish Kirk as the "least learned" national clergy in the world, that the Irish branch of that kirk should have had no better means of improving their condition than the Queen's University in Ireland.

Mr. Nesbitt, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway, and at present Professor of Latin in Queen's College, Belfast,



in reply to the Commissioners, felt "quite certain that many students are now deterred from going up for their degree, on account of the very limited nature of their classical attainments. The students come here knowing little or no classics, and when a strict examination stares them in the face," he touchingly continued, "you can easily see what a deterring influence it has." Mr. Nesbitt was accordingly prepared to advocate a scheme which would "merely allow the mathematical student, or the student for honours in *any other subject*, to get rid of subjects which he can never acquire any profound knowledge of, and which are merely a drag upon him." President Berwick, of Queen's College, Galway, showed himself quite worthy of his Northern colleagues. "There is a great hankering after Greek," he complained; "I should be glad to see the degree given without forcing this language on any one." President Berwick was asked by Sir Thomas Redington, "Am I to understand that you are favourable to admitting candidates to the degree of A.B., although they should not have that general education and information which the present course requires?" He answered, "The students only get a smattering in a great number of the subjects." And being pressed to explain himself openly, confessed that the students were smatterers for the simple reason that the matriculations were such shams that, "it would require twice the period" of the actual curriculum to enable them to master it. But we shall give this astounding avowal in President Berwick's own words. "It would require twice the period. . . . I believe in order to master the present curriculum, the student should enter college a good classical scholar, well-grounded in Greek and Latin, and have acquired a respectable knowledge of mathematics. *The fact is this, they come with nothing that can be called classical knowledge; they know nothing about classics in fact, but they come prepared in mathematics to a certain degree.*" And, accordingly, President Berwick would be glad to see a degree given without forcing Greek upon any one. As the Belfast president says, "it will become very painful to continue to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and to be able to present to the public no degrees."

"You conceive the information the students acquire," asked Mr. Price, "is what may be called '*smattering*'?" And President Berwick promptly replied, "that is inevitable, *because they have to begin with the rudiments.*" Exactly what the Erasmus Smith schoolmaster told us, "our school is destroyed because the Queen's College takes our scholars before they have learned their grammar." Another question put by Mr. Price to President Berwick relates to that transformation of

the so-called Professors into Schoolmasters of very humble pretensions, of which Mr. Thompson told his American friends. "*Then the system,*" said Mr. Price, "*as it now works, involves this practical drag to the teachers, that they are compelled to be elementary teachers to the mass of students?*" And President Berwick in 1857, like Mr. Thompson in 1868, replies, "*To the large majority they are.*" President Berwick is finally driven to confess that the "inevitable" consequence of all this "elementary" teaching, even in 1857, while the degree had not as yet been chopped up and degraded to what the reader has seen, was to make the pretended University a mere school—the Commissioner is good enough to say, a high school. We beg to give this piece of evidence at length. President Berwick has nothing better to say in defence of the practices of his college than that Belfast and Cork are behaving as badly.

MR. GIBSON.—Do you think that a University which should confer the degrees for an amount of education which could be conferred in a high school, would be discharging its functions?

PRESIDENT BERWICK.—No.

MR. GIBSON.—Do you not think it the province of the Professor to be something more than a mere schoolmaster?

PRESIDENT BERWICK.—Certainly.

MR. GIBSON.—And in every college which forms part of a University the necessary range of a Professor should be of a much higher order than that adopted in a mere high school?

PRESIDENT BERWICK.—Yes.

How Mr. Berwick must have enjoyed this line of examination! He was not going to be let loose even at this point.

MR. GIBSON.—You have stated that the preparation of the students who present themselves for matriculation is such that if you regarded their fitness to enter on the present curriculum, you would be obliged to reject eight out of ten.

President Berwick had admitted so much to Sir Thomas Redington: but to continue Mr. Gibson's question.

*Am I therefore to infer that the college under present circumstances can do little more than perform the part of a high school?*

PRESIDENT BERWICK.—That is the case with regard to classical subjects. Although what I say on this point is principally restricted to this college, I have heard that the students come very badly prepared in classics to all the colleges.

Though President Berwick, when fairly cornered, tries to confine his admissions to the case of classical studies—sufficiently important in themselves—as he had just confessed that "almost every professor" is an elementary teacher, the

attempted reservation comes too late. At any rate, we are not trusting to President Berwick's admissions. The evidence as to every department is simply overwhelming. In Belfast, considering the comparative success of the Queen's College in consequence of its adoption by the Presbyterian General Assembly, the evidence is frightful and scandalous. The most elementary studies, Geometry, English, are as neglected as Classics could be. Thus Mr. Tait, Professor of Mathematics, told the Commissioners that he had "to examine but a small portion of the students at the Matriculation examination, *in the very elements of Geometry and Algebra*," and that, nevertheless, "the average standard of preparation is very much lower than ought to be expected." At the same time he confessed that there were few rejections, "because," as he mildly put it, "*the average standard has been somewhat reduced*." Doctor Frings, Professor of Modern Languages, pleaded that there might be a matriculation examination "*of ever so low a standard, in one of the modern languages*." The unfortunate "Professor" did not know what to do with the interesting *alumni* of the Presbyterian Alma Mater, inasmuch as "very few of them ever saw a French word in their lives." Mr. Craik, Professor of History and English Literature in the same favoured institution, began his revelations about the Belfast matriculation by acknowledging to Sir Thomas Redington that so far as his department was concerned the matriculation examination "merely involves a knowledge of the English language, and of the elements or outlines of Geography, a little Greek and Roman History and English History too." When interrogated about the extent to which the juvenile *pasteurs* satisfied the exigencies of this formidable test, Mr. Craik replied—our readers will hardly believe their eyes—"I could hardly insist on a student being rejected, *however great his deficiency in my department*." "But," said Sir Thomas Redington—we may readily suppose, in blank amazement—"if the student proceed to Medicine, his knowledge of the English language is not tested in any subsequent year?" And Mr. Craik admitted that this was the case, and that in fact "a man may proceed through the whole course of this college and obtain a degree in Medicine without having any competent knowledge whatever of the English language." Our readers may judge from this avowal what the conditions were in 1857 of the education of the professional students which Queen's Collegism so desperately counts to its credit as a "University." Even though the knowledge of the Arts students was "tested" in subsequent years, it is plain that their entrance education in English was not fixed at a standard

which ought sensibly to thin the ranks of the Presbyterian Kirk in Ulster. "*Possibly*," said Mr. Craik, "*possibly I could hardly go the length of saying that if a person came entirely ignorant of the English language I should pass him.*" It might have been better in the long run if the president, professors, and council of Belfast Queen's College had been less cannily alive to the "painfulness of having our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and being able to present to the public no degrees." It might have been better, too, if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Kirk in Ulster had been so good as to thrust less impertinent interference into the affairs of Catholic education and had devoted a little intelligent attention to the education that was being provided for its own Ministers and Ruling Elders *in futuro*. But this involves a supposition.

We do not believe it is necessary to trouble our readers with many more details of the plight to which the Queen's Colleges had been already reduced a whole decade of years before Mr. Thompson's American excursion. We would only add the evidence of Professor Bagley, of Queen's College, Galway, on the general question of the trustworthiness of the intra-collegiate examinations,—sessional examinations and like "tests"—which the happy Elect of the matriculation ordeal were supposed to undergo on their course to the degree.

MR. PRICE.—You do not appear to lay much stress on the *certificates* of the professors, *which are returned to the University*, that the subjects are fairly studied?

WITNESS.—My impression is, that in most cases where a man had been studying very hard at other subjects, the professors would be disposed to deal very leniently with him.

So much for the extent to which the intra-collegiate studies were allowed to correct the miserable deficiencies condoned at matriculation.

We had almost forgotten Queen's College, Cork. That institution of some two hundred medical and engineering students, together with about as many Arts students as disposable Arts scholarships and exhibitions, deserves a word, and we cannot do better, out of the mass of corroborative testimony of all kinds, than allow its Vice-President to say that word. It is perfectly graphic. This is the way in which, as far back as 1857, Queen's College, Cork, got its forty or fifty Arts students, on the oath of Vice-President Ryall.

MR. PRICE.—According to the system on which the matriculation examination is conducted here, it is perfectly possible for an examiner in any distinct

branch to report a man as a total failure, and yet that the Council shall admit him upon their own judgment, however arrived at.

WITNESS.—*Perfectly possible, and it is the constant practice!*

We daresay it will hardly be asserted that even in 1857 the proposed Queen's Colleges and Queen's University in Ireland had made much progress towards realization. And in 1857 it must at least be said that the outline of a university existed on paper, at any rate in calendars and regulations, if not in lecture-halls and at examinations. We do not pretend to know the designs of the Cabinet on the subject of Irish university reform. It is certain, however, that before Mr. Gladstone can either include or exclude the Queen's University under any system he may be maturing, it will be necessary for him to have a Queen's University of some sort in the first place. Considered as a Christmas pantomime, what is called the Queen's University might be unobjectionable, but real universities and true graduates will hardly feel a fraternal sentiment towards the travesty which Queen's College Councils have, unfortunately not in vain, "desired to see." We trust that, whatever may happen, the Cabinet will not forget either to close the so-called Queen's College at Belfast, or at least subject it to the requisite transformation at the hands of some university board. Best of all, perhaps, if for a generation or so, at any rate, the pupils of the General Assembly should be introduced to university teaching in Trinity College, Dublin. They could not become more intolerant, while, in respect to culture and education, the novelty would have much to recommend it. It is true that, as regards Trinity College, Dublin, the best possible reasons exist for the reluctance with which that protected establishment views the approach of any reforms which could expose its venerable *far niente* to the dreaded test of Catholic competition.\* The pampered monopoly would slumber in its Sleepy Hollow yet a while longer if it could. Were it never to wake, its inaction and inertia would be life and vigour compared to the stagnant superficiality of the Queen's University shams.

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\* While this article was going through the press, we received Mr. Howley's trenchant pamphlet on the abuses which a privileged security has naturally developed in the superannuated institution of the penal days, the rich but silent sister of Oxford and Cambridge. Trinity College, Dublin, presents, on an immense scale, an example of the results of enormous wealth when a public foundation has for generations been taught to consider itself safe from rivalry, and to despise exertion.

## ART. V.—ITALIAN CHURCH ARCHITECTURE.

(COMMUNICATED.)

THAT different ideas of the human mind are expressed by different styles of architecture will hardly, I suppose, be denied by any who has thought upon the subject. If this be granted, then it is difficult to see how any one style of architecture can be upheld to the exclusion of all others. One style may, indeed, be preferred by us to another, as more in harmony with our thoughts and feelings, or more in accordance with the wants of our own times; but to assert absolutely that either Gothic or Italian, or any other style, is the only architecture, betrays surely bigotry of the very narrowest type, and at the same time great ignorance of the beautiful, and even of the nature of man himself.

In the number of this Review for last April the cause of Gothic architecture was most ably, although at the same time modestly and temperately, defended in a communicated article. In his very opening words the writer declares that "most works which have been written upon the vexed question of the 'Revival of Gothic Architecture' are so narrow-minded, so bitter and acrimonious in their tone, and so obstinately insist upon regarding 'Gothic' as the *only* Christian architecture, that it is difficult to read them without the loss of one's temper." The writer, however, is of opinion that Gothic architecture is the best adapted for our modern English churches. He is also careful to state that he is not writing *against* Italian architecture, for he "can conceive no more glorious temple erected to the honour of Almighty God than a great Italian church, with its sublime dome reared high above a sumptuous *baldacchino*, with its marble-faced walls and brilliantly reflective pavement, its splendid pictures and costly altars, its bronze capitals, and its gilded vault." It is therefore chiefly because he thinks that there is no chance of such a church ever being built in England that he advocates the use of Gothic as the *one existing* style suited to our wants, adding, at the same time, his hope that the future will invent or develop a style of its own.

It is the intention of the writer of the present article to take the opposite view, and to endeavour to defend the cause of Italian ecclesiastical architecture as quite as suitable, if not



more suitable, to the wants of the Church of our own days; although he trusts that the same moderation will be found in his remarks as is to be met with in the article to which reference has been made.

First of all, it may be well to state that I believe *no* style of Church architecture is in itself anti-Roman; nor do I think that Gothic churches need be so cut up with columns as to be wanting in spaciousness; or that they are necessarily dark or cold; or that the high altar *must* always be hidden in such churches from a great part of the congregation. In all this, therefore, I agree with the writer in the April number. To say that Gothic architecture is anti-Roman is simply absurd, for nothing is more striking, or offers a greater contrast to the narrow-mindedness of too many supporters of both the Gothic and Italian styles, than the liberality with which the Holy See has tolerated almost every kind of architecture. No doubt every ecclesiastical building—no matter in what style it is built—ought to be so constructed as to enable the Church's ritual to be carried out as perfectly as possible; and although those who are best acquainted with the Italian style may think that of *existing* styles it offers greater facilities for this purpose than any other, yet not on this account ought they to consider the Gothic incapable of improvement. Every style of architecture can, I believe, in the hands of a gifted and conscientious architect, be brought into harmony with the requirements of the Church of our own day. As, however, to the choice of any particular style for ecclesiastical buildings, the Holy See may be said to be almost indifferent, leaving this to the feelings and tastes of different countries, and to the wants of different ages. When the Church rose from the Catacombs—where, by the way, she had not scrupled to decorate her secret hiding-places with Pagan designs, and sometimes even with representations borrowed from Pagan Mythology, if only they served to help forward the truth which had been committed unto her—she was content to avail herself of the form of the Basilicas as the best adapted of existing buildings for the worship of the triumphal Cross, without inventing any new style of her own. The Basilicas, therefore, of old Rome became the cradles of the Church's public worship—for her worship in the Catacombs could hardly have been called public—and they will be found, upon examination, to have profoundly influenced every succeeding style of ecclesiastical architecture, whether Byzantine, Gothic, or Renaissance. The church of *S. Agnese fuori le mure*, built by Constantine, may be taken as a specimen of the ancient halls of justice, from which the idea of the Christian basilica was borrowed.

Internally it consists of an oblong; three sides of which are surrounded with columns; the fourth side being a semicircle. The first order of columns supports a second, which forms a gallery, and on which a flat ceiling rests. In the upper columns, the rules laid down for a basilica by Vitruvius have, it is said, been carried out. In most cases, however, except with regard to plan and proportion, the rules of the ancient architecture were neglected, and when the treasures of the Pagan city were pressed into the service of Christianity, columns were erected at hazard, without any regard to the suitability of their bases, capitals, or entablatures, utility no doubt being first thought of, rather than beauty of detail. But the Church can never for long make use of anything without stamping it with her own impress. Thus we find that even in the time of Constantine another aisle or transept was added at the end of the building, the semicircle or apse being still retained as its termination. In this way the sign of the Cross became distinctly visible; and the faithful were enabled to realize more vividly the great symbol of their redemption. Then, too, the upper galleries of the ancient Pagan basilicas were suppressed, and in their place a wall pierced with windows was raised upon the columns of the nave.\* Sometimes, as was also the case in the decline of Classical architecture, this wall was supported by round arches resting upon the columns, thus leading the way for the substitution of the rounded vault for the flat roof. In the north of Europe the pointed arch—I have neither wish nor time to enter into the vexed question of its origin—was afterwards preferred to the round, while the intersection of transept and nave had already prepared the way for the dome and the lantern, according as either the round or the pointed arch was adopted. The sixteenth century brought with it the revival of classical tastes, yet although attended with very great evils, the Church, as a writer in the July number of this Review, who is evidently a warm admirer of Gothic architecture, has pointed out, threw herself to a certain extent into the movement, in order to confine its influence within its proper channel, and to prevent it from overflowing and destroying, instead of fertilizing Christendom. Nay, it was at this very period, that without wishing to exclude other styles of architecture, the Holy Roman

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\* As, for example, in the Basilica of S. Paul, *fuori le mure*, and in the old Basilica of S. Peter, which was superseded by the present church. In these churches the aisles were double, and nothing could be more beautiful than the effect of the insulated columns, as may still be seen at S. Paul's. So striking is it, that few, perhaps, have entered that basilica without supposing it to be longer even than S. Peter's.

Pontiff thought fit to raise over the tomb of the Apostles that mighty and glorious temple—the mightiest and most glorious, surely, which the world has ever seen, or will ever perhaps see again, and which few will deny is the noblest expression of the strength and majesty and harmony of proportion of the Church which our Lord has founded upon the Rock—the relics of B. Peter himself, resting beneath its mighty dome. From what has been said, therefore, it can, I think, hardly be denied that in every style of architecture which the Church has made use of, the leading idea of the Basilica, that is to say the “*nave*,” which the Holy Roman Church at once instinctively seized upon as typical of herself, the bark of Peter, ever tossed to and fro upon the troubled sea of this present wicked world, has been preserved, while the form of the Cross added to the nave clearly is an inspiration of her own. I said just now that the great Basilica of S. Peter’s—for notwithstanding all its deviations from the style of the early Basilica, it is still called by that name—is the noblest expression of the strength and majesty and harmony of proportion of the Church of God; and oh! surely no one who was present at the Council of the Vatican, or who even heard or read about it, could have failed to see how perfectly the very material building harmonized with the strong and majestic living Church of the living God, ever perfect in all its proportions, ever in harmony both with God Himself, and with the wants of men. Who could have looked up into that glorious dome, and read there the words: “*Tu es Petrus et super hanc Petram edificabo ecclesiam meam*,” without making such an act of faith, as he never had made before, that the gates of hell shall never prevail against the Church? Who could have seen the Vicar of Christ, the living Peter, seated with the Episcopate of the whole Christian world over Peter’s tomb, without feeling how wisely his predecessors had chosen the style of architecture for the great typical Church of Christendom? Now this thought naturally leads me to speak of the chief characteristics of Italian Church architecture, before turning to its suitableness for our modern wants in this country.

That the Gothic style is beautiful, most beautiful, most majestic, most heaven-inspiring, I gladly allow. No one can love or admire Gothic more than I do. That it expresses some of the noblest thoughts of the mind of man, who was made in the image of God, I willingly concede; but that it combines in itself, as is the case with Italian church architecture, speaking generally, strength, grandeur, and harmony of proportion, in the latter of which, as it appears to me—although I must here confess that I am no architect—the

essence of the noblest architecture must be placed, I do not, cannot admit. Of course there is only one S. Peter's in the world—but the three characteristics, strength, grandeur, harmony of proportion, combined together, belong more or less to the Italian style in general, and, so far as I can see, in a greater degree to the Italian style than to any other. The architecture of old Egypt was mighty and sublime, but beauty was wanting. The temples of Greece were of perfect beauty and proportion, but strength and grandeur were wanting. The great mediæval cathedrals were beautiful and majestic, but neither strength nor unity were the leading features. Enter a Gothic cathedral or abbey, whether York, or Canterbury, or Westminster, or Amiens or Cologne, and say whether the unity of the mighty whole is the first impression made upon the mind. The eye rests upon the beauty of some pointed arch, or upon the glories of some painted window, or upon some exquisitely carved shrine or altar-piece, but the grandeur of the whole, the unity of the whole, is lost sight of amidst the multitude of details. Enter, on the other hand, some Italian church—I do not say S. Peter's, or any of the great basilicas of Rome, or even such a church as S. Andrea della Valle, or S. Carlo in Corso, or S. Ignazio—but say of the more ordinary churches, although unprovided perhaps with the dome—the grandest feature of the Italian style—and far from free from many faults of detail, and the mind is filled at once with the idea of strength and unity. The eye has no time to rest upon the details, nor does it ever occur to any one, I venture to say, to observe whether the windows are round or square, or even—at least for a long time—to notice whether the walls are of marble, or the pavement brilliantly reflective, or other features splendid, or the altars costly, or the capitals of one order or another, or the vault gilded. The perfect unity of the whole so fills and satisfies the mind as to cast a deep feeling of peace over the whole man, and thus to fit him in a very special way for the worship of his God. Add to this that the harmony of proportion and the unity resulting therefrom, are best adapted for modern Church architecture, because typifying the perfect unity of God's Church, which never perhaps was shown forth in so marked a way as in our days. If the Holy Roman Church, rising from the Catacombs, chose the nave of the Basilica as the most fitting type of the bark of Peter riding in safety over the waters of persecution; if the architecture of the Middle Ages may fairly be said to represent the heavenward aspirations of the earnest-minded Northern races, and of Christendom in its glory; not less fitly, at least in my poor judgment, does Italian architecture

typify the marvellous unity of God's Church in these latter days. But let us look a little deeper into the matter.

We are often told that one of the chief glories of Gothic architecture lies in its symbolism. The triple aisle, the five aisles, the cruciform design, the spire, and the arch which point to heaven, all these, it is said, are suggestive either of holy doctrines, or of heavenly thoughts. True, but neither the triple aisle, nor the five aisles, nor the cruciform design, are peculiar to the Gothic style; for as we have seen, they are but the result of the impression, which the Church has stamped upon almost every style of architecture which she has employed for her own service, and to the greater glory of God; while if the symbolism of the spire and pointed arch be wanting to Italian architecture, the want is more than compensated by the grandeur of the dome and rounded vault, so significant of heaven, which is to be the Church's everlasting home. It may be urged, perhaps, that not every Italian church can have a dome, for if the writer of the article on "Gothic Revival" be correct in his estimate, the cost of such a church will be from three to five times as great as a Gothic one; but then it may be answered that not every Gothic church can have a spire, as we know too well from our experience of the stunted towers which now in so many places disfigure England. As for the rounded vault, I can conceive no reason, although I speak with great diffidence, why its symbolism cannot be, to some extent at least, preserved by a rounded wooden roof, just as the open wooden roof of Gothic churches preserves the symbolism of pointed architecture. Or, again, if the early Basilica style be preferred—why, instead of a flat, expensive, highly decorated roof,—which after all is no necessary accompaniment of the Basilica—should not the open and even pointed roof still to be found in some of the existing examples both at Rome and Ravenna be adopted? But I shall afterwards again touch upon this point. What then is the chief characteristic of Gothic and Italian architecture? Of the former, I answer at once that it is "mystery," as shown forth not so much in its general design, for this, as we have seen, is common also to Italian architecture, as in minuteness of detail. In every true Gothic church there is always something more than we can take in at one glance of the eye, or by one grasp of the mind. Our minds therefore remain always searching after the hidden. Everything, no matter how minute, is symbolical. The images of our Lord and the Saints are not representations of our Lord who came in the flesh, or of the Saints, who were men of like passions with ourselves. They are as if "clothed with white samite, mystic, wonderful." So too the true painted glass of the

Middle Ages gives us gleams, as it were, many-coloured and mystical, of the heaven where our Lord and our Lady and the Saints are dwelling. The foliage of the sculpture is not the foliage of earth, the fleurs-de-llys are not the lilies which we love to place on our Lady's altar in the months of summer, nor are the animals introduced into the sculpture the animals of this world. The rood-screen, whether heavy or light, it matters not, or the metal gylle, which separates the nave of the church from the sanctuary, speaks to us at once of the hidden mysteries of the hidden God; for as the writer on Gothic revival remarks, "they impart a look of intricacy and sacredness to the sanctuary, without giving that isolated appearance which is so painful to some." All this is right and proper in such a style of architecture, because it represents *one* side, and that a most true one, of Christian thought and feeling. The sacraments are hidden mysteries, and God has called Himself a hidden God, and this is true, not only of the earlier dispensations, but also of Christian times. But there is another side of Christian thought and feeling, no less true, which is I think better expressed by Italian architecture, and to this I must now turn.

I come now to ask what is the chief characteristic of the Italian style. It is twofold—unity and openness of revelation. We will take the latter first. The mysteries of the Christian Church are no doubt hidden mysteries, for we can never realize the fulness of their efficacy in this world, and God too is a hidden God, for now we see through a glass darkly, and it will only be in Heaven that we shall see Him face to face; but it is no less true, that all the sacraments are open wells, from which all who thirst may drink, and that our Lord has rent in twain for ever the veil which separated the Holy of Holies from the Holy Place, and from the inner and outer courts having opened for us a new and living way into the Holies, so that even the least, and poorest, and lowliest of His children, as members of a Royal Priesthood, may enter in where He, our great High Priest, has gone before. See how beautifully all this is expressed in Italian architecture. The main features of Christian symbolism, which the Church has evidently wished to stamp upon all buildings consecrated to her worship, are preserved, and these are recognized with ease; but neither eye nor mind is attracted, or rather distracted, by the symbolism of minute detail. No screen of any sort separates us from the Holy place, so that the eye takes in at one glance the unity of the whole building, with its wide open sanctuary, and the altar, where the Son of Man is ever walking among the



golden candlesticks.\* So again, if there be one mark more distinctive than any other of the divinity of God's Church, it is her perfect *unity*. "I have prayed for you that the glory which I had with the Father before the world was, may be given to you, that you also may be one in Me, even as I and the Father are one. I in you, and you in Me, that the world may believe that I have sent you." Now, if this be so, then as we have seen—and it is useless therefore to repeat the argument at any length—no style of architecture so well expresses unity, combined with strength and majesty, as the Italian.

Let me try to make this still clearer. To my own mind it has always seemed—although, of course, the idea is by no means new—as if the Gothic style of architecture answered to what, for want of a better name, may be called the romantic school of literature, especially of poetry, and the Italian to the Classical, or again, the former may be compared to landscape painting, the latter to sculpture. A word or two upon each comparison:—If, for example, we take the plays of Calderon or Shakspeare, no one, I think, will say that unity is their distinguishing feature. There is in them so much intricacy of detail, so great a multiplicity and development of character, combined with constant change of scene, that their unity is materially interfered with, and the effect of the whole play, although not of particular characters and parts, considerably lessened. Hence it is that we rise from reading one of Shakspeare's dramas, or from witnessing its representation, with our minds full of some particular beauty, or struck by the energy of some particular character or passage, but not impressed, as it seems to me, with the grandeur and unity of the whole. On the other hand, in the old Greek plays, and in the best dramas of the French school, just because there is less intricacy of detail, less multiplicity of character, which is presented before us rather in bold outline, than in those more subtle touches and more hidden traits which are so distinctive of the romantic school, and less change of scene, we rise from reading them not so much perhaps impressed by particular characters and passages, but lost in admiration at the harmony and unity of the whole. Even in the Greek trilogies the unity must have been perfect. Are we, then, to depreciate

\* The Sistine Chapel, it is true, has an open screen; but the practice and observances of the Pontifical chapels are peculiar to themselves. Thus, in these chapels the use of the organ is prohibited, and the choir is placed in a gallery, a position which would hardly be to the taste of the admirers of Gothic.

Shakespeare any more than Gothic architecture? By no means. I have already declared my warm admiration for the latter, and so, in like manner, I say that I yield to no man in paying homage to our great poet, who, as Carlyle has truly said, is the outcome of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages—those ages, be it remembered, which produced and perfected Gothic architecture, for without their Catholicism a Shakespeare would have been impossible.

Again, Gothic architecture may be very fitly compared to painting, especially landscape painting, and Italian to sculpture. In painting we may have groups of figures, which are seldom successful in sculpture; we may have trees and plants and flowers, or woodland or river, or sea or sky, and in landscape painting minute details on which I need not touch; but in painting, as in Gothic architecture, it will be found that the eye does not at once take in the picture as a whole, but requires time to master and realize all its several parts. Go, for instance, to the Vatican, and stand before the "Last Communion of S. Jerome," and see how long it will take to realize all that is pictured forth in that glorious masterpiece. Again and again you may go, and each time you will find fresh beauties and a deeper significance. The expression of the face of the priest, as he bends over the Saint to give him in the hour of death the Lord of life; the dying Saint, half leaning forward in adoration of his Lord, half falling back from the ever-growing weakness which is slowly creeping over him, evidently unconscious—because conscious alone of the great Presence—of the kiss of worship which the woman kneeling at his side is impressing upon his withered hand, as if he were already gathered to the company of the glorious Saints: all this, and much more that I could mention, requires time and study to observe; it cannot be taken in at once. So is it with Gothic architecture.

Now, it is otherwise with sculpture, to which I have compared the Italian style. The more perfect the work of art, the less we observe the details; it stands before us a glorious whole, at once filling and satisfying the mind. What is the secret of this except that we feel that although by further examination we may discover particular beauties, and even particular defects, yet the general harmony of proportion and the unity of the whole are such as to render particular beauties and particular faults—unless, of course, these stand forth too prominently, so as to interfere with unity—of less importance than they are in painting. We see at a glance the open revelation meant to be conveyed by the artist. Hence, too, as I said above, large groups in sculpture are seldom satis-

factory, simply for want of unity, sculpture being required to perform an office which belongs rather to the sister art of painting. Do not these remarks apply in very great measure to Italian architecture?

I conclude, then, that the latter has special beauties and advantages of its own, which are not so prominent or are even absent in the Gothic style. Neither style, therefore, ought of itself to be excluded from the service of the Church, and this, if for no other reason, because, as has been well said, "Nature, the great prototype of architecture, has many styles of beauty, and employs them all. The horizontal, arcuated, vertical, or pointed styles," Mr. Ruskin notwithstanding, "all find precedent in her domain; and though it could be proved that the Gothic was beyond all comparison superior to any other style in capability of the grander qualities, yet it would be opposed to all natural teaching to claim for it the sole and universal empire:"—

"Not oaks alone are trees, nor roses flowers."

But it is more than time for me to ask whether the Italian style is unsuited for our modern ecclesiastical requirements.

One of the more common objections to the use of Italian church architecture is that it is unpopular, as may be seen by the almost universal adoption of the Gothic style. Now, that for the last thirty years the latter has been generally preferred in the nations of the North cannot, of course, be denied, nor is it difficult to account for this preference. It is due partly to the revival of the "romantic" school literature, by means of which the Middle Ages, with their arts and chivalry and legends, have been placed in a truer light before the minds of men, and also in no small measure because, as it seems to me, our church architects have given far more time to the study of Gothic than to that of the Italian style. It will be objected, no doubt, to this last assertion, that architects are forced to fall in with the wishes of those who desire to have churches built for them, and that the demand at present is almost entirely for Gothic buildings. To this I answer, that granted that at the present time the tide of popular taste has set in favour of Gothic, architects are surely something more than mere builders and contractors, and that it is their highest duty, by mastering the different styles of architecture, to lead and guide the taste of the people. But can it be shown that the present taste is likely to be enduring? Even in the Middle Ages, nay, during the whole history of ecclesiastical architecture, has there not been a constant change from style to style? Thus, have we not seen the style of the Pagan pass

into that of the Christian Basilica, and this again into the Romanesque, which divided itself into the Byzantine and Lombardic? So, again, in our own country, did not the Saxon style, or, as it was called, "the Roman manner," introduced from Italy by such men as Paulinus and Wilfred, pass into the Norman, one of the chief features of which was the arcade, or series of small round arches, many of these intersecting each other, which, as Bishop Milner points out, appear in some part or other of all the churches built by the Normans in this country, and which sometimes cover the whole of them? So, once more, did not the Norman—whether from the beauty of the effect produced by the intersecting of the arches above alluded to, or from some other cause, we need not stop to inquire—pass into the "Pointed" style? Nay, during those centuries which witnessed the chief glories of what is called Gothic architecture, did not almost each generation change its style in accordance with its own taste, so that a church begun in one style was not unfrequently continued in another, and finished in a third? What reason, then, is there to suppose that in our own times, when we have no style of our own at all, but have to go back to that of the thirteenth, or fourteenth, or fifteenth centuries, a change of taste may not soon again take place amongst us, when we may perhaps witness a "revival" of the best features of the Italian style? If Gothic architecture itself so soon forgot its leading features, owing to the fickle taste of our forefathers, I at least, for one, can see no great strength in the argument that at the present moment the Gothic is the most popular, and well-nigh universally used. For my own part, I think I can perceive signs of a coming change. The greater intercourse with Rome, owing to cheap and rapid communication, will necessarily create a love for the style of Roman churches, and for the round arch, which is one of their distinctive features; for although, as I have said, the Holy See has ever left her children free to adopt any style they choose, and although also, to use the words of the writer in the April number, it may be "as absurd to say that attachment to the Holy See is shown by building churches in the Italian style as it would be to suppose that attachment would be shown by speaking Italian instead of one's own native language in ordinary discourse," yet "where the treasure is, there will our hearts be also," and as in the days of Paulinus and Wilfred, the architectural language of Rome can never be a strange tongue to us as long as children love to catch the tone of their mother's voice.

But more than this; whether a preference for Gothic architecture in ecclesiastical buildings be rooted or not in the educated

and artistic mind of England may be an open question, but for myself I have very great doubt whether Gothic churches are ever really popular amongst our poor, for whom chiefly, after God's honour—because the churches are the homes and schools of the poor—they ought to be built. The fact is, that Gothic churches are unsuited to the uneducated and the poor. Not for the reasons I gave at the outset; namely, that they are necessarily dark or cold, or that it is difficult to see the altar from all parts, but simply because the symbolism and mystery of such churches are above their grasp.\* To these, I find, the pointed roof, and the conventional form of the cross and the lily, and all the beautiful details of Gothic ornamentation, and the high altar, by no means the most conspicuous part of the building, are too often either unmeaning, or, perhaps a disappointment. They require the large plain Latin cross, the noble altar with majestic altar-piece, the church rich, if possible, in paintings and images. I am speaking here of course of the better kind of churches of either style; for if, as it is alleged, our ordinary so-called Italian churches are for the most part but long, ill-shaped, badly proportioned rooms, so on the other

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\* As for the objection that Gothic churches are cut up with columns, the same will apply to the best specimens of the Italian style. That Gothic buildings can be erected without aisles is, of course, undeniable. Thus we have, as the writer of the article in the April number has pointed out, the Cathedrals of Alby and Angers, Cahors and Angoulême. But it is to be doubted whether such churches would ever be generally as greatly admired as those supported by columns. Nor, should I think, could they be built except at a very great expense. There is a remark, however, of the above writer about the darkness of Italian churches which requires a word of notice. The windows of Italian churches, he says, "are features to be avoided as much as possible. They are kept out of sight whenever it can be managed." Now, I have said above, that on entering a good Italian church no one ever thinks about the windows; but to maintain that, as a rule, Italian churches are darker than Gothic ones, seems to me an opinion simply untenable. As an instance of an essentially dark church, he brings forward S. Peter's, Rome! I venture to say—and I have lived many years in Rome—that it is one of the brightest and lightest churches in the world; so it is also the coolest in summer and the warmest in winter; nor would it ever be a dark church, as S. Paul's undoubtedly is, even were it to be set down in the place of the latter, amidst all the smoke of London. Again, one of the chief reasons why complaints are made in England about the altar not being seen arises in no small measure from the use of fixed benches, which occupy a great deal of room, and which prevent the poor coming close to the altar at their pleasure, as they do in Catholic countries. It is useless, no doubt, to complain of benches as long as our clergy are ill provided for, and such a terrible separation exists as that between our very rich and very poor—a separation, however, which is directly contrary to the Apostolic warning of S. James (ii. 3), and which will probably only be put an end to by some fearful political convulsion. Still, we ought, I think, never to forget that to fill up the whole church with benches is an evil—a necessary one, perhaps, under present circumstances, but still an evil.

hand too many of our ordinary so-called Gothic churches are but slightly decorated barns devoid of symbolism or beauty. Again, the vast number of Catholics in England are Irish, yet the taste of the Irish people, although not a few Gothic churches have been built in Ireland of late years, has generally, I think, been shown in their preference of the classical or Italian style both in ecclesiastical and civil architecture. Now in which of the two styles, Gothic or Italian, is the altar more conspicuous,—in the former, where, for the sake of the surpliced choir it is now recommended to have a deep chancel, and where the altar is, therefore, comparatively hidden, or in the latter, where the altar may either be placed at the end of the wide open sanctuary, and yet leave ample room for choir as well, or be brought forward to the entrance of the sanctuary—a still more conspicuous position—the choir being then seated behind it, as is often the case in many of the French churches that have apsidal terminations? The grandeur of the effect will be also considerably heightened, if the sanctuary be raised several feet from the nave. In churches which have domes, even if the high altar cannot be placed under the dome, but is erected at the end of the church, still it will form a far more conspicuous object, and yet allow more room for the choir than any Gothic church. Further, which of the two styles is the better adapted for paintings and images, which are found to be of so much value for the instruction of the poor and as aids to devotion? Of the Gothic style it has been well said, “that in its purest, most characteristic and most thorough development, the paintings go into the windows, and the sculpture into the sides, where the one is transparent [this is assuredly true of the modern Munich glass] and the other in durance; and where, in consequence, instead of vital and individualized works, they become only secondary, not on a level with the architecture, but quaint, cramped, and conventional.” To me there seems a great deal of truth in these remarks, for certainly in buildings where painted glass, which forms one of the greatest charms of the Gothic style, is employed, paintings cannot be seen to advantage. So to with regard to images; if not, as is generally the case, constrained, archaic and unnatural, they are at any rate seldom welcomed by Gothic architecture—I am speaking of course of images for devotional purposes, not as mere ornaments—with the same freedom and cordiality as by the styles of Greece, or Rome, or Italy. Now, surely this is a drawback, for next to the Adorable Presence on the altar of the B. Sacrament, there is nothing which so contributes to the devotion of the faithful, as holy paintings and images of Our Lord, Our Lady and the Saints, paintings and images

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introduced not as mere ornaments, but as objects of veneration.

I come now to what I confess is the most difficult part of my subject, the expense of Italian churches. The writer so often alluded to approves of a remark of Mr. Eastlake that, "since the Cardinal's death there has been a manifest existence of a desire amongst Roman Catholics to return to the Pointed architecture for their churches, schools, and convents; but *unfortunately the demand for cheap showy buildings has not abated*, and the consequence is that in this direction the artistic aspect of the Revival has not improved."\* The writer himself lays the blame more on the employers than on the architects, and adds, "a cheap church may be a good church, but if so, it must be a plain church." Nothing can be more true; but a question here arises, which offers the greater attraction to the eye and heart, a cheap and plain Gothic, or a cheap and plain Italian church? The chief charm of Gothic architecture consists, as we have seen, in the beauty and intricacy, and symbolism and mystery of its details; but of this there can be but very little in a cheap plain church. It may be said that at least there will be the pointed arch; be it so, but then to some minds the round arch is more majestic than the pointed one, and quite as expressive. Is then a cheap plain Italian church more attractive to eye and heart and mind than a Gothic church which is also cheap and plain? That a plain Italian church—for one moment I set aside the question of cheapness—may be made such, I believe; and few, surely, who are familiar with Italian villages can fail to have noticed many such. The reason we have already seen; it is because in good Italian churches, even when quite unadorned, the eye is satisfied with the perfect proportion of the building, and stands in no need of minute details to gratify it, while heart and mind can well afford to forget the necessity of adornment when penetrated with the simplicity and unity of the whole. Add to this that in an Italian church, although the architecture may be plain, altars will always occupy a more conspicuous position, and a few really good paintings and images will have a better effect

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\* It is, no doubt, only the latter part of the sentence which is here approved of, for it is hardly correct to say that the return of English Catholics to Pointed architecture dates from the Cardinal's death. It began long before. The opening words of the sentence are also calculated to leave a false impression, as if the Cardinal had been opposed to Gothic. Far from this being the case, every one who knew him will bear witness that he had too large a mind not to admire what was beautiful in every style, although it may well be that, towards the end of his life especially, he showed a preference for Italian architecture.

than in a Gothic church of the same kind. But what about the cheapness? Italian architecture may be divided into three styles: that of the Basilica, the Romanesque in its Lombardic form, and the Renaissance.

That either a Renaissance or a Lombardic church with a dome would be most expensive, must, I suppose, be conceded at once. It is evident, therefore, that such a church can only be built in England when there are ample funds for the purpose; but as we are at present engaged in building up the living temples of children's souls, we naturally have not so much to spend on raising material temples to God's honour. I confess, however, that I see no reason why we should not build cheap and plain Basilicas, and if the dome be omitted, cheap and plain Lombardic and Renaissance churches, yet at the same time noble and majestic. Of course, when more money can be spent, the nobler and more majestic they will be, and more attention can be paid to decoration. We will take the Basilica and the Lombardic styles together. If instead of the flat or highly ornamented roof of these styles we adopt the open wooden roof—and instances of this, as I have said, are not wanting in Italy—there seems to me absolutely no reason why churches built in these styles should not be as cheap as the Gothic. In such buildings no massive supports are required either for dome or vault, while all the advantages attributed above to the Italian style would be secured. It may be said that neither a Basilica nor a Romanesque church is anything without either mosaics or paintings. That these add very much to their splendour and beauty cannot be denied, but still, until suitable decorations on a large scale can be added, churches built in these styles are not in any way more bare than cheap and plain Gothic churches.

With regard to churches built in the style of the Renaissance without domes, especially if they be without aisles, but only with side chapels, and with shallow transepts, the question of expense is more difficult to determine. We cannot argue from one or two instances, and further statistics are required. But even although more expensive, it may be safely said that not a few noble Renaissance buildings, even with domes and adorned with costly marbles, might have been built in England for the sums that have been expended over many of our Gothic churches.

Lastly, the broad open sanctuaries of Italian churches, of whatever style, seem best of all adapted for the solemn and due performance of the rites and ceremonies of the Church, above all in these times. In modern Italian churches,

especially, the sanctuary, in almost every instance, takes in the whole width of the nave, so that it can be seen by all. No small advantage, surely, for those who love to be present at the Church's more solemn services, above all at that most precious of modern privileges, Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, for they are thus better enabled to realize that between the Holy Place and them there is no longer any veil. In Gothic churches, on the other hand, except in a very few instances, the sanctuary is generally narrow even when it is not deep—and now apparently there is a question of making them deeper. I know, indeed, that in many modern Italian churches the sanctuary, although always wide, is not as long as it might be; but that is merely a fault of internal arrangement, not of external construction, for I can hardly remember an instance where the sanctuary could not be prolonged so as to satisfy every requirement of the ritual.

In conclusion, it only remains for me to say that if I have proved but a sorry defender of the cause I have been advocating—nay, even if I have failed to make good my position—I may at least have succeeded in pointing out that there is in the Italian style an appropriateness and a symbolism, a beauty, a majesty, and a glory, which they little dream of, who see nothing good except in the architecture of the Middle Ages.

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#### ART. VI.—IRISH PRIESTS AND LANDLORDS.\*

*Letters signed "C." in the "Tablet" of Nov. 30, Dec. 7, and Dec. 14.*

IN our two preceding numbers, we have examined the facts of the last Galway election; and at the same time have considered the due relation of Irish tenant voters, whether to their landlords on one hand or their priests on the other. Our excellent contemporary, the "Tablet," took the same view with ourselves on this grave question, and powerfully illustrated it in some leading articles. A reply to these however, as well as to our own, was published in its columns from a Catholic correspondent; and his three letters have induced us to say a few more words on the same theme.

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\* After this article had been sent to press, a supplementary letter from "C." appeared in the "Tablet" of Dec. 28th. We have added therefore at the end a few comments on that supplementary letter.

So far as the writer occupies himself with extenuating, or rather defending, the misdeeds of the landlords at the Galway election, his argument proceeds on a standard of political morality, which we must designate as simply deplorable; nor do his statements need any other refutation, than that of being stripped from their disguise and nakedly set forth. This was in fact done by the "Tablet," in its brilliant and crushing article of December 7th. In truth, how are you to treat a writer who calls it "absolute nonsense" to say that the elector should vote according to his genuine convictions, and not at the dictation of his landlord? \* If a man chose to characterize as "absolute nonsense" the axiom that two and two make four, you would be really puzzled how to answer him; for what premiss could be more undeniably self-evident, than is the conclusion which he calls on you to prove? And the parallel fully applies to the case before us. But "C.'s" third letter is chiefly concerned with a different theme altogether; with deprecating the political intervention of priests on open questions, such as those concerning tenant-right. His arguments on this head appear to us weak in the extreme; but at all events they may fairly claim a distinct reply. We begin however with his attempted defence of the inculpated Galway landlords.

His first letter starts with an apparent implication, that "such English Catholics as may have an elementary acquaintance with Irish affairs" will see us to have been importantly mistaken in our apprehension of the *facts*. Yet we have received communications from persons whose whole life has been passed in Ireland, singling out for special praise the knowledge of Irish facts exhibited in our article. Nay our critic himself—who has had "twenty-five years of intimate connection with Ireland," and has resided in the country for "from eighteen to twenty years,"—directly confirms our facts in every relevant particular. The allegation, which underlies the whole Keogh Judgment, and which is assumed as true by Englishmen in general, was, that the majority of Galway electors preferred Trench for their member, but were coerced into voting for Nolan by a ruthless and overbearing sacerdotal conspiracy. We replied by mentioning it as simply undeniable, that the tenant farmers—who constitute the vast majority of electors—were enthusiastic advocates of Nolan; and that the intervention of priests was exclusively for the purpose of stimulating them to defy landlord tyranny, and to vote according to their genuine convictions. This fact is

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\* "C.'s" expressions will be seen in the appendix to our article.

not only not denied, but is more fully developed and emphasized, by our present critic. There is a certain doctrine, he tells us (first letter), as to the rights of property, which was represented by Captain Nolan, and which Captain Trench stood for the very purpose of opposing. This doctrine, he adds, is held more firmly by the tenant farmers, than even by the priests;\* nay, he says that the former hold this doctrine "with a faith hardly exceeded, if exceeded, by their faith in God."† Accordingly he begins his second letter with declaring it to be "indubitable," "that if priests and landlords had equally stood aloof, Captain Nolan would now be the sitting member." Why, if Mr. Butt's opponents in the House of Commons had frankly made such an admission as this, there would have been no possibility, even in that densely prejudiced assembly, of attempting to defend Judge Keogh.

The vast majority then of the Galway electors held with firmest conviction, that the highest interests, religious and temporal, of their country, are involved in the return of such candidates as Nolan. Accordingly, to vote for him was alike their constitutional right and their religious duty. But vigorous attempts were made to prevent them from fulfilling this duty. Our statement was, that this that and the other landlord put every kind of pressure on his tenants, for the purpose of inducing them to abstain from voting for that candidate, who (in their most confident judgment) was identified with the highest religious and temporal interests of their country. "C." does not so much as hint that these landlords did not know the intensity of their tenants' adverse political convictions: and as to the facts of the case,—not only does he fully admit the truth of our whole allegation, but he entirely defends these landlords for doing all which we alleged them to have done. According to this intrepid advocate, Lord Westmeath's tenants were legitimately warned (see our October article, p. 262) that those who should even "try to avoid" voting against their conscience, "shall be deemed not to approve of or value the indulgence to tenants

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\* "The clergy believe" this doctrine "with so much less faith and universality" than the rest of the class from which they spring, "accordingly as education may have expanded their mind."

† We cannot avoid observing by the way, that there seems to us some offensiveness in a Catholic thus speaking of his co-religionists. If there is one fact more unquestioned than another about Irish Catholics, it is the firmness of their religious faith. Yet "C." says it is doubtful whether they believe in God more firmly, than they believe in a certain political doctrine, of which no one has ever alleged that it is a revealed truth.

ever practised on this estate"; and Sir T. Burke's (ib.), that they they must not "vote *against his will* for any candidate," however earnestly preferred by them; and Archdeacon Butson's (p. 264), that "their cattle might die, and things of that sort might happen," in which case woe betide them if they had preferred the interests of their country to their landlord's sovereign pleasure.

As regards all this, we must once more express our hearty agreement with the Archbishop of Tuam's admirable letter, which we printed at length in October (p. 273). So far as such landlord tyranny extended—and "C." apparently admits it to have been almost universal—the tenant farmers were coerced into "holding the franchise in exclusive trust for their enemies"; i.e. for those whose political creed is diametrically opposed to their own. Their "servitude" was so far "worse than that of the West Indian slave." For certainly on one hand their personal convictions were as simply ignored and disregarded, as could be those of any slave: and then on the other hand, "the negro was not amused or insulted with the show of freedom, which he was well aware he did not enjoy; whilst the Irish slave, wearing his mask of freedom, was worried to give his vote for the purpose of prolonging his servitude, and riveting more stringently his chains."

Our readers will testify, that we have shown no disposition to ignore such extenuating circumstances as these criminal landlords have to plead. In July (p. 111, note) we admitted very cordially "that many" of them "possess very estimable qualities." "The standard of political morality," we added, "is so disgracefully low in these islands, that many a man will be guilty in his political capacity of acts, from the parallels to which he would shrink with horror in private life." The whole of "C.'s" letters, to our mind, quite curiously corroborates this view. He avows himself a Catholic, and we willingly credit him with the possession of every private virtue. But on the other hand—as the "Tablet" pointed out in its article of Dec. 7—he abounds in statements and admissions, in regard to which he does not show the faintest consciousness that they are utterly fatal to his cause. How do we account for this? By the obvious fact, that he is blind to the very notion of electoral freedom, political justice, and personal responsibility for a vote given or withheld, where the parties concerned are of the tenant class. He does not betray the slightest suspicion, that tenants act virtuously by voting according to their conscience, and act culpably by doing the reverse; but treats of them as though they could honestly comport themselves as the



mere organs of their landlord's will. Above all, look at his astounding view of the relation between politics and religion. The priest, he says in his third letter, "has set himself to study, to teach, to *practise* the things of the next world; and the more he expands his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven, the less clearly will he see and appreciate the things of this world." In other words—would you find a trustworthy political leader, let him be one who does not "practise the things of the next world"; who does not "expand his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven"; who is in fact altogether worldly and irreligious: those only can guide us aright on things of this world, who prefer this world to the next. We will not do "C." the injustice of supposing, that he habitually or consciously holds this violently anti-Christian doctrine, which indeed may almost be said to involve the denial of Christianity itself. But we do cite the passage as illustrating principles, which unconsciously influence his mind, when he speculates on things political. And it is observable, how much the landlord party often tend to agree with their extreme opponents the anarchists, in desiring to sever politics from religion. Attention was indeed drawn to this by the Bishop of Clonfert and his clergy, in the "Sellars circular," which we quoted in October (p. 289, note). In Ireland, as in other countries, it is the priesthood who may be trusted on the whole, for pursuing the true and Catholic mean.

To return however. We were saying that we have shown ourselves anxious to do the landlords every possible justice; and that on a former occasion we spontaneously expressed our conviction, how often their standard of private morality vastly surpasses what might be inferred from their political conduct. In like manner we went out of our way (July, p. 108) to express our opinion, that the Irish landlords, like the corresponding class in Great Britain, are unjustly treated by the existing Constitution, in not having received a far larger amount of direct electoral power. No one indeed will say that this fact affords any defence for corruption and intimidation; but it does place these practices in a somewhat less disgraceful light. Yet it is difficult to suppose that those guilty of such misdeeds, if they possessed more electoral power, would use it creditably; it is difficult to suppose that those who view with so malignant an eye the public virtue of the humbler elector, can have much public virtue of their own.

In the same spirit we willingly accept "C.'s" testimony, as to the kindness and forbearance which Irish landlords frequently, even commonly, display toward their tenantry. "The Irish

landlord," he says (second letter) "is an example of good nature, patience, and forbearance, which the English landlord sees no necessity for following." But we must in fairness add, that "C." does his best to deprive his own testimony of all value. According to him, the landlord is throughout intending to exact a very sufficient quid pro quo; and does but accept the political immorality of his tenants, in part-payment of their rent. We think better of the landlords than this; but "C." shows how little *he* at least sympathizes with true liberality, by advising every landlord to raise his rents, if his tenants will not submit to his dictation in the votes they give.\* We do not for a moment believe that any Irish landlords are so lost to all sense of shame as to act on this proposal; and it is almost incredible that a Catholic can have made it.

"C." implies in his first letter, that if some of the Galway priests had belonged to the proprietary class, things would have gone very differently. But let us suppose there had been a due proportion of priests, whose private judgment on the land question agreed with that of the landlords;† what does "C." fancy such a priest could do? Doubtless he might (very properly) try to persuade the farmers, that their convictions are mistaken. But could he fail to inculcate on them the duty of voting *in accordance with those convictions*? Could he fail to rebuke such landlords, as should practise corruption and intimidation? Would his agreement with the landlords on one political question blind him to the elementary truths of morality?

Indubitably however, as a matter of fact, the priests are all of a different class; and they are all thoroughly satisfied, that the landlord view of the land question is profoundly injurious alike to their country's religious and temporal welfare. See the Bishop of Clonfert's forcible words, quoted by us in October (p. 270). Moreover, as "C." himself states in his first letter, the whole body of tenant farmers are more intensely possessed

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\* The passage deserves quoting, as an illustration of the writer's moral standard on things political. "I should advise" Lord Clanricarde "to hang up, framed and glazed, in the rent-office, that comparison between the influence of a landlord and of a tradesman so often quoted; and I should further advise his lordship to *have his estate revalued* [the author's italics], taking chance of the 'holy and patriotic indignation,' and to repeat these valuations periodically."

† The strong bias of our own opinion is, that no one acquainted with Ireland would agree with the landlords on this question, except through prejudice of birth or association. But we do not enter on this in the text: because indubitably the question is a perfectly open one; and we do not wish to build any part of our present argument on any premiss which a Catholic can fairly deny.

by this persuasion, than even are the priests. Now we fully admitted in our October article, that there were a very few priests, who, though engaged in a most just cause, "made very serious practical mistakes;" "used language of very indefensible violence;" and "otherwise let themselves down, from their position as priests of God, to the position of honest but intemperate partisans" (p. 258). We added (p. 265) that we should have urged this in greater detail, had it not been for the circumstance that certain Government prosecutions are imminent. We are as far as possible from wishing to defend these excesses. But none the less there were three different reasons, any one of which by itself should have decided every priest in the county to work, with due self-control indeed, but still with all his heart, for Nolan at the last election.

Firstly and chiefly was his business to instruct his flock in their moral duties. But it was a moral duty, that they should vote according to their convictions; that, when firmly persuaded that a certain candidate is identified with their country's highest religious and temporal interests, they should not be diverted by selfish motives from giving him their suffrage. Just as it is the priest's business to enforce on his people the duties of chastity, sobriety, honesty,—so it is no less his business to urge on them the duty of political conscientiousness.

But secondly, as we have said, he is himself thoroughly confident, that their cause is most importantly the cause of religion and morality. By actively promoting it therefore, he is conferring a most valuable service on his country's religion, morality, and happiness. What valid reason could he give for holding back in so pious an enterprise? We urged this consideration at greater length in October, from p. 273 to p. 277; nor has "C." attempted any reply to what we there set forth.

Thirdly, "C." himself admits, if we rightly understand him, that the priest legitimately takes part in political agitation, wherever what we have called "sacred questions" are at issue; questions on which all good Catholics as such are necessarily unanimous. The priest for instance, according to "C." himself, should earnestly exhort his flock to vote for the candidate, who will support denominational education, or who will oppose any anti-Catholic divorce bill with which Ireland may possibly be threatened. But we ask how he can do this with any effect, except by enforcing the universal principle, that they should vote according to their genuine convictions. On what ground could any one maintain, that it is their duty indeed to vote according to their conscience on such

matters as denominational education, but that they need not do so on such matters as tenant right? By surrendering the principle of electoral conscientiousness in the latter case, a priest would preclude himself from appealing to it in the former. Landlord pressure in Ireland, as we observed in October (p. 272), is the one chief obstacle, which prevents Irish Catholics from having their due proportional weight in the political scale. In days like these particularly, when no one can tell what assaults on the Catholic Church may impend at any moment, it is of vital importance that Catholic electors be sensitively alive to the sacred duty of voting in accordance with their convictions.

And now let us view the same thing in its practical working, with special reference to the arguments adduced by "C." in his third letter. We are no enthusiasts for the existing British Constitution: see our remarks of last July, pp. 104, 105. But in fact both English and Irish *find* themselves under that Constitution; and it is their duty therefore to promote what they regard as their country's highest welfare, by every constitutional means in their power. Now throughout the United Kingdom there is no single class of voters, at once larger in point of numbers, and bound together by more definitely pronounced political doctrines, than that of the Irish Catholic tenant farmers. If there be any undoubted constitutional right therefore in these islands, it is the undoubted constitutional right of the Irish Catholic tenant farmers to be proportionally represented in Parliament. But the only recognized, nay the only possible way, in which they can obtain such representation, is by being organized under political leaders, in whom they shall heartily confide, and who shall at once stimulate and direct their political action. We set this forth at greater length in October (p. 275), and we need not repeat what we there said. We asked then, and we now ask again, the straightforward question,—who are to *be* their political leaders? If we rightly understand "C.'s" very obscure expressions, he would consider that the landlords should in some degree occupy this position. But we would urge—not that such a reply is *mistaken*—but that it is simply *unmeaning*. It is as though the free-traders had been recommended, to make the late Lord Derby their political leader. The landlord cannot possibly be his tenants' political

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\* As our article is passing through the press, a vigorous criticism of the British constitution is set forth (Dec. 31) in the very remarkable series of letters on "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," published by the "Pall Mall Gazette."

leader, because he is their political opponent. If they vote with him, it is not at all because they follow his political guidance, but because they have not firmness to resist his tyrannical intimidation. He does not so much as dream of indoctrinating them with his political views: no hint of the kind can be found throughout the whole Galway evidence.\* His appeals are of a very different kind. He reminds them that "their cattle may die, and things of that sort may happen"; † and proceeds to inquire where they will *then* be, if they shall have been true to their political principles.

Under these circumstances, to our mind the one fact in Irish politics which is immeasurably more cheering and hopeful than any other, is that so vast a majority of these electors follow the political leadership of their priesthood. Their political creed is undoubtedly such as every Catholic is at full liberty to hold: but it is nevertheless of a kind peculiarly liable to be most dangerously corrupted; to become anarchical, revolutionary, and irreligious. Notoriously on the continent of Europe such has been the phenomenon presented: whereas in Ireland, as "C." confesses (third letter), "the war between property and envy, between religion and irreligion, rages only partially"; we might say more truly, rages not at all. To what is the Empire indebted for this most happy circumstance? Precisely to the political influence of the priesthood. As we said in October (p. 274), we wish there existed some other class who could take in hand what we may call the rough work of political organization and manipulation; but it would be a miserable day for the Empire, when the substantial leadership should pass away from the priesthood.

"C." ascribes to us indeed the opinion (third letter), that "clerical political action" should be confined to "cases" in which the priesthood is "unanimous." But we said the exact reverse (pp. 277, 278); though we had no space to enlarge on this particular aspect of the general theme. Whatever political opinion be held in Ireland such that a good Catholic has full liberty to hold it,—we rejoice to see its advocates place themselves under the political guidance of those priests who hold it in common with themselves; because by that means it is pre-

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\* "C." himself represents his pattern landlord thus addressing his tenant: "Here is a candidate *specially obnoxious to me*: there is no reason why you as a Catholic should vote for him: *you may sympathize with his political ideas*, which nevertheless may be in error: *you hold your land from me* at less than its value: *all I ask of you is to withhold your vote.*" The italics are ours.

† Archdeacon Butson's agent. See our October article, p. 264.

served from anti-religious and anti-social aberration, and confined within a Christian and Catholic channel.

We do not for a moment deny that, as things are, several serious evils are caused by the political action of the priesthood. As we said in October (p. 292), "the Irish Church would be unlike any other religious body which ever existed, if there were not defects, even serious defects, in its practical working; and the last thing we wish is that these should be concealed, if only the innumerable redeeming features of the picture be adequately exhibited." But we would urge, firstly, that (for the reasons just given) even the present state of things is immeasurably better, than that which would be caused by the abstention of priests from the political arena. Then secondly, these evils would be almost entirely remedied, in proportion as priests should more sedulously govern their conduct by those synodical decrees, enacted by the bishops and confirmed by the Holy See, which we translated in October (p. 269). "C." (third letter) accounts these decrees "an inadequate protection." But we are not aware of his reason for such an opinion; and it is certain that whatever sacerdotal scandal was to be found in the last Galway election, is entirely traceable to the neglect of those decrees. Finally we would add a third remark on this particular part of our theme, which brings us more directly into collision with "C." than even the preceding two. He considers that in proportion as a priest "practises the things of the next world," "expanding his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven,"—in that proportion he is a bad political leader. We maintain on the contrary, with the utmost confidence, that the more deeply imbued are priests with the pure and full ecclesiastical spirit,—the more simply detached from worldly motives and aims,—in that proportion the evils of their political leadership will be less, and its blessings still more inestimable.

"C." implies in his third letter that, as a matter of fact, bishops put spiritual pressure on priests, and priests on laymen, in behalf of "purely political" interests, such as tenant right and home rule. Most certainly, if this is so, it is in direct contravention of the synodical decrees; which expressly enact that "every one be permitted to think freely for himself on things doubtful." The most violent Protestant indeed would not go beyond ourselves, in accounting any such attempted pressure as among the most intolerable of abuses. But unless "C." means that he is himself cognisant of such cases—and we do not understand him to mean this—we entirely disbelieve in their existence: we entirely dis-



believe that either bishop or priest has ever represented it to be the religious duty of a Catholic as such, to vote for or against tenant right; for or against home rule. That bishops and priests indeed have most earnestly enforced on the people, as a sacred duty, the voting on such matters *in accordance with their genuine conviction*—this we freely confess and rejoice to believe. And in regard to what we called in October (pp. 266-273) “sacred questions,” the Church undoubtedly goes further. Undoubtedly a good priest would press his people, by every religious motive at his command, to vote against a Fenian candidate, or against one opposed to denominational education. But these are the very cases in which “C.,” if we rightly understand him, *approves* the political action of the priesthood. And even in these cases, be it observed, what the priest attempts to influence, is the voters’ *convictions*. He does not desire that they shall vote for A while they think B the preferable candidate; but that they shall come to consider B an unfit candidate, and shall vote against him accordingly.

The “Spectator,” in a very kind criticism of our October article, complains that we treated the Galway priests too leniently, because their language must have conveyed to their flock the impression, that to vote against tenant right was of itself blameable in a Catholic elector. But the writer, we think, has not laid due stress on the fact, how absolutely notorious it was throughout the whole county, that every single tenant-farmer regarded Nolan as on public grounds the preferable candidate. What the priests so justly censured on religious grounds, was not the voter’s opposing tenant-right, but his preferring his own private advantage to what he regarded with firmest conviction as his country’s highest good. “C.” piques himself on his intimate acquaintance with Ireland, and is indubitably anxious to say everything he can in behalf of the landlords: yet see what admissions he has to make. In his first letter he says that the tenant-farmers believe in those principles with which Nolan was identified, “with a faith only exceeded (if exceeded) by their faith in God.” And at the end of the same letter he introduces his pattern landlord as *admitting* that his tenants “sympathize with Nolan’s political ideas,” even when he endeavours to prevent them from *voting* for Nolan.\* Nor does “C.” so much as hint, from the beginning of his first letter to the end of his third, that any one of the tenant-farmers who voted for Trench did so on

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\* See the citation in a previous note.

any public grounds of any kind. On the other hand, take any Catholic elector who (as being of a higher rank) may have presumably been in favour of Trench on public grounds,—there is not the faintest trace throughout the Galway Evidence of such an elector being exposed to any pressure whatever from the priests, against voting in accordance with his convictions. All that the priests denounced, was his refusing to his tenants the same liberty of conscientious suffrage which he exercised himself.

We can see no ground for the opinion, apparently entertained by "C.," that Irish priests, as coming from the tenant class, must inevitably be more or less at variance with the landlords. He says in his first letter that the priest "would rather have nothing to do with" "the Irish proprietor, be" the latter "Catholic or Protestant." But there are very obvious reasons for this. So long as proprietors cleave to those unholy maxims on electoral dictation for which "C." makes his distressing apologies, what can a conscientious priest do? Such landlords come before him as at once tyrants and corruptors of public morality. Again, in the last paragraph of his third letter "C." expresses a wish, that "the clergy" would ally themselves with the "social strength and power" of the landlords, as a secure bulwark against irreligion. But how can any landlords effectively resist irreligion, so long as, by tyrannizing over their tenants' consciences, they violate alike the laws of God and man? Under existing circumstances, it seems to us that the priests deserve great praise for the singular moderation with which they speak of these oppressors. The most superficial reader of the Galway Evidence must be struck with the great anxiety shown by every priest who was examined, to do careful and punctilious justice to the good qualities of those landlords, with whom he had been most energetically at variance. We fully believe that where any landlord will frankly surrender, as immoral and antichristian, all claim to influence his tenants' votes otherwise than by influencing their convictions,—the priests with whom he may come in contact will even go out of their way to show him extreme respect and deference. But at all events "C." has no right to argue, from what priests often do now, to what priests *would* do towards a landlord, who should respect and admire his tenants' public virtue, instead of doing his utmost to corrupt or punish it.

On the whole, so totally do we differ from "C.'s" general view of true Irish interests, that we venture to think that one end, specially aimed at in Irish clerical education, should be the fitting priests to occupy, still more effectively and with still

more salutary results, that political leadership, which is now so healthily and happily theirs. Of course clerical education is a theme external to the proper sphere of a periodical like ours ; and we will therefore pursue no further what we have here hinted. But we may refer our readers to a very interesting letter, contributed to the "Spectator" of Dec. 21 by Rev. Dr. Redmond, lately dogmatical professor at S. Thomas's, Hammersmith : though we are far from agreeing with every single opinion expressed by that able writer.

And now let us revert to the last Galway Election, and the various circumstances which have thence ensued. We said in October (p. 271), that "we are by no means sure that the Galway Judgment may not be the best thing which could possibly have happened ; because of the indignation thereby excited against that inveterate tyranny and oppression, which the Judge has not merely absolved but rather canonized." We must not forget however, how very large a price it has been necessary to pay for this benefit ; how grievously intensified has been the antipathy—already deplorably great—felt by the mass of Catholic Irishmen, towards England and towards that class of their countrymen whom they identify with England. We may consider this under three heads.

Firstly, there is no phenomenon more regretted by those who desire harmony between Ireland and England, than the sullen suspicion and dislike so often entertained by Irishmen towards English law. Well-wishers of union are earnestly desirous of removing this suspicion ; whether on one hand by adapting the law more successfully to Irish needs, or on the other hand by removing misconceptions (which no doubt largely exist) of its true character. The Galway Judgment came as if on purpose to frustrate such well-meant endeavours. The enormous majority of the Galway constituency were earnestly in favour of those principles which were identified with Nolan, and were earnestly in favour of Nolan as *representing* those principles. If there be such a thing as constitutional right in these islands, it was their undoubted constitutional right to return him as their member. A landlord conspiracy was formed, and inaugurated at Loughrea, to deprive them of this constitutional right ; and their natural protectors the priests came forward accordingly, to defend them against that conspiracy. Here steps in the English law, represented by Mr. Justice Keogh. It absolves the conspirators ; while it singles out for punishment the people's cherished protectors, against whom the worst that can be said is, that some of them performed what was in itself their bounden duty with indefensible violence of act or language. It is as though Judge Keogh's very object were to confirm

Irishmen in their persuasion, that the English law is an instrument of oppression specially devised for their injury.

Then secondly consider the attitude assumed towards Ireland, by the English House of Commons and the English people. The iniquity of the Keogh Judgment is a matter on which no second opinion is possible, to those who know the most superficially obvious facts of Irish life.\* Even "C." does not attempt expressly to defend it. On the other hand, if there have been any question of our time on which the English people have been practically unanimous, it has been in their *admiration* of this Judgment. Irishmen feel that the Englishman's prejudice against them is so intense, as to incapacitate him from seeing what is before his very eyes. What would have been the outcry in England, if in an *English* county such intimidation had been proved as was established against many Galway landlords? But Irish Papists, it would seem, are worthy of no better treatment than intimidation. Such is the view which Irishmen take of the English sentiment; and surely with much truth, if with some exaggeration. Nor can there be any doubt that the whole thing has largely forwarded the agitation for home rule.

Now thirdly as to the landlords. Never was there a more monstrous—we may even say a more impudent—claim, than that made by the Irish landlords to be political leaders of their tenants. Political leaders forsooth of those, from whose political views they fundamentally and violently dissent! Observe "C.'s" tone in speaking of the small farmers' doctrine on the land question; and imagine such a person assuming to be a political leader of those who hold it. A claim of this kind must be felt by the whole tenant class, not merely as a standing injury, but, even more keenly, as a standing insult. And never was it put forth in a shape nearly so offensive, as at the last Galway Election. In that contest, the one point at issue was what had always been the central point of political difference between the landlord and his tenants. And what the former claimed as his due was simply, that the latter should co-operate positively, or at least negatively, to the defeat of that doctrine, which, of all political doctrines, they most

\* We admitted in October (p. 265) that the Judge was technically right in declaring the election null and void, on the ground of the misconduct of certain of Captain Nolan's supporters, for whom he was legally responsible as his agents. Yet the Judgment was in two ways iniquitous. Firstly, in absolving the landlords, whose conduct was indefinitely more illegal and unconstitutional than that of the priests. Secondly in that it ignored, or rather by implication denied, the indubitable fact, that Nolan was the genuine choice of the electors. Irishmen found their priests' combination to protect them against tyranny stigmatized as itself tyranny.

specially cherished. Why, far more rankling irritation must have been left in the mind of many who were cajoled or frightened into acquiescence, than even of those who endured suffering for their courageous resistance.

The landlords' position is now no longer tenable; ousted as they have been by Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill and Ballot Bill of their usurped and unjust power. We sincerely trust then, that they will at last do justice to their own higher qualities, and surrender with a good grace. Let them express at once, by word and act, that they respect and admire the tenant who votes according to his convictions. So will harmony come to exist between the two classes; and there will be greater hopes of tenants recognizing that amount of truth, which may be contained in their landlords' political doctrine. But if the latter resolve still eagerly to clutch at a power which has in fact escaped their grasp, for obvious reasons the exasperation will be even greater than before. A great deal has been most truly said, on the grievous calamity involved in class being set against class. But who is *responsible* for this? Is it those who merely desire to give their personal vote according to their personal judgment? Or is it not rather those who seek to *deprive* them of that indefeasible right? Certainly, if there is one opinion more than another, the prevalence of which among one class would intensify all the worst evils of Irish society, it is that which "C." has not blushed by implication to maintain. We refer to his opinion, that the tenants' honest vote is an offence which may justly be visited by their landlord with raising their rent; or, in other words, with inflicting severe physical suffering on themselves and on their families.

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After the preceding article had been sent to press, "C." published a supplementary letter in the "Tablet" of Dec. 28th, which to our mind contains more curious matter than the other three put together. We may at once explain however, that our comment on that letter will contain nothing more of importance on the general subject; and that no reader therefore need trouble himself to look at what here follows, except so far as he is interested in the personal controversy between our critic and ourselves.

"C." was led to make his explanation, by a note which which we addressed to the "Tablet," mentioning our intention to answer his letters; and he seems to have been at

once struck with some misgiving, as to the possible effect of one or two things he had said. Observe e.g. the following sentence :—

I wish also to repudiate the idea (which it seems intended to fasten on me) that I consider the interference of landlords with their tenants' votes as defensible.

Now certainly, before this disavowal, we had very strong grounds indeed for "fastening" on him this "idea"; as a few citations will abundantly show. In our October number the following passage occurred :—

There is literally no more reason why tenants should vote for their landlord's candidate as such, than for their apothecary's or their baker's. Doubtless the landlord may most legitimately place before his tenants his political views, with their reasons; but so may the apothecary before his patients, and the baker before his customers. Doubtless, again, it may happen that some voters may have predominant confidence in the judgment of the particular person who is their landlord; but, then, others may have similar confidence in the judgment of the particular person who is their apothecary or their baker. Still, in all three cases, the ultimate decision, as to an elector's vote, rests with the elector himself; and he betrays the trust which God has placed in his hands, if he exercises it otherwise than according to his own sincere conviction, of what will promote his country's highest interests. (p. 271.)

This passage seems quite to have stung "C."; for in each of his letters he adverts to it. In his first letter, he promises to show that this "dictum of the DUBLIN REVIEW is absolute nonsense." In his second letter, he "considers himself entitled to repeat that such a dictum is absolute nonsense." In his third letter occurs the following, part of which we have already quoted :—

If I had the ear of Lord Clanricarde, I should advise him to hang up, framed and glazed, in the rent-office, that comparison between the influence of a landlord and a tradesman, so often quoted in this discussion; and I should further advise his lordship to *have his estate revalued* ["C.'s" italics], taking chance of the "holy and patriotic indignation,"\* and to repeat these

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\* This quotation is from the following passage of our October article. The priests, we said, "assume as a matter of course"—we had already argued that they were perfectly *justified* in assuming—"that those Catholics of the tenant class who thought of voting for Trench, were induced to such a course by preferring their landlords' favour or some other private interest to the public good. And though, even granting this, the language of a few individual priests was most indefensibly violent, a certain amount both of holy and of patriotic indignation was certainly in place" (p. 259). As "C." quotes this phrase once or twice with a certain irony, we suppose we rightly understand him as meaning, that "holy and patriotic indignation" is *not* in place, when persons, in giving a vote, prefer their private interest to their country's religious and temporal welfare.



valuations periodically. And I believe the Marquis would come to admire the principle involved in the comparison, even more than does the DUBLIN Reviewer.

Nothing can be plainer than this implication. If Lord Clanricarde's tenants refuse to vote for the candidate favoured by that nobleman, "C." advises him to raise their rent upon them. After such a statement, we have certainly reason to be surprised at "C.'s" "repudiating the idea"—nay, censuring those who try to "fasten" it on him—"that he considers the interference of landlords with their tenants' votes as defensible." But the paragraph in his supplementary letter, which follows the sentence we have quoted, is still more wonderful:—

What I do say is, I dislike the principle of this non-interference universally and invariably applied; I say that such an application is unwise in itself, and not invariably requisite, and must necessarily result in the application of strict commercial principles to the management of land. In other words, it must result in high rents and short credits; certainly an undesirable result to Irish tenants.

Our critic then "dislikes to see the principle universally and invariably applied," that what is not "defensible" shall not be done. "It is unwise in itself," he adds, "and not invariably requisite," never to do what is not "defensible." The tenants indeed should not even *wish* their landlord not to do against them what is not "defensible"; for otherwise (so resolved is he to hurt them somehow) he will be quite sure to do what they will like much worse.

So far as we can penetrate this dense fog of words, "C." seems to mean, that landlord pressure was rightly applied in such an extreme case as the last Galway election, but that it ought not to be applied on ordinary occasions. To this we reply in the first place, that in our view (for reasons we gave a few pages back) landlord corruption and intimidation at the last Galway election was a more offensively tyrannical procedure, than the interference put forth in any other case on record. Secondly we ask, is it or is it not in itself wrong, that the landlord should interfere with his tenants in the free exercise of their suffrage? If it is not, he ought to interfere *whenever* he considers he can thereby promote his country's welfare: but if it *is* in itself wrong, then it was wrong inclusively at the last Galway election. And thirdly, *the landlords* at all events, to do them justice, attempt no such illogical compromise as their advocate has invented in their behalf; as will be evident to any one who

reads the extracts from the Galway Evidence which we gave in October (pp. 262—265). It is put forth as *the recognized and established principle* that, in return for his many kindnesses, the landlord has full right to expect from his tenants that they shall not vote against his candidate.

"C." then proceeds, if we rightly understand him, to deny the possibility of there *being* such a thing as landlord intimidation. These are his words:—

I say further, that the expression "landlord intimidation" is a convenient but loose and, as generally used, worthless expression. I say that no man is bound to let land at less than its value; and that if he insists on getting the fair letting value of his land, he is not thereby guilty of intimidation. That he is bound neither by law nor by custom to give, as many do, gates, slates, timber, &c.; and that if he refuses to do so, he is not thereby guilty of intimidation. Ingenuity itself can make nothing of what is usually called landlord intimidation, except that it is the withholding of certain favours, which no law, human or divine, prescribes the granting of.

Certainly the landlord cannot be said to practise intimidation, when he merely refuses to let land at less than its value, or to make presents of timber, gates, and slates. Who indeed in the world ever dreamed that this *does* constitute intimidation? But the landlord may very truly be said to practise intimidation, if (expressly or by implication) he *threatens* to withhold such benefits from tenants, who will not vote for his candidate in order to oblige him. Or, to speak more correctly, we should make a distinction. If the tenants hold their land on such terms, that by doing what he threatens he would inflict on them severe suffering,—then his threats are precisely "intimidation": otherwise his procedure may more correctly be called "corruption"; because it is the offer of pecuniary largess for political dishonesty. Which of the two—intimidation or corruption—be the more morally disgraceful, we need not attempt to determine.

As a matter of fact however, every one knows that in Ireland the former alternative is the true one. Owing to the excessive competition for land, the whole body of tenants (generally speaking) accede to terms of contract, which they cannot fulfil in their integrity without severe suffering. Many a landlord has long taken advantage of this fact, to impose on his tenantry that intolerable political yoke against which we have inveighed. Thanks to the zeal of the priesthood, assisted by the Land Bill and the Ballot Bill, this yoke can no longer be maintained. "C." implies that, as a matter of course, the landlord will be induced by this circumstance to raise his rents and inflict on his tenants the physical suffering therein

involved. We find however, from his supplementary letter, that he is not himself a landlord; and we entirely refuse to believe that, if he were himself under a landlord's responsibilities, he would act on the advice he is so prompt in giving to others. Nor do we expect that any of the landlords will so act. We believe that their misdeeds proceed far more from thoughtlessness, narrow-mindedness, and class-feeling, than from hard-heartedness or any pleasure felt by them in oppressing their tenancies. But let us suppose for a moment one were found to do as "C." suggests. Let us suppose that some one were found to raise his rents and inflict severe suffering on his tenants, from mere spite at having lost a power, which he ought to be ashamed of himself for having ever desired; the power of coercing them into a dishonest vote. We believe most of our readers will agree with ourselves in declaring without hesitation, that such a fellow would be unworthy of mixing in the society of upright and honourable men.

There is nothing else in "C.'s" supplementary letter, which calls on us for comment.

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## ART. VII.—REPLY TO MR. RENOUF BY F. BOTTALLA.

### No. III.

#### THE CONDEMNATION OF POPE HONORIUS I.

[In presenting our readers with F. Bottalla's concluding remarks on the great Honorius controversy, we would draw their special attention to one circumstance. After our own last article on Honorius had been written (April, 1870), F. Colombier introduced quite a new element into the discussion. He maintained in the "*Études*," that S. Agatho died one year earlier than is commonly supposed; and that no attempt was made in the Council to touch Honorius's memory, until the legates lost their full authority by the Pope's death. F. Bottalla, having carefully examined F. Colombier's proofs, has added the great weight of his own judgment in favour of the same opinion.]

**T**HE second proposition Mr. Renouf undertook to prove in his second pamphlet is that Pope Honorius was condemned for heresy by ecumenical councils and by Popes. We must not forget that the main purpose of Mr. Renouf's first pamphlet was to show from the condemnation of Pope Honorius that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was in conflict with incontrovertible facts. But he was fully aware that the simple fact of this

Pope being condemned as a heretic, however certain it might be, would not advance the main point he had in view, unless he proves firstly, that the ecumenical Council, in the full exercise of its authority, had condemned him for heresy, which he had taught *ex cathedra*; and secondly that Pope Leo II., when confirming the Council and its decree, acknowledged the sentence in the exact meaning intended by the majority of the Council, before the terms of the final definition of faith had been definitively settled. Mr. Renouf indeed undertook to prove in the last part of his second as well as of his first pamphlet, that the error of Honorius was an *ex cathedra* pronouncement. But this implies that Pope Honorius erred in a dogma of faith, a view which we have already refuted. Wherefore the last part of Mr. Renouf's pamphlet fails to bear out that which precedes it. That gentleman should have proved from the documents of the Sixth Council, that the assembled fathers condemned Honorius for an error taught *ex cathedra*; and moreover that Leo II. confirmed this sentence in that very sense. For unless the Sixth Synod condemned the Pope for an error taught *ex cathedra*, its sentence could by no means affect the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. And further, unless Pope Leo II. confirmed the sentence of condemnation in this very sense, it would be legally null, and in nowise entitled to our veneration.

These are the two capital points on which the whole controversy hinges. Hence any one may easily perceive how far Mr. Renouf has misunderstood and misrepresented the point in question in his two pamphlets. He seems surprised at Dr. Ward's insisting on these two essential points; and he believes that his critics have entirely misunderstood the drift and bearing of his arguments, since they adopt this view of the main point in question. But the mistake is wholly his own. That part of his pamphlet is directly calculated to mislead his readers, both as to the main issue of the controversy and as to the line of defence which I with others have pursued in order to Honorius's rehabilitation. He undertakes to prove that Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Council for no other offence than that of heresy. For this purpose he accumulates the names of the numerous Catholic theologians, who have admitted that the Synod really condemned Honorius for heresy. Among them we meet with all who believed that the Acts of the Council had been tampered with, and who, on that account, were led to exaggerate the import of the synodical judgment in order to establish thereby the spuriousness of the conciliar record. But all those quotations serve but to throw dust into the eyes of those who are not acquainted with the Honorian controversy. Mr. Renouf knew full well that even Dr. Ward, though so uncompro-

missing and indefatigable a champion of Papal Infallibility, thought it more probable that the Bishops of the Sixth Council intended to condemn Honorius expressly as a heretic. And he should also have remembered that F. Colombier, in his able articles in defence of Pope Honorius, likewise admits that this Pontiff was anathematized by the Synod as guilty of heresy.\* It was therefore needless for Mr. Renouf to give us a list of old names, since two of the greatest supporters of Papal Infallibility in our day are of that opinion. Mr. Renouf had better have drawn up, if he could, a catalogue of the Catholic (not Gallican) theologians, who may have maintained that Pope Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Council for heresy taught *ex cathedra*. Then his labour of collecting the names of divines of former ages would not have been utterly lost.

These preliminary remarks will suffice to show our readers the kind of controversy which we have in hand, and the plan which we have followed in our Apology of Pope Honorius. In the last part of our pamphlet we observed that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is in nowise concerned by the nature of the offence for which Pope Honorius was condemned.† Though we treated that question at length, and we still hold the opinion that the several passages of the Acts of the Council concerning Honorius's condemnation are susceptible of a milder interpretation, at least with respect to the mind of the majority of the Synod, nevertheless we are fully aware that both in past centuries and in our age learned theologians and zealous defenders of Papal Infallibility have upheld a contrary view. We therefore did not make it the main subject of our Apology; since we had principally in view to defend Papal Infallibility against an old objection. Our Apology then may be divided into two parts: the first is that the Synod did not intend to condemn Honorius for a dogmatical error taught *ex cathedra*; the second, that Pope Leo II. gave his sanction to the final condemnation of Honorius, only in as much as it implied that he had grievously failed in the discharge of his pastoral duty. We deem this point the most important in the controversy, since no sentence of a Council would gain currency in the Church unless stamped with the sanction of the Pope himself. Mr. Renouf took no account of our plan in the discussion; he misunderstood our views, and insisted only on proving what is readily admitted by many Catholics, without prejudice to their adhesion to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. Yet did he flatter himself that he had given the *coup-de-grâce* to this dogma, merely because he

\* "Études Rel. Hist.," Sér. iv. liv. de Mars, 1870, p. 390, seq.

† "Pope Honorius I. before the Tribunal of Reason and History," p. 95.

thought he had shown that Honorius was branded by the fathers of the sixth Council as guilty of heresy.

But, to return to our subject. In the first part of our discussion we laid the principal stress of our argument on the letters of Pope Agatho proclaiming Papal Infallibility, and on the unquestioning assent the Council, both before and after its condemnation of Honorius, indisputably gave to his claims. Mr. Renouf thought that this was the main argument we relied upon in order to show that Honorius was not condemned for heresy. Be it so. He went on to say that Pope Agatho's letter in nowise implied the doctrine of Papal Infallibility: in proof whereof he alleged arguments so flimsy, that they could serve only to entrap the ignorant. Dr. Döllinger himself, who, as all know, is by no means prejudiced in favour of Papal Infallibility, asserted that this very doctrine was cunningly inserted by Pope Agatho in his letters to the Emperor and to the Council.\* But whether cunningly inserted or not, certain it is that the assembled Bishops received these letters without the slightest protest or gainsaying, and made no reserve or exception in their submission. In our pamphlet we recalled some facts strongly bearing on this subject; but which need not to be repeated here.† As to the remarks of Mr. Renouf on the letters of Pope Agatho, having plainly shown in our book on Papal Infallibility how groundless and erroneous they are, we now dismiss the subject, and refer our readers to that part of our work.‡

We will here examine what Mr. Renouf brings forward against our second proposition as to the import of the confirmation given by Pope Leo II. to the condemnation of Honorius. But we have first to make the following observations on our opponent's assertions as to the necessity of the Papal sanction being appended to the decrees of a General Council. He acknowledges indeed that the Pope's approbation is requisite in order that a Council may be deemed Ecumenical; but he maintains that "when after its close, the Pope has once acknowledged it as Ecumenical . . . every Catholic looks upon its declarations, with reference to faith and morals as having been specially assisted by the Holy Ghost." § Mr. Renouf evidently misunderstands the Catholic doctrine, and thereby invalidates his whole argument, as Dr. Ward excellently observes in his review of Mr. Renouf's pamphlets. First he misunderstands the Catholic doctrine, in that he calls a doctrine, common to Catholic theolo-

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\* "Die Papst Fabeln," p. 137.

† "Pope Honorius, &c.," p. 90, seq.

‡ "Papal Infallibility," sect. xi. p. 255, seq.

§ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 54.



gians of every school, a view peculiar to a certain section of Ultramontanes: whereas it is held by many Gallicans. Catholics maintain that every decree of an Ecumenical Council is passed by the assembled fathers, on the implied and necessary condition that it receives the sanction of the Roman Pontiff. This is the reason why all the Ecumenical Councils in their final address to the Pope beg of him to confirm their decrees by his Pontifical authority. But none of the synodical Acts could be regarded as an infallible tenet, or having force of ecclesiastical law, unless it have been promulgated as such by the Pope to the universal Church.\* This is the doctrine of all Catholic theologians, save a few Gallicans. Mr. Renouf and his friends should begin by refuting this doctrine and by convincing divines of the truth of its contradictory, before asking them to judge of the case of Honorius by different principles.

Now Mr. Renouf maintains that the Sixth Ecumenical Council has been simply confirmed by the Holy See.† In proof of that he alleges the three professions of faith contained in the *Liber Diurnus* of the Roman Pontiffs. In the first of them the Pope solemnly promises to observe the first five Ecumenical Councils "usque ad unum apicem immutata," "et una cum eis pari honore et veneratione sanctum Sextum Concilium. . . . quæque prædicaverunt prædicare; quæque condemnauerunt ore et corde condemnare." In the second and third profession of faith the like expressions are to be found, with this exception, that in the second mention is made of the condemnation of Honorius; but of this we will speak further on. As to the general expressions used in the three professions, they prove nothing in favour of the assertion of our adversary; because they refer only to the decrees of faith, since it is in them that the final definition of the revealed doctrine is pronounced, and the final condemnation of heretics and heresies. The Roman Pontiff proposes to the belief of the faithful only the dogmatical canons or the definitions of faith which have been definitively sanctioned by the Synod. But over and above this the doctrinal decisions of a general Council are of faith only so far forth as they receive the sanction of the Roman Pontiff, and according to the import and extent of that sanction. Now that Pope Leo II. did not intend to confirm the condemnation of Honorius, as implying that this Pope was a teacher of heresy, appears, as we maintained in our pamphlet, from his

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\* If the Pope has pronounced his doctrinal decision before the Council had been assembled, his decision should be regarded as infallible and definite, before the synodical decree had been published.

† "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 55.

letters themselves on the subject of the Sixth Council. Mr. Renouf has not attempted to prove that Pope Leo sanctioned every part of the Acts of the sixth general Synod, and every reason referred in them for the condemnation of those whose names are mentioned in the definition of faith. He asserts that Pope Leo II. not only accepted and confirmed the Synod, but also approved of and promulgated the edict of the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus with reference to the Council. He further adds that, "in the Pope's reply to the Emperor's letter there is not a word which indicates the slightest disapproval of anything either in the edict or in the proceedings of the Council."\* But his silence proves nothing, especially when in many a place he clearly states his views concerning the condemnation of Honorius. Nor can his approval and promulgation of the Emperor's Edict be construed against our assertion; because in the very passage referred to by Mr. Renouf as a striking proof of the contrary, he (the Pope) says nothing which can bear that meaning. In it he praises the Emperor for the support given to the Council, for the peace restored to the Church, and for his having contributed to spread throughout the world the truth of the Apostolic teaching by his imperial edict. He continues to eulogize the Ecumenical Council for having followed in everything the apostolical rule and the teaching of the Fathers. He moreover declares that he consents and confirms with his Apostolic authority those things which had been defined by the Council, because it had most fully preached the faith which the Apostolic See of Peter received with veneration. Finally, he ranks the Third Constantinopolitan Council with the Ecumenical Synods. Now in all this the Pope has in view only the last Definition of the Council, which put down the Monothelitic heresy and secured the triumph of the Catholic doctrine. In fact, as we remarked in our pamphlet, it was only to the Definition of faith that Pope Leo II. required the signature of all the bishops.† It is true that he sent to the Bishops the Edict of the Emperor and the prosphonic address to the same prince. But he acted thus in order to show, as he says, in his reply to the Emperor, that "by the sentence of the Synod, and by the decree of the imperial Edict, as by the two-edged sword of the spirit, all ancient and recent heresies are destroyed with all their blasphemies."‡ Thus not only there is no proof whatever for what our opponent asserts, but his opinion is also refuted by the very letter of Pope Leo himself.

\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 57.

† See his Letters, ii. iv. v. (Labbe, t. vii. pp. 1456-57, 1460, 1462).

‡ "Relatio Leonis Papæ ad Imp. Constantinum" (Labbe, l. c. p. 1152).

But Mr. Renouf appeals now to the letters of Pope Leo, for the purpose of proving from them that the Pontiff intended to condemn Honorius as guilty of heresy. The first passage he refers to is from Leo's relation to the Emperor Constantine. We had remarked in our pamphlet that the words τῇ βεβήλῳ προδοσίᾳ can by no means be understood to apply to Honorius, but to the originators of the heresy,—Sergius, Cyrus, and their followers. We defended this view in some letters inserted in the *Tablet*; and we were glad to see that the learned Mr. Maunoury, in some articles in defence of Pope Honorius, published by the *Univers*, agreed with us. The learned Father Franzelin, in his treatise *De Incarnatione*, had already maintained the same opinion. Would Mr. Renouf charge them with want of scholarship? In our volume on Papal Infallibility we have again examined this controversy, and we believe we have made it evident from the very wording of the Greek text that the sentence quoted above refers to the Patriarchs of Constantinople, who originated the heresy of the Monothelites. We invite our readers to peruse from p. 277 to p. 281 of that volume, and they will be convinced of the exactness of our assertion. We must only here remark, as we did in that work, that even were the words in question to be explained as they have been by many Catholic writers, they would fail to fix on Honorius the guilt of heresy. This is why his apologists readily admitted the interpretation of their opponents. The task they had in hand was not that of clearing Pope Honorius from all fault whatsoever, but only from the charge of heresy. On the contrary, Gallican writers, who intended to convict the Pope of heresy, must by necessity admit Mr. Renouf's view of the sense of this passage. Consequently neither the authority of earlier writers, nor that of the others, can give the least countenance to Mr. Renouf's erroneous view.

But it is far stranger to see how this gentleman takes no notice of the remarks which we made in our pamphlet on the letter of Pope Leo II. to the bishops of Spain against the charges against Pope Honorius, which he grounded thereon in his pamphlet. He again quotes the passage of Leo's letter, where it is distinctly said of Honorius, "who did not extinguish at its outset the flame of the heretical dogma, as was required by the dignity of the apostolic authority, but by his negligence fostered it." These words are the antidote to the charge of heresy alleged against Pope Honorius. Pope Leo shows that he was not condemned because guilty of heresy, but because he was negligent in the discharge of his pastoral office. Mr. Renouf remarks only that the word *negligendo* can easily be harmonized with the charge of heresy. He says that *negli-*

gence may imply doing something without duly weighing the consequences; and that "the real neglect of Honorius consists in allowing the letters of the Abbot John to be written in his name and subscribed with his hand."\* But, to begin with the second remark, even were we to grant (what we absolutely deny) that the letters written by the Abbot John contain heretical tenets, Pope Honorius could never be proved formally guilty of heresy, because by a gross neglect he allowed the letters to be written in his name and subscribed by him. He would certainly be liable for that to great punishment, but he would never on that account be a formal heretic. Because it could be said in his favour either that he did not read the letters, trusting the learning and the orthodoxy of his secretary; or that he misunderstood the real drift and meaning of several propositions contained in them; and no one could prove the contrary. A real and formal heresy requires the interior assent to the error condemned by the Church, and the obstinacy in maintaining it against the true doctrine proposed by the competent ecclesiastical authority. Now we meet with none of this in the case of Pope Honorius: consequently he could not at all be condemned as a heretic, because by a most guilty neglect he allowed letters containing heresy to be written in his name and subscribed with his hand, either without reading or understanding them. But, on the other hand, we have already refuted this objection as absolutely groundless, because the letters in question contain no error whatever in matter of faith.

As to the other remark of Mr. Renouf, we confess that we are at loss to understand whether that gentleman intends anything definite, or is using words devoid of all intelligible sense. He says that there is more than one kind of negligence, and that they do not necessarily imply inactivity. But in this he is wrong, for negligence in every language means the omission of due vigilance. He who is guilty of negligence may act, and, commonly speaking, he acts in some way or the other; but his action does not properly constitute his negligence, when it is only its consequence and fruit. A prodigal may be called by Cicero "*negligens in sumptu*"; that is to say, making useless expenses, because he did not attend to the proper manner of spending his money. In the *Capitulaire de Villis* it is said, "*fraus de latrocinio vel de alio neglecto*"; because negligence, culpable negligence, often causes harm to others; in fact, the full passage which Mr. Renouf copied from Du Cange is as follows: "*Si familia nostra partibus nostris aliquam facit fraudem de*

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\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 62.

latrocinio aut alio neglecto, illud in caput componat." And Du Cange himself explains the word *neglectum* by *negligentia*; and he adds: "sed maxime ea quæ culpæ proxima est." Therefore this instance, with the others brought forward by Mr. Renouf, prove only that *negligence* is often culpable and punishable. But this is beside the question, because we admit that the negligence of Pope Honorius was culpable, and deserving of the punishment which was decreed by the Sixth Council. What we deny is that his fault of negligence harmonizes with the charge of heresy made against him. As to Leo's letter to King Erwig, Mr. Renouf takes no notice of what we wrote in our Apology. We have already proved that Pope Honorius was by no means included by Leo II. among the "omnes, &c." who had held a heretical doctrine: because he had unquestionably excluded him from the class of those heretics who had defended with obstinacy the heretical dogma of the Monothelites. Pope Leo expressly distinguished the case of Honorius from that of the other heretics: "all these" preached one will and one operation in the Divinity and in the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ; but Honorius only permitted the immaculate rule of the Apostolical Tradition to be polluted. As we remarked in our pamphlet, the word *παρεχώρησε* does not imply a complete surrender of faith, as if Leo had directly said that Honorius polluted the Church by his heresy. This assertion of Mr. Renouf should be proved before being accepted. The letter of Leo to the bishops of Spain, confronted with that to King Erwig, affords further evidence as to the Pontiff's real meaning. Let us then conclude that the sentence of condemnation against Pope Honorius, pronounced by the Sixth General Council, was sanctioned by Leo II. only in as much as it charged on Honorius a gross neglect in the discharge of his Pontifical duties.

Now, it were a sheer loss of time to repeat here what we observed in our pamphlet concerning the Seventh and Eighth Ecumenical Councils in the case of Pope Honorius. Our opponent has ignored what we wrote on the subject from p. 129 to 135 of our pamphlet; and we are not called on to defend what he has not thought fit to attack. What Mr. Renouf has said in the matter, in his second pamphlet, is only a *réchauffée* of what he asserts in his first; with this difference, that, speaking in the latter of the Seventh Synod, he quotes on his side names and passages which we had already, in our pamphlet, expressly shown to be irrelevant;\* and he further seems to

\* "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of History," p. 131. "The Case of Pope Honorius, p. 63.

forget what we have often remarked, that even if, not only private bishops, but the whole Seventh Council and the Eighth had condemned Pope Honorius for heresy, it would not follow from this that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is untenable, unless it be first shown that Honorius was anathematized for having taught heresy *ex cathedra*.\* That gentleman mixes together those two questions, which every Catholic theologian should carefully distinguish and separate.

With regard to the second profession of faith contained in the *Liber Diurnus*, Mr. Renouf believes that it has not even a word to qualify the acceptance of all its acts, whether as regards the definition of faith or the condemnation of the heretics.† First of all, we remark that it is not at all requisite that every profession of faith should explicitly express what is always implicitly supposed by every Catholic. But, moreover, in our case we believe that, at least with reference to the condemnation of Pope Honorius, a hint may be found in it of what Mr. Renouf requires. In fact the words, “*pravis eorum assertionibus fomentum impendit*” re-echo to us Leo’s words: “*flammam hæretici dogmatis . . . negligendo confovit*.” It seems that the second profession of faith was moulded in this part on Leo’s declaration and limitation of Honorius’s condemnation. We, moreover, cannot understand how readily our opponent tries to underrate the importance of a document, on which De Marca himself had set great value for the defence of Honorius. The word *eorum*, says Mr. Renouf, after Honorius has most ungrammatically been referred to *auctores*, with the intention of excluding him from the list; but it manifestly refers to Constantinopolitanos.‡ I do not know what are the grammatical principles of Mr. Renouf; I know only that, according to the most elementary rules of grammar, the word “*eorum*” is to be referred to the names of the Patriarchs who had been mentioned,—Sergius and the others, who were qualified as the authors of the new heretical dogma.§ So that the obvious and necessary meaning of the text is that Honorius contributed fuel to the iniquitous assertions of the Constantinopolitanos, Sergius and Pyrrhus, &c., who had been the authors of the new heretical dogma: therefore, together with them and the others, he was condemned by the Sixth Council. That

\* “Pope Honorius,” p. 130, &c.

† “The Case of Pope Honorius,” p. 56.

‡ *Ibid.* l. c.

§ The words are as follows:—“*Auctores vero hæretici dogmatis Sergium, Pyrrhum, Paulum, Petrum Constantinopolitanos, una cum Honorio, qui pravis eorum assertionibus fomentum impendit*,” etc.—“*Liber Diurnus*,” c. ii. tit. ix. (Migne, PP. LL., t. cv. p. 52).



profession of faith draws clearly a line of demarcation between the fault of Honorius and that of the Patriarchs of Constantinople. If the fault of Honorius was that of having fostered and encouraged the evil assertions of the authors of the heresy, how can he have been one of the authors of the heresy itself?

Before taking in hand the other part of the controversy concerning the sense in which the Sixth Synod intended to condemn Pope Honorius, we must make a passing remark on what Mr. Renouf says at page 66 and following. He first expresses surprise at what I say at page 135, as to the meaning of a Council pronouncing an anathema against a Prelate after his death. He believes that Leo II. understood the anathema in a different sense when he told the Spanish bishops that Honorius and the other Monothelites "*æterna damnatione mulctati sunt*."\* Does Mr. Renouf believe that the synodical anathema, inflicted on persons after their death, implies their eternal damnation? If so, what would he think of the authors of the famous *Three Chapters* being anathematized by the fifth Council, though they had submitted to the profession of Chalcedon, and had been declared orthodox by that Council? Would he admit in that case that the conciliar sentence could in any wise influence the sentence already pronounced on them by the Eternal Judge? Would he admit that the authors of the *Three Chapters*, who had submitted to the confession of faith sanctioned at Chalcedon and had been declared orthodox by that Council, should be believed "*æterna damnatione mulctati*" because they were anathematized by the fifth Council, together with their writings? Does he think that the sentence of anathema inflicted by the Church after death gives any certainty of their having been condemned by Christ? If he holds these opinions, we have nothing to say to him. But no theologian and no Catholic, we believe, will agree with him in this view. The anathema pronounced by the Church against any of her children after their death has no other meaning, as we remarked elsewhere,† than to condemn the fault which they committed in their lifetime, as it appeared before her tribunal; she strikes their names out of the diptychs and erases their pictures from the churches, in order to repair the evil consequences of their faults, and to caution their successors against falling into the same crime. Therefore, in consequence of the anathema, the name of Honorius ought to be struck from the diptychs and his image erased from the churches. If that had been done, nothing would have been added to the import of the

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\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 66, note.

† "Pope Honorius, &c.," p. 135.

sentence of his condemnation. Nor would it be an argument against his orthodoxy, but a simple consequence of the anathema, whatever the reason which led the Synod to the act of condemnation.

But Anastasius, or the author of Pope Agatho's life, suppresses the name of Honorius in the list of those whose names were struck out of the diptychs, and whose ikons were erased in the Greek churches. Baronius, quoting that passage, argues that the name of Honorius must have been kept in the Oriental diptychs, because it is certain that it had been left in them at the time of the Monothelites. In our pamphlet on Pope Honorius we have adopted the remark of the learned annalist, without adding ought thereto. If Mr. Renouf had read *was* (as there should have been),\* instead of *is* (a blunder), he would have been in no need of wasting his ink on two pages of banter.

Moreover, Mr. Renouf evidently intended to make capital out of that argument, as if we had laid any great stress upon it for the defence of Pope Honorius, in order to be able to claim a rebutting victory. But this gentleman forgets that in historical matters we do not require that every argument should be apodictic, capable of standing by itself, and of affording by itself alone demonstrative evidence for the thesis in question.

It remains shortly to explain the last part of our controversy, that is to say, how and for what reason Pope Honorius was really condemned by the Fathers of the sixth Council. We again remind our readers that this part of our argument is not at all necessary for the defence of the dogma of Papal Infallibility, for which Pope Honorius's case has received so great celebrity. Nevertheless its further explanation may doubtless contribute to the full understanding of the whole controversy, and cast some light on the main question of Papal Infallibility. But a few remarks are necessary concerning the Sixth Council, before coming to the point in question. And first of all we must do justice to the accurate researches made on the subject by Father Colombier in the articles quoted above. He has fully proved that the process against Pope Honorius was only undertaken when the news of Agatho's death had arrived at Constantinople. On this account he shows to us that the death of the latter took place on the 10th January, 681, between the fifth and the sixth session (7 Dec. 680; 12 Feb. 681): that is to say, one year earlier than has been commonly fixed by historians and by Hefele himself. Nor could the news of his death reach Constantinople, in that age, before the month of March, between the ninth and the

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\* *Ibid.* l. c. line 26.

tenth session (8 and 18 March). I have carefully examined his proofs and confronted the documents which he alleges, and I am fully satisfied with his conclusions; but with a view to brevity I refer my readers to his articles and to No. V. of his learned letter, which he addressed to Mgr. Hefele. Unquestionably till the eleventh session, when, as we suppose, the Byzantine metropolis was informed of Pope Agatho's death, we find not even the slightest hint of any process in contemplation against Pope Honorius. In the eleventh session, the Emperor Constantine ordered that the papers intrusted to him the year before by Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, should be read and examined in public session. That was evidently a pretext. The papers contained documents collected by Macarius in defence of his error; but the Patriarch had already been deposed and condemned in the eighth session, and he had made no appeal whatever to the papers which he had put in the hands of the Emperor long before his condemnation. But among the documents gathered by the Monothelite Patriarch was the letter of Pope Honorius to Sergius. And we venture to say that this was the only reason for examining the whole documentary evidence, as a favourable occasion of indictment against the Sovereign Pontiff was wanted: but it was laid hold of as soon as it was known that the Holy See was vacant. We cannot possibly conceive that the imperial judges and the Patriarch of Constantinople, George, would have undertaken such an unexampled step against an illustrious Pope whilst the great Pontiff Agatho was living. Nor can we understand how the Papal Legates could have abstained from any protest against the attempted condemnation, which not only was not implied in the Papal instructions, but was manifestly against them. But with regard to the Papal Legates, the historian Eutychius records, in his Annals, that the Papal Legates were deprived of their presidency before the cause of Honorius was brought into the Council.\* This is the reason why Matthew Cariophylus, in his refutation of Nilus in the Council of Florence, maintained that Honorius was condemned by the faction of the Oriental Bishops.† And he argues as follows:—Either the Papal Legates consented to the act of the condemnation of Pope Honorius, or they did not: if they consented, they acted against the orders of Pope Agatho, who had enjoined on them to deal only with matters of faith: if they did not consent, the Synod, which condemned Honorius was only a faction.‡ But if Pope Agatho ceased to live before the

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\* "*Annales*" (Migne, PP. LL., t. cxi. p. 1114).† "*Refutatio Nili*" (Migne, PP. GG., t. cxlix. p. 766).‡ *Ibid.* l. c.

eleventh Action of the Council, as F. Colombier has proved, it is plain that the Papal Legates, being without instructions, and deprived of their presidency in the Synod, preferred to abstain from any protest, till the matter had been referred to Rome.

But, moreover, how was the trial against Pope Honorius conducted? First of all we remark in it a great interference of the civil power in an affair which wholly devolved on the ecclesiastical authorities. The imperial judges assumed the initiative in the whole business; they imposed on the assembled bishops the obligation of examining the documents concerning Honorius, and to pronounce their sentence; they threatened them, that unless they acted accordingly, their decisions in the case of Macarius of Antioch would not be put into execution.\* In the opening of the thirteenth session, the Synod was reminded of the engagements undertaken in the preceding session, and that it was expected to fulfil its engagements.† These engagements were fulfilled without any examination whatever of the documents, without any discussion, without any cross-examination of those who were interested in the affair. A simple perusal of the letter of the Pope was held to be a sufficient justification of the most severe sentence which has ever been pronounced against a Pope! What authority has that sentence in the Catholic Church? The authority of the tribunal was at least doubtful, its procedure was quite illegal, its justice most problematic. An indictment was made, for the first time, against a great Pope who had worked much for the unity of the Church; but such an indictment was made only on account of the pressure of the civil power, without any initiation whatever from any ecclesiastical authority, without any authorization from the Apostolic See. On a cause of such importance, and of so delicate a nature, no discussion is allowed, no witnesses are called, no defence is admitted, no votes of the assembly are requested; a sentence is pronounced under the pressure of the imperial representatives, and it is conceived in terms of so great a bitterness, which betrays the existence of an imperial faction in the Council. Such is the document, which Mr. Renouf, and others, bring forward as an irrefragable refutation of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. Had not the name of Honorius been mentioned in the formula of faith among the condemned by the Council, had not Pope Leo II. approved the whole of that formula, and manifestly confirmed the condemnation of Pope Honorius, we would give to the

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\* Sess. XII. Conc. VI. (Harduini, t. iii. p. 1327).

† Sess. XIII. (l. c. p. 1331).

thirteenth session of the fourth Council of Constantinople the value which it deserves.

But Leo II., we say, sanctioned the formula of faith, and confirmed the condemnation of Pope Honorius; and, moreover, Pope Hadrian II. authentically declared that the Orientals had condemned Honorius with the consent of the Holy See. It is only on this account that Pope Honorius's condemnation becomes a subject worthy of consideration. How is it then that the Holy See authorized the Council to condemn Pope Honorius, whilst it seems evident that Agatho in his letter did not intend anything of the sort? Moreover, in what sense did the new Pope accept and sanction the condemnation of that Pontiff? F. Colombier has already remarked that the Council, after having hurriedly condemned Honorius in the thirteenth session, held two more sessions of no importance, and soon after it suspended its sittings for three full months, from the 26th of April to the 9th of August; and he thinks it certain that, during that time, ambassadors were sent to the newly elected Pope, and a consent obtained from him to the condemnation of Pope Honorius. Doubtless, Leo II. sent to Constantinople, as a new Legate, the sub-deacon Constantine, whom he mentioned in his letters of confirmation of the Synod.\* It is also certain that the condemnation of Honorius was in some way renewed in the sixteenth session, and afterwards inserted in the formula of faith, which was enacted in the eighteenth session.

We do not doubt that Leo II. consented to the condemnation of Pope Honorius. The Pontiff must have known that the wire-pullers of the faction against Honorius were the Emperor and the Court, supported by the Patriarch of Constantinople. A blunt refusal to adhere to the condemnation of his predecessor would have elicited a refusal on the side of the Emperor to ratify his election; and it would have occasioned a new schism. We feel sure that Pope Agatho, being in different circumstances, and in possession of more authority, would not have sanctioned an act which stamped one of his illustrious predecessors with ignominy. Leo II. ventured to consent to that act of supreme rigour against a Pope, in order to avoid a far more difficult position for the Apostolic See. But did he consent in the intention of that Synodical faction which wished to brand Pope Honorius with the charge of heresy? We have fully answered this question in another part of this article. Pope Leo condemned Honorius so far as that Pontiff's *acts* deserved condemnation, whatever his personal *intentions* may have been. But those acts amounted to nothing like the profession of *heresy*.

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\* Rescriptum Leonis Papæ ad Const. Imp. (*ibid.* p. 1471).

Again, how far did the Council agree with Pope Leo's view? Did the whole Council condemn Honorius for heresy, or rather for his having been grievously negligent in repressing the Monothelite error? We have said that, even if the whole Synod had condemned Pope Honorius for heresy, its decree would have been without authority in the Church, since Leo II. did not stamp that judgment with his authentic sanction. But we think that there are reasons to believe, that at least a large number of the Eastern Bishops in the Council did not hold that opinion. We are fully aware that several passages of the Council concerning Honorius, *prima facie* regarded, convey the idea that Honorius was in truth condemned by the Orientals for heresy; and we do not doubt that really this was the intention of a part of the Council, led by the Byzantine Patriarch and the Imperial Court. Nevertheless, we think that if we consider the same passages, divested of the hard language in which they are dressed up, we may be convinced that a large portion of the assembly, whilst yielding to the current, and affecting fully to submit to the rod of the imperial magistrates, did not intend to mix up Honorius with the rest of the heretics, though they were not able to frame their opinion and judgment in such form as might clearly express their idea. With this view, we examined in our pamphlet those passages in which the Pope was condemned, apart from the Monothelite heretics, as well as those in which he was condemned in solidum with the others.

But Mr. Renouf, in his usual style, ignores our view; he misapprehends our appreciations, and casts ridicule on our explanations. When examining the decree which was pronounced by the Synod against Honorius in the thirteenth session, we remarked that the Fathers had purposely drawn a line of distinction between the cause of the Monothelites and that of Honorius; that they said of the former: "These are the names of those whose impious doctrines we execrate"; but of Honorius they spoke apart from them, and declared that they anathematized him only because he followed in all things the mind of Sergius, and gave weight to his impious doctrines. We found that the same distinction has been kept in the prosphonic letter to Constantine, and in the Edict of the Emperor, wherein the Monothelites condemned by the Council are called "inventors of heretical novelties," whilst of Honorius it was said that he "eos in his sequutus est," and that he was "hujus hæreseos confirmator, qui etiam sui extitit oppugnator." We remarked that, if these expressions had been used in the case of persons who had professed heretical doctrines,



they might be understood as implying the crime of heresy. But since they were applied to Pope Honorius, whose letters, as we have proved, contained nothing heretical, they should be taken in a different sense. What is then their meaning? We have again and again shown that the fault, the grievous fault, of Pope Honorius before the Church was that of neglect in the discharge of his Pontifical duties. He abstained from examining and condemning the errors of Sergius and Cyrus, and he thought to quench the controversy between them and Sophronius by following the advice of Sergius, and by imposing the economy of silence on both the parties, with regard to the use of the terms "one or two operations"; that economy was truly an injury to the Catholic doctrine, and calculated to encourage heresy. This was the fault pointed out by Leo II. as a cause of the condemnation of Honorius. And without the least doubt, when Leo II. sanctioned his predecessor's condemnation, the whole Synod, or its majority, must have agreed in that essential point. A faction of Bishops may have remained obstinate in their determination to condemn Honorius as a heretic, but the majority must have been glad to find support to their own conviction of the view expressed by Pope Leo II., and they would have willingly agreed with him. If that was not the case, how is it that the Eastern Bishops did not utter any word of protest, or any remark whatever, when Leo II. published his view on the condemnation of Honorius, which would, in that hypothesis, have been opposed to their own view? But if that view was agreed upon by the majority of the Council, what meaning might they intend when they said of Honorius, in their own prosphonic letter to Constantine, that he "*eos* (Sergium et Cyrum) in his sequutus est"? They could surely not mean heresy; it would have been against their agreement with Leo's view; it must then refer to the fault with which Leo charged Honorius, who was in nowise guilty of the heresy of Sergius, but assented to his proposal concerning the economy of silence. But the words "*qui eos in his sequutus est*," do not differ from those of the sentence of the thirteenth session: "*eius (Sergii) mentem in omnibus sequutus est*." Then we concluded that the Council, or its majority, really alluded to Honorius having consented to the economy of silence proposed by Sergius, which gave growth and strength to the erroneous dogmas of the Byzantine Patriarch. Likewise, when the Synod said of the letters of Honorius that they had *followed* the teachings of the heretics, we remarked that the fundamental signification of the verb *ἑπομαι* is not only "to follow," but also "to help" and "to support"; therefore, we intimated that the

Council meant by these words, in as much as they concern Pope Honorius,\* that his letters had favoured the teaching of the heretics; as the same Council says, lower down in the same decree, that Honorius had confirmed the impious dogmas of the heretics: "et impia dogmata confirmavit."

Now Mr. Renouf qualified our explanation as a comedy or farce. He argues that the letter of Honorius is declared by the Council altogether alien from the Apostolical teachings. But he does not see that the Council spoke there indiscriminately of the letter of Sergius together with that of Honorius, while the said Council in the second part of the decree, by qualifying apart the fault of Honorius, supplies an explanation to the words of the first part, concerning the letter of that Pope. Therefore, if from the second part it does not appear clearly proved that the Council condemned Honorius for heresy, the first part must be toned down so far forth as it concerns Honorius, and must be explained in harmony with the second. Now let us suppose for a moment that the second part, in which it is said that "Honorius Sergii mentem sequutus est et impia dogmata confirmavit" should yield the meaning mentioned above, why could not the words referring to the letters of Honorius, "alien from Apostolic teaching," mean alien from that Apostolical foresight against heretical doctrines in the Government of the Church, which has always been traditional in the Church? Why could not the word *ἑπομαι* be rendered by helping and supporting, implying that the letters of Honorius had given help and support to the false teaching of the heretics? I do not see with Mr. Renouf, why, if a soldier, who follows his commander, could be said to help and support him, the letter of a Pontiff, who wrongly approved an economy of silence, which gave strength to heresy, could not be said to give support to it.

But Mr. Renouf thinks in the second part of the decree the words *τῇ γνώμῃ ἐξακολουθήσαντα* could not be referred to the economy of silence, because *τῇ γνώμῃ* cannot philologically bear that meaning. It was certainly by no means necessary that Mr. Renouf should remark that *ἡ γνώμη* is not interpreted by lexicographers to mean "scheme," or still less, "economy" either of silence, or otherwise. But when we say that a person follows the mind of another, we mean that he follows his principles, his maxims, his designs, his plan, his scheme, according to the special circumstances to which we allude. Now we had

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\* Those words of the Decree refer to the letters of Sergius and to that of Honorius. But the Synod could not say them with reference to Honorius's letter, in the same meaning which they imply with regard to the letters of Sergius.

shown that Honorius approved in Sergius's letter only the proposal of the economy of silence, and that so far he plainly agreed with him and favoured his view. We therefore inferred therefrom that when the Council said that Honorius had followed Sergius's mind, it meant to allude to his having adhered to Sergius's proposal as to the economy of silence. What have the *philological curiosities* of Mr. Renouf to do with all this? Finally, neither from Stephanus, nor from Schleusner can Mr. Renouf prove to evidence that the words *περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἡμάρτηκότας* necessarily imply a formal error in faith, and not also any other sin, which may concern faith, since the fundamental meaning of *ἡμαρτάνω* is "to sin."\* Finally as to the term "heretic" of the eighteenth session, if Mr. Renouf would not attribute it to the synodical faction so embittered against Honorius, it should be understood in a secondary meaning. And F. Colombier supplies *several examples* of that meaning in his first article in defence of Pope Honorius.†

And of this we have said enough. If our reasoning will not satisfy Mr. Renouf or others, no matter. The cause, which we defend, cannot be in the least affected thereby. It would therefore be useless for Mr. Renouf to return to that subject with his lexicography, or to fill pages with passages of old theologians, without criticism, whose name has been long since forgotten, and whose authority in our age is nought.‡ In this fashion he will never gain the least ground as regards the main question at issue. Even should he prove to evidence that the whole Sixth Council condemned Pope Honorius for heresy (which many Catholics of our age admit), he would have proved nothing, as we have repeatedly said, against Papal Infallibility; nor even would he do much damage to the orthodox repute of that illustrious Pontiff; since the perusal of his letters would sufficiently clear him from that stain, and the style of the proceedings against him in the sixth Synod gives very little authority to the thirteenth session.

But what does Mr. Renouf think of a decision *ex cathedrâ*, of which he treats in the last part of his pamphlet? How can he believe that the supposed error of Honorius was an *ex cathedra* teaching? He argues as follows: The letters of Pope Honorius are called *decreta* and *decretales*, which have binding authority; but in order to have binding authority, they are

\* Suarez said, "Omissive censetur favere hæresi qui omittit facere quod tenetur, &c." On this account Honorius could be said to be guilty against faith.

† "Études Relig. Hist.," Dec. 1869.

‡ We speak of a great part of those theologians who are alleged by Mr. Renouf in support of his opinion.

necessarily to be *ex cathedra*: ergo Honorius's letters are *ex cathedra*. From this he thinks that the *ex cathedra* character of his teaching may be legitimately inferred. Is not this amazing? Does Mr. Renouf believe that all the *decreta* and *decretales* of the Roman Pontiffs contain infallible decisions *ex cathedra*? If not, how can he argue that the letters of Honorius contain an infallible definition *ex cathedra*, because they were called *decreta* and *decretales* by Baronius, Lupus, and others? But the Pope, replies he, speaks *ex cathedra* when he speaks as Pope; and when he speaks with supreme authority he speaks as Pope. But does Mr. Renouf truly believe that the Pope pronounces always an infallible definition of faith whenever he speaks as Pope? When the Pope publishes some disciplinary law or economical disposition, and authoritatively imposes it on the Church, he speaks as Pope and with supreme authority; but he does not pronounce thereby a definition of faith. A definition of faith or *ex cathedra* requires a definitive judgment pronounced by the Pope as universal teacher on a dogmatical question, which is addressed to all Catholics, or intended to be communicated to all, and requiring their interior assent. Mr. Renouf is of opinion that the necessity of interior assent is extremely modern; and he remarks that my opponents may safely challenge me to mention in the early centuries of the Church a single instance in which the contents of any Papal document were held to be binding upon the internal assent of all Christians. After having written a large volume on Papal Infallibility, I do not believe it necessary to answer Mr. Renouf here in few lines on that subject; but I may remind him that we have fully met his challenge throughout that volume, and that we are quite ready to hold our ground against our opponents, whoever they be.

As to the letters of Honorius, they do not contain any definition whatever with regard to the point in question. The Pope purposely abstained from defining the point in dispute, being satisfied if the two opponents, Sergius and Sophronius, would avoid the term "one or two operations," which would (as Sergius insinuated in his letter) cause scandal to the simple. "Laudamus," he said, "novitatem vocabuli auferentem, quod posset scandalum simplicibus generare. . . . Hortantes vos ut unius vel geminæ novæ vocis inductum operationis vocabulum aufugientes. . . . Auferentes ergo, sicut diximus, scandalum novellæ adinventionis, non nos oportet, unam vel duas operationes definientes, prædicare, etc." By these and other words Honorius clearly declared what his mind was with reference to the question at issue; to wit, that he did not intend to condemn the doctrine of the two operations in Christ, but

only to discourage the use of certain terms. Meanwhile Mr. Renouf replies that the supposed economy of silence is a pure historical invention.\* And he accuses me of unfairness in the analysis given of Sergius's letter; especially because I asserted that Sergius asked the Pope to sanction the economy of silence, and I attributed to the Byzantine Patriarch motives which were alien to his principles.† But what did Sergius mean when he said that it would be harsh and cruel to drive millions of souls into heresy and perdition for the sake of one expression; that in similar contingencies the Fathers had often followed an economy pleasing to God (*θεαρέστοις οἰκονομίαις*) for the salvation of many souls? Did he not assert that it would be a prudent economy to impose silence on both the contending parties; that either of the two opposite expressions would open the way to some error; and that Sophronius had already pledged his word to observe this economy of silence; and even the Emperor had adopted this advice?‡ He concludes with the request that the Pope would read the account he had given, and let him know what should be done.§ As to the intentions attributed by us to Sergius, we said enough in our first article.

But Mr. Renouf insists, that the condemnation of the expression "one or two operations," was not economical, but dogmatical. Well, how can he prove that Pope Honorius condemned those expressions, because he forbade them economically? Our opponent should be reminded that the expression "two operations," was not at the age of Pope Honorius the technical term and the orthodox expression of Catholic doctrine, as it became after the Lateran Council, and still more after the Sixth Synod. But again, Mr. Renouf objects that, "even if the hypothesis of economy were allowed to be tenable as regards the prescription of silence, with reference to 'one or two operations,' there is not the shadow of a pretence for applying the hypothesis to the question of one or two wills."|| To this we reply:—1st. The question of one or two wills had not yet been explicitly mooted at the time of Sergius and Pope Honorius; nor had Sergius proposed

\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 84.

† *Ibid.* p. 93.

‡ Epist. Sergii in Sess. XII. Conc. VI.

§ Mr. Renouf remarks that we translated τὰ περὶ τούτων δοκούντα σημάναι by "that he would let him know his thoughts upon the matter." But who told Mr. Renouf that we meant to give a verbal translation of those words? Moreover, who told him that δοκούντα should necessarily be translated by the verb "to decree"? He alleges the words from Act. xv. 28, ἔδοξε τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι καὶ ἡμῖν; but did he remember that the English version has "it seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us"?

|| "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 86.

anything in his letter with reference thereto. Pope Honorius had then no reason either to defend anything on that subject explicitly, or to apply to it the economy of silence, though having regard to the nature of the Monothelitic dogma, that economy ought to be implicitly applied to the controversy of the two wills, which became later so prominent among the Monothelites. 2nd. The reason why Pope Honorius spoke of the will of Christ in his letter to Sergius, was that the Patriarch had mentioned in his letter that the term "two operations" would convey to the minds of many the idea of two contrary and conflicting wills coexisting in Christ. On this account the Pontiff proved that in Christ there were no conflicting wills, because there was no lust, or will of the flesh: and for this reason he explained those passages of the Gospel which would seem to favour the error of two conflicting wills in Christ. In all this he gave no new definition; for such was neither asked for, nor wanted; but he repeatedly insists on the doctrine already set forth by Pope Leo, which so plainly implies the dogma of two wills and operations in Christ.

With regard to the ancient custom of the Popes publishing their dogmatical definitions in the Synod of the Bishops of Italy, or in the Assembly of the Clergy of the Roman Church, we will make but one remark. Mr. Renouf asserts, with his customary fairness, that I copied Orsi on this point. Now I find the following words in that part of my pamphlet:—"We do not now mean to spend time in demonstrating these points of ecclesiastical discipline; they will be found proved beyond all question in the learned works of Coustant, Thomassin, and Cardinal Orsi."\* Is that what Mr. Renouf calls copying from Orsi? I said no more than that on that historical subject. I have moreover expressly maintained that it was not necessary for a Papal utterance *ex cathedra* at that age that it should be promulgated in a synod.† Mr. Renouf has wasted two pages in refuting what I did not assert, and moreover in fancying that the holy men, who, according to Abbot Anastasius, wrote Honorius's letter to Sergius, meant "a synod in the sense of Thomassin"!!‡

And with this we conclude; because we do not think it worth while to go through other petty and merely grammatical remarks of our opponent, which bear very little or not at all on the subject, or to defend ourselves from other personal attacks, which have no reference to our Apology. We stop here, because we think we have fulfilled our promise.

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\* "Honorius before the Tribunal, &c.," p. 19.

† *Ibid.* p. 13.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 82, seq.



## ART. VIII.—THE VATICAN COUNCIL : ITS AUTHORITY : ITS WORK.

*Acta et Decreta Sacrosancti et Œcumenici Concilii Vaticani die 8 Decembris, 1869, a SS. D. N. Pio P. IX. inchoati. Cum permissione superiorum. Friburgi Brisgovie. 1871.*

*Documenta ad illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum anni 1870. Gesammelt und herausgegeben, von Dr. JOHANN FRIEDRICH, Professor der Theologie in München. Nördlingen. 1871.*

*Letters from Rome on the Council, by QUIRINUS. Reprinted from the "Allgemeine Zeitung." Authorized Translation. London. 1870.*

WE had intended to draw up a short concluding article on the Vatican Council, in which would be given at one view a summary sketch of that august assembly and of its work, together with the aim, the magnitude and the effect of that grand work,—grand, indeed, as we shall see, though as yet unfinished and but a part and instalment of a still grander whole. We are not sorry, we rather rejoice, that, up to the day of the present writing, certain impediments lay in the way of our executing this design. The great threatened schism, that was to sever half Germany and all the East from the Church,\* has had time to gather up and put forth all its strength. The great theological windbags of Munich have had time to exhaust all the resources of their "scientific history," their "liberal theology," their "higher criticism" and their "deeper views"—to shoot their last brittle sophism against the everlasting rock, to spit at it their last envenomed lie. What Bismarck, the Cavour of Prussia,† may yet do for their

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\* "All modern culture will separate itself in spirit from the Church." "Many Bishops . . . . know that the establishment of such doctrines [as Papal Infallibility] would drive the educated classes of the country, if not into open schism, to an internal and lamentable breach with the Church." "An internal split in the Church is more and more revealing itself." "The promulgation of the dogma will lead to the definitive separation of the Uniate Churches in the East." "It is known [July 16, 1870] that the new dogma will lead to the separation of the Orientals."—*Quirinus*, pp. 33, 40, 388, 774-5, 795.

† "M. de Bismarck's whole soul glowed with the passionate resolve to expel Austria from Germany. It was not in his character to hesitate as to means, and neither moral nor material obstacles diverted him from his object. In fact, he entered on the contest unencumbered by scruples of any kind. To raise Prussia to the political status which he thought his country ought

cause by means of penal legislation remains to be seen. But, in the line of theological assault, we may fairly assume that by this time they have left nothing substantially new to be yet advanced; that they have said their say, and can now only repeat the same thing in the same or in other words.

The Vatican Council opened on Wednesday, the eighth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine. On that day between seven and eight hundred Bishops, gathered from every region of the Christian world, met together before the throne of their supreme head. This the first was but the opening session. In it no business, whether of a doctrinal or disciplinary character, was entered on or even alluded to. It was all worship, prayer, exhortation—the fitting preliminaries of a work that was yet to be begun; many members, but one heart, one soul, one voice, one holocaust of praise and supplication. This is the simple fact, the brief but true history of that day.

But the parable of the two standards \* had not yet ceased—will indeed never cease—to have its living illustrations and verifications. On the morning of that same eighth of December, 1869, before the opening of the Council, probably before a single Bishop had begun to wend his way to the Vatican Hall, an essay appeared in the London “*Times*” under the title of “*The Crisis in the Roman Church*,” in which the following passage is contained:—

“The Council of the Vatican has revealed to the public gaze for the first time the internal divisions which rend asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic system from its summit to its base. . . . For once the distractions and variations of Protestantism shrink into insignificance before the wider chasms which now yawn between the contending sections of Roman Catholic Christendom.”

On reading these lines we could not trust the testimony of our eyes. We must surely, as often happens to readers as well as to copyists, have passed over some word, or phrase, or line, or even a whole sentence, which, if noticed, would entirely alter

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to hold, was his religion. He entered the path of action with the fervour of a Mahomet enforcing a novel faith, and, like Mahomet, he succeeded.”—*The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866*, by Sir Alexander Malet. London. 1870, (p. 8). In a leading article of the *Times* of last September 7, the following passage occurs:—“The ascendancy of Germany rests on her own and on the world’s conceit of her strength—a strength which must not be merely preponderant, but absolutely irresistible. Strange to say, the real contest lies between the strong ‘Man of Blood and Iron’ [Bismarck] at Berlin and the feeble old man at the Vatican.”

\* *Exercitia Spiritualia S. Ignatii, Meditatio de Duobus Vexillis*: 2 Heb. 4 die.

or greatly modify the sense of the passage, as we at first understood that sense. So we read again and a third time leisurely and carefully. But no: there it was clearly and roundly affirmed, as clearly and roundly as words could affirm it, that a Council not yet in existence had displayed to the world a breaking up of Catholic unity of so stupendous a character that, compared with it, the variations of Protestantism through all its hundred sects shrank into insignificance! We then asked ourselves, Is it possible that this writer expects that even one intelligent Englishman will believe such a statement as this? But we had not long to wait for an answer from ourselves to ourselves. We had been too often and for too many years witnesses to the unbounded gullibility of the great mass of English Protestants in whatever tells against the claims of the Catholic religion. We had too often seen with what capacious, with what perfectly shark-like, voracity that mass swallowed down any kind of antipapal garbage flung to it. Did the writer expect? He knew, as surely as he held the pen in his hand, that thousands and tens of thousands of his countrymen would receive his monstrous lie without hesitation, and believe it more firmly than they believed the Apostles' Creed.

And what, our readers may well ask, are the evidences of this astounding fact? Who are the authors of this tremendous schism? The evidences are the diversities of opinion among Catholics as to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility; whether it be revealed, or, supposing it to be revealed, whether it would be expedient to define it as such. Diversities of opinion, as to the doctrine itself, which had notoriously existed, to some extent since the Council of Constance,\* but especially since near the end of the seventeenth century—the overwhelming majority of theologians, nay, the all but unanimous consensus of theologians of mark outside France, being on the side that is now affirmed definitively and for ever. If diversities of opinion on the doctrine, a few months before its solemn definition, were evidences of a disruption of unity, they were just as much evidences of that disruption a hundred and ninety years ago, when the Gallican Assembly issued its famous four articles.

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\* The following sentence from a work of the celebrated Gerson will be interesting to many of our readers. We take it from a small but excellent volume by the Archbishop of Edessa, published in Rome in 1870:—"Ante celebrationem Sacrosanctæ hujus Constantiensis Synodi, sic occupaverat mentes plurimorum litteratorum quam illitteratorum ista traditio [de infallibilitate R. Pontificis], ut oppositorum dogmatizator fuisset de hæretica pravitate vel notatus vel damnatus." On Gerson's bitterly hostile spirit against the Holy See, *vide* Bouix, *de Parocho*, pars 1, s. 1, c. 6, § 4.

They were just as much evidences for full one hundred years after the appearance of those articles. Nay, they were, during all that period and for many years after, much stronger evidences : inasmuch as, during all that period and for many years after, Gallicanism completely dominated through all France ; whereas, for several years previous to the Vatican Council, it appeared to be completely extinct in France, and in reality was almost extinct. Yet this writer has the incredible hardihood to affirm that "the Council of the Vatican has revealed to the public gaze for the *first* time, &c. For *once* the distractions and variations of Protestantism, &c."

And who are the agents and primary witnesses, to whom the highest and most effective position is given in the thin ranks of the upheaving and disuniting opposition ? An apostate friar, named Hyacinthe, and a German writer, we believe, a trio of German writers, who have published a catena of "inexorable logic and unanswered history," under the pseudonym of Janus. Of the logic, after assuring our readers that it is thoroughly of the Protestant stamp, we need say nothing more here. But the unanswered history has been answered\* in such a style, that, if a Catholic historian had been convicted of one tenth of the falsehoods of which they have been proven guilty, his name would be uttered among us only as a byword of shame and reproach. The writer concludes this section of his essay with the following sentence, one of the most astoundingly audacious utterances we ever met with in prose or rhyme :— "The unity of the Roman Church, whatever may be the result of the deliberations commenced this day, is now declared by Roman Catholics themselves to be at an end." What Roman Catholics ? Are Hyacinthe and Janus Roman Catholics ?

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\* By Father Keogh, of the Oratory, in his "Few Specimens of Scientific History from Janus," 1870 ; and by Dr. Hergenröther, in his "Anti-Janus," 1870. Professor Robertson has translated the latter work into English, and has prefixed to his translation a most valuable and interesting historical dissertation on Gallicanism. See also the articles in this Journal for January and April, 1870.

It is a curious fact that, in an article in the "Edinburgh Review" for July, 1871, on the Vatican Council, the main statements of the "Times" Essay are reproduced, sometimes in the very same words. Thus, in page 134 of the "Review" we have the following, the intermediate sentence, here omitted, being the same in both :—"In the record of facts which *no one doubts*, the story of the Vatican Council has revealed to the public gaze the internal divisions which rend asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic Church from its summit to its base . . . . For once the distractions and variations of Protestantism shrank into insignificance before the wider chasms which yawned between the contending sections of Roman Catholic Christendom." What an unlimited faith these purveyors must have in the unlimited voracity of their shark !

Was Luther a Roman Catholic, when he wrote his "Babylonian Captivity"; or Calvin, when he wrote his "Institutes"; or La Mennais, when he wrote his "Affaires de Rome"? But enough of this for the present. We now proceed to a brief review of the Council in its real and actual constitution and working.

Of the eighteen General Councils\* which preceded that of the Vatican, the four first have been always admitted by the High Church party,† by many of that party the six first, as of unquestionable authority. Now there are two characteristics of the Vatican Council which mark it out in a very striking manner from these four, and indeed from all that succeeded them, not even excepting the greatest of them all, the Council of Trent. The first is in its ecumenicity; the second is in the work it has actually done, to say nothing of that which it had proposed to do, and which, with God's blessing in God's good time, it *will* do.

A Council, as we shall see by and by, may be really general for all practical purposes, and yet not perfectly so. To constitute a Council perfectly and in every way general, there are certain conditions necessary, on which all Catholic theologians are agreed. These conditions are arranged under three heads—the summoning or convocation of the Council (convocatio); the constitution of the Council actually assembled, and its mode of proceeding in forming the decrees, whether of faith or discipline (celebratio); the final issue of the Council, in which it receives its supreme binding force (exitus).

Under the first head, the Council must be ecumenical in him who calls it, and in those who are called to it. In other words, it must be convoked by the ecumenical pastor, or with his consent, express or implied; and all Bishops exercising ordinary episcopal jurisdiction, and such other ecclesiastical personages, as by right or privilege are entitled to sit in General Councils, should be invited to it. Of the ecumenicity of the Vatican Council in reference to this first head, no doubt can be raised.

Under the second head, the conditions are—1st, that the Council be presided over by the Pope in person, or by one or more representing him; 2nd, that the number of Bishops present should be such as fairly to represent the majority of the ecclesiastical provinces; 3rd, that the questions to be

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\* Some writers draw a distinction between General and Ecumenical; but the words are, in common use, perfectly synonymous.

† "The four first General Councils are so entirely admitted by us, that they, together with the plain words of Scripture, are made the rule and measure of judging heresies amongst us."—Jeremy Taylor, "Dissuasive," c. i. s. i. For several other authorities (Calvin among them), see "Palmer on the Church," p. 4, c. ix.

settled should be previously submitted to a deliberation suited to their gravity and difficulty; 4th, that the Council should be free, both in its deliberations and decisions.

On the first of these conditions, as verified in the Vatican Council, nothing need be said: on the second, not many words, but these of weighty import. At the first General Council, Nice (A.D. 325), there were present 318 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates; at the second, Constantinople\* (A.D. 381), 150 Bishops, all Eastern; at the third, Ephesus (A.D. 431), upwards of 200 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates; at the fourth, Chalcedon (A.D. 451), 630 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates. At the definition of the first dogmatic constitution of the Vatican Council (session third), there were present 664 Bishops, who all voted for that constitution. At the definition of the second dogmatic constitution (session fourth), there were present 535 Bishops, who all voted for that constitution, with the exception of two, who, immediately after the Papal confirmation, publicly gave in their adhesion. With the sole exception of the second Lateran, none of the Councils after that of Chalcedon comprised as many Bishops as were at either of the above-named Vatican sessions; while the number present at these two sessions was, we believe, in proportion to the whole existing episcopate, much larger than at *any* of the preceding eighteen Councils; as unquestionably the number of provinces represented was far more numerous and far more widely scattered over the face of the whole world.†

The length of time that elapsed, and the number of private sessions held, between the opening and suspension of the Council, are sufficient evidences of the amount of deliberation gone through previous to the solemn publication of each of the two dogmatic constitutions. But these deliberations were not free, and the votings at them and in the two public sessions were not free. This is the great charge, the main grievance, the head and front of all offence. In faint, foreboding wail, it is heard in Janus, who wrote several months before the opening

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\* This Council was not strictly and in all things general; but it has been always and by all reckoned among the General Councils, after its dogmatic definition, the Creed of Nice amplified, had been confirmed by the Pope.

† It appears, from a synoptical table given in "the Vatican Council from its opening to its prorogation" ("Tablet" office, London), that about three-fourths of the bishops of the whole Church were present; and that every country, where a Catholic episcopate exists, was represented, with the exception of two—Russia, in which there are twelve Catholic bishops (prevented from going by the stringent prohibition of the Imperial Bear), and Norway and Sweden, in which there is but one.



of the Council, before a single bishop had set out on his journey to Rome. The letters of Quirinus from Rome, commence immediately after the opening of the Council: the wail of Janus is taken up in the very first paragraph of the first letter, and soon sharpens into a scream, that goes on, with its dismal monotony, splitting our ears to the very last page. These scientific historians chose their ground well—for their own purpose. Pretending to be Catholics and writing under a Catholic mask (thus might they have communed among themselves), we cannot deny that the Council was legitimately assembled, summoned by the proper authority and in the proper way. This is too evident to all. Equally evident is the fact that the bishops have come in abundant force and from all quarters. To deny this fact or to throw even a doubt upon it, would be simply to ruin our cause by betraying our real design: so, to make a show of impartiality and the better to conceal that design, we may as well announce the fact at once, and say, "The synod is unquestionably the most numerous ever held; never in the early or Mediæval Church have 767 persons entitled to vote by their episcopal rank been assembled. It is also the most various in its national representation. Men look with wonder at the number of missionary bishops from Asia, Africa, and Australia."\* The private or semi-private meetings of bishops, loose conversations, flying reports of things said or done or contemplated to be said or done, these, as not being patent to the eyes of the public at large, furnish materials which may be worked to account. Here there is ample room for exaggeration and distortion of every kind, even for pure invention. But this latter weapon we must use cautiously, and only where the success of our line of attack demands it. The lie which carries farthest and tells surest is that which has an element of truth in it.

We have read Quirinus from cover to cover, upwards of 800 pages; and in doing so we carefully marked every passage in which the freedom of the Council was called in question. Sarcasms, sneers, words of bitter hatred and scorn are thickly strewn over those long, dreary pages: but not a single authentic fact is produced to show that any undue influence was used, that any influence whatever was used, the pressure of which

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\* These are the words of Quirinus in his second letter, page 82. The paragraph which commences with these words ends with the following on the same page:—"The more the new dogma is combated, the more necessary is the consensus of five quarters of the world—of Negroes, Malays, Chinese, and Hottentots, as well as Italians and Spaniards." Was there a single Negro, Malay, Chinese, or Hottentot among the Bishops of the Council? Not one. Is this a specimen of scientific history.

would affect the freedom of any assembly of human beings outside a nursery or an infant school.

But, before proceeding farther, we must first give our readers some account of the character of this book, and of its title to be accepted as, what it distinctly claims to be, not only an authority, but "the *best* authority for the history of the Vatican Council" (p. vi.). The exposures of Janus have been, as already intimated, complete and decisive. No act of similar justice has yet been done to Quirinus, at least, so far as we know, in our language. We therefore the more readily undertake the task—which, however, as being but a part, an incidental part too, of our general design, must be executed within a much more limited compass.

The authors introduce themselves in their preface thus :—  
 "These letters on the Council originated in the following way. Three friends in Rome were in the habit of communicating to one another what they learnt from persons intimately acquainted with the proceedings of the Council. Belonging as they did to different nations and different classes of life, and having already become familiar, before the opening of the Council, through long residence in Rome, with the state of things and with persons there, and being in free and daily intercourse with some members of the Council, they were very favourably situated for giving a true report as well of the proceedings as of the views of those who took part in it. Their letters were addressed to a friend in Germany, who added now and then historical explanations to elucidate the course of events, and then forwarded them to the '*Allgemeine Zeitung*'" (p. v.).

The writers and their German supplementer are from first to last anonymous; nor has any one of them up to the present day made an avowal of his name. This, of course, adds to the weight of their "best authority."\* They profess to be Catholics;

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\* Since the above was written, we lighted accidentally on the following passage in the eighth edition of "*Men of the Time*," published in the June or July of the present year :—"ACTON, LORD . . . was born at Naples in 1834. . . . For a few years he was a student in the Catholic College of St. Mary's, Oscott, at the time when Dr. (afterwards Cardinal) Wiseman was at the head of that institution; but his education was mainly due to the renowned ecclesiastical historian, Dr. Dollinger of Munich, *with whom he lived for a considerable time*. . . . In the latter year [1865] he stood as a candidate for the borough of Bridgnorth, when he announced, in a speech delivered to the electors, that he represented not the *body*, but the *spirit*, of the Catholic Church. . . . In 1869 he repaired to Rome, on the assembling of the Œcumenical Council, and while there rendered himself conspicuous by his hostility to the doctrine of Papal infallibility, and by the activity and

and the translator takes special care to admonish his readers that the contents of the volume "are exclusively the work of Catholics" (p. vii. note). For the sake of simplicity we shall henceforth speak of the book, as if it were, what the letters themselves uniformly represent it to be, the production of a single pen. We say then that Quirinus, whether formerly a Catholic and educated in the Catholic faith or not, exhibits from beginning to end a thoroughly anti-Catholic spirit—to a great extent Protestant, but Jansenist out and out, to the very backbone; with all that is worst and most odious in the worst and most odious form of that protean heresy. From beginning to end the letters breathe the spirit of that heresy, and reek with its noisome odour. Then, having taken his stand on the Döllinger stump, it is incredible, on one hand, with what persistent and unwearyed malignity of vituperation he pursues every person and institution opposed to the stump ticket; and, on the other hand, with what almost indiscriminate uniformity of panegyric he exalts those who are, even to a degree, for that ticket.

We believe that, since the day when S. Peter first announced the gospel in Jerusalem, there never was a Pope whose name has been so often and so widely mentioned during his own lifetime as that of our present Holy Father; whose character and acts have been so often and so widely canvassed in the records of contemporary literature. Passing over volumes and isolated pamphlets, we doubt if there be a single newspaper in all Europe, we might say in the whole world, a single magazine or review of a miscellaneous character, which, during the last quarter of a century, has not had from time to time something to say, in praise or blame or simple narrative, of Pio Nono. In the anti-Catholic press he has been often assailed, sometimes with great bitterness, and not seldom for acts which all true Catholics would consider as deserving of pure eulogy. He has been represented in his official capacity as imprudent, rash; filled with an extravagant idea of his own authority; pushing that authority to the extreme limit, and without regard to the consequences ensuing from long-established prejudices and opinions; consumed with a passion for defining questions hitherto undefined. All this, and more of a similar import, has been said of him over and over again. But, until we opened Quirinus, we had never seen, not even in the most rabid invec-

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secrecy with which he rallied, combined, and urged on those who appeared to be favourable to the views entertained by Dr. Döllinger. It is believed that he was in relation with the '*Allgemeine Zeitung*,' and that much of the news published by that journal on the subject of the Council was communicated by his lordship. Lord Acton may be regarded as the leader of the self-styled '*liberal Catholics*,' &c., &c."

tives, any representation of him, in his private and personal bearing, as other than a model of meekness and suavity. The hundreds upon hundreds of reports that have reached us directly or indirectly from those who had personal interviews with him, all, without a single exception, bear the same testimony. Of all men and women, Catholic and non-Catholic, to Quirinus and to Quirinus alone it has been reserved to exhibit him to the world with the manners of a churl, the temper of a hornet, and the tongue of a fishwoman. So violently incredible does this statement of ours appear at first sight, that, if any one of our readers would be disposed to believe it without proof, we can only say that we envy not his credulity. Here then are our proofs in Quirinus's own words. One of the bishops,\* on a certain occasion, "found the Pope in a state of violent excitement, trembling with passion" (p. 174).† What an unruly, mischievous lad the Pope must have been in his schoolboy days; what a terrible fellow as a grown-up, bearded man—how peppery and pugnacious, when, now in his extreme old age, with the awful weight of Sovereign Pontiff pressing on his shoulders, he indulges himself in "biting reproaches" (p. 420) and "outbreaks of bitterness" (p. 480) to such a degree, that at length "it is *certain* that his excitement has reached fever heat"! (p. 578). Nay his comments, says Quirinus, "if rightly reported here [that *if*], are so irritable and bitter that I *scruple* to mention them" (p. 737). Quirinus is so shocked by the language of the Pope on one occasion, that he says, "I should consider it a *sin* to publish it" (p. 748). Such snow-white purity of conscience! What a sweet, precious, blessed babe of grace Quirinus must be, compared with that hectoring, hoary old sinner of the Vatican!

A little story of long-past days rises in our memory, and, as we think it in point, we shall trouble our readers with it. In a small but flourishing town, in a certain quarter of the British empire, there lived many years ago a shopkeeper, whom we shall call J. It was universally supposed that he drove a very thriving business. Great therefore was the surprise of everybody, when one fine morning the rumour got abroad that he

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\* This bishop was the Chaldean Patriarch, who knew neither Latin nor any other language intelligible to the Pope. Only a third party was present at the interview, to act as interpreter. This third person Quirinus represents as "one of the most devoted courtiers of the Vatican." Did Quirinus get this bit of scientific history from the "devoted courtier," or from the patriarch, between whom and him there was no common language? Was it really three black crows, or only something as black as a crow?

† The figures subjoined to the extracts given in this and succeeding paragraphs indicate the pages of the book.

had closed his shop, and was about to compound with his merchant creditors. And he did compound with them, paying a few shillings in the pound. Not many years after, the same catastrophe, with the same finale, occurred a second time; and then, after a decent interval, a third time. Very ugly surmises were all along whispered about pretty freely; but the mystery was at length fully cleared up. Some time after the third composition J. purchased a fine estate in the country, built a superb mansion on it, retired from business, lived a pleasant life in that mansion, and died there in green old age, about twelve years ago. We forgot to say that he was throughout a strict Methodist, and, especially after his retirement from business, an assiduous frequenter of their meetings. Now, it so happened that in the same town there lived another shop-keeper, whom we shall call M., to whom J., while engaged in business, owed a few pounds. One Sunday morning the former sent his eldest son, then a mere child, for the sum. As the boy stammered out his message, J. listened with perfect composure; then, lifting up his hands and eyes, and immediately lowering them again, exclaimed in a low and slow tone, and with a solemn and pitying expression on his face, "My child, I never touch money on the Sabbath." This is a true story. The writer of this article was the tiny messenger on the occasion, and, though now more than fifty years have passed away since that Sunday morning, remembers the whole incident, the voice, the words, the gestures, as if they were but of yesterday. J. was a man of quite a delicate conscience: he *scrupled* even to touch money on the "Sabbath," and thought it a *sin* to do so. But there were certain other money-touchings which he did not scruple or think a sin. Quirinus's delicacy of conscience, which he so trumpets forth to the world, does it not marvellously resemble that of our sanctimonious Methodist?

Out on these whited sepulchres, that hold  
But dead men's bones in them, like those of old.  
Better be wolf in his own native skin,  
Than sheep outside—still ravenous wolf within.  
Better be seeming evil, being evil,  
Than steal the cloak of God to hide the devil.

But it is not only in moral qualities that the Pope is so grossly deficient; he is equally deficient in intellectual. He is not only a testy old bully, but he is also an ignorant old blockhead:—

It is merely repeating what is *notorious* in Rome to say that Pius IX. is *beneath comparison* with any one of his predecessors for the last 350 years in theological knowledge and intellectual cultivation generally. . . . . It is

known here that, small as are the intellectual requisites for ordination in the Roman States, it was *only* out of special regard to his family that Giovanni Maria Mastai could get ordained priest. His subsequent career offered *no* opportunity or means for supplying this neglect, and thus he became Pope with the *feeling* of his *entire* deficiency in the *necessary* acquirements. This unpleasant *consciousness* naturally produced the idea that the defect would be remedied *without effort on his part* by enlightenment from above, and divine inspiration would supply the absence of human knowledge (502).

We beg to direct the attention of our readers specially to the words which we have put in italics. We say a fact is notorious in any community, when its existence is known and manifest to the mass of that community. It may or may not be true that the Pope has not given any decisive proofs of profound theological knowledge or general intellectual cultivation; but how can it be *notorious* that he is in these respects *beneath comparison* with any one of his predecessors for three centuries and a half? Are the elements for such a comparison sufficiently copious and clear to justify so grave and sweeping a charge? It is certain that he speaks the Latin and French languages with as much ease and accuracy as he speaks his own Italian. This is, in itself, no slight amount of culture, and furnishes besides no slight presumption of something more. Why, the short discourses which he has addressed to the numerous deputations that have waited on him, of late years, are of themselves decisive evidences of high culture. To say nothing of the sacred wisdom and unction that pervade them, they are, in a purely literary view, quite gems in their way—so pregnant, so terse, so simple, and yet so pointed. Put beside them the leaden pages of Quirinus!

But worse, far worse, are the remaining sentences of the paragraph, as well in what they clearly imply as in what they clearly affirm. Let us see distinctly what they *affirm*. First, the Pope's intellectual qualifications for the priesthood were beneath even a low standard. Secondly, he nevertheless got ordained, and the Bishop who ordained him did so, not on account of his virtues or other qualities which might in a measure make up for his intellectual deficiencies, but *only* out of special regard to his family. Thirdly, from the day of his ordination as priest to the day of his elevation to the papacy, he had *no* opportunity or means of supplying the neglect of his early years, and therefore did not supply it, and therefore was as great an ignoramus on the latter day as on the former. Fourthly, on the day of his elevation to the papacy, he was truly conscious "of his entire deficiency in the necessary acquirements" for that office. He was conscious, not only of his deficiency, (who should not be?) but of his *entire* deficiency.



He was conscious of this entire deficiency not in mere accidental qualities, not in qualities, which, however desirable, are not essential, but in the *necessary* acquirements. Fifthly, notwithstanding this feeling and consciousness of his entire unfitness for an office of such tremendous responsibility, he, on that very day, freely accepted that office. Finally, he then was and still is so grossly ignorant of one of the most elementary lessons in the order of grace and of the spiritual life, as to expect not merely divine assistance aiding and guiding his own efforts, but divine inspiration without such efforts and supplying their place.

Let us now see what Quirinus's inculpatations clearly *imply*. First, it is not stated that Mastai Ferretti was, at the time of his ordination, conscious of his unfitness for the office he then took upon himself, as it is stated that he had such consciousness at the time of his acceptance of the Papacy. But undoubtedly the Bishop who ordained him, knowing his incompetence, and ordained him *solely* on account of his family connexions, was guilty of a mortal sin. Secondly, still more guilty was Pope Gregory XVI., when, with similar knowledge, promoting him to the office of Bishop, and afterwards to that of Cardinal. But most guilty, immeasurably most guilty of all, were the Cardinals who elected Pius to the Papacy and Pius in accepting the Papacy, they and he knowing "his entire deficiency in the necessary acquirements."

We leave these statements and inferences as they are. It is surely needless to add a single word of comment. The burning intensity of Quirinus's malice overmastered his caution. Gnashing with too much violence, he has shaken off the mask, and shown the budding horns; stamping with too much fury, he has betrayed the cloven hoof.

Next to the Pope, the *individual* whom Quirinus selects for his most frequent, most insolent and most vindictive comments, is Dr. Manning. The Archbishop of Westminster first appears on Quirinus's stage in the very first letter, and leaves it only at page 803, in the sixty-ninth and last letter. He has a "fanatical zeal for the new dogma" (p. 66). He is "the leader and oracle of the infallibilists" (p. 348). "Next to the Jesuits, Manning and Ward are the chief authors of the whole infallibilist agitation" (p. 359). "From the Pentecost of the blessed year 1870, as Manning has prophesied, dates the age of the Holy Ghost" (p. 531). He is "at the head of the extreme party" (p. 547). In a speech delivered in the public session of May 25, he "assured the Opposition that they were all heretics *en masse*" (p. 569). He is among "the fanatics" who "would prefer the Church being exposed to the danger of schism to

modifying" (p. 582), &c. &c. It is Manning here, Manning there, Manning everywhere. He is always in the saddle; and wherever you see a troop of the Pope's brigade scouring the dim horizon, in pursuit of scientific historians and high critics, "there, be sure, is Manning charging," with the bright steel in his firm grasp, and the *ακαμαντον πυρ* of ultramontanist glowing on his burnished helm. Quirinus hints in one place (p. 136) something about a vacant Hat looming in the distance. But, if Dr Manning were raised to the dignity of Dean of the Sacred College of Cardinals, it would not be to him an honour equal to that which Quirinus has conferred on him, by thus singling him out among all the members of the Council as the one special object of continuous, scurrilous, and (as we have just seen) even blasphemous invective, from beginning to end.

But the marked contrast in the manner in which Quirinus uniformly speaks of the two opposing parties in the Council, indicates to us more strikingly than any thing else in his book, the blind, the downright infuriate spirit of partisanship with which he seems penetrated, saturated, possessed like a demoniac. We doubt if there ever has been, since the beginning of the world, an assembly of 700 men, certainly there never has been an assembly of 700 Bishops, composed of persons of such diversity of clime and tongue, with all the other diversities which these two imply. Yet the higher intellectual and moral qualities belong exclusively to the minority of under two hundred, the lower intellectual and moral qualities belong exclusively to the majority of over five hundred. The Bishops of the minority, no matter where they come from, are all white; the Bishops of the majority, no matter where they come from, are all black or tawny, or discoloured in some way.

*The Minority.* On this side are "all among the French, American and Irish Bishops who possess any culture and knowledge" (p. 74); "Ginoulhiac, of Grenoble, who is considered the best theologian among the French Bishops" (p. 125). This was before Maret turned up; then *he* becomes the most learned (pp. 513, 744). Of Mgr. Maret's theological powers Quirinus gives us no means of judging, except from a solitary specimen—his argument against the definition of Papal infallibility, as given by this writer. Of the argument we have to say, that (whether or no Mgr. Maret is responsible for it) it is one of the shallowest and most absurd pieces of theological reasoning we ever met with in any treatise. It is this. If the Council defined the infallibility of the Pope, then the lesser (on the principle of the majority) would give power to the greater. To which Cardinal Bilio, one of the presidents of the Council, replied, that the Council *gives* nothing to the Pope, and

can give nothing to him, but only *defines* what he has, the Pope, if it seems good to him, confirming the definition. The reply is clear and decisive (pp. 608, 663). Did the Vatican Council, in defining the simple supremacy of S. Peter and the Pope (sess. 4, c. 1, 2), give the supremacy to S. Peter or the Pope? Did the same Council, in defining that God is omnipotent, eternal, &c. (sess. 3, c. 1), give to God omnipotence, eternity, &c.? Did the Council of Nice, in defining the divinity of Christ, give divinity to him? Quirinus is surprised that the Cardinal should have addressed severe language "to one of the most learned and respected men of the French clergy, the president of the Paris Theological Faculty." If Mgr. Maret really spoke as Quirinus declares him to have spoken (which we are very slow to believe), we should say that he could not do better than enter some orthodox theological college, and there learn the first rudiments of the sacred science. And though we may not rely on this specimen as indicating *Mgr. Maret's* theological ignorance, at all events it very irrefragably demonstrates *Quirinus's*.

But to return to Quirinus's panegyrics. We have room only for a few more of the countless flowers showered on the heads of the minority. One "is a man of rare eloquence, rich experience and knowledge of mankind, and easily outweighs ten Italian Cardinals in culture and learning" (p. 146). Now, it so happens that the person on whom this extravagant encomium is passed, had already given proof of an amount, not only of gross ignorance, but of erroneous doctrine, especially on the subject-matter of the fourth session, such as we believe no other Bishop of the Church has exhibited since the synod of Pistoia. These errors are enumerated and condemned in a long brief addressed by the Pope to him in October, 1865, and published several months before the meeting of the Council. But Quirinus has himself furnished sufficient means for judging of the justness of his eulogy, for he gives in the appendix a full report of the speech delivered by this Bishop against the definition of the infallibility; and in that speech we have found no trace whatever of theological learning, while its theological reasoning is feeble indeed. Another member of the minority "lashed with incisive words and brilliant arguments" (p. 168). Another "is the best speaker in the Council after," &c. (p. 195). Three others are "three of the most influential prelates of the Church" (pp. 449-50). Another "is beyond question the most profound historical scholar among the members of the Council" (p. 455). Another "has spoken with great power and dignity" (p. 556). Another "cited clenching proofs" (p. 594). Another (an American, vide "Martin Chuzzlewit") delivered "*one of the most remarkable*" speeches made "since the opening of the Council" (p. 595).

Another "won great commendation, and his Biblical comments were also found to be well grounded and to the purpose" (p. 662). This, by the way, is the pure Evangelical and Methodist cant, and is stolen word for word from Brother Styles. Another made a "long and powerful speech" (p. 683). Another, the author of a condemned work, is "a man distinguished alike for intellect, eloquence, and learning" (p. 806). In short, the speeches of the minority were in the main "solid and thoughtful" (p. 755).

Now, we do not so much quarrel with this unbroken strain of praise, considered absolutely and in itself. It is from a comparison of it with the terms constantly applied to the members of the majority, that we can comprehend the full intensity of the writer's envenomed spirit—especially when we bear in mind how large both absolutely and relatively that majority was. The following are specimens of the language in which Quirinus characterises the qualities, intellectual and moral, of the 533 Bishops who voted for the definition of the Pope's infallibility. We may premise that, soon after the close of the Council, as well as quite recently, we learned from more than one source, of the very best authority, that the Bishops of the Council, who, as a body, displayed the most profound theological knowledge, united to the highest order of ability, were the Spanish and Neapolitan—both, as we were informed, preeminent over those of all other nations. They came from the countries of Suarez and S. Alphonsus Liguori.

*The Majority.* "Above a hundred Spaniards have come from both sides of the ocean to let themselves be used as instruments of the Italians at the Council. They have no thought, or will, or suggestion of their own for the good of the Church. It is difficult to form a notion of the ignorance of these Latins in all *historical* questions [scientific history, of course], and their *entire* want of that general cultivation which is assumed with us as a matter of course in a priest or a bishop. And up to this time *I have always found* here that the predilection for the Infallibility theory is in *precise proportion* to the ignorance of its advocates" (p. 143, Rome, Jan. 9, 1870). The petition for the definition of infallibility, signed by 400 Bishops of the Council, "is made up of gross and *palpable* untruths and falsifications"; and among the signatories "the Romance South Americans are even more ignorant than the Spaniards" (p. 173). Of the majority "Deschamps *alone* has won great applause as an eloquent speaker, though with sufficient poverty of thought" (p. 192). They are "fanatics," a "crowd of abject fanatics and sycophants" (pp. 389, 582, 586), "quite

incapable from their standard of cultivation of appreciating theological arguments," and many of them, "even if they were convinced, would not act on their convictions" (pp. 611-12). The Spanish Bishops utter "*merely* bombast and abject protestations of homage . . . and among the *reptiles* here they are the most cringing after the Neapolitans" (p. 726). We had marked many other passages of a similar tendency; we think, however, we have quoted quite enough.

Observe, the first of these extracts was penned just a month after the opening of the Council. The Spanish people, as is well known, especially those in high position, whether in church or state, are exceedingly reserved. Notwithstanding this, and the bustle naturally consequent on the meeting together of so many hundreds of Bishops, theologians and others, the congregations, the Christmas ceremonies, &c.; notwithstanding all this, Quirinus succeeded, within the space of one month, in so effectively pumping above a hundred Spanish Bishops, as to be able to pronounce dogmatically on their dispositions, their theological and historical knowledge, and their general cultivation. Quirinus has again overshot himself. With the Bishops, as with the Pope, he has shown himself to have the venom of the serpent without its cunning. With the Bishops, as with the Pope, the truculence of his passion has overpowered him. The blows he aims at them, as at him, fall back on himself with crushing force. Did he not *scruple*, did he not think it a *sin* so rashly, so recklessly to exhibit to a godless and mocking world so many Bishops as stupid, imbecile, grossly wanting in the learning proper to their state, grossly careless of the highest interests of religion, of the Church, of God's own eternal and immaculate truth? Did he not think it a sin so rashly and so recklessly to call these Bishops foul names, to call them fanatics and sycophants and reptiles?

But profuse and acrimonious as are the assaults on the Pope and the Episcopal majority, immeasurably more profuse and acrimonious are the assaults on the Jesuits. *They* are among the very first objects that arrest the scorching glare of Quirinus's baleful eyes; and never, until he utters his last dying howl, do they for one moment recede out of the range of his vision. They are for ever flitting before him, like a prey he would seize, but which flies when he bounds at it, fascinating him, mocking him, maddening him. On others he deals his blows intermittingly: them he keeps pounding, pounding incessantly, as if his arm rose and fell under the influence of a resistless force, like the hammer of a great clock striking the hours. If he aims at the Pope upwards of twenty times and at the Bishops upwards of twenty times, he aims at the Jesuits

upwards of one hundred and twenty times. We will not bore our readers with specimens. It is the old story, familiar to every one conversant with the history of the Church for the last three centuries. During that long and stormy period has there been a single man, animated with a special hostility to the Holy See, especially under the mask of a Catholic name, who was not also animated with a special hostility towards them? Has there been a single writer who assailed the purity of Catholic doctrine, a single Janus or Quirinus, who did not also assail the purity of their characters? Has there been a single statesman who set about crushing the liberty of the Church in any Catholic nation, a single Pombal or Cavour, who did not commence the work of sacrilege by crushing, or trying to crush, them? "*Quid plura?*"\*

Having given these specimens of Quirinus's "best authority" on the Vatican Council, we have now a word to say on his "deeper views" as a theologian. He constantly sits in judgment on theology and theologians, and pronounces his decisions with that assured self-complacency which so often imposes on unsuspecting ignorance. His denunciation of the Spanish Bishops, given above, may be taken as a specimen. Does he anywhere exhibit evidence of his qualification for an office of such high censorship—evidence not of the justness of his actual criticisms, but of his capacity to criticize at all? Let us see. On the Pope, the Church, and General Councils, he has given a profusion of theological disquisition; but theology which is, as we have said, a mere compound of Protestantism and the most extreme Jansenism. In all the other numerous and vast departments of the sacred science he has given us, as far as we could notice, but one solitary opportunity of testing his theological acquirements.

In his sixth letter (dated Rome, December 24, 1869), commenting on one of the Schemata submitted to the Council, Quirinus says (p. 112): "It contains on its front the impress of the new Jesuit school. . . . Here is a characteristic specimen. At the Florentine Synod of 1439, which bequeathed such painful recollections both to East and West, Eugenius IV. had it defined 'that the souls of those who die only in original, or in actual mortal sin, descend into hell, but are unequally pun-

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\* Dr. Johnson, in his "Life of Paul Sarpi," near the end, has the following: "His detestation of the corruption of the Roman Church appears in all his writings, but particularly in this memorable passage of one of his letters: 'There is nothing more essential than to ruin the reputation of the Jesuits; by the ruin of the Jesuits Rome will be ruined.'" Sarpi was the Quirinus of the Council of Trent. How men, like events, reproduce themselves!



ished.\* This proposition has sadly tormented theologians, and they have devised all sorts of ways of softening or explaining it, even assuming the very doubtful authority of this Council, which was rejected by the whole Gallican Church. For even the most resolute faith recoils in horror from the logical inference that God has created the human race in order, from generation to generation, to plunge into hell far the larger portion of mankind, simply because they have not received the baptism which in most cases was never offered them. The vast gulf between this proposition and the Scriptural doctrine that God is Love, and wills all men to be saved, *no* theologian has undertaken to bridge over."

This is indeed a "characteristic specimen"—of Quirinus, and quite enough. It exhibits in a marked way, first, the gross dishonesty of the scientific historian; secondly, his equally gross ignorance of the commonest theological speculations and of the commonest theological books.

Quirinus's *scientific history*. First, from his words a reader unacquainted with the Acts of the Councils would at once infer, would take for granted, that the introduction of the above definition among the doctrines of the Church was due entirely to the Council of Florence, and that the definition is not to be found in any previous General Council. Is this true? It is false. The Council of Florence was held in the year 1439. In the profession of faith, made in the name of the whole Greek Church, in a General Council (second of Lyons) held nearly a hundred and seventy years before (1274), the very same definition is given with hardly the variation of even a single unimportant word: "We believe . . . . that the souls of those who die in mortal sin, or with only original, immediately descend into hell, to be punished with unequal penalties."†

Second. What does Quirinus mean by saying that the Council of Florence "*bequeathed* painful recollections both to

\* "Animas eorum qui in solo peccato originali, vel mortali actuali decedunt, in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen disparibus puniendos."—*Note of Quirinus*.

† Πιστευομεν . . . . . εκεινων δε τας ψυχας των εν θανασιμω αμαρτηματι, η μετα μονης της προπατορικης αποχωρησαντων, παραυτικα εις τον αδην καταβαινεν, ποιναις ανισοις τιμωρηθησμενας. (Harduin, vii. 696.) The exact words of the Council of Florence, as given by the same Harduin, ix. 986, are:—"Diffinimus . . . . . illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato, vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen disparibus puniendas." The Council did not define anything as to the nature of the punishments: the main force of the definition falls therefore on the word "immediately" (παυτικα, "mox"). Perrone, de Deo Creatore, n. 812, *note*. Quirinus, doubtless, being entirely ignorant of this, we do not attribute his omission of the word to bad faith.

East and West"? These words, if they mean anything, plainly signify that something was done in the Council or by the Council, which was the cause, or at least the occasion, of serious injury to the Church; something to be regretted; something that had been better left undone. Or they signify, what amounts to much the same thing, that it were better for the interests of the Eastern as well as the Western Church, if the Council had never met. Is this true? It is false. In the first place, we believe that, with the sole exception of that firebrand, Mark of Ephesus, all the Eastern Bishops who assisted at the Council remained firm till death in the faith there professed—Mark having been indeed opposed to reconciliation from first to last. It is beyond all question that the great majority of them did so remain, several of them under very trying hardships. The testimony to the truth of so many and such men, to say nothing of the salvation of their immortal souls, was of itself no slight gain. In the second place, if the rest of the Greeks remained in their schism and their errors, in what way or in what degree was the Council responsible for this? Did the Council of Nice bequeath painful recollections, because the Arians remained Arian, disturbing, afflicting, and in effort lacerating the Church for generations? Did the Council of Trent, because the Protestants remained Protestant? Did the Vatican Council, because Quirinus and a handful of Munich sciolists have turned Protestant? In the third place, that the profession of faith made in the last session of the Council, most especially that part of it which regards the Roman Pontiff, should have been assented to and subscribed by the Greeks—ah! this is a painful, *the* painful, recollection to Quirinus and the other New Protestants, as of course it has always been to the Old; but to all true Catholics a recollection pleasing indeed and most delightful.

Third. But the authority of the Council is "very doubtful," and why? Because the Council "was rejected by the whole Gallican Church." Of the theology here implied we shall speak presently. Is the historical statement true, namely, that the Council of Florence was rejected by the whole Gallican Church? It is a falsehood, but of that kind which we characterized above in commencing our strictures on Quirinus. It is a falsehood with an element of truth in it. His most Christian Majesty prohibited the French Bishops from attending the Council, and consequently (O blessed Gallican liberties!) not a single French Bishop was at it from beginning to end. (The very same thing happened to the French Bishops in reference to a previous General Council, the second of Nice.) In those days of slow and uncertain communication, reports of the most erroneous

kind regarding the proceedings of the Council were spread everywhere through France. In consequence of these reports, the French Bishops, having no means of coming at a sure knowledge of the real facts, did not at first receive the Council. Eventually, when they did arrive at that knowledge, they accepted the Council entirely, absolutely, cordially. Of the positive and absolute rejection of the Council by the Gallican Church, at any time, there is no authentic evidence whatever: while of the ultimate reception of it we have decisive evidence. We suppose that the testimony of distinguished French theologians, at least of those who held what used to be called the Gallican doctrines, would be admitted as sufficiently conclusive on the point. Of these Tournely, beyond all question, held the very highest place in the public estimation. So high, indeed, did his character stand, that, after his death in 1729, it was no uncommon thing for even able and learned theologians, such as Collet, La Fosse, Montagne, &c., to publish courses or particular treatises of theology under his name or as continuations of his work. Now, Tournely, after admitting that, for the reasons just stated, the Council was not at first received in France, distinctly affirms that, the grounds of doubt having been removed, there is no reason for excluding the Council from the list of General Councils.\* Natalis Alexander (ob. 1724), the famous historian, a very decided Gallican, not only maintains the full ecumenicity of the Council, but defends that ecumenicity at considerable length against the cavils of Mark of Ephesus and others.† We might refer to many other authorities of the same kind. We will name but one more, Cardinal de la Luzerne (ob. 1821). He was an open, uncompromising defender of Gallicanism; and was, we believe, the last of that class (Quirinus will pardon us) to whom even by courtesy the title of theologian could be extended. In a work written expressly and exclusively in defence of the declaration of 1682, Luzerne, towards the close of that work,‡ undertakes to reconcile two positions held by him with certain proceedings in the Council of Florence. Now, if he did not believe in the ecumenicity of the Council, his obvious course should have been to deny that ecumenicity at once. But so far from adopting such a course, he takes up an elaborate chain of reasoning, which he carries on for upwards of forty pages — whether successfully or not is beside the

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\* Tournely, de Ecclesia, vol. ii., p. 309-10.

† Dissertatio 10 in Hist. Ecclesiast., sec. 15 et 16.

‡ Sur la Déclaration de l'Assemblée du Clergé de France en 1682. Troisième partie, chap. 21.

present point—without dropping a single word to indicate that he entertained the smallest doubt on the subject; arguing all along just as if he were reconciling his positions with the Council of Nice or of Trent. So much for the specimens of Quirinus's scientific history given within so short a compass. Let us now glance at the specimens of—

*Quirinus's high theology.* First. The doctrine of Quirinus on general Councils is throughout so entirely erroneous, that we need barely point out the proposition, which is implied in the preceding extract, and which affirms that a Council approved of as General by the Pope possesses but doubtful authority, if rejected by a single national Church. This doctrine is opposed to the uniform practice and manifest belief of the Church: it is simply heretical.

Second. "This *proposition* [of the Council of Florence] has sadly tormented theologians." Whatever may be said of the doctrine set forth in the proposition (of which by-and-by), it is absolutely certain that the proposition itself, this new definition of that doctrine, threw no fresh difficulty in the way of theologians; created no new torment for them. As to the eternal lot of all who die without being in a state of grace, the Council defined merely what had not only been defined before, but had been always, as it is at this day, the universal, clear, explicit faith of the Church, and of every man, woman, and child in it, who understood the first rudiments of the faith. But the Council's definition about the Pope is the sore point with Quirinus, and for that he aims this blow at its authority, by insinuating that it framed a new theme of discord and distress for theologians. Is it true that the Council did this? It is false, utterly false.

Third. "This proposition has sadly *tormented* theologians, and they have devised all sorts of ways of softening or explaining it." The proposition of the Council, as we have seen, left theologians exactly in the same state in which it found them. But did the doctrine declared in the proposition create at any time, before or after the Council, a special torment, that is, a special difficulty for theologians in the solution of objections, in harmonizing the doctrine with other defined doctrines: a difficulty such as does not occur in almost every treatise of theology, dogmatic and moral, and in some treatises at every second step? Most certainly not. On the contrary, as we shall see immediately, the solution given by the overwhelming majority of theologians, both before and since the Council of Florence, to the only difficulty worth looking at, clears away that difficulty most satisfactorily, and dissolves it into empty air. While, on the other hand, there are theological difficulties,

for example, on the subject of the divine attributes, of grace, of sin, &c., which have "sadly tormented theologians" and divided theological schools for centuries; and whose cloud will probably not altogether melt away until the golden dawn of the eternal day arises, "and in thy light we shall see light." Has the definition of Florence near so sadly tormented theologians as have several definitions we could name of the Council of Trent? But we forgot: even Trent, as he more than once intimates, is far from pleasing Quirinus. For a person assuming the name of Catholic, he is hard to please. Trent does not please him,\* still less Florence, least of all and not at all the Vatican. What *would* please him? We think we can guess—a Council consisting of the "numerous theological High Schools and learned theologians" (141) of Germany.

Fourth. "The vast gulf between this proposition and the Scriptural doctrine that God is Love, and wills all men to be saved, *no* theologian has *undertaken* to bridge over." Is this true? It is, as every mere tyro in theology should know, false, monstrously false. The great mass of our dogmatic theologians, from the ponderous folio down to the duodecimo text-book, have undertaken the task, generally in the treatise "de Deo," or in the treatise "de Gratia," or in that "de Incarnatione." That eminent theologian Perrone, whose work had reached the thirty-first edition seven years ago, has done so in both of the two first of those treatises. Suarez did the same more than two hundred and fifty years ago, in his treatise "de Prædestinatione." S. Thomas did the same in his commentary on the Sentences, more than six hundred years ago, before the Council of Lyons,† and so long before the Council of Florence. These, and hundreds besides of our theologians, have undertaken to do that, which our "*best* authority for the history of the Vatican Council" so coolly affirms that "*no* theologian has undertaken." They *undertook*: that they have succeeded, the illustrious names of so many among them should be to us a sufficient guarantee. That their views are sufficiently "deep" to exhaust Quirinus's theological sounding-line, we have not the means of ascertaining: for, what he denies is not the success, but the fact of the undertaking.

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\* Hallam, a stanch Protestant, has the following in his "Literature of Europe" (p. 2, c. 2, n. 18, note):—"No General Council ever contained so many persons of eminent learning and ability as that of Trent; nor is there ground for believing that any other ever investigated the questions before it with so much patience, acuteness, temper, and desire of truth."

† It was on his way to this very Council, to which he had been summoned by the Pope, that the holy Doctor was called to the better life.

As to the inference he insinuates by saying that God is Love, and that He wills the salvation of all men, this mode of reasoning might pass in a composition like Moore's "Loves of the Angels" (where it actually occurs), but it is not that which theologians are in the habit of using. God is infinite Love, but he is also infinite Justice. It is true, as Scripture and Holy Church so frequently proclaim,\* his works of Mercy are above all his works. It would be simple justice to plunge the sinner into hell after the commission of his first mortal sin (as was done to the angels), after the second and after each succeeding mortal sin. And yet how many millions on millions are there, and in every age of the Church have been, to whom God pardons mortal sin committed, not only seven times, but seventy times seven! How many are there whom God has pardoned after many long years, nay, after a life-long career of continuous sin! On the other hand, how many live in sin and die in sin, without repentance? To say nothing of the perpetual and manifest faith and teaching of the universal Church, if there be anything clearly affirmed in Scripture, it is that such are doomed absolutely to everlasting punishment. Does Quirinus deny this? If so, then he is an open heretic on this point, as he is on other points. Yet, notwithstanding this awful decree of Justice, God is none the less Love, infinite Love.

God is infinite in all His attributes, in his justice as in His mercy. But the exercise, if we may so speak, the outward manifestations, the works of these attributes are not infinite. God is free, with an absolute and perfect freedom, in the manifestation of each of His attributes; free to manifest them not at all, free to manifest them when He wills, and to what extent He wills. That will, we know, works with infinite wisdom, as well as with infinite power. How that will thus works in the natural order and in the visible creation, we see and know to some extent; because it manifests itself to our eyes and our understandings. But of its works and ways in the supernatural order and invisible world, we know no more than the senseless stone, except so far as he has deigned to reveal to us in His Sacred Word. From that Word alone can we know to whom and in what way He wills to exercise his pure justice, to exercise his pure mercy, to exercise his justice and mercy meeting each other. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?"

It is idle therefore to argue as to the condition of infants dying in original sin from those general truths—God is Love,

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\* "Deus qui omnipotentiam tuam parcendo maxime et miserando manifestas," &c. Oratio, Dom. 10 post Pentec.



God is Justice, God is Omnipotence, and the like—especially as God *has* revealed, in part at least, how far He manifests to them His love and His justice.

In the future world there are two, and only two, permanent states, Heaven and Hell : for, after the day of General Judgment, there will no longer exist the intermediate or purgatorial state. The essential beatitude of heaven consists in the vision of God and the love of God, and the ecstatic joy resulting from these two. Now hell, in its primary and essential meaning, simply signifies the state of eternal exclusion from this beatitude. It commonly, but not necessarily and "*vi termini*," implies much more. From this beatitude all are absolutely and for ever excluded who die in original sin or in actual mortal sin, with or without original. This is an article of Catholic faith. But, as Suarez, with his usual acuteness, remarks, the sentence of condemnation to everlasting fire to be pronounced on the reprobate at the general judgment (Matt. xxv. 41, &c.) is addressed only to those who could perform works, that is, who were capable of committing actual sin : hence of those who die with only original sin there is no mention made there. In the third chapter of the Gospel of S. John, our Lord announces to Nicodemus the doctrine of the new birth, the necessity of regeneration for all men alike, as all alike are born in sin. He announces this necessity twice over,—first, in a general form, the necessity of the thing itself ; secondly, the necessity of the instrument or means whereby the thing is to be obtained—baptism. He is speaking merely of regeneration from the universal corruption, original sin ; and it is very remarkable that on both occasions he simply says that the want of this regeneration excludes from the kingdom of Heaven :—"Except a man be born again, he cannot *see the kingdom of God* . . . Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot *enter into the kingdom of God*." Whereas, in the innumerable texts of Scripture in which mention is made of the punishment of actual sin, positive torment, the "*pœna sensûs*," is invariably, or almost invariably, alluded to.

But to return to the theologians. It is true that a few have held that infants dying in original sin, together with exclusion from heaven, suffer also some very light pain of sense. But this opinion is rejected by the overwhelming majority of theologians. The opposite opinion, says Vasquez, is "the common opinion of the schools." "All theologians teach it," according to Suarez. Bellarmine affirms that it is held by "the whole school of theologians."\* Nay, the majority of theo-

\* "*Communis in schola*,"—Vasquez in l. 2., d. 134, n. 6. "*Omnes theologi*

gians,\* with S. Thomas and Scotus at their head, maintain (Vasquez holds it as certain) that those lost ones, though knowing full well that there is an unspeakable happiness which they are never to enjoy, yet feel no sadness or pain of any kind from the knowledge of this privation—God's omnipotent hand so cradling their minds in this calm repose. Yet farther still, Suarez and others, still following the same Angelic Doctor, hold that they enjoy a permanent and undisturbed natural beatitude of the understanding and the will; knowing God as perfectly as He can be known through His creatures, and for all eternity loving Him and enjoying Him as thus known. A graphic and touching description of the sentiments and condition of those souls on the great Judgment Day, and for ever after, is given by Lessius, some extracts from which cannot be unacceptable to our general readers:—

They shall be gathered together in one place, but separated from the wicked as having a destiny different from theirs. They shall see the majesty of the Judge, and adore Him. They shall see the assembly of the saints and of the wicked, of whose good and bad works they shall have a knowledge. They shall hear the sentence of the Judge pronounced on both, and shall rejoice that they are not among the wicked. They will give thanks to God for having been snatched away before coming to the use of reason, inasmuch as the immense majority of them, especially the children of unbelievers, would otherwise have incurred the same damnation. They will therefore not murmur against God, but will feel themselves exceedingly indebted to Him for having delivered them from the peril of such great woes. They shall themselves receive a sentence from the Judge, but a gracious one; which, though it excludes them from the beatific vision and the kingdom of heaven, secures them in a state suited to the dignity of their nature, wherein, satisfied and rejoicing, they shall dwell in the praises of God for all eternity. . . . . All this is corroborated by the scholastic doctors. S. Thomas says that "they shall share largely in the divine goodness and in natural perfections, and shall be united to God in the communion of natural goods, and so shall rejoice in Him from their natural knowledge and love of Him." . . . . . Wherefore, although they are called *damm'd*, in as much as they are for ever deprived of the glory of heaven for which they were created, we may reasonably believe that their lot is *far happier and more joyful than that of any human being on this earth.*†

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docent."—Suarez, de *Mysteriis Vitæ Christi*, d. 50, s. 5. "Universa schola theologorum."—Bellarm. de *Amiss. Gratiae*, l. 6, c. 5, ad object. 7.

\* Lessius (loco infra cit. n. 145) says of this opinion, "passim docent doctores."

† Lessius de *Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis*, l. 13, n. 143–5, c. 22. The whole of these paragraphs are well worth attentive perusal. We need hardly add that every statement contained in them rests on solid (to us un-

We have more to say, viewing the question about those souls from another stand-point. But we must stop here. We have given an outline of *one* bridge which theologians have constructed across that gulf, which Quirinus affirms that "*no* theologian has *undertaken* to bridge over,"—the stones that compose this theological structure seeming to us firm and transparent, as if quarried out of the crystal floor of the New Jerusalem.

But Quirinus has shown himself not only utterly ignorant of theology, but utterly ignorant, we will not say of its technical terms, but of ecclesiastical words and phrases in common use among Catholics of all classes, and to be found in the commonest books of devotion and instruction.

On Sunday last [January, 1870] the Pope gave audience to a great crowd of visitors, some 700 or 1,000, it is said. . . . [Among other things, he said that] in Church matters no attention was to be paid to the judgment of the *world*, as he himself despised it, for the Church's kingdom is not of this world. It has hitherto, *of course*, been held in the Church that the judgment of the world—that is, of *their* flocks, who constitute their own immediate world—is exactly what the Bishops ought to attend to very much, &c. (p. 149.)

We are wrong. This is not ignorance, cannot be ignorance. It seems to us impossible that Quirinus did not see, what is at first sight so perfectly manifest, that the Pope here uses the word "*world*" in the sense in which it is invariably used in the New Testament when contrasted with our Lord, His Gospel, His Church; \* in the sense which, in such contrast, it has in the Fathers, in the theologians, in all Catholic writers whatsoever. It is in this sense we so often read, and hear, and speak of the maxims of the world, the spirit of the world, the ways of the world, as opposed to the maxims, the spirit, and the ways of God and His holy law. "Woe to the world because of scandals : If the world hate you, know ye that it hath hated Me before you : In the world you shall have distress : but have confidence, I have overcome the world : You are of God, little children . . . . they are of the world : therefore of the world they speak, and the world heareth them." † The devil, the world, the flesh,—are not these the three great enemies of the Church and of her individual members, for ever warring against her

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answerable) theological reasoning. The decision of Innocent III. (Cap. Majores) seems very clear :—"Pœna originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero pœna peccati est gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus."

\* The word has five different significations in the New Testament, on which see Ferraris, Bibliotheca, sub voce "Mundus" : "Quarto, accipitur pro hominibus mundanis ; quos vocamus mundanos, quia ea sola quæ in præsenti vident desiderant."

† Matt. xviii. 7 ; John xv. 18 ; xvi. 33 ; 1 John iv. 5.

and them? Is not the world by far the most formidable of the three, especially as against the Church herself? By this world, with its impious principles, its wisdom, denounced by the Apostle, with its deadly hate, with its mighty power, the Church, but for a mightier power, would have ages ago been swept from the face of the earth—her name dimly remembered, like the names of ancient dynasties that have so long perished from among men. The world! Is not Quirinus one of her million evangelists, paid to spread her lying gospel, paid in the fairy coin with which she rewards her faithful servants, in the clapping hands and loud praises of her great chiefs and her nimble scribes? The world! Is not the Vicar of Christ the one only man on earth, to whom is given the full and supreme and universal commission to watch the insidious devices and evil teachings of the world, and in season and out of season to denounce, and condemn, and warn against them? Quirinus censures the Pope for despising the judgment of the world. Is he to respect it? Certainly not. Is he to hold himself indifferent to it as to a thing in itself neither good nor bad? Certainly not: for it is not so. He is to despise it, then. He is to despise it, as in itself despicable—folly and madness, as the Scripture, times without number, designates it. He is to despise it by not fearing it: for, though it rushes on him with great fury, he knows that it cannot prevail against him or against the Church built on him. He is to despise it by putting it aside and taking no account of it, in executing his first great task of teaching his flock, of guarding the deposit. Is the Pope to consult the devil's hornbook as a guide to be attended to in announcing the pure Gospel of Christ?

And now we think we have, from Quirinus's own pages, produced materials abundant for forming a just estimate of the man and the writer; for setting his character and his authority in their true light, clearly and fully. Intrinsically and seen through, he is nothing—not worth two drops of the ink we have wasted on him. But he represents a sect, contemptible indeed in its numbers, but strong in malice, indefatigable and unscrupulous in the pursuit of its object through dark and tortuous ways, hypocritical and mendacious.\*

"The number of fools is infinite," says the Wise Man. The sect knows this; and knows, too, the old saying, "Fling plenty

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\* We take the following extracts from the admirable essay on the spirit of Jansenism, prefixed by F. Dalgairns to his treatise on Devotion to the Sacred Heart:—

"Jansenism was a planned systematic conspiracy against *Rome*, but not in the same sense as that of Luther and Calvin. Geneva and Augsburg waged an open war. Jansenism was a secret plot. Its strength did not lie in its

of dirt, some will stick." It is for this reason that, on second thought, we have devoted so much space to the exposure of Quirinus's true spirit—on second thought: for in commencing this article we had no other idea than that of tossing him off in a couple of sentences, and leaving him to rot into the oblivion which he was sure in no distant time to reach. One word more, and we part with him for ever.\*

The charge of want of freedom in the Council, on which, as we have already intimated, Quirinus keeps so constantly harping, requires not now any serious notice—required not at any time, but certainly requires not *now*, when the lapse of more than two years since the day of the great definition has displayed to the world such stupendous evidence of the perfect unity of the Church, "the whole body compacted and fitly joined together." Of all the arguments and insinuations levelled by Quirinus against the freedom of the Council there is but one,

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doctrines, but in the terrible tenacity with which its disciples clung to them, and the no less terrible obstinacy with which they determined to remain within the visible communion of the Church of God, for the very purpose of eating into its vitals, and braving its decrees. . . .

"They [the Jansenists] thought themselves happy if, with painful erudition, they discovered that the narrator of the triumphant death of a martyr made some blunder in the name of a Roman legion, or in the official title of some Roman magistrate. . . . Such was Jansenism in its first stage, the most repulsive and the most dishonest of heresies. . . .

"Their great principle, that it was possible to belong to the Church and yet be her opponent in matters in which she was not infallible, and their claim at the same time to be the judges of those matters. . . .

"The only real and thorough Jesuitism, in the Protestant sense of the word, was Jansenism." (pp. 6, 30, 32, 46.)

This picture is, we can say, from long and close acquaintance with the subject, a perfect photograph.

\* The present writer read on its first appearance, and read with unbounded delight, the pastoral of Archbishop Manning on "The Council and its Definitions," published towards the close of 1870. But, partly from old and intimate familiarity with the theological ground over which the Archbishop travels, and with so many of the writers who had travelled the same ground long before him; partly from the effect of twenty intervening and busy months, "tinging with browner shade the evening of life" and its fading power of memory; he had lost, except on one point, all distinct recollection of the details of that pastoral. On turning to it while writing one of the preceding paragraphs, he was most agreeably surprised to find that most of what he had marked in Quirinus for further exposure had been already noticed therein. We are glad of this for two reasons: first, because it abridges our work; secondly and principally, because, exclusive of other considerations, Dr. Manning's constant and active connection with the proceedings of the Council from first to last (Pastoral, pp. 2, 24) gives to his testimony a peculiar weight. We would beg to direct special attention to chapter 4, "Scientific History and the Catholic Rule of Faith." The reasoning is as clear and unanswerable as a mathematical demonstration.

which, if the statement of fact on which it is based were true, would tell seriously against that freedom. "Here the Bishops are in a sense the Pope's prisoners. . . . It is the Pope who makes the decrees and defines the dogmas; the Council has *simply* to assent" (p. 147). "On their [the Bishops'] arrival they were strung and fixed, like the keys of a harpsichord, into the great conciliar instrument, and they find that they are to be used by the hand of the mighty musician to produce tones which sound to *themselves* most utterly nauseous" (p. 292). "Even the most abject Placet-men of the majority . . . had not quite expected to be summoned to Rome, *simply* in order to formulate the lecture notes of a Jesuit into dogmatic decrees for the whole Church" (p. 327). The Bishops or theologians, or both together, were summoned to Rome, that they "might *simply* endorse the elaborations of the Jesuits as voting-machines in the prison-house of the Council" (p. 502).

Now it so happens, most unfortunately for Quirinus, that Friedrich\* has given, in the second part of the work named at the head of this article, the whole of the original drafts or *schemata* (the Jesuit "lecture notes" and "elaborations") as submitted to the Bishops. We beg the reader to compare, as we have compared, these drafts of the two dogmatic constitutions with the constitutions themselves as finally adopted and decreed; and he will find hardly a single paragraph or sentence, we believe not even one, standing in the latter as it stood in the former. Except in the general titles, "on Faith" and "on the Church," everything is altered,—the arrangement, the titles of the chapters, the matter of the chapters—not a little entirely eliminated—not a little entirely new introduced. In the first Constitution the Schema is cut down to about one-half its original dimensions, eighteen chapters reduced to four, a whole batch of matter entirely suppressed, and a whole batch of new canons subjoined. The second Constitution is reduced to about one-third of its original compass,—four chapters instead of fifteen, much very weighty matter put out altogether; the chapter on the Papal infallibility, not in the Schema in any form, inserted, and a series of canons expunged. In short, the Bishops so hacked and so completely transformed the Schemata, leaving but the faintest outline of them in their Constitutions, as if they had thereby intended to give to the

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\* Friedrich was one of Quirinus's fellow conspirators. He has since openly turned New Protestant. Of upwards of twelve hundred priests belonging to the diocese of Munich, just three have joined the Döllinger sect. This fact we have been assured of by a Bishop of the highest character, who, in the course of last spring, himself had it from the lips of the Vicar-general of that diocese.



world the clearest and most palpable proof that these Constitutions were altogether their own work, their own free and deliberate work, and no mistake about it. We thank Friedrich for giving us those documents, which we have not seen elsewhere, showing, as they do, that Quirinus is one of the greatest liars that ever lived, greater even than Macaulay's Barère—greater, and with this difference, that Barère lied to cover his own past infamy, while Quirinus lies to load with infamy the Vicar of Christ and the Bishops of the Church of Christ.

We have hitherto spoken of the ecumenicity of the Vatican Council under the two first conditions of convocation and celebration. Of the ecumenicity of the Council in its final issue we need not say one word; for this the only condition required, according to all Catholic theologians, is the confirmation of the Council by the Pope. The Jansenists, indeed, insisted also on the acceptance of the Council by the universal Church. But even this condition, were it necessary, has been fulfilled in a most marvellous manner. The lapse of more than two years has, as we observed above, exhibited the perfect unity of the Church to the eyes of all men. This and all other attributes of the Church remain always in her, undiminished, untainted; but their outward manifestations and signs are sometimes to the eye of the world, as well as to the eye of faith, far more splendid than at others. The sun is always, in his own centre of light, the same radiant luminary; but his brilliancy is to our eyes greater and lesser, as clouds and vapours come and clear away. From extracts given in the early part of this article, to which others from less suspicious sources might have been added, it is evident that certain parties confidently expected that some great schism, not only *from* the Church but *in* the Church, would arise out of the Council. But the mutterings that seemed to prelude the coming tempest, came only from the lips of the false prophets, and, having received no responsive echo from the vaunted ranks of disaffection, they at first died away in silent and black despair, to break out again, from time to time, in fitful bursts of rage and malediction. The victory of faith, of faith which overcometh the world, is complete and perfect, as was the victory of Michael over the dragon. It turns out that out of about ninety Bishops who were opposed to the defining of the Papal infallibility, not half a dozen were opposed to the doctrine: the rest were opposed, not to the doctrine, which they believed firmly, but to the definition of it; and this on the sole ground of the inexpediency, or, as it was termed, inopportuneness of that

definition. Mgr. Dupanloup, the Bishop of Orleans, was held up as one of the leading members of the French opposition, as he undoubtedly was. In a pastoral\* recently addressed by him to his clergy, he says: "In my letter of adhesion addressed to the Holy Father from Bordeaux, I reminded His Holiness that, if I had written and spoken against the opportuneness of the definition, as to the doctrine itself, I had always professed it, not only in my heart, but in my public writings." But whatever may be said on this point, one great fact is now clear to the whole world. The Bishops of the opposition, whether opposed to the definition itself or to the expediency of it, the Bishops of the whole Church, without even one solitary exception, have submitted to the definition. The lie, like the mark of Cain, is branded on the forehead of the liar. "The internal divisions which rent asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic system from its summit to its base," were but thin mists floating around the Holy Mountain. They have passed away: and from the summit to the base of that Mountain there is neither chasm nor mark of chasm. Through all the Church there is unity of faith—unity perfect and indestructible—as has been ever, as shall be ever, all days, even to the consummation of the world. Every day, from every clime, one glorious Credo arises to the throne of God, harmonious as the chant sent forth from all creation, in the first exulting dawn of its being, "when the morning stars praised Me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody."

Such was the Vatican Council from its commencement to the final absorption, so to speak, of its work into the Church's system. Let us now turn to a consideration of the work itself—always bearing in mind that that work is yet unfinished. We should have a most inadequate idea of the achievements of the Council of Trent if we formed a judgment only from its two first dogmatic decrees, important as these decrees are.

As the Council of Trent differed in many striking features from all the Councils that preceded it, so the Vatican Council differs in many striking features from the Council of Trent. Both were alike called into existence by the aggressions of the great Protestant heresy, or rather the enormous swarm of heresies comprised in the name of Protestantism; the earlier Council against Protestantism as it existed at that time; the later as it exists in our time. In an article in our number for

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\* A translation of which is given in extenso in the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record" for last August.

last January\* we noticed the two states of Protestantism; that of its earlier and chrysalis existence, and that of its latter and fully developed existence; that of its earlier and more definitely dogmatic life, that of its latter and thoroughly antidogmatic life; that of its earlier years, when it believed in a God and a revelation, and professed a religion or rather a multitude of religions; that of its latter years, when it has no form of religion, rejecting God and revelation altogether. But there was another development of Protestantism, which, as not coming within our scope, we did not notice in that article: and this was its influence on pretty large numbers of Catholics themselves. We do not mean that Protestantism continued for a time, after its rise, to lurk within the Church, as Arianism did. Even after the Council of Nice there were many Bishops, decided and obstinate Arians, who continued to hold their sees and to rule as Catholic Bishops.† There were even Arian Councils, and Councils mixed Arian and Catholics—as the Council of Nice itself was in a small degree.‡ Nothing of this kind happened at the period of the Reformation, either before or after the Council of Trent. Indeed, from the character and attitude which Protestantism assumed from the very outset, it could not have been so. The Arians, as far as they could, shuffled and parried, shirking a distinct and open profession of their heresy, veiling it under ambiguous formulas. The Protestants, at once and before the world, unfurled the standard of revolt, and proclaimed their “non serviam.” Arianism erred only in faith, and only in one dogma of the faith. Protestantism, as was observed in the article alluded to, rejected the whole foundation of the faith and nearly all the articles of the faith, and moreover rejected the whole liturgy, establishing a creed and form of worship, both entirely new.

The influence of Protestantism on Catholic minds has been exercised not in one way but in a variety of ways, and is to be referred not to any one law of our nature but to a variety of laws. We speak of secret, subtle, unsuspected influences. Hence we exclude the influence, for example, of argumentative works directly and professedly assailing the Catholic religion. Whoever takes to the reading of such works, without the proper motives and the proper precautions, does what he knows to be perilous to his soul, exposes himself freely to the dangerous occasion, and is already judged. But there is an influence

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\* Art. VI: “The world turned Atheist,” &c.

† At the Council of Sardica, held twenty-two years after that of Nice, out of 380 Bishops there were nearly 80 Arian.

‡ Of the Bishops of the Council of Nice, at least 13 were Arian.

from mere literature, taking the word in its more restricted sense as comprising history, poetry, novels, and the like. There is an influence from books that treat of the Christian evidences or mental philosophy or metaphysics. There is an influence from frequent and close social intercourse with non-Catholics. There is an influence from maxims, constantly repeated in speeches, newspapers, and other periodicals, about civil and religious liberty, about secular education, about Church and State, &c. Catholics living under the pressure of persecuting laws, are exposed to the temptation of what is now called minimizing. Persons engaged in amicable discussion with Protestants, with a view to their conversion, are exposed to the same temptation: and a very serious temptation it sometimes is, as the result in certain cases has proved. The great mass of our Protestant literature is in tone and spirit thoroughly of this world. It takes no account of the eternity, beside which our whole present existence is but an instant of time, one pulse of the secondhand. Even in sermons and other writings of that kind, the narrow way, the everlasting fire, the difficulty of salvation—all such things are kept in the background. Extraordinary success, splendid achievements, great abilities—these and such like are the only objects of praise, the only idols of worship. With what a universal shout of derision has our Protestant press lately received the words of an English Catholic peer, "First Catholic, then Englishman!" Yet, what is this but the pithy expression of a principle of religion, which is self-evident to every Catholic, and should be evident to every one having any religion at all, to every one believing in a future life of rewards and punishment? What is it but saying, First the possession of the true faith, of the one sure way to the salvation of my soul: then, compared with that, to be English or French, to be rich or poor, to be prince or peasant, is of secondary importance?—as indeed it is, and of little importance—of no importance whatever. Of what importance was it to Cavour to have been Italian first, if he now dwell with everlasting burnings, to which his most wicked life, if unrepented of, has infallibly doomed him? Such is our Protestant literature. All these influences to which we have alluded, and others besides, have of their own nature a tendency to colour minds coming in contact with them: they teach by maxim, or seduce by example. Of course the Church herself remains, by virtue of the promise, untainted; or, rather, she displays her unfailing strength the more, in her conflict with error and sin. But neither individuals nor individual churches have the promise, and may be infected, as they have been.

It would occupy another article as long as the present, possibly two or three such articles, to give a satisfactory account of the taints which the Protestant influence has communicated to points of doctrine since the Council of Trent. Several of these doctrinal errors had been formally condemned in Papal Constitutions issued from time to time. Others had been left more or less untouched, and might have been held without any ecclesiastical censure up to the meeting of the Vatican Council. Confining ourselves to those errors which the Council has already condemned in its two existing constitutions, we proceed to place before our readers an account of its work. We may premise, however, that, besides condemning doctrines which had been previously reprobated by the great mass of eminent theologians, it has settled one or two points which had hitherto been moot questions, and discussed among them with perfect freedom.

*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith.*—In the two first chapters and corresponding canons of this constitution, atheism, pantheism, and materialism are condemned, and the decree of the Council of Trent on the inspiration and canon of Scripture is renewed. On these points nothing need be said. But, besides this condemnation and renewal, there are some very noteworthy decisions contained in the second chapter. 1. In the first chapter is defined God's clear and certain knowledge of the future *free* acts of creatures. This, though held by theologians as revealed and *de fide*, had not been expressly defined in any previous Council.

Chapter II. *Of Revelation.*—2. It is defined "that God, the beginning and end of all things, can, by the natural light of human reason, be known *with certainty* from things created." It is well known to our theological readers that the opposite of this doctrine had been maintained in published writings by more than one Catholic philosopher in the present century, and that action was taken on the matter by Rome. As the authors are still living, and as they (not being men of "deeper views") yielded a sincere and loyal submission to the Roman decisions, we make no further comment.

3. It is defined that, though God can be thus known by the *natural* light of human reason, "yet it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal to mankind Himself and the eternal decrees of His will, in another and *supernatural* way."

4. It is defined that "to this revelation it is to be attributed that the divine truths which are accessible to human reason, can also, in the present state of the human race, be known by

*all, without difficulty, with undoubting certainty, and without any admixture of error."*

5. It is defined that "it is not for this reason that revelation is to be called *absolutely* necessary, but because God, of his infinite goodness, has ordained man to a supernatural end."

This supernatural end is the enjoyment of God in the Beatific vision, a participation in God's own uncreated and infinite happiness for all eternity. This is an elevation to the attainment of which no creature whatever can, of its own nature, however excellent that nature may be, have any power or claim, or any disposition whatever. Divine grace and revelation, without which we cannot have faith, are absolutely necessary to elevate the creature and its works to a fitness for the supernatural end.

6. It is defined that the books of the Old and New Testament are held by the Church as sacred and canonical, (a) "not because, having been composed by mere human industry, they were afterwards approved by *her* authority; (b) nor *merely* because they contain revelation without any error."

The first member of this definition does not, as some have supposed, condemn, directly or indirectly, the third of the famous theses of Lessius and Hamel.\* For, what they held was that a book, though not written under inspiration, becomes Sacred Scripture, if the *Holy Ghost* should afterwards reveal that it contains no error. Whereas the Council speaks only of approval by the authority of the *Church*. What the Church approves of as true is infallibly true; but she does not *make* Sacred Scripture, she only *defines* what God has made so. It does not follow that God would not make a book Sacred Scripture by a similar approval. Then, observe, the thesis does not say that the book, originally uninspired, becomes *inspired*, but only says that it becomes *Sacred Scripture*. See below, n. 7, at the end.

7. It is defined that the books of the Old and New Testament are held by the Church to be sacred and canonical, "because, having been *written* by the *inspiration* of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and *as such* have been delivered to

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\* These theses, published in 1586, were as follows :—"1°. Ut aliquod sit Scriptura Sancta, non est necessarium singula ejus verba inspirata esse a Spiritu Sancto. 2°. Non est necessarium ut singulæ veritates et sententiæ sint immediate a Spiritu Sancto ipsi scriptori inspiratæ. 3°. Liber aliquis (qualis forte est secundus Machabeorum), humana industria sine adstantia Spiritus Sancti scriptus, si Spiritus Sanctus postea testetur nihil ibi esse falsum, efficitur Scriptura Sacra." The authors subsequently expunged the clause within parentheses. See Perrone de Locis, p. 2, n. 97, not., and Janssens, Hermeneutica Sacra, n. 30.



*the Church herself?*" In the hypothesis of Lessius and Hamel the book could not be said to be *written* by inspiration. Hence it would appear that their thesis is not in accordance with at least this clause of the definition. On the other hand, it may be said that the definition of the Council is not absolutely, and in respect of any and every hypothesis, exclusive; that she simply defines the actual ground on which the Church holds the aforesaid books to be sacred and canonical, without in any way touching on the question, whether a book might not be held as sacred and canonical on the other ground named in the thesis, if such ground existed in favour of any book. In reality, if God revealed of any book that it was free from all error, His authority would be just as much pledged for the truth of that book as for the truth of a book directly inspired by Him. We are of opinion, therefore, that the Council has left the aforesaid thesis quite unscathed.

8. As to the expunged clause of the thesis, affirming that the second book of Machabees is perhaps an example of the hypothesis—this is manifestly no longer tenable (if it ever had been). For the Council has most explicitly defined the books on the canon are held to be sacred and canonical, because *written* by inspiration. The book in question was therefore so written.

The Vatican definition of the ground on which the books of Scripture are held as sacred and canonical is, in substance and essence, the same as the Trent definition; but the former is by no means a mere repetition of the latter. The Trent definition simply affirms that they have God for their *Author*.\* The Vatican evolves this definition, and gives to it a greater precision, by (a) excluding the two grounds named in n. 6; (b) by expressly declaring that they have God for their author, *in as much as they were originally written under His inspiration*; and (c) that, as thus originally inspired, they were delivered to the Church. This we look on as a highly important addition.

Chapter III. *Of Faith*.—9. It is defined that the motive of faith is "the authority of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive." These two constitute the authority of God—His infinite wisdom, whereby He knows all things, and cannot be deceived; His infinite veracity, whereby He cannot speak otherwise than as He knows, and therefore cannot deceive.

\* "Orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta [S. Synodus], omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti, cum utriusque unus Deus sit *auctor*, necnon traditiones ipsas, &c. . . . pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur." Sess. 4.

On this point, now for the first time solemnly defined, theologians have been always, thus far, substantially agreed. A controversy has, however, existed among them as to whether the revelation itself forms a part of the motive of faith. Of course no one ever said that the sole authority of God in itself is sufficient. A revelation is evidently an essential condition for faith; hence the Council says "the authority of God revealing." The controversy is perhaps, to a great degree, verbal; but, in as much as the revelation, in itself and apart from the person revealing, has no weight whatever, it derives its whole moving force from being *God's* revelation.

10. It is defined (a) that, for the reasonableness of our faith, together with the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, God willed that there should be external proofs of the revelation, especially miracles and prophecies; and (b) that these proofs—miracles and prophecies—are most certain, and (c) suited to the understanding of all.

These definitions are opposed to errors that have been advanced, in different forms, in our own as in former times, some by infidel writers, some by Protestants, some, though rather obscurely, by Catholics.

11. It is defined that we are bound to believe, with divine and Catholic faith, not only those things which the Church, by her solemn definition, proposes to be believed as revealed, but also all that, "by her ordinary and universal teaching," she thus proposes.\*

A section of the Jansenists held that the solemn definition of a General Council was, at least in certain cases, necessary in order that the faithful should be bound to believe. The present definition is, however, not so important in reference to this manifest error, as in reference to certain productions of Catholic writers, chiefly in what is called popular controversial theology.

12. It is defined (a) that God has endowed His Church with clear notes (evidences) of her divine institution, so that she can be known by all as the guardian and teacher of revealed truth; (b) that to the Catholic Church alone belong all the divinely established motives [especially miracles and prophecies] of the evident credibility of the Christian faith; (c) that the Church, by herself [i. e. abstracting from the aforesaid evident motives of credibility], possesses a great and permanent motive of

\* The definition is, in form, new; but, of course, not so the doctrine affirmed in it:—"Aliquid potest constitui de fide per Universæ Ecclesiæ consensum, quando omnes fideles conspirant in aliquo dogmate firmiter credendo, cum quo unanimi consensu non potest stare falsitas et deceptio: quia Deus assistit Ecclesiæ, ne tota decipiatur."—Lugo, de Fide, d. 1, n. 277.

credibility, and an indisputable witness of her own divine mission; this motive and witness consisting in "her wonderful propagation, her conspicuous sanctity, her exhaustless fruitfulness in all good things, her Catholic unity, her unconquerable stability."

Observe, you have here enumerated the four great notes of the Church—Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, actual and potential ("Catholicitas facti et juris"), Apostolicity—the latter being included in the unconquerable stability.

13. For this reason, and also because God gives grace for perseverance in the faith, never deserting until deserted, it is defined that no one, having received the faith, can have a just cause (a) for changing it (b) or calling it in doubt (Can. iii. 6).

From this definition it follows that invincible ignorance can never be pleaded for apostacy from the faith.

Chapter IV. *Of Faith and Reason.*—14. It is defined that there is a twofold order of knowledge, each distinct from the other, not only in their principle [source from which the knowledge comes], but also in their object [the truth known]. (a) They are distinct in principle; "because in one we know by natural reason, in the other we know by divine faith." (b) They are distinct in their object; "because, besides the truths which our natural reason is able to come to the knowledge of, there are other truths proposed to our belief, mysteries hidden in God, which we can know only through divine revelation."

15. It is defined (a) "that human reason, enlightened by faith, and seeking zealously, piously, and calmly, attains, by God's grace, some, and that a most profitable, understanding of mysteries . . . , but (b) can never attain a perception of them, such as it may attain of the truths which constitute its own proper object."

16. It is defined (a) that, though faith be above reason, there can never be any real opposition between them; (b) and, as any such imaginary opposition arises, (i) either from the doctrines of faith being wrongly understood, (ii) or from holding false opinions as the dictates of reason; it is defined (c) that, therefore, every assertion contrary to faith is utterly false.

17. It is moreover defined (a) that the Church, as guardian of the deposit of faith, has from God the right and the duty of condemning science falsely so called; and (b) that, consequently, the faithful are absolutely bound to account as errors all such opinions as are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if condemned by the Church.

18. (a) Inasmuch as reason proves the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by it, cultivates theological science; while

faith protects reason from error, and gives it manifold additional knowledge; (b) it is defined that, therefore, not only no opposition can exist between faith and reason, but each gives support to the other.

A perfect illustration of this definition is furnished in the treatise "*de Deo ejusque attributis*," in almost every page of which reason and revelation, their exquisite harmony, the support given by each to the other, are displayed with marvellous precision and force and beauty. In no other theological treatise is exemplified more strikingly the true saying, that the study of scholastic theology, blended with dogmatic, tends very powerfully to lift up the mind to high and holy thoughts; to draw it off from the things of earth and time, and pillow it on the bosom of the eternal serene. Of course the suitable dispositions are supposed, among which are mental aptitude, including a certain amount of imaginative faculty, and a keen relish for the study. To one who addresses himself to any study whatever, as a mere task, as a work to go through and have done with, that study, however in itself at once elevating and attractive, will be a mere burden, not elevating, perhaps depressing.

19. The Council moreover declares (a) that, in as much as the Church is neither ignorant of nor despises the benefits that men derive from human arts and sciences; (b) nay, in as much as she acknowledges that, as they come from God, the Lord of all knowledge, so, if rightly used, they, His grace assisting, lead to Him; (c) therefore, so far from opposing the cultivation of them, she, in many ways, aids and promotes it. (d) Nor does the Church forbid that these sciences should, each in its own sphere, make use of their own principles and their own method. (e) But, while recognising this rightful liberty, she carefully guards against (i) their imbibing errors, by opposing the divine teaching, (ii) or invading and disturbing the domain of faith, by transgressing their own limits.

These definitions constitute a complete body of Catholic doctrine on a subject that has become in our day of the highest importance—the proper provinces of Faith and Reason, together with the true and harmonious relations existing between them. The definitions are clear as they are complete.

20. At the close of the Canons corresponding with this Chapter, (a) it is defined that it is not enough to keep clear of heretical doctrine, but that those errors which approach more or less nearly to such doctrine are to be carefully avoided: (b) and the duty is declared of observing the Pontifical constitutions and decrees, in which such errors are condemned as are not expressly enumerated in the present Constitution of the Council.

*First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ.*—In the Introduction to the Chapters of this Constitution, the Council proposes to set forth the Catholic doctrine on (a) the *institution*, (b) the *perpetuity*, and (c) the *nature* or properties of the Apostolic Primacy. The definitions on the institution and perpetuity are given in the two first chapters, those on the properties occupy the third and fourth. Accordingly in Chapters I. and II. *Of the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Blessed Peter*, and *of the Perpetuity of the Primacy of Blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiffs*, it is defined, (21) in general terms, that the primacy, not of honour only, but of real and true jurisdiction over the universal Church was given by our Lord immediately and directly to S. Peter.

22. And that this same primacy is, by the same divine right, continued unceasingly to the successors of S. Peter, the Roman Pontiffs.

Chapter III. *Of the Power and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.*—The nature and compass of the primacy of jurisdiction, thus defined in general terms, is in this chapter evolved and specified in detail. Accordingly it is defined (23) that this jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is ordinary and immediate.

24. And that all the members of the Church, pastors and people, individually and collectively, are bound in obedience to it, (a) not only in matters of faith and morals, (b) but also in whatever appertains to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the whole world.

For our non-theological readers it may be necessary to offer a few words of explanation on the phrases "ordinary jurisdiction" and "immediate jurisdiction." The meaning of these phrases will be best understood by briefly stating the two errors to which they are opposed. Several Gallican theologians formerly held that the Pope, though having jurisdiction in the whole Church and in every part of it, could not exercise this jurisdiction in the dioceses of other Bishops against their will, unless in some extraordinary case, as in that of urgent necessity; that, except in such case, he could not, for example, go into the diocese of another Bishop, and there, without reference to him, proceed to ordain priests, appoint to parishes, enact laws, &c.; that, in short, his jurisdiction, out of his own diocese of Rome, is *mediate* and not immediate. Of course the Pope never has interfered and never will interfere in the common every-day functions of Bishops, unless for some reasonable cause. But the full and strict right to act so and so is one thing; the prudent and salutary use of that right (of which the Pope is sole supreme judge) is quite another thing.

The Jansenists went much farther, and maintained a far more pernicious heresy, a heresy subverting the Church from her very foundation. They held that the whole ecclesiastical jurisdiction was given by Christ to the body of the faithful, and by them communicated to the pastors of the Church and to the Roman Pontiff himself; and that, consequently, the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is *delegated* and not ordinary—not attached permanently and by divine right to his office. This error had been repeatedly condemned by the Popes, especially by Pius VI. in the bull "*Auctorem fidei*," issued against the synod of Pistoia, prop. 2 and 3.

25. It is defined (a) that, in virtue of this supreme jurisdiction over the universal Church, the Roman Pontiff has the right of free communication with the pastors of the whole Church and with their flocks, in teaching and ruling them in the way of salvation. As a consequence (b) the doctrine is condemned which affirms (i.) that this communication can be lawfully impeded, (ii.) or that acts done by the Apostolic See, or by its authority, require for their validity any sanction of the secular power.

26. As a further evolution of the supreme jurisdiction, it is defined (a) that the Roman Pontiff is the *supreme* judge of the faithful; (b) that, in all causes that come under ecclesiastical adjudication, recourse may be had to his judgment; (c) and that, as there is no authority higher than his, his decision cannot be overhauled or judged by any one. (d) Wherefore, the opinion is condemned which asserts the lawfulness of an appeal from his decisions to an ecumenical Council, as to a higher authority.

Chapter IV. *Of the Infallible Teaching of the Roman Pontiff.*—This definition, so long longed for, is given in words of as much clearness and precision as human language is capable of. It shuts out every possible evasion. The sacred doctrine is enshrined in an adamantine tabernacle, which no spear of man or devil can ever penetrate to the end of time.

27. (a) It is defined, (i.) as a revealed dogma, (ii.) that the Roman Pontiff, when speaking *ex cathedrâ*, that is, when, as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, defines any doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, (iii.) is endowed with the same infallibility with which our divine Redeemer endowed His Church in defining any doctrine on faith or morals; (b) and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.



Observe, the doctrine is defined as *revealed*: it is therefore strictly *de fide Catholicâ*, an article of Catholic faith; and the opposite is absolutely heretical. He, therefore, who openly denies this definition is by the very fact cut off from the Church, and ceases to be a Catholic even outwardly and in name.

Such is the work achieved by the Vatican Council in only two sessions. The Council of Trent, whose dogmatic teachings embrace a wider field than those of all the preceding general Councils taken together, defined, after all, not much beyond what had been previously in substance the manifest faith of the Church. In the first Constitution of the Vatican Council doctrines are defined, which, as we have seen, might have been called in question, and were called in question by writers, in other respects thoroughly sound, and in all respects thoroughly and loyally Catholic in heart. But it is the third and fourth chapters of the second Constitution which constitute a monument of the special glory of the Vatican Council above all preceding Councils. We say the special glory; for we believe that the body of definitions contained in those two chapters are calculated to contribute to the increased and more perfect consolidation of the *internal* peace, to say nothing of the visible unity of the Church, more than all the dogmatic definitions of all the other Councils together. Every one acquainted with the history of theological science for the last two hundred years, knows well the extent of disturbing and embarrassing influence which the Gallican doctrines, both moderate and extreme, on the Church, exercised in certain quarters of Christendom. It is true that, if you take the whole body of the faithful, lay and ecclesiastical, the number imbued with those doctrines was, at least comparatively, very insignificant. It is true that, among really great and learned theologians outside France, those doctrines had not, as far as we can now call to memory, a single defender. But there they were. The open enemies of the Church made a bad use of them: bad Catholics made a worse use of them; but the worst use of all was made by bad governments calling themselves Catholic. Pius VI. in his celebrated bull ("Super solidate") condemning Eybel (the Quirinus of his day) assigns, as one of the reasons of his delay in issuing the condemnation, a certain feeling of delicacy, as if he should have seemed to act on personal considerations. Something of this kind, no doubt with other good reasons, seems to have restrained the Holy See from long since issuing a solemn condemnation of the Gallican errors. And it is not a little remarkable that in the "Schemata" submitted, by order of the Holy Father, to the

Bishops of the Vatican Council, no mention whatever is made of the papal infallibility. The Council resolutely took the work into its own hands; and bravely and well has it done that work—sweeping with a single stroke the whole Gallican nuisance and every vestige of it clear and clean out of the Church, never more to reappear, except as a convict before her tribunal, with the indelible anathema branded on its forehead.

And now, in closing this long article, out of much that we have still to say but cannot say, we select one observation—an observation that would have come in with more propriety before the definition of the papal infallibility, but which even now may be not altogether useless. Against that definition it *had* been objected, on the sole ground of expediency, that, while it might drive some out of the Church, as being too heavy a burden and strain upon their faith, it might or certainly would prevent some, already on their way to the Church, from entering it.

As to the first difficulty, we have but one word to say. We see now the actual result, the actual extent of the apprehended or threatened evil. We see the miserable rag-fair of apostates, we see whom they have from the ranks of old Protestantism as their patrons and associates: and, while we sincerely deplore the awful ruin they are bringing down upon their own souls, we say of men who had been so minded, that their loss is to themselves a loss, but a gain to the Church, in which while they remained they were working much mischief, they can now no longer work. Their faith was burdened, solely because it was not a true faith. "They went out from us, but they were not of us. For, if they had been of us, they would no doubt have remained with us."

As to the second difficulty, we are quite out of the way of judging of the statement of fact. But, supposing the statement to be perfectly true, we say that, putting aside the line of action which the double duties of charity and truth prescribe to private individuals engaged in the conversion of non-Catholics, the Church is our mother, and her first her great duty is towards us her children; she is our shepherdess, and her first her great duty is towards us her flock. Most longingly she yearns for those who are not her children, that they may become so,—for those who are outside her fold, that they may enter it; most fervently she prays for this, most laboriously she works for it. But she cannot withhold a new and invigorating bread of life from those who are of her household, because those who are outside, approaching to her, turn from her in loathing of the manna. If the Council was firmly persuaded, as no doubt it was, that the definition would do much

and manifold good through the whole Church, it was no just reason for abstaining from that definition, because some not of the Church would make it a scandal to themselves, and remain in their darkness. The light that was to illumine the eyes and gladden the hearts of two hundred millions of Catholics should not be barred out from them, because two hundred or two thousand or two hundred thousand of non-Catholics would allege that its effulgence was too strong for their weaker organs of vision, and so turn away from it. This is the true principle. That the expectation of the result is being every day, from the day of the definition, more and more fully realized, the blind can see, and the deaf can hear. We behold as yet only the beginning, the early spring, whose full harvest may not come for another generation, or for a generation after that. Cavour is gone to his own place, Bismarck in the appointed hour will go there too, and Quirinus and Janus and the rest of them. Meantime the work of God, which they have so laboured to demolish, flourishes with growing strength and beauty of holiness. Upwards of six years ago the writer of this article ventured to predict, in a certain publication of his, that, if a general Council should ever again meet, and, if the question of papal infallibility were mooted in it, that infallibility would undoubtedly be defined. Little did he then dream that he should live to see that day: "he saw it, and was glad"—*Vidit, et gavisus est.\**

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\* The following extract, coming as it does from the pen of a decided Protestant, will, we think, prove interesting to our readers. We found it in a small and neat volume, "A brief Memoir of Pius IX.," recently published in Dublin, by McGlashan & Gill. It is taken from a work of the celebrated German author Schiller, entitled "A Universal and Historical Review of the most remarkable affairs of State in the time of the Emperor Frederick the First." It may be found, the translator informs us, in page 39 of the eleventh volume of his collected works, published in Leipzig in the year 1838. It was first printed about the year 1790:—

"By such traits may be recognised the spirit which gives light to the Roman Court, and the unwavering firmness of the principles which each Pope, leaving all personal feelings in the background, finds himself forced to assume. Emperors and kings, enlightened statesmen and unbending warriors, are seen, under the pressure of circumstances, to sacrifice their rights, to become faithless to their principles, to yield to necessity: but such things were seldom or never witnessed in a Pope. Even when he wandered about in poverty, possessed not a single foot of land, nor a soul devoted to him in all Italy, and had to live on the charity of strangers, he held firmly to the rights of his See and of his Church. Whilst every other political community suffered, or still suffers, at certain times, on account of the personal qualities of those to whom their governments are entrusted, such was scarcely ever the case with regard to the Church and her Head. As dissimilar as the Popes may have been in their temperaments, ways of thinking, and abilities, so, in as great a degree, were they firm, alike, and unchangeable in their policy.

It was only after the preceding article had been sent to press that the English translation of Dr. Döllinger's Lectures on the reunion of the Churches\* reached us. More than ten years ago a certain theologian, in a published work of his, thus wrote of the German professor in reference to an outrageous panegyric passed on him in an English Review:—"Many entertain a high respect for that excellent person, Dr. Döllinger (who has deserved so well of the Catholic Church), but as a historical writer, by no means as a theologian. There is no evidence, as far as I know, that he is a learned theologian." When these words were written, the seeds of unsound doctrine had hardly begun to bud out of Dr. Döllinger's mind. Since then they have been growing more and more to maturity; until, in the volume before us, we have open and undisguised heresy in full bloom. Whatever may be said of his acquaintance with Protestant theology, his latter productions give the clearest and most unmistakable proofs, not only of his not being a learned Catholic theologian, but of his gross ignorance of Catholic theology, ignorance of its very elements. The spirit and tone of the Lectures so closely resemble the spirit and tone of Quirinus, including the furious malignity against the Jesuits; master and pupil are so much of one heart and one tongue; that to enter into any lengthened criticism of the former would be little else than to present our readers with a rehash of our strictures on the latter. To do this would be, we are persuaded, as tiresome for others to read as for us to write. We will, therefore, confine ourselves to a few loose notes.

In pages 2, 3, and elsewhere, Dr. D. speaks of the Catholic, the Greek Schismatic, and the Protestant Churches as forming parts, though separated and disunited parts, of one Church,—of "*the Church*." He speaks of the "*Greek Catholic or Eastern Church*" as "separated from the *Roman Catholic or Western Church*." By the former he means, of course, the Greek schismatics, who themselves have taken the title of "*Orthodox*" (as Dr. D. himself states), not having dared to take that of

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Their temperaments, ways of thinking, and abilities did not appear to have penetrated in the least into their office. Their personality, it may be said, melted into their dignity, and passion became extinguished beneath the triple crown. Although the chain of succession to the throne of Peter was broken with each departing Pope, and riveted again on the advent of his successor; although no throne in the world changed so often its occupant, or was assumed and resigned in so stormy a manner; yet this, however, was the only throne in the Christian world which appeared never to change its possessor. For the Popes alone died—the spirit which animated them was immortal."

\* "*Lectures on the Reunion of the Churches*." By John J. I. von Döllinger, D.D., &c. Translated with a Preface by H. N. Oxenham, M.A. London, 1872.

Catholic, as having well known that the title would not cling to them. We venture to doubt if even the christening hand of the great scientific historian will impart to it a new adhesive force. Seriously speaking, what a miserable figure this old man, once so honoured, makes in this dress of new Protestantism, or rather in these threadbare rags of a decayed Tractarianism.

In page 9 he takes up the Protestant doctrine of fundamentals and non-fundamentals, or, as it is now more commonly phrased, of essentials and non-essentials,—a doctrine than which, as opening the door for all kinds of error, none other in the whole body of Protestant theology is more dangerous. "The division of the two great ancient Churches of East and West is, or rather was, *unmeaning*, because of their *essential* unity of doctrine; now, on the other hand, since July 18, 1870, it is different." Are the Catholic dogmas of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son and of the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff unessential, and the division on them unmeaning?

On the theological literature of Germany the Scientific thus delivers solemn judgment:—"In theology the disproportion is so great that the Protestant theology is at least six times richer than the Catholic in quantity and *quality*." As to mere quantity, the statement, whether true or not, proves nothing. There are some books that deserve to be enshrined in gold, but there are millions of volumes fit only for waste-paper, fit only for lining trunks and lighting fires. A morsel of bread is, for human food, worth a ton weight of rotten fruit. As to quality, out of much that we have to say we can only make room for one brief observation. We should like to have from Dr. D. a definite answer to the two following questions:—What does he mean by theology? What does he mean by a good or bad, a rich or poor, quality of theology? In reference to the first question, we infer,\* from numerous and clear statements and allusions in his writings, that by theology he simply means a particular department of ecclesiastical history. From the same sources we infer, in reference to the second question, that a theology of rich quality would be a theology written on this plan, especially if written in the German language, and carrying out his own or other kindred doctrinal views. A work so

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\* But we are not left to inference. The accomplished translator of Dr. Dollinger's work on "The Church and the Churches" (London, 1862) says, in the Biographical Preface (p. vii), that he, "having ceded for some years his professorship of ecclesiastical history to Möhler, . . . took that of dogmatic theology, which in his hands was *transformed into a history of revelation* and of the development of doctrine." Möhler died in 1838; so that of the end we now see, the beginning must have commenced upwards of thirty-five years ago.

written could with no more justice be called a treatise of theology than Lord Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors" could be called a treatise of equity. Dr. D. never alludes to any of our true and great theologians, except to sneer at them. We doubt if he ever read two pages of S. Thomas or of Suarez. We doubt if he ever read a single line even of his own Germans, Tanner, Laymann, &c. &c.

In page 99 he ascribes to Catholic theologians "the doctrine that fear alone, without love of God, is sufficient for the remission of sins." No Catholic theologian ever held this doctrine. All Catholic theologians hold that the fear of God, springing from His grace, is good and holy and salutary, and, as the Scriptures expressly teach, the beginning of the love of God. All Catholic theologians hold that this fear, without the love of God, is *insufficient* for the remission of sins. A host of our greatest theologians\* hold that a *sincere sorrow* for past sin, based on this fear, together with a *sincere resolution* to sin no more, is a sufficient disposition for receiving the remission of sin, in the sacrament of Penance, through the absolution of the priest. Are we addressing ourselves to a theologian, or simply explaining a lesson in the Catechism to a little child?

We are heartily sick of this. We will give but one more instance of the thoroughly Protestant spirit and incredibly gross ignorance with which this wretched production swarms. In pages 63-4 he says that "Leo X.'s Bull against Luther condemned as errors such *universally familiar truths* as that the best penance is reformation of life," &c. Is it possible that Dr. D. has been up to this day ignorant of a principle for interpreting Papal theological censures, known to every merest theological tyro? The principle is this. Unless the contrary be intimated, propositions, selected for censure out of any writer, are condemned in the sense of the writer (*in sensu ab auctore intento*), that is, in the sense which they bear viewed in the light of the context, and according to the ordinary rules of interpreting human speech. A proposition, which in a Catholic work would be perfectly unobjectionable, might in a heterodox work be used to convey downright heresy. Words and phrases which, before the rise of particular heresies, were quite sound, became afterwards suspected and censurable, and could not be used at all by Catholic writers, or used only in a context which clearly indicated their Catholic meaning. We could give examples without end. We have one in the words quoted from Dr. D. in the second paragraph of this present

\* Gormaz, in his *Cursus Theologicus*, published in 1707 (de Pœnitentia, n. 444, et seqq.), quotes upwards of one hundred and thirty theologians in favour of this opinion. How many might be added to the number since that date!



postscript. The phrase "Roman Catholic Church" is in itself perfectly orthodox, and is in common use among us. But in the passage referred to it is used to convey a meaning purely heretical, namely, that that Church is but a part (a branch, as the Tractarians used to say) of the Catholic Church, of which the Greek schismatics form another part.

Now Luther's proposition, that the best penance is reformation of life, might (at least if it had not been tainted by his use of it) be uttered by a Catholic without the least offence. For on Catholic lips it would simply mean that reformation of life is better, as it is incomparably better, than the mere performance of penitential works without such reform; or that, as all our theologians teach,\* priests in imposing penance should principally consider what will best conduce to the future amendment of their penitents. But Luther meant something entirely different from this, namely, that a reformation of life is *alone* necessary, and that there is *no* use in penance: as the Council of Trent so well explains it (*ibid.*, at the end of the chapter):—"They [the innovators] in such wise maintain a new life to be the best penance, as *to take away the entire efficacy and use of satisfaction.*"

One word more and we have done. Towards the close of the seventh and last lecture, the Scientific thus delivers himself:—"I have found it the almost universal conviction in foreign countries that it is the special mission of Germany to take the lead in this world-wide question [the fusion of the Catholic, Greek schismatic, and Protestant Churches into one], and give to the movement its form, measure, and direction. *We are the heart of Europe, richer in theologians than all other lands,*" &c.

This beats, and beats hollow, Hannibal Chollop's speech to Mark Tapley:—"We are a model to the airth. . . . We are the intellect and virtue of the airth, the cream of human natur', and the flower of moral force."

Strange, inexplicably strange, it is, that our German Chollop, in the very next page but one after that from which the above extract is taken, proclaims that those same Germans have yet a conquest to make more difficult to win than their recent victory over France, and which he tells is nothing less than "the conquest of ourselves, our indolence, our *pride*, our selfishness, our prejudices, our *easy self-conceit.*" We did not think the Germans were quite so bad as all that. Perhaps the great man uses the plural form in the singular sense, as Popes and Kings say *we* and *us* for *I* and *me*. If so, we assent heartily.

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\* And as the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 8) clearly implies:—"Let them [priests] have in view that the satisfaction which they impose be *not only* for the preservation of a new life and a medicine of infirmity, but also for the avenging and punishing of past sins."—Waterworth's Translation.

### NOTE TO THE THIRD ARTICLE OF OUR LAST NUMBER.

**I**N a note to p. 344 of our last number we ascribed to Mr. Allies the opinion, that Dr. Döllinger "has destroyed by one act of intense pride and overweening self-sufficiency the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church." And in opposition to this we expressed our own humble view, that "long before the Vatican Council, Dr. Döllinger had forfeited all claim to be accounted a defender and champion of the Church." Mr. Allies however entirely disclaims the opinion with which we credited him. He writes to us as follows :

In the note of the DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 344, there is what I cannot but think a strange misconception of my meaning, in a passage in which I speak of Döllinger. I had said (and please observe the words I underline), "*A schism, having been for years brooded over, fostered by secret and unavowed writings, and by tampering with bad Catholics and ill-conditioned statesmen throughout the world, is at length hatched into a rickety existence by the most unhappy of priests, whose life has been prolonged beyond the age of seventy to destroy by this act of intense pride and overweening self-sufficiency the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church.*" The expression "*this*" refers to *all* the antecedent sentence, in which I had in my mind Janus and other proceedings before that publication ; and of this whole complex act I say that it had destroyed the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church—that is, of course, years which had passed before this act began. Thus my sentence exactly expresses what the writer of the note says constitutes the only point of difference which he feels with my speech. It expresses, that is, in so many words, that "long before the Vatican Council Dr. Döllinger had forfeited all claim to be accounted a defender and champion of the Church."

We have to express our sincere regret for having inadvertently misapprehended Mr. Allies' meaning ; and at the same time our great gratification, in having so valuable a corroboration of our own view on Dr. Döllinger's past position.

## Notices of Books.

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*Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects.* By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Third vol. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1873.

ANOTHER welcome volume of His Grace the Archbishop's Sermons, seven of which were preached on Rosary Sundays between the years 1866 and 1872, and all of which are more or less connected with the cause of the Holy Father. Amongst the many services which the Archbishop has rendered to the Church of God during his Episcopate, none will be remembered with greater gratitude by future generations than the untiring zeal with which, in season and out of season, he has pleaded the spiritual and temporal prerogatives of the Vicar of Christ; and although, always, as he himself tells us (Sermon viii. p. 189), turning with reluctance to any other matter than those divine and interior truths which are necessary to salvation, has borne witness "for the truth on the great laws and facts which affect the course and conduct of this world." Great, indeed, is the advantage, not only to England, but to the Church at large, that he has done so; for nothing can well be more important at the present day than that Catholics should be taught to see how, in all and each of the disheartening and trying events, as well as in the glories which have marked the Pontificate of Pius IX., the finger of God is upholding His Church, and preparing the way for her future triumph. The glories of the Holy Father's marvellous Pontificate speak for themselves, but we are all of us too ready to be discouraged when cross upon cross, and evil upon evil, and betrayal upon betrayal surround his path. If, then, our hearts are still brimful of hope and courage—for of course our faith as Catholics has been never shaken—it is chiefly to men like our Archbishop, and to himself in a very especial degree, that this is due; for as cloud after cloud has obscured the sky, and the prospects of the world have grown darker and darker, the Archbishop has never ceased to keep our eyes fixed upon the Divine promises made to the vicar of Christ in the person of St. Peter, and to the special Providence which is guiding his feet at every step, amidst the revolutions and convulsions of the world. There are few, it has always seemed to us, even among the leaders of the Church in our day, who have grasped so firmly the *whole* counsel of God as manifested in the Incarnation of His Son, or who have laid hold with so strong a grip on the rock of Peter as the Archbishop of Westminster. Hence it is that he is able to point out to his flock in so admirable and luminous a manner the guiding and protecting finger of God in every new vicissitude through which He permits the mystical

Body of His Son to pass, and to furnish to the world, which can see for the latter nothing but ruin and destruction, even new arguments, that Divine in its origin, and upheld by an Almighty Hand, the Holy Roman Church is indeed that kingdom of which it has been foretold, that of it "there shall be no end."

No one can read these Sermons, and especially the "Introduction" to the present volume, without recognising the truth of these remarks. The dethronement of God in His own world, the rejection of His Christ by the Governments of the earth, the Holy City of Rome, the city of the Incarnation and of the Blessed Sacrament of Mary, "redeemed" from God, and brought again into the bondage of corruption, and into subjection to the prince of this world, the seemingly universal triumph of the spirit of lawlessness, which will one day culminate in the person of the great Antichrist—the persecution of the bishops and religious orders, both in Italy and in the new German Empire, and—most hateful of all—the "perils by false brethren," in parts of Germany, supported, as in the latter by the civil power, for of themselves they are powerless. All these are shown to us as trials indeed, great and searching, but yet as so many stepping-stones, as it were, to the shore of the Church's everlasting rest.

"Look round the Christian world: the best is in schism; its churches are mosques; the Incarnation has departed from them. Look at the north and north-west of Europe: Protestantism has done its work in beating its fragmentary Christianity as fine as the dust of the summer threshing-floor, and the winds of the revolution are carrying it away. Wheresoever Protestantism has been the old Catholic churches are desolate. The Word made flesh is no longer there. The anti-social and anti-Christian revolution has descended upon Italy, submerged the whole Peninsula, and flooded Rome at last. The Incarnation has no longer a home in the Christian world. The Vicar of Jesus Christ is bid to go forth, because for two sovereignties to co-exist in Rome is impossible. The nations look on and applaud. They are all, either by active co-operation as in Germany, or by tacit connivance as in England, *participes criminis*. One and all alike say, 'We will not have this man to rule over us!' 'We have no king but Cæsar.' It would seem that the 'discessio,' or the falling away foretold by the apostle, is not far from its accomplishment. We are indeed entering upon perilous times; but we enter upon them with no fear. 'When these things begin to come to pass, look up and lift up your heads; for your redemption is at hand.' No Catholic doubts of the final and complete overthrow of the powers now in array against the Vicar of our Lord. They are more lordly, more imperious, and to human force more irresistible than ever before. But they have entered the lists, not against man, but against God. If we have to suffer, so be it. God's holy will be done! May He only make us fit for so high a grace, and hasten to the redemption of His Church in His own good time!" (pp. cvii. cviii.).

The "introduction" is particularly valuable for the light thrown upon the so-called "Old Catholic" schism in Germany, Prince Hohenlohe's note to the Governments of Europe, the text of which had apparently never previously been made public, is given in full, and the true source of the movement not only pointed out, but named:—

"The source of this opposition, then, was Munich. The chief agent

beyond all doubt was one who in his earlier days had been greatly venerated in Germany and in England. Truth compels me to ascribe to Dr. Döllinger the initiative in this deplorable attempt to coerce the Holy See, and to overbear the liberty of the bishops assembled in Council. Prince Hohenlohe is assuredly no theologian. The documents published by him came from another mind and hand" (p. xxxiii.).

Speaking of the persecution of the religious orders in Germany, the Archbishop says:—

"The attack upon the Jesuits and kindred orders, therefore, is a transparent feint. The real attack is upon the Church. The pretence of distinguishing between Ultramontanism and Catholicism is too stale to deceive any Catholic. The Holy See is Ultramontane, the Vatican Council was Ultramontane, the whole priesthood, the whole body of the faithful throughout all nations, excepting only a handful here and there of rationalistic or liberal Catholics, all are Ultramontanes. Ultramontanism is Popery, and Popery is Catholicism. Even English Catholics are not to be caught with such chaff. They do not believe in a Catholic who says that he does not believe in the Infallibility of the Pope. They know that this was explicitly or implicitly contained and affirmed in the Supremacy of the Pope for which our martyrs died. They know that their fathers persecuted ours for this, which they call Popery. There is no Catholicism to attack except Ultramontanism, and it is Catholicism that is attacked now: witness the exclusion of the clergy from the schools; the mal-treatment of the Bishop of Ermland, and of Mgr. Namgonowski; and, finally, the official threats of laws now preparing to regulate the Catholic Church in Germany" (pp. li., lii.).

Clearly, then, as His Grace had previously pointed out, it was the hand of God that gathered together the Fathers of the Vatican Council at the eventful moment of their meeting:—

"The Council of the Vatican was not convened an hour too soon. If the Gnosticism of what has well been called the Professordom of Germany had been allowed to spread its mixture of conceited illusionism and contemptuous rationalism for a few years longer, the faith of multitudes might have been irremediably lost; and Germany, which now presents the noblest fidelity and constancy in its Episcopate, in its priesthood and in its laity, might have been a prey to the old Catholic schism, or to the tyrannical liberation of those who deify the civil power" (pp. xxxix., xl.).

Here is a striking passage in connection with the civil principedom of the Pope from the sixth Sermon:—

"Men will not believe that under temporal forms and accidents lie concealed and guarded the highest moral laws. They denounce St. Thomas of Canterbury because he resisted King Henry II. in matters of Church lands and manors, and tribunals and appeals. They accuse him of pride, worldliness, and avarice. But St. Thomas saw an intention that under these things lay faith, morals, and the divine authority of the Church, and that in these all was at stake. He won his contest by the shedding of his blood, and he saved these things for the English people for more than three hundred years. The usurpations of Henry II. triumphed in Henry VIII., whom Thomas Cranmer served and flattered, when he ought to have withstood. The instincts of St. Thomas are proved to be unerring by the spiritual and moral state of England now. The poor have been disinherited of their spiritual patrimony; and the civil power, with its laws, has departed century by century farther from the unity of the Christian Church and faith; but these

things men will not hear from our lips, They have been spoken of lately by one from whom I am sorry to be widely parted, but for whose fearless zeal I have a true respect. He has described the state of London as he sees it, and as we know it to be ; and London of to-day is the legitimate fruit of civilization without Christianity. This is the work of the same anti-social, anti-Christian spirit which is now exulting over what it believes to be the downfall of the temporal power of the Vicar of Jesus Christ" (pp. 145, 146).

To our own mind one of the most striking sermons is the tenth, on the "Divine Commonwealth." It is exceedingly simple, being nothing more than a contrast between the Commonwealth without God and Christ as we see it at the present day, and both the Jewish Commonwealth, in which the constitution was given by God Himself, and the Christian Commonwealth, animated by the spirit of the Gospel. Alas ! the rulers of the world have forgotten that God still sitteth as King for ever, and that the sword which they bear is not their own, but has only been lent them for a little time, and this, too, only to execute justice and mercy in His name, and that the day will surely come, sooner or later, when he will take back into His own hands the power which He has given them, and show Himself as "King over the whole earth." The inhabitants of our own day may erect monuments to "Rome redeemed from the Theocratic government" of the Vicar of Christ ; but as long as His Kingship is rejected, so long will the peoples of the earth, like the Jews of old, who refused to have God for their King, and who asked for an earthly King to lead them to battle, even as other nations continue to be ground down under such bondage and tyranny as must in the end lead to their own utter ruin. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there alone is liberty.

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*Address delivered at the Liverpool Collegiate Institution Dec 21, 1872. By*  
 Right. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. London : Murray.

**T**HE earlier parts of this Address, however forcible and interesting, are altogether subordinate (both in themselves and in the speaker's manifest intention) to his criticism of Dr. Strauss's new work, and of modern unbelief. And by this straightforward and unflinching criticism, Mr. Gladstone shows to his very great honour that the bearing testimony to religious truth is with him a more influential motive, than is even the keeping together that political party, which gives him his high worldly position.

His expression of firm belief in Christianity has apparently stung almost to madness one writer in the "Pall Mall Gazette." The position at once assumed by that periodical was, that if Mr. Gladstone did not profess to refute Dr. Strauss in detail, he ought to have held his tongue altogether. This is really charming. Hardly a week passes, that our irreligious contemporary does not state or imply as an indubitable fact, that the great majority of profound thinkers are rapidly surrendering all belief in a Personal God. Does he ordinarily accompany such statements with *arguments*,



against Christianity and Theism? Of course not. He knows very well that they are unnecessary for his purpose; he knows very well that a vast majority of his readers are far more impressed by this kind of confident statement, than they would be by any argument he could produce. It becomes then a matter of vital importance; that the real nature of such allegations should be understood, and every one who possesses a character for intellectual power, does important service by the mere fact of energetically declaring his religious belief. Much more does one of Mr. Gladstone's great name deserve our warmest gratitude for such emphatic declaration; and it is abundantly possible that he may have made several individuals pause in a course of thought which, if unchecked, would have issued in shipwreck of their salvation.

We heartily recommend this Address to our readers' perusal. We would only protest against one sentence in the Introduction, which advocates the "duty of personal respect" (p 8) towards assailants of religion. We entirely agree, that religious controversialists injure their sacred cause, by assailing their opponents with invective and with the imputation of this or that definite evil motive. But no Catholic can admit, that disbelief in a Personal God is possible to any human adult of sound mind, without that grave moral culpability which, if unrepented, will be justly requited by eternal punishment. He may not therefore of course express himself in any way inconsistent with his conviction on this head; he may not speak, as Mr. Gladstone speaks (p. 8), of the pantheists' "*honest self-delusion*."

The Catholics of this Empire in general look to Mr. Gladstone as their main hope, for a legislation which shall treat them with justice and equality. It must greatly strengthen their confidence in him to observe that, Protestant though he be, he holds so much religious belief, and so firmly, in common with themselves.

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*My Clerical Friends, and their Relations to Modern Thought.*  
London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1873.

THIS is a most striking work, ably conceived and brilliantly carried out. Under the title "*My Clerical Friends*" the author most effectively contrasts, more especially in their teaching and in their relations to modern thought, the clergy of the Church of England with that other clergy, scattered throughout the world, of every nation and people and kindred and tongue, the members of which have been called by a Divine vocation to share in His everlasting Priesthood, Who is a "Priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech." The whole work is so skilfully constructed, that although here and there a digression may be somewhat too long, the reader is enabled step by step to observe and carefully examine on the one hand, the merely human origin and elements—not to speak of the assistance lent to them by the powers of darkness—and the illogical teaching, of an institution which in vain calls itself a Church; and, on the other hand, the Divine origin, super-

natural constitution, and marvellous unity of the teaching of the Church of the living God : until at the end the reader, unless perchance he has eyes that see not, is found to fall down upon his knees, and adore before the latter, with the cry upon his lips, "This is none other but the house of God and the gate of heaven." The work may be compared to a long street in some great capital, upon one side of which the traveller, as he passes along, finds glorious buildings of sublime architecture, and perfect proportions, and exquisite beauty, and on the other, nothing but rude huts and broken-down cabins ; until at the end of the street he finds himself standing face to face with the palace of the king, and recognizes at once that the mind of the same architect must have conceived both the royal palace and the stately buildings which on one side lead up to it, and that the wretched hovels on the other are but the poor contrivances of suffering humanity to give shelter to the famine-stricken, the diseased, and the homeless. The book no doubt has its imperfections, as we shall afterwards see ; but its general effect is so overpowering, that we cannot conceive how any, except the wilfully blind, can resist its conclusions. That it will embitter not a few readers—more, however, from the language, which is always racy, and sometimes caustic in the extreme—we have also but little doubt ; but when the first feeling of bitterness is over, and the book is taken up a second time—and it will be taken up *many* times,—we feel sure that every honest mind will acknowledge the cogency of the author's arguments, and the remarkable ability with which they are maintained from first to last.

The author has divided his subject into four chapters or parts ; viz., "the Vocation of the Clergy," "the Clergy at Home," "the Clergy Abroad," and "the Clergy and Modern Thought."

The first chapter proves most conclusively that the Church of England has never, as a Church, had the least idea of an altar, a sacrifice, or a priesthood. Thus the founders of that Church, we are told, who are certainly competent witnesses as to *their own* religious opinions, detested the very thought of such things, "and would have destroyed even that semblance of an hierarchy which they have preserved, if the Tudor sovereigns would have suffered them to do so." (p. 11.) No wonder then that our modern Ritualists should fling such ill-sounding names at the heads of the first Reformers, as those of "apostates, traitors, perjurers, robbers, villains." No wonder that Mr. Baring Gould should call the Reformation itself "a miserable apostasy," or that the "Union Review" should consider Barlow and Scory as "rascals," capable of any profanity, "even of going through a mock ceremony of consecration." Still, not all this current of abuse, can prevent the founders of the Church of England from being witnesses as to what they themselves held, or meant to bring about in their new Church (p. 12).

They not only avowed their intention to root out and abolish these very doctrines of the Christian Priesthood and Sacrifice, which some of their heirs now struggle so assiduously to receive, but actually succeeded in doing so. Never was success so complete. Inconsistent and vacillating in other projects, there was no shade of ambiguity about their purpose in this. Not only these doctrines, but every notion connected with or springing out of them, became as utterly unknown in England as in Corea or Japan. If they

were ever attended to by English bishops and clergy, it was only to revile them." . . . In the reign of Elizabeth "the *Daily Sacrifice* was so utterly exploded and all thought or memory about it, that there was hardly a parish in England in which 'the Lord's Supper' was celebrated more than three times a year. . . . A totally new religion had been substituted for the ancient Faith." (p. 13.)

So again, from the age of Henry VIII. to that of Charles I., "not a single voice was lifted up in England to protest against this violent suppression of the Christian priesthood. It was acquiesced in by the whole nation. There was an end of it. . . . If Barlow taught that a bishop need not be consecrated, Hooker was equally sure, as his own words will tell us, that a priest need not be ordained." (pp. 16, 17.) Hooker indeed, whose name is cited as a witness in favour of the necessity of episcopal ordination, "is the most decisive witness against it, both by word and deed." During life he taught that "there may be, sometimes, very just and sufficient reasons to allow ordination made without a bishop."\* And when about to die, he received the last rites of his religion, not from an Anglican minister, but from the unconsecrated hands of his friend Saravia, who had no power to dispense them. (pp. 19, 20.) During the reign of James I. it was still the same thing. Thus the 51st Canon of 1604 requires all the Anglican clergy to pray for the Church of Scotland, which was non-episcopal: and we know by the confession of Bishop Cosen that many ministers from Scotland and France and the Low Countries were instituted into benefices with ease, and yet were never re-ordained; and by the admission of Mr. Keble, that the early divines (of the Church of England) "never venture to urge the exclusive claim of the government by archbishop and bishop, or connect the succession with the validity of the holy sacraments"† (p. 22.) "Even Andrewes had no more belief in the necessity of episcopal ordination, as he himself assured Dr. Morton, than Barlow or Hooker." (pp. 24, 25.) Nay, the most eminent Anglican prelates, such, for instance as Morton, Bishop of Durham, absolutely refused to re-ordain Presbyterian ministers, on the ground that it would cause scandal. (p. 26.) It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century, that the doctrine of the invalidity of Presbyterian ordination arose, as an argument against the dissenters. In 1610, when James, thinking Episcopacy more in harmony with monarchy than Presbyterianism, selected three Scottish ministers for consecration, they were consecrated accordingly, without previously having been ordained priests, notwithstanding a mild protest from Andrewes, who took an active part in the ceremony. Fifty years later, Reynolds, a Non-conformist, was made a bishop; and, in our own age, Reginald Heber openly professed that in Germany he would "humbly and thankfully avail himself of the preaching and sacramental ordinances of the Lutheran Evangelical Church." As for the doings of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Wilberforce, who publicly ministered in a Presbyterian church in 1871, they are known to all. Truly, as Bishop Hall once said, "There is no difference in any essential matter between the Church of England and her sisters of the

\* Book vii. ch. xiv. Works, vol. iii. p. 286, ed. Keble. The passage was suppressed by Laud and his followers for many years.

† Preface to Hooker's Works, p. lix.

Reformation"; and, as our author remarks, "the chain of tradition from Barlow to Wilberforce is complete." Justly then does he propose the following dilemma to the modern Ritualists, who "abhorring the so-called Reformation, and nourished on other doctrinal food than their new community has ever dispensed, desire to revive an idea always living and operative in an older Church, but completely exploded in their own."

"Either the Church of England always believed in the grace of Orders and the Apostolical Succession, or she did not. If she did not, why do they profess it? If she did, why did *she* disown it? On the first supposition she denied a Divine truth; on the second she betrayed it. In either case only an irrational fanaticism, or an almost inconceivable levity of mind, can see in such a teacher the mouthpiece of God, and 'the pillar and ground of the truth.' The best friends of the National Church are they who maintain, like Bishop Tomline and Dean Elliot, that she never believed in 'any form of ordination whatever,' for in that case she has at least been consistent, and only resembles her 'Sisters of the Reformation'; while on the High-Church theory, which was invented to do her honour, she is the basest and most impious of them all. The worst enemy of the Church of England can offer no graver injury than is involved in the imprudent suggestion that she has always secretly believed truths, which she has always publicly denied." (pp. 34, 35.)

When we come then to sum all these things up, and remember that only so late as 1868 Dr. Wilberforce declared in Convocation that the Church of England had always within herself persons of *extreme divergencies of doctrine—a thing as inevitable as having different countenances on different men,*" and the Bishop of Salisbury was of opinion that if any attempt were made to enforce a uniform creed, "it would break up the Church," and the Bishop of Ely agreed entirely with his Right Rev. brother of Salisbury, and the Archbishop of Canterbury wound up the debate by saying—and, as our author remarks, "it is not reported that any one was heard to laugh"—that he "did not wish to restrain or curb the liberty of the clergy," it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that

"If, as some would fain believe, the gentlemen who occupy the national pulpits, only to display what Dr. Wilberforce styles '*extreme divergencies of doctrine,*' were specially and individually called and set apart by the Divine Spirit, as the theory of '*vocation*' implies, to be His unfaltering witnesses to Immaculate Truth, either He did not think it necessary to qualify them for their office, or was perfectly indifferent how they discharged it." (pp. 47.)

Our author had previously said:—

"A vocation to teach, and believe and teach whatever you choose, is a contradiction in terms. No man requires a vocation to do nothing. The feeblest of us can do that, any hour of the day, without any supernatural gift. The Church of England is evidently of this opinion. Even in the administration of her '*Orders,*' with which she once so easily dispensed altogether, she displays so little gravity, and exacts such meagre conditions, as to encourage in her members the apathy which she manifests herself. There is a suavity of indifference in her languid and listless attitude towards the whole subject of ordination, and especially in her view of conveying it, which seems to reveal her candid impression that no human action is of less importance." (p. 44.)

The second chapter, "The Clergy at Home," although disfigured by a few personalities of somewhat questionable taste in connection with certain Anglican bishops still alive, is, nevertheless, a masterly exposition of the progress of the author's own mind towards the truth, which stands out in marked contrast to the help which he received from his Anglican clerical friends, whether of influence, teaching, or example. He found himself a clergyman of the Establishment, without ever having undergone the least preparation for it—no ecclesiastical training, no searching examination into his "vocation," no solemn retreat before the laying on of hands, as are to be met with amongst the "clergy of another sort,"—obliged to accept the instructions of a parish clerk as to how to baptize an infant, and ignorant both as to the mystery and administration of what is called, even by the Anglican Church, "the most comfortable sacrament of the body and blood of Christ." A sphere of labour having been assigned to him in a rural district, it was of course natural that, having to teach others, he should now begin to teach himself. He commenced, then, with the history of the "Reformation" and the "Reformers"; but soon discovering that the "Reformers," who were a jest and a proverb to one another, and each of whom thought all the rest miscreants, could only be "blind leaders of the blind." He took next to the study of Scripture. Engaged in this, it was not long before he perceived that S. Paul, although full of fatherly tenderness towards sinners, however fallen, could employ nothing but words of the most awful severity in his denunciation of *sects*—no "cheering tidings," as he remarks, for a minister of that community which has been described as "a hundred sects battling within one Church,"—while S. Peter used, if possible, even stronger language upon the same subject. He also examined into the true position held by S. Peter in the Christian polity, and the exact nature of the functions committed to him; and the views of his clerical friends on this momentous point are placed before us in a series of propositions, which, unless we are much mistaken, will make many an Anglican reader wince in agony; for "if they are true, it seems transparently evident that Christianity is false." (pp. 73-104.) We are sorry that our space forbids us to give these propositions in full; but to do anything short of this would utterly fail to convey to our readers any idea of the absurdity of the position of the author's "clerical friends." So too, for the same reason, we must refrain from referring to the admirable contrast which he draws between the "sects" and the one Church of Christ. We cannot, however, refrain from quoting part of the conclusion of this chapter:—

"That any one acquainted with her past history and actual condition, which is, perhaps, more shameful than that of any other sect now in existence, can sincerely believe that the Church established by law in England is that very *kingdom of God*, which was founded on a rock, and before which the Gentiles were to bow down, is perhaps a more enormous aberration of human reason than any which history records. Even her least ignorant members, as if to show that they know no more of the nature of the Christian Church than the lowest fanatics whom they profess to despise, threaten to desert her if their pretensions are rejected, and to construct for their private use *one more* new Church. They do not even suspect that man can no more make a church than he can make a world. They dream not

that it requires the whole omnipotence of God to do either. He has made *one*, and will never make another. To do so would be a *confession of failure* worthy of Jupiter or Buddha, of Barlow or Andrews, but not of the Most High God. If, then, any one can imagine that the Church now established in England, and destined to split into a hundred fragments as soon as the control of the civil power is withdrawn; . . . which never produced' (to quote from another passage a little further on) "a saint, a prophet, or a martyr, or the faintest similitude of either, with its 'three different religions and three score varieties of each'; with its ritual, which varies with the taste of each individual minister; and its doctrine, which is 'a confused gabble of antagonistic sounds'; with its bishops, who 'do not wish to restrain the liberty of the clergy'; and its clergy, 'who do not choose to be restrained';—if any one can imagine that such a church 'is that matchless edifice of omnipotent skill of which prophets and apostles spoke in such rapturous terms, and for which they predicted such a magnificent destiny,' what can he think of the architect of such a building." (pp. 132-133.)

We cannot follow our author through the third chapter—"The Clergy Abroad"—in his progress towards maturity of conviction. We give, however, two extracts. The first relates to the "Incomparable Sacrifice," the truth of which was now more than dawning on his mind:—

"God alone is worthy of God; and here He is at once the Priest and the Oblation: '*Ipse offerens*,' as one of the wisest of his servants has said, '*ipse et oblatio*.' In this sacrifice countless saints have found the abundant fulfilment of that gracious promise, '*I will not leave you orphans*.' For this is that last invention of the Creator's love, and maturest fruit of His incarnation, which converts even our fallen world into a true paradise, and without which it would be only a cheerless sepulchre, the home of sad and weary spirits, 'seeking rest, and finding none.' In this Divine Sacrifice the light of God falls upon human faces and illuminates human souls. It is more than a vision of angels, for *they* descend every day from heaven to look upon it. It is more than our life, for it is its end and object, and without it we could not live. I knew not then its manifold sweetness, but I was to know it later. May they who behold it from the sanctuary intercede for me, who am unworthy to look upon it even from the porch." (p. 162.)

The second extract sums up so amusingly the attitude of the Protestant mind with regard to missions to the heathen, that our readers, we are sure, will feel grateful to us for placing it before them. The scene is laid in the well-known *Salle des Martyrs* at the *Missions Étrangères*, where our author had gone with the "clerical friend" who accompanied him on his journey, and who, although he could talk of the "happiness of assisting at the holy sacrifice, which, he said, was also offered in the Church of England," always carried with him a neat edition of the Book of Common Prayer whenever he was present at any Catholic service:—

"My companion, who had assumed an air of intense depression, which he no doubt considered suitable to the occasion, as if he had just heard of the death of all his relations, inquired gravely 'what provision was made for the maintenance of the Society's missionaries!' When the superior replied with something like a smile, that 'they trusted for that to Divine Providence,' a still deeper gloom overspread his features. But on the whole he behaved very well, though he probably regretted that 'our Roman brethren, who are evidently not without good qualities,' should have such an extremely un-



favourable impression of the church of Dr. Tait. For my part, I also thought, during that visit, of that English institution, and shuddered at the thought." (p. 178.)

We must also point out as worthy of especial notice the admirable way in which the author gathers up the general opinion and sentiment of Anglicans, on the dignity and office of Our Lady, in a series of propositions, which are given much in the same way as those upon the supremacy of S. Peter alluded to above. After reading them, an honest mind can come but to one conclusion; namely, that to those who reject the office of Our Lady the Scripture is indeed a sealed book.

There is a passage, however, at the close of this chapter in which the author does not seem to us to have expressed himself with sufficient clearness, and in which, indeed, he seems to deny the possible salvation of those who die out of the Church's visible unity. The passage is as follows :—

"There is yet another delusion more persuasive than all the rest, which merits notice. It was a common thing with the Donatists and other rebels against the Church to boast of the *virtues* of their leaders. These virtues, as their illustrious adversary S. Augustine allowed, were sometimes real. Yet he declared that even if they were crowned by martyrdom they would not avail to salvation. S. Paul had said exactly the same thing before either of them. In his famous Epiphany sermon, *Sur la Loi*, Bourdaloue quotes the words of the great Doctor of the Latin Church, which express, he adds, 'the unanimous consent of all the Fathers.' Such virtues, S. Augustine observes, however eminent, profit nothing, to use the words of S. Paul, and will only increase the final condemnation of those who die out of the Church. 'They are the more to be reproved,' he says—'*magis vituperandi sunt*'—'and God will judge them with all the more rigour, because they lived so well and believed so ill.' *The same is true of all the children of revolt, of every school, and in every age.*" (pp. 256-7.)

In this passage the author seems to us to have forgotten the well-known distinction between the *anima* and *corpus ecclesie*, by which it becomes possible for those who in good faith die out of the Church's external communion to be saved. For this reason the last sentence, which we have marked in italics, appears to us entirely untenable. S. Augustine and S. Cyprian are speaking either of those who are leaders of sects, in whom it is more difficult to suppose good faith to exist, or of those who are wilful unbelievers; but we may surely reasonably hope that among all those who are, through no fault of theirs, in a state of schism or heresy, many may, notwithstanding, although not recognizing the claims of the Catholic Church, yet exercise divine faith in "Deus Unus et Remunerator," and be otherwise free from mortal sin. So, too, the words quoted\* from S. Paul are beside the question; for those who die in invincible ignorance, which, according to our author's view, cannot be said to exist, may die in the grace of God, not having sinned against light. A passage is also quoted from Dr. Newman's "Anglican Difficulties," lect. ii., in which the illustrious Oratorian says that the "grace given to Anglicans is intended ultimately to bring them into the Church; and if it does not tend to so, it will not ultimately profit them."

\* 1 Cor. xiii. 13—the well-known passage about charity.

But it is evident from the third lecture that Dr. Newman is speaking of the grace given to Anglicans to lead them forward to the Church, which, if rejected, will not of course avail them anything at the end. Then at page 79 Dr. Newman says, "Of course we think as tenderly of them as we can, and may fairly hope that what we see is in some instances the work of grace, wrought on those who are *in invincible ignorance*; but the claim is unreasonable and exorbitant if they expect their state of mind is to be taken in evidence, not only of promise in the individual, but of truth in his creed."

If then the author merely means that the virtues of sectarians are no evidence of the truth of their creed, he is right; but the passage quoted above seems to us to involve a far more sweeping condemnation.

There is also in the fourth chapter, "the Clergy and Modern Thought," a good deal with which we do not feel quite satisfied, although there is far more that is worthy of the highest praise. We cannot help feeling that the author treats with far too great a contempt and in far too light a tone the *intellectual* difficulties presented by "modern thought." No doubt it is intolerable that every new hypothesis of natural science or modern philosophy, changing as these do almost from year to year, should be exalted into a new Gospel. But to treat the speculations and difficulties of our "advanced thinkers" as imbecility, appears to us a grievous and lamentable mistake: first, because the latter are for the most part men of intellect; and, secondly, because nothing can well do the Catholic cause greater harm than contempt for its opponents. The subjects however touched upon by the author in his last chapter are of too vast importance to be dealt with satisfactorily in a notice like the present and we are already forced by its great length to hurry to a close.

We will only here say, therefore, that we cannot help doubting whether he has always taken due pains, rightly to understand those authors whom he so justly denounces. In one instance we are sure of this. Mr. Mill, in the passage quoted at p. 315, most certainly does not characterize the *God of Revelation* "as a monster of injustice and cruelty." Mr. Mill is speaking throughout of the "God" whom he supposes to have been imagined by Dean Mansel. We quite believe that he misunderstood the meaning of that Anglican dignitary; but however that may be, we explained in our number for last January (p. 73) what we are confident is Mr. Mill's meaning.

Notwithstanding these few imperfections, this very remarkable work will, we have no doubt, mark an *era* in Catholic controversy.

*Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, of the Oratory. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

*Historical Sketches.* Part II. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

THESE two portions of F. Newman's collected works have appeared since our last issue. The chief content of the former is the well-known series of *Essays on "Anglican difficulties"*; a work which, notwith-

standing its great ability, will be somewhat circumscribed as to its permanent importance, by the circumstance of its dealing exclusively with one transitory and singularly hollow phase of theological opinion—the Tractarian. Incidentally, however, it contains many thoughts of great lasting value. As an instance, we will extract a very admirable sentence, occurring at pp. 264-265, which we also quoted in October. We italicise a few words.

"In matters of conduct, of ritual, of discipline, of politics, of social life, in the *ten thousand* questions which the Church *has not formally answered* even though she has *intimated her judgment*, there is a constant rising of the human mind against the *authority of the Church and of superiors*, and that in *proportion as each individual is removed from perfection.*"

According to F. Newman, then, there are "ten thousand questions" on which the Church has "intimated her judgment" without imposing it; ecclesiastical "superiors" are rightly employed in pressing such judgment on the acceptance of the faithful; and these in their turn do not hesitate to accept it, unless in proportion as they are "removed from" spiritual "perfection."

The remainder of the volume is occupied with the well-known letter to Dr. Pusey on his "Eirenicon." We suppose that the Patristic testimony on devotion to the Most Holy Virgin was never before so effectively exhibited and marshalled; and that this will long be accounted, in England at least, the standard work on this particular theme. At the same time, there are a few passages in the letter, of which we said at the time (April, 1866, p. 545) that we regretted the appearance; and now on consideration we feel the same regret. Yet we must explain, as we have often pointed out before, that F. Newman's words have been grievously misinterpreted. It is quite a mistake to suppose, as many have done, that he censures certain "foreign writers," such as S. Alphonsus and Ven. Grignon de Montfort, for excess or mistake in Marian devotion. We showed in detail on a former occasion (April, 1871, p. 454) that he disavows in the most express terms any such intention.

The second of the two volumes is half filled by the powerful series of lectures on the history of the Turks. As the "Month" has pointed out, these "embody the true Catholic instinct as to the hatefulness of Mahometanism, and its blighting influence upon the East, and upon all the countries where it has set its foot." And this was peculiarly desirable at the time of their original publication; when Englishmen were largely blinded, by their political sympathy with Turkey, to the detestable character of its religion.

The rest of the volume is occupied with two biographical Essays, contributed long ago to the "Encyclopædiæ Metropolitana;" and with the original (Anglican) introduction to "the Church of the Fathers."

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*The Athanasian Creed.* Four Lectures by FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY.  
London: Longmans.

WE have so lately (see the last article of our October number) expressed our own view of the present Anglican agitation on the Athanasian Creed that we must content ourselves with a very few remarks on these

interesting lectures. Canon Oakeley expresses the Catholic doctrine clearly, uncompromisingly, and at the same time most charitably. His first lecture is on the legitimate attitude of Catholics towards the present Anglican agitations ; his second, on the Creed itself ; his third, on the dogmatic principle ; his fourth, on the "damnatory clauses." To our mind no other part of the pamphlet is so touching, as his preliminary remarks on his continued affection for those Anglican friends, among whom he once played so conspicuous a part.

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*Catholic Worship, a Manual of Popular Instruction on the Ceremonies and Devotions of the Church.* By FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY, M.A. 2nd Edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THERE are few in England who can write upon Catholic worship better than Canon Oakeley. We are not, therefore, surprised that a second edition of this popular Manual has been called for. The little work has been attentively revised with the aid of an able and experienced ceremonialist, and we trust that, according to the wish of the author, it will find its way into the hands of many recent converts and non-Catholic inquirers ; and, indeed, of all who wish to know more of the beauty of holiness, with which the Church worships God. The reader will find most useful information with regard to the permanent arrangements of Catholic Churches, the ordinary offices, as well as those proper to certain seasons, the devotional practices of the Church, and occasional offices. At the end will be found a glossary of ecclesiastical terms used in the work.

Not the least valuable portion of Canon Oakeley's Manual is the paragraph about indulgences. It is short, but to the point. There is no part of Catholic doctrine or practice on which Protestants are so profoundly ignorant as the subject of indulgences, while we fear that there are too many Catholics who forget the immense importance of gaining them. The subject of indulgences is one of vast importance, and we feel sure that, whether for the sake of the holy souls in Purgatory or our own souls, it cannot be too frequently brought before the minds of our people.

Canon Oakeley's Manual is admirably suited for distribution.

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*The Hidden Life of Jesus, a Lesson and Model to Christians.* Translated from the French of HENRI MARIE BOUDON, Archdeacon of Evreux, by EDWARD HEALY THOMPSON, M.A. Second edition. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

WE are glad indeed to find that Mr. Healy Thompson's admirable translation of Boudon's "Hidden Life of Jesus" has reached a second edition. This is a sign that spiritual reading is on the increase among

English Catholics, and also that in these over-busy days there is a growing desire to know more and more of the hidden life of our Blessed Lord. What better remedy could we have for all the excitement, and hurry, and bustle, and shallowness of this superficial age, than to fix our eyes, as this little work teaches us to do, on our Lord hidden in His general self-annihilation, hidden as to His generation, eternal and temporal, hidden as to His natural qualities, hidden in His privation of temporal good, and of the esteem and friendship of creatures, hidden again in ignominies, hidden as to His power, offices, and dignities, hidden as to His graces and Divine mission, hidden even when most seen, hidden last of all in His glorious life, in the Blessed Sacrament, and in His most holy Mother and His Saints ?

But this is only half the lesson taught by this excellent spiritual work. In the second part we are led on to the practice of the hidden life and of union with God. We are told of the advantages of this life, and we are reminded of a truth, too often forgotten, that the highest Saints are they whose lives are least known to men. To realize the truth of this, we have only to think of God's dear and most blessed Mother, S. Joseph, and S. John the Baptist. We are next instructed how to keep ourselves healthy in the midst of the infectious atmosphere of the world, to give ourselves up to the practice of the hidden life with courage and fidelity, to avoid all self-display, to be watchful over ourselves whenever we are obliged to put ourselves forward, to prefer humiliation to the esteem and friendship of others, to take pleasure in being unknown, to make a holy use of the interior sufferings which hide us even from ourselves, not to fix our eyes upon ourselves, but to live only to God alone, as if there were only God and ourselves in the world ; and last of all, in order to draw down the blessing of God upon our practice of the hidden life, to have a special devotion to the Holy Family, to the holy angels, and to those Saints whose lives have been most hidden in Christ.

All this no doubt is quite contrary to the spirit of the age, which loves publicity and excitement, and which encourages men to put themselves forward, and make themselves a name, and heap up riches, and gain what is called a position in the world. All this, too, is hard to flesh and blood, and harder still at a time when soft living is the rule, and mortification the exception. Yet, after all, what is the doctrine taught in this work, what is the practice of the hidden life except simply the teaching and following of Christ ? the teaching and following of Him who has said : "Blessed are ye that hunger now, for you shall be filled. Blessed shall ye be when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as evil for the Son of Man's sake. But woe to you that are rich ; woe to you that are filled ; woe to you that laugh now ; woe to you when men shall bless you." So too we know that "flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God." Yet it is just because the spirit of this work is contrary to the spirit of the age, and hard to flesh and blood, that we rejoice, and take it as a healthy sign, that the work itself has reached a second edition.

What joy, too, would it have given to Father Faber and Mother Margaret, with both of whom the works of M. Boudon were especial favourites—had they been still alive—to know of the success of a book which they

loved so much. Yet we may confidently hope that they *do* know of it, and that beholding all things clearly in the light of God, they are able to see—what we can only guess at—the hidden good produced by the publication of such solid spiritual works as the one now before us, and the growth of the hidden life in the souls of English Catholics. For this they prayed during their lifetime; surely it is no presumption to hope that they have not ceased to pray for the same cause, now that they have passed beyond the veil.

It is true, as the translator remarks, that in some of Boudon's writings there are certain inaccuracies of expression; but then we must also remember that as he wrote before the condemnation of Quietism, these can hardly be laid to his charge; and there can be no doubt that, had he lived after the condemnation, he would certainly have been the first to correct anything even seemingly out of harmony with the doctrine of the Church.

For the sake of those of our readers who may as yet be unacquainted with this work, we give the following extracts:—

“O how true it is, that there are few who are contented to find nothing in creatures, and to whom God alone suffices. But when God finds souls thus pure, disinterested, and faithful, He gives Himself to them with such profuse outpourings of His divinest graces, that He seems to have nothing in reserve for them. Nevertheless, after He has bestowed His most precious graces, He gives Himself to them with yet further excesses of love unspeakable. If it is written (Psalm cxliv. 19) that He will fulfil all the desires of those that fear Him, how much more of those who belong to Him alone through His only and most pure love! These are the souls that obtain from Him the sweetest favours, and that impetrate the greatest mercies. These are they that sustain the weight of His wrath, that turn away His anger from the people, and stay His chastening hand. . . . When He is preparing to let fall His scourges on some city, province, or kingdom, a few such souls have power to avert His wrath. And what do they not effect in the order of grace! Be assured of this, that often in the sight of God, to them is due the glory of the great marvels which He works in the justification and sanctification of souls, although externally He uses for His purposes, preachers, missionaries, and directors.” (pp. 104-5.)

Again:

“In order thoroughly to understand this truth (namely, that the glory of God's marvels is often due to those whose lives are hidden in Christ), we have only to consider the most B. Virgin, who, retired apart in her humble abode, neither preached, nor administered any sacrament, and yet it cannot be doubted but that she was more useful to the world than apostolic men, and all other persons who were most actively employed in external works. . . . Alas! they who look only at the outside of things imagine that they remain useless in the midst of their abasement; but they know not that by serving as victims to divine justice, for sinners, for the cities, dioceses, and provinces in which they suffer, they appease His wrath, and obtain incalculable benefits and unspeakable blessings for those places where they have thus been trodden under foot, whilst the glory is given to those who have laboured externally to procure them. . . . O precious state, all holy, all divine; and yet, alas! this is the state which all the world flies from, from which even the devout turn away, corrupt nature not enduring to be deprived of the knowledge, the esteem, and the friendship of creatures.” (pp. 106-7-8.)

The words quoted in the last extract will have an additional interest, if we



bear in mind that for eight years this holy writer lay under one of the most disgraceful imputations from which a priest can suffer.

The merit of Mr. Healy Thompson's translations is too well known to require any words of praise. We heartily wish him success in this good work he has undertaken, of giving us not only a library of Religious Biography, but also select translations for spiritual reading. Perhaps we may be allowed to add in conclusion, that we should have been glad if Mr. Thompson had throughout the whole work translated the expression "Dieu Seul," by the English words "God Alone," as he has done at p. 90, and in some other places, rather than by the words "God Only." The former expression has become to us almost a household word.

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*The Book of the Holy Rosary. A Popular Doctrinal Exposition of its Fifteen Mysteries, with an Explanation of their Corresponding Types in the Old Testament, a Preservative against Unbelief.* By the Rev. H. FORMBY, of the 3rd Order of S. Dominic. Embellished with 36 full-page Illustrations. London: Burns, Oates, and Co. 1872.

THIS new work by Mr. Formby is, as we are told in his brief admonition to the reader, the result of the labour of many years, and it is evident that the author has taken great pains in endeavouring to carry his conception into execution. The plan of the work is excellent. After a general introduction on the duty of doing our best to acquire the knowledge of God, on the benefit of studying the Scriptures, and on the testimony of the types and figures of the Old Testament, the fifteen Mysteries of the Rosary are presented to the reader; the three divisions—namely, the Joyful, Sorrowful, and Glorious Mysteries—being severally preceded by some type from the Old Testament applicable to each; while each separate mystery is first explained in itself, and then illustrated by two or more types taken in like manner from the Elder Covenant. Thus, for example, the Joyful Mysteries, taken as a whole, are shown to us as typified by the Ark of the Covenant, brought by King David to Mount Sion; the Sorrowful, by the hostility shown to the rebuilding of Jerusalem; the Glorious (not quite so happily, we think), by the song of triumph of the three children in the furnace. So, again, the types selected for the Mysteries, taken separately, are as follows:—For the Annunciation, Eve and Adam banished from Paradise, and the prayer of Anna; for the Visitation, the Ark in the house of Obededom and the Burning Bush; for the Nativity, the fleece of Gideon, and the manna that came down from heaven; for the Presentation, the infant Samuel presented to Eli, and Moses gazing at the Promised Land; for the finding of Our Lord in the Temple, the sorrow of Anna for the absence of Tobias, and her joy at his return. The agony in the garden is typified by the prayer of Elias for the dead child, and his weariness because of the sins of the people; the scourging at the pillar, by Job smitten with a grievous ulcer from the sole of his foot, even to the top of his head, and by the rainbow as the sign of mercy; the

crowning with thorns, by the ram caught in the thorns, and by Daniel in the lion's den; the carnage of the Cross, by Isaac carrying the wood for the sacrifice, and by David going forth to meet Goliath; the Crucifixion, by the fountain in Paradise, the Paschal lamb, the passage of the Red Sea, the prayer of Moses on the Mount, the brazen serpent in the wilderness, and the rock which yielded sweet water. Coming to the Glorious Mysteries, we find that the sign of the prophet Jonas, and Samson bursting the bonds of the Philistines, typify the Resurrection; the High Priest entering into the Holy of Holies, and Elias taken up from earth, the Ascension; the giving of the Law, and the sacrifice consumed by fire from heaven, the mission of the Holy Ghost; the visit of the Queen of Saba to King Solomon, and the return of Judith with the head of Holofernes, the Assumption; while the coronation of the glorious Queen of Heaven is shown to us as shadowed forth by the raising of Esther to the royal throne, and by her intercession for her people.

We hardly, however, think that *all* the types are happily chosen. Thus, *e.g.*, after the striking type of the visit of Elias to the widow of Sarephta, including within itself several other types, such as the drinking of the torrent by the way during the three years and a half that the heavens were closed, the passing over to the Gentiles, the handful of meal, and the cruise of oil that wasted not, shadowing forth, as they did, the true bread, which cometh down from heaven, which was anointed with the unction of the Holy Ghost, and which, though eaten from day to day on the altars of the Church, wastes not, neither is diminished; the two sticks, as a figure of the Cross of Calvary; and, lastly, the resurrection of the dead boy, when laid upon the prophet's own bed, and touched by the prophet's body, as typical both of Our Lord's rising from the dead, and of the resurrection of the just to life eternal at the last day, because they have been touched by the body of Our Lord—after such a type as this—or rather, as we have said, such a collection of types—the weariness of the same prophet under the juniper tree seems to us hardly so striking. We should have thought that King David—the most typical, perhaps, of all the Old Testament characters—who when flying from the face of his own son Absalom, passed over the brook Cedron, and went up the Mount of Olives weeping and barefoot, with his head covered, and shortly afterwards was cursed by Semei, and stoned, and covered with the dust of earth, would have been a far more vivid type of Our Lord in His bitter agony. So, too, the rainbow of many colours, as typical of the many-hued appearance of our Lord's Body when scourged at the pillar, seems to us somewhat fanciful and far-fetched—not, certainly, calculated to further one of Mr. Formby's chief objects in publishing the work—namely, the preserving men's minds from unbelief, by giving them “an insight into the marvellous methods by which Divine Wisdom, long ages ago, has prepared the way for the Christian mysteries.” For our own part, we much doubt whether minds suffering from temptations to unbelief, especially at the present day, will greatly be relieved of their doubts by the light which the comparison with the types of the Old Testament is found to reflect upon the mysteries of Christianity. To us it seems, although we wish to speak with great diffidence, as if the beauty of harmony between type and mystery can only be fully realized by those who have drunk deeply of the spirit of the Church,

who have meditated long and attentively on Holy Scriptures in the spirit of little children, and whose eyes have been opened to the hardly lesser harmony which exists between the Church's dogma and spirituality and devotions.

Again, the explanation of the Mystery of the Coronation of Our Blessed Lady opens with a passage from the Apocalypse about the Marriage Supper of the Lamb (Apoc. xix.). Now, this is no doubt very applicable to the joy of all the Saints, which forms the second point on which the Church wishes us to meditate in this mystery. But the joy of all the Saints is but the secondary point, the chief one being the coronation of our Lady. And here we naturally look in Mr. Formby's pages, but in vain, for some allusion to that "mighty sign" which St. John saw in heaven when the temple of God was opened in heaven, and the *Ark of His Testament was seen in this temple*, and there were lightnings, and voices, and an earthquake, and great hail—a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars." (Apoc. xi. 19 ; xii. 1.) As the first book of Scripture foreshadows the redemption of mankind and the overthrow of Satan's power by bringing before us a Woman, a Child and a Serpent, so, too, the last book of Scripture sets before our eyes the final victory of the Mother and the Child over the old Serpent, who seduceth the whole world, as also the coronation of the Mother as the Queen of all Creation, the sun being her robe and the moon her footstool, and the stars of heaven her crown.\*

The doctrinal exposition of the Mysteries is for the most part conveyed in extracts from the fathers and doctors of the Church, of whom short biographical notices are also given.

Mr. Formby thus explains the idea which he had in view in composing this work :—

"Taking a lesson from the wisdom of the Church (who, in prescribing to her clergy and religious communities a system of prayer in common, uses especial care that the Breviary employed for this end shall be the richest possible repertory of knowledge ranging through the Sacred Scriptures, Patristic Theology, and Biographies of Saints), and the conclusion could not but plainly appear that the knowledge of God and the spirit of prayer were always intended to be yoked together, and that the happiest fruits were to be looked for from their union. Knowledge, by itself alone, St. Paul says, puffeth up (1 Cor. viii. 1), and ignorant piety borders on superstition ; it is their union that tends to make the Christian.

"But if knowledge and prayer are always intended to be yoked together, there certainly will be found in use in the great body of the faithful at least some one well beloved and universally accepted form of prayer to whose nature it would likewise belong, to be in a similar manner associated with knowledge, and which in consequence could not fail to possess capacities for conferring upon the general body of the faithful benefits similar in kind to those which accrue to the clergy, from the use of their Breviary. And what other can this be than the devotion of the Holy

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\* See Dr. Newman's Letter to Dr. Pusey in his "Eirenicon."

Rosary with the beautiful system of popular theology contained in its fifteen mysteries? Again, like the Breviary, the Rosary enjoys the privilege of being either the joyous, social prayer of a multitude, or the pious exercise of complete solitude. And in either case the use of the devotion makes the same demand upon the mind of the pious reciter for a knowledge of the particular mystery which for the moment happens to be under contemplation.

"It remained, then, but to endeavour to collect together a volume of such doctrinal explanatory matter as could suffice to store the mind with the knowledge requisite to enable the act of the intelligence easily and pleasantly to accompany the words of the prayer, and thereby to offer the valuable twofold benefit of bringing a perceptible access of continually growing relish for the practice of the devotion, as also a pleasant and acceptable aid in what St. Paul declared to be the very necessary labour of endeavouring to please God 'by growing in knowledge.'"

Now, agreeing with Mr. Formby in the main, there are nevertheless a few points upon which we must dissent from him. We agree with him in thinking that the knowledge of God and the spirit of prayer should always go hand in hand together, but there may be a deep knowledge of God without much knowledge of Scripture history, or of the types of the Old Testament; and, therefore, we regret that Mr. Formby, in speaking of the necessity of "increasing in knowledge," has not always added the words which St. Paul adds—"of God." For the same reason, we cannot utter so sweeping an assertion as that made by Mr. Formby when he says that *ignorant piety* (under which he would include, we presume, the piety of the unlearned) "borders on superstition." On the contrary, we believe and know by experience that there is often far more knowledge of God amongst our unlearned poor than amongst our learned rich; nay, we will even go further, and say that we believe that the higher kinds of prayer are more often bestowed by God upon the former than upon the latter. Oh, surely, surely, there is many a poor Catholic who has never heard of the rainbow as the type of the many-hued body of Our Lord when scourged at the Column, or of the Queen of Saba, or of Queen Esther; but whose prayer or recital of the Rosary is full of the knowledge of God, because the mind of that poor Catholic is fixed upon *God alone*, or upon the central object of the mystery which he is contemplating. On the other hand, does it not too often happen to the learned, that with much knowledge about the *things* of God, their prayer is deficient in the knowledge of God himself, because their minds, instead of being fixed on God alone, are allowed to dwell too much upon what, after all, are but the means, and not the end? Nor will it do to quote, as Mr. Formby does, the words of St. Paul, "I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray also with the understanding" (1 Cor. xiv. 15), for it is clear from the context that the apostle is speaking of praying in an unknown tongue, in which "the spirit prayeth, but the understanding is without fruit," and not in any way of ordinary prayer; for who can say that the higher kinds of prayer to which we have alluded above are without fruit to the understanding? In such prayer the spirit is enkindled with the fire of the Holy Ghost, and the understanding is lit up with the light of the Incarnate Word. Are we not told by all spiritual writers, that just in proportion as we are filled with God, and our prayer grows purer, so will images and the thoughts even of holy

things and holy scenes drop away from our minds, which will remain fixed upon God alone? So, too, are we not also told that those who are engaged in the study of theology run a special danger of becoming distracted in prayer, and cold and barren in meditation, and this on account of their more than ordinary knowledge of the things of God?

We trust Mr. Formby will bear with us in making these remarks. We have no desire to depreciate knowledge, still less the knowledge of Scripture, or of all that can throw light upon the mysteries of religion; but we have felt ourselves compelled to offer these criticisms, as it has seemed to us that the learned author has somewhat undervalued the prayer of Christ's unlearned poor; for hitherto, at least, the poor have been for the most part unlearned. Yet it is of these the Apostle St. James writes: "Hearken, dearest brethren; hath not God chosen the poor in this world, *rich in faith*—(the Apostle says nothing about bordering on superstition), and heirs of the kingdom which God hath promised to them that love Him?"

We could have wished to touch upon some other parts of Mr. Formby's work, as *e.g.*, upon the fall of Eve, where we fear we should have again to part company from him upon one or two points, but we have already exceeded our space. There is, however, one other remark we must make. The work is called a "*popular doctrinal exposition*." We shall be glad indeed if the author's hopes are realized, but we fear that the price of this handsomely-got-up volume will confine it to the tables of the wealthy; while, from the style in which it is written, and the matter which it contains, admirable though it is, as well as from the quotations from Latin and French poets and writers,\* not always translated, it will, if we mistake not, be oftener in the hands of the learned than of those for whom it appears chiefly to have been intended. If we might be allowed to make a suggestion, we would venture to express a hope that before long the author will give us a cheap edition, consisting of the engravings, together with a short explanation of each mystery, with its corresponding types, so that the essential part of the work may be brought within the reach of a larger number of readers.

The engravings, as is usual in all Mr. Formby's works, are excellent, although some of them are hardly free from what we can only call posture-drawing.

Mr. J. H. Powell's designs have pleased us greatly, and are quite free from this fault. Mr. C. Clasen's introductory illustrations are also worthy of special praise.

In conclusion, we must assure Mr. Formby, that if in some respects we have felt ourselves obliged to differ from him, this has only been from a desire to see the "*Book of the Rosary*" improved to the utmost, and rendered still more profitable for the general good. We yield to no one in gratitude to Mr. Formby for all that he has done for the education of our children, and

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\* At. p. 4, Mr. Formby speaks of the "actual volume of the inspired writings as the '*fait accompli*' of the love and mercy of God." We have no objection to the use of a French expression when nothing equivalent to it can be found in English, but we think that in this instance at least Mr. Formby might have contented himself with plain English.

for the encouragement of a higher taste in art; and we heartily go along with him in his earnest hope that, by means of such efforts as his, "the Devotion of the Holy Rosary may be still more widely extended over the earth, so that the knowledge of God may also come to cover the earth, as the waters cover the sea." (Dedication.)

The work has been issued with the permission of the Father Provincial of the Order of St. Dominic, to the third order of which Mr. Formby belongs, and with the "Imprimatur" of His Grace the Archbishop.

We must have only to add that we are sure our readers will agree with us in thanking Messrs. Burns and Oates for the really good taste with which the volume has been produced.

*Norwich Cathedral Argumentative Discourses in Defence and Confirmation of the Faith, "Pleadings for Christ."* First and second series. Norwich: Henry W. Stacy; London: Hamilton & Co. 1871, 1872.

THESE two little pamphlets consist each of three discourses delivered in Norwich Cathedral during the past year. The first four, which are on "Christianity and Free Thought," "Christianity and Scepticism," "Christianity and Faith," and "The Demonstration of the Spirit," were preached by Dr. O'Connor; the last two, on "Above Reason, not Contrary to it," and "The Cumulative Argument in favour of Christianity," were added, by Dr. Goulburn, the Dean of Norwich, who also edited the two series, which are, we believe, to be followed by others. The circumstances which led to the undertaking are briefly indicated in the preface to the first series, where we are told that "The frightful prevalence of sceptical views among all classes of the community, and the alarming fact that even among the clergy themselves insidious objections to the things which are most surely believed among us are gradually winning their way, seem to make it imperative upon all persons and societies intrusted with the guardianship of the Faith to make some definite effort to stem the evil"; and that "It has been thought that this guardianship is one of the special functions of our cathedrals." And very justly. And as infidelity has been defeated in England once, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will be defeated again.

These discourses, therefore, are directed against scepticism. Their main argument and let it be understood that we are by no means in every respect endorsing it,—is as follows:—"WE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE CHRISTIANITY. . . . We can give you the very strongest possible probability—we can give you the very highest degree of evidence *short of demonstration*—for believing Christianity; but *we cannot demonstrate it*. I say again, WE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE CHRISTIANITY."\* It is by this circumstance, add the writers, that scepticism illogically attempts to justify itself. A sceptic is to be distinguished both from an unbeliever and from a doubter. An unbeliever is one

\* ii. 8, 9.



who disbelieves in Christianity because he believes in something else ; *e.g.*, in Judaism or atheism, which is inconsistent with it. A doubter is one who withholds his assent, not because he requires an improper kind of evidence, but because he thinks he has not enough of the proper kind. But a sceptic is one who when he has sufficient evidence of the proper kind, still refuses to believe, because he demands demonstration. And demonstration is an improper and unreasonable kind of evidence to demand as a condition of belief in religion. For there are two fields of thought on which the human faculties may be exercised. The first is that of *things*, *e.g.*, numbers, chemical substances, mechanical laws : here full and perfect assent is logically based only on *demonstration*, and the resulting certainty is the certainty of *science*. The second is that of *persons*,—that is to say, of our own persons, our existence and the validity of our intellectual and moral faculties, and of the persons of others : here full and perfect assent is based on highly probable evidence and on *trust*, and the resulting certainty is that of *belief*. And inasmuch as the Revealer of the Christian religion was a Person, Jesus Christ, and therefore the human faculties, in considering the evidence that this Person was what He represented Himself to be, are engaged on this second field of thought—scepticism is contrary to reason.

What is here to be attended to is the proof of the proposition, that when dealing with persons full and perfect assent is logically based on highly probable evidence, and on trust. In proof of it, the following argument is given :—In the first place, trust is a legitimate source of certainty. And so far is this the case, that doubt is useful on this condition only, that it starts from belief ; if it do not do so, it is pernicious.\* In the second place, the field for the exercise of this faculty of trust is that of persons. To begin with, moral principles rest on this foundation ;† and as our moral and our religious life are plainly of a piece, this affords ground for believing that religion will do so also. Again, we must trust other persons : — “ If a man were to say ‘ I do not trust my wife, my children, my friends ; I do not trust any one until they prove to me, demonstrate to me [in the strict and scientific sense of the word demonstration], leave me in no doubt of their honesty, their love, their truthfulness,’ . . . you would put that man into a lunatic asylum. And why ? Because you would say that he gave the surest evidence of madness ; that one part of his nature [the speculative reason] had acquired a diseased intensity, which had mastered all the rest. You would say that that man had gone mad with distrust and suspicion,—had gone sceptically mad,—and you would treat him accordingly. And yet I defy any one here to show logically that the man might not be right. I defy any one to give that man such a logical and scientific demonstration as would prove to him, beyond all possibility of doubt, that his friends, or his wife, or his children, were not in a conspiracy to deceive and to wrong him. You see, then, that there is an absolute necessity for trust in the ordinary affairs of common life.”‡ Moreover, there is a reason for this disposition of things. It necessarily follows from our being not merely intellectual but also moral beings. And it is a part of our probation. Besides, every act by which we resist

\* Developed in ii. 13.

† Developed in ii. 15.

‡ ii. 15, 16.

the impulses of the lower and animal nature, is an act of trust in the natural or the revealed law. The first instinct of the child is that of trust ; whatever it is told it believes. And although in our intercourse with our fellow-creatures circumstances may arise which legitimately call for suspicion—for just as the speculative reason must be conditioned by the faculty of trust, so also must the faculty of trust be conditioned by the speculative reason ; yet we do not find that those who are always looking out for reasons for suspicion are the men of the highest and purest tone, the most improving and valuable amongst our acquaintances. Again, just as our own higher and moral nature cannot prove itself to our lower, but we must trust it ; so when in the course of life, we come into contact with others who are higher and better than we, these higher natures cannot *prove* themselves to be so. There is always room for disparagement, for imputation of motives, for accusations of onesidedness, or self-delusion, or hypocrisy. And on the other side there is always room for trust ; so that contact with a higher nature is a veritable probation. Nay, the lower nature, because it is lower, cannot perfectly understand the higher. And therefore—

“Should we not expect beforehand that if there were a revelation of a perfect nature, it would appear to our lower natures in some respects unintelligible, in others mysterious, in others (even as our own nature appears to us in some points of view) self-contradictory ? For all mysteries, everything that we cannot understand, must come to our understanding in the shape of two contradictory propositions ; we view the thing on two opposite sides, because we cannot see all round it at once. Well, then, should we not expect that this perfect nature, in the revealing of itself to us, should thus try our faith ? If it would be unreasonable to expect that an inferior man should perfectly understand and appreciate a higher and a better man than himself, is it unreasonable to suppose that we might find some difficulty in perfectly appreciating the nature of the one supremely Perfect Being ? Should we not expect, judging from analogy, that we might have some difficulties of the same kind in understanding God that we have in understanding one another ; that there would be the same trial of our faith, the same testing whether we would choose to think better or worse of God—the same probation and discipline when brought to apprehend that perfect nature ?” (iii. 14.)

Again :—

“We do believe that in answer to the craving desire of the soul of man to look upon human perfection, this earth has once been visited by a perfect man. . . . But if this be so, then you would expect before you opened a page of the Gospels—before you read a line of that wondrous life, that according to the analogy of all other holy and righteous lives we know of, this life should not demonstrate itself, should not make it an impossibility for the sceptical intellect to find fault with it ; that it should only reveal itself to those whose lives were in some measure like it,—that its wisdom should justify itself, but only to the children of wisdom.” (iii. 16, 17.)

So that as the subject of Revelation is a Perfect Nature, and the Revealer a Perfect Person, both the substance and the evidence of religion must of necessity leave room for trust, and be means of trial, and neither, consequently, can be susceptible of demonstration.

Adequately to criticise this argument, which might have been more pro-

foundly built up from a consideration of the nature of personality itself, would require a space much larger than that at our disposal. We therefore confine ourselves to three observations. Firstly, the reasoning contained in it demands a psychological analysis of the natural tendency to believe;\* and it would have been the duty of the lecturer to supply this had the nature of his auditory admitted of it. Secondly, the argument is, in fact, not an appeal from the evidence to something else which is not evidence, but, if it is worth anything, an appeal to another kind of evidence which the writers regard as illogical not to take into consideration. It is not an appeal *from* reason. It is an appeal *to* reason, demanding of it that when it pronounces a verdict as on the total evidence, it should take into consideration not only that part of it arising from speculation merely, but also another division of evidence asserted to be consequent on the action of other mental faculties. And therefore, thirdly, the question is not so much whether certain things are demonstrated and certain others not, as whether there are not two distinct kinds of demonstration, the one where the resultant certainty rests on grounds in the last resort speculative, and the other where it does not do so, and would not be certainty if it did so. But both will be equally demonstration, if we have regard to the effect they legitimately produce.

The first four lectures—those by Dr. Connor—are by far the most weighty and thoughtful; but he often, though no doubt unintentionally, seems to represent Christianity rather as a subjective conviction of his own than as an objective system of truth proved by objective evidence. For instance:—“They [unbelievers] for the most part tell us that though it is true that Jesus of Nazareth was very useful to humanity at a certain stage of its development, yet that humanity needs Him no longer. . . . We say, on the contrary, that Jesus Christ is still essential to the true spiritual life of man. Unbelievers will say to Christians, ‘Your facts are not so certain as those of philosophy or, science.’ We answer, It may be so to you, but it is not so to us.” Again, some of the beliefs of atheists, &c., “we think very monstrous”; “we do not think” there are circumstances in Christianity which should excite suspicion; “we Christians have our own way of accounting for” the change wrought by Christianity in the soul: and so on. We should be disposed to believe that these imperfections were altogether, as they no doubt are in part, errors of expression but not of thought, were it not for the original sin of private judgment which taints the whole series, and shows itself, for instance, in the following passage, wherein what the preacher supposed to be the proper attitude of a good Christian towards an unbeliever is described:—“You are not called on to begin by imagining yourself not a Christian, and then arguing yourself into Christianity; but you are entitled to say, I am a Christian; I have very good and satisfactory reasons for being a Christian, and before you ask me to give up my Christianity, give me some reason why I should do so; show me that all this is a delusion and a mistake: then I am ready to give up my Christian ideas at your bidding. But, meanwhile, I am not much disposed to rise up and go out of my Father’s house, where I have been sheltered and fed, at the bidding of any prodigal

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\* Cf. Bain, “The Emotions and the Will,” pp. 568–585. (1859.)

who has gone into a far country, and who cries to me to come and share his banquet, which may prove, after all, to be one of husks.\* This is a half-truth well put. But no one is justified in saying, "If I cannot detect the fallacy in your arguments, I will become an infidel;" he ought to say, at the very utmost "I will learn logic." And no one has a right wantonly to lay himself open to moral and intellectual danger, any more than any one has a right, without sufficient reason, to expose himself to physical danger. With reference, again, to the expressions previously quoted above. Of course, Christianity, in the sense of our belief in Christianity, is a subjective conviction, and we can say with perfect justice "I believe," "I maintain most resolutely," &c., concerning it. But how can any one imagine for a moment that this is inappropriate way of speaking in addressing persons already predisposed to scepticism? "Most excellently said!" they will reply: "that is just our position. What is actually true, no one knows; but that is true to you, and this is true to us." How much better it would be at once to take the higher ground; to say simply, "Christianity is *true*, scepticism is *false*"; and to leave out these "I's" and "to me's," which can be excused only by supposing them to have been inserted from a feeling of politeness. When a man is defending *himself*, he may if he pleases give up an advantage of which, if he chose, he might justly make use. It may even be called a chivalrous generosity for him to do so. But when he is maintaining the cause of another, he has no right to throw away any advantage of which he may fairly avail himself. Truth forgets that she is truth when she even forensically puts herself on an equality with error, or stoops to use a language invented by her rivals to conceal her pre-eminence.

"Pleadings for Christ" abounds in short, apt, and sometimes almost epigrammatic observations: *e.g.*,—"It is just as absurd to object to Religion that it is not Science, as it is to object to Science that it is not Religion." "You may be sure that no man will ever lightly change his religion, if his religion has ever changed *him*." "Whoever would deeply stir the tides of the human heart must not only announce a law, he must preach an idea." "Assuming for a moment that God was manifest in the flesh, how could we possibly understand this union, or know anything about it beyond the fact?" "We are triumphantly asked how a religion that claims to be a gospel for the poor should need all these laborious and intricate historical evidences to prove it. We might answer that the critical and metaphysical difficulties of these evidences do not much trouble the poor; they are mostly made, and have to be answered, by learned men." But this fashion of writing with special readiness lends itself to the concealment of a fallacy; so we have, for instance, the notable observation that "Christianity is a great experiment—a probable, a reasonable experiment, but still an experiment";† *i.e.*, that belief is a leap in the dark. Sometimes the argument descends to puerility as when the Three Divine Persons, subsisting in One Nature, are compared to a man who is by turns a hungry being, a praying being, and a reasoning being. "How can this thing be?" asks the lecturer in triumph. "Can you explain it?"‡ Sometimes the criticism of opponents sinks to caricature, as

\* iv. 11.

† ii. 23.

‡ iv. 10.

when Dr. Connor informs his hearers that they may be told by an unbeliever "that when a man is tempted to steal, for instance, he will be kept from stealing when he has learned that s-t-e-a-l spells steal; or that, when a man is tempted to shed the life-blood of his fellow-man, it will be a great help to him against the temptation, if he understands the anatomy of the body which he is tempted to slay."\* Dr. Goulburn, whose property the illustration about the hungry being is, was ill-advised enough in the same discourse † to attack the Catholic Church, as if by the doctrine of Transubstantiation, she implicitly denied the evidence of the senses: a mistake which a very limited acquaintance with Catholic Theology would have prevented him from making. Acquaintance with the writings of Sir William Hamilton would have done him the same good office; ‡ but that he is weak on scientific subjects is evident from his reproduction in the last discourse of a sensational newspaper-paragraph-derived idea about photographs in the eyes of the dead. § But the faults which we have noticed, and some others of a similar nature, which the reader will no doubt himself discover if he choose to peruse these discourses, must not in fairness blind him to the fact that they contain many excellent arguments, of which we would in conclusion instance one, || showing that the historical evidences are strongest when taken to prove a strongly dogmatic Christianity, weakest in the hands of Unitarians or Latitudinarians.

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*The Mystery of Life, an Essay in Reply to Dr. Gull's attack on the Theory of Vitality in his Harverian Oration for 1870.* By LIONEL S. BEALE, M.B., F.R.S., &c. London: J. and A. Churchill. 1870.

**A**BOUT the meaning of this word *Life* there is an unfortunate ambiguity. Sometimes it is taken to mean the aggregate of the phenomena common to, and distinctive of all, living beings; sometimes the agency by

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\* v. 21.

† v. 25.

‡ Hamilton's Reid, p. 518. Dr. Reid, who is generally very trustworthy, had in this instance so far forgotten himself as to declare that Catholics require Protestants to prove that bread and wine are not flesh and blood. So Hamilton promptly puts this stopper on him:—"The Catholics require nothing of the kind. They admit that *physically* the bread and wine are bread and wine; and only contend that, *hyperphysically*, in a spiritual, mysterious, and inconceivable sense, they are flesh and blood. Those, therefore, who think of disproving the doctrine of transubstantiation, by proving that in the Eucharist bread and wine remain physically bread and wine, are guilty of the idle sophism called *mutatio elenchæ*." By *physically*, we hardly need explain, in so far as they are subjects of *physical* science—i.e. *quoad accidentia*, is meant. In the same way Theodoret speaks. By *hyperphysical* is in like manner meant in so far as they are subjects of hyperphysical science *ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, metaphysics, which penetrates to substances, or, in Kantian and Hamiltonian phraseology, noumena.

§ vi. 9.

|| iii. 18, 19; iv. 18—22.

which these phenomena are produced. Respecting the nature of life in the second sense two opinions are at present held. The first, which is that maintained by Dr. Beale, is the hypothesis that a peculiar vital force or principle animates each living being, and produces in it that part of the phenomena which cannot be accounted for by the operation of the physical forces of inorganic nature. Thus the motion of a living body is accompanied by an expenditure of nervous force—which is probably of the same fundamental character as the forces of inorganic nature ;—digestion arises from nervous influence and the properties of the gastric juice : but over these and the other processes is set a vital force. This preserves the balance of the organism by regulating them, and directing their action to a common end. It is called vital force to indicate that it is the source of formally vital phenomena, and to distinguish it from the forces which are treated of in general physics, and are denominated physical forces. It is supposed to be in its nature fundamentally different from physical force or forces ; for to explain phenomena which cannot be accounted for by physical forces we need, not something which merely follows their laws, and consequently would explain nothing which they would not explain as well, but something which shall co-ordinate and regulate their action as it were from above. This vital force cannot, indeed, create the chemical elements or physical forces with which it has to deal, but the changes continually going on in the organism place in its hands a store of physical force which it can apply to this or that purpose, according to the needs of the living whole. And therefore its activity neither increases nor decreases the total quantity of physical force existing in the universe. The second opinion denies the existence of any such vital force as has been just described, and attributes vital phenomena to the operation of the physical forces ; it is therefore called the physical theory of life. On behalf of this theory it is argued that to pretend to explain the action of the varied and complicated machinery which dissection and the microscope show to be at work in a living body by attributing them to the operation of a “vital principle,” is as if a visitor to a cotton factory “were to give up in despair any attempt to acquaint himself with the meaning of the several processes that go on before his eyes, and were to regard it as a sufficient account of the transformation of raw cotton into a woven material, that it takes place by the agency of a calico-making principle.” It is pleaded that in every case where an explanation has been given of any phenomenon occurring in a living being, it has been explained by showing it to be produced by the operation of the forces of inorganic nature and of nerve-force—a force working through organized matter of a peculiar kind (nervous tissue), but correlated with the other forces ; and that as science advances the other vital phenomena will, if they are to be explained at all, be explained in the same manner. A plant or animal is, therefore, only a very complicated machine, and the effects seem to be wonderful, and the explanation is difficult, only because the complication is immense.

Which of these opinions is the correct one—what is in reality the nature of the agency by which vital phenomena are produced—can obviously be decided only by examination of these phenomena. And when we proceed more carefully to examine them, there are two things which at once fix our



attention—the first, the extraordinary character\* of the phenomena themselves ; and the second, the extraordinary character of organisms, in which alone they take place. Of the phenomenal definitions of life, consequently, some have drawn attention specially to distinctive characteristics of organisms or bodies of plants and animals, as, “life is the sum of the phenomena *proper to organized beings* ;” others to distinctive characteristics of vital phenomena, as, “life is a general and continuous movement of combination and decomposition.” But great difficulty has been found in constructing any definition which will include all that is alive, and exclude all that is not.

However, the most superficial observation of any living being through a considerable space of time discloses phenomena which even to the most thoughtless are so strange, and are so different from what we find in inorganic nature, as abundantly to warrant the appellation, “The Mystery of Life.” Any inorganic object, as a crystal, a stone, a lump of iron, a machine, remains the same only so long as it continues to be composed of the same particles of matter ; add to or remove from a watch a spring, a wheel, a lever, and its properties and powers are *pro tanto* altered. On the other hand, an animal or a plant continues to present the same appearance—to sleep and to feel and move in alternate periods, to bear leaves, and flowers, and fruit, in recurrent seasons,—not merely in spite of, but only on condition of continual renewal of its particles ; and if this renewal is prevented for any length of time, a thorough and radical change takes place, and it is resolved into a mass of putrescence. Breathing and the ingestion of food continually convey into the body new matter which becomes an integral part of it ; secretions and excretions continually carry away matter which was formerly an integral part of it ; by these means, indeed, the entire organism may in some species be several times wholly renewed in the course of its existence ; and this characteristic of life has suggested the second definition quoted above. We live only because we do not continue the same. Every living organism is *in fluxu*, and it is this very *fluxus* that ensures its persistent existence. Again, a non-living object is modified in exact proportion to the quantity and intensity of the external influences acting on it. The degree to which a spring is bent is a test of the pressure brought to bear on it ; the increment of motion in a moving body is a test of the attractive force which draws it on ; the distance to which the pith ball of an electrometer is repelled from the stem indicates, as precisely as humidity in the atmosphere and accidental mechanical imperfections in the instrument allow of, the tension of the electricity present. But it is not so with a living being. It possesses an internal activity able, within wide limits, to resist the action of external influences ; and when these without, or morbid agencies within, become too strong for it, it breaks down altogether, and death ensues. The temperature of the blood, for instance, is almost the same in the coldest as in the hottest climates. That which lives is continually exercising over itself a regulative power, and increasing or diminishing, as may be needful, the intensity of the processes going on within it. The heart beats more forcibly when disease of its valves offers any considerable impediment to the circulation. The blood is directed with greater force

and in greater quantity to the organs which are working than to those which are at rest. The secretion of gastric juice is regulated by the presence and quantity of food in the stomach. A living being possesses also a reparative power for healing injuries experienced by it, while no non-living product of nature can repair those which may be done to it. The healing of a wound, the growing together of the two ends of a fractured bone, convalescence from an illness, have no parallels in the inorganic world. Further, a living being has that most marvellous power of producing others the same in species with itself. It may be added that, at least, in the higher orders of plants and animals, which exhibit the phenomena of life in greater complexity and abundance, species are so rigid,—resist external influences so obstinately,—that all their members will die rather than become essentially modified by their environment. And even if it be granted to the disciples of the Darwinian that one species can be changed into another, the immensity of the time postulated brings the admitted rigidity of species into the strongest relief. Again, the duration of the life of a living being is not indefinite. It may continue to live for more than a hundred years, although of soft consistency and almost infinite complexity, its delicate fabric sustaining during that time a continual friction arising from voluntary and involuntary movements. But even if it be not destroyed or injured by accidental causes, vital phenomena manifest themselves in it for a period only about four times as long as that occupied by its growth and development. And these vital phenomena pass through a definite cycle. It grows and consolidates in infancy, childhood, and adolescence; remains for some time in full possession of its powers; and then becomes gradually weaker with declining years, until the descent is closed by death. It begins its distinct existence as a minute germ (the germinal spot), so small that it cannot be seen by the naked eye; and when it is made discernible by the microscope, it is but a clear homogeneous spheroid as structureless as a drop of water. It is, however, placed in juxtaposition to nutritive material, and absorbs it into itself until it is millions of times, perhaps, its original bulk; but, wonderful to say, it does not pass over to the nature of that which it absorbs, but assimilates it to itself, and by its inherent power places it here or there, and changes it thus or thus, so as to form itself into an organism of marvellous harmony and complexity, and resembling its parents, often in most minute particulars. And neither to the manner in which the organism is formed, nor to the nature of the organism which is formed, is there any parallel in the inorganic world. The best definition of an organism is probably the teleological one suggested by Kant; “an organized product of nature is one in which all the parts are reciprocally ends and means.” Thus the muscles, which are the organs of motion, and those of special and general sensation, *e.g.*, eyes, ears, and skin, whose behests it is the function of the greater part of them to carry out, evidently subserve the general good of the organism by assisting in supplying it with food and protecting it from incidental dangers. On the other hand, the nourishment of the immense mass of muscular substance purifies the blood by abstracting from it elements which, if retained, would render it unfit to be the pabulum of other organs. The same may be said of the adipose tissue, which at the same time serves as a reserve of heat, providing nourishment against time of need; of the horny

matter of the nails and hair, the former of which protect the extremities, while the latter afford protection against climate ; of the bile secreted by the liver, which secures digestion ; and of the calcareous matter of the bones and teeth, which remaining in the blood would produce diseases of the blood-vessels, as it does in old age, but passing on to the bones is the source of their necessary firmness ; so that, generalizing, it has been held that there is, as it were, a balance of organs, and that every organ is a secretion with respect to every other. The nervous system exercises a sort of general supervision over all the organism ; in return, the whole of the organism combines to support the nervous system. The circulatory system provides the digestive organs with the nourishment necessary to the fulfilment of their functions ; the digestive organs furnish the materials of the blood. The body of man is like his mind ; no part of it continues to function normally except the others do so also. Each part is the servant of the whole ; and the whole feels with, and in case of necessity comes to the assistance of, any of the parts.

Such are the most prominent and obvious characteristics of life. They do not belong to this living being and to that, but, *mutatis mutandis*, to all living beings whatsoever. They belong to nothing that is not alive. Their peculiar and distinctive character raises a very strong initial presumption against any opinion which asserts that the physical forces of inorganic nature are the cause of vital phenomena, and at once throws a heavy burden of proof on those who declare this to be the case ; and although some approach to some sort of a physical explanation of some of them may to some extent be made, this is as far from a fairly complete explanation of vital phenomena in their integrity as the piers and jetties of the opposite harbours of two continents are from bridging over the ocean which rolls between them. The continuance of the living being under varying external conditions, and still more the reproduction of plants and animals the same in species for at least many generations, are, to say the least, almost incredible, if we do not recognize the existence of an internal regulating principle set over the physical processes to direct and co-ordinate them.

How, then, is this initial presumption met by those who hold the physical or molecular theory of life ? In the first place, they attack the opposite theory. Dr. Gull, for instance, in his "Oration," declares that "They who maintain the hypothesis of a separate vital force, independent of the ordinary forces of nature, and which has no special relation to them, do, by the very terms of the hypothesis, assume that the phenomena of living beings are out of the proper range of science, and they consign us to a perpetual mental inactivity and ignorance in that region of knowledge in which, above all others, man is interested." But the amount of residual phenomena which require some further and non-physical agency to explain them, can be determined with precision only by exact knowledge which and how much of the total phenomena occurring in a living being can be explained by causes merely physical. While, therefore, the molecularist enters on the investigation of phenomena with a bias arising from a foregone conclusion as to the kind of cause to which he is to refer them, vitalism equally incites to the study of the phenomenon, but leaves the investigator free to refer any particular

phenomenon either to a physical or a vital agency ; for no one supposes that everything which takes place in a living organism is to be ascribed to its vital force, nothing to physical forces. Even if a person attributed the manufacture of cotton to a calico-making principle, that need not prevent him from examining the nature and action of the machinery, which would according to him be the means by which that principle worked. He would, in fact, from the nature of the machinery, see that it required some regulative principle, and he would find that principle in the body of workmen attending to the mill. It is also argued that certain of the phenomena which occur in living beings have been accounted for by the operation of the physical forces, and that consequently the rest are to be explained in the same manner. This, however, assumes that all the phenomena are of the same nature as those which, it is asserted, have been thus explained. This is the very point at issue ; and if some aspects of some phenomena presented by living organisms have been accounted for by the operation of physical forces, there are always other aspects which cannot be so accounted for. It is urged also that the molecularist theory is more in accordance with the present tendencies of science than vitalism is—*i.e.*, the present tendency of science is to explain phenomena by reference merely to matter and motion, and it is more in accordance with this tendency to explain life by matter and motion than to explain it in any other way. But this, as Dr. Beale very truly says, is only the constantly recurring dream about unity,—the idea that all phenomena, whether of inorganic nature, or life, or mind, are the results of some one universal law, stealthily influencing even modern and scientific thought. And this old dream of unity is distinctly unscientific.\*

In the second place, when the advocates of the physical theory of life endeavour to substantiate it, they do so not by proposing evidence in its favour, but by treating us to apologies for the lack of evidence, to dogmatic assertions, prophecies, suppositions, and vague language conveying no definite information. We are told, for instance, that if certain kinds of matter manifest vital phenomena, this is because of "their molecular machinery, worked by their molecular forces." This would be all very well as a sentence introductory to a description of the machinery and the forces, showing them to be such as would produce the phenomena in question. But, as it stands, it is on a par with, *e.g.*, an assertion that the battle of Waterloo was lost by the French because of the state of the weather, made by a person ignorant what the state of the weather was, and ignorant what influence it had, if any, on the defeat of the French army ; for it is at the same time admitted, that of this molecular machinery not a trace has ever been seen, that only the merest generalities can be inferred about it, and that these generalities are even ludicrously insufficient to form the basis of a train of reasoning of which the physical theory of life shall be the conclusion. If we complain of this, we are told, with perfect justice, that it arises from the inherent difficulties of the subject—from the extreme minuteness of the molecules, the scanty and precarious

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\* Mill's Logic, Book iii. ch. xiv. § 7.

character of our knowledge of their movements, and the impossibility of knowing what these movements are when the molecules are combined in the unknown but doubtless complex manner in which they are combined in protoplasm. This is a very excellent reason for not accusing the investigators of negligence; but, as it is not evidence for the molecular theory, but an apology for the lack of it, it is one of the worst possible reasons for accepting their conclusions. We are then assured that evidence will be hereafter forthcoming. Forthcoming evidence, however, is not evidence until it comes. And what ground can there possibly be for believing that evidence will hereafter be forthcoming, except present evidence looking the same way? If this present evidence is not conclusive, or if no evidence at present exist, this state of things is not altered by predictions, which, if they have any weight at all, have weight only from present evidence. And by the time that we are, in the last resort, informed that there are privileged spirits who can investigate Nature by imagination, and explain her hitherto hidden mysteries by a process of divination, it has become plain to the meanest understanding that nonsense is being substituted for science. "Has Science," very pertinently asks Dr. Beale, "has Science, with her *observation*, her *experimental* method, and her *facts*, really been brought to this?" "The formation of tissue," he says in another place,\* "has been attributed to 'vacuolation' and 'differentiation,' and these polysyllables have lately been superseded [?] by the still more vague terms, 'subtle influences,' and 'external conditions,' and 'sundry circumstances.' And it has been affirmed that to the 'primitive properties of the molecules,' and 'natural selection'† may be referred all the varying forms and structures known to us, as well as all the phenomena of the living world. But such terms explain nothing. By their use further enquiry is discouraged, and the mind bent upon investigating the secrets of nature is misled at the very outset." Declarations that the tissues of living beings are formed by "subtle influences" and "sundry circumstances" would be invaluable, no doubt, if the persons making them could tell us any more than other men of science can as to what the "subtle influences" and "sundry circumstance" are. But the idea that any information is conveyed by statements so trivial as that vital phenomena are produced by "sundry circumstances" and "subtle influences," or that such statements are capable of supporting any theory of life whatever, only shows how even those whose mental training might be supposed to have put them out of the reach of such a danger, are liable to be imposed upon by mere words and phrases, and to confound verbal with real explanation. Again, the history of the formation of tissue is, according to Van Baër's law, a history of differentiations; so that tissue is formed by differentiation, not in the sense that differentiation is the cause of tissue formation, but that it is the manner of it. It is, however, the cause that is in question when we are examining theories on the nature of the agency which produces vital phenomena; and in the sense of

\* Page 58.

† Natural selection is, however, a *causa vera*. The question is about the extent of its operation, and the presence in this or that case of the conditions of its operation.

cause, it is as ridiculous to say that tissue is formed by differentiation as it would be to say that the earth's annual revolution round the sun is the cause of its going round that body once a year.

The character of the arguments—if arguments they can be called—used to support the physical theory of life are thus insufficient even appreciably to diminish the initial presumption against it. It is Dr. Beale's object in his Essay to supplement this presumption by a variety of special facts and arguments into which we cannot enter, but the general character of "The Mystery of Life" will have been abundantly evident from the above observations.

*The Scripture Doctrine of Creation: with reference to Religious Nihilism and Modern Theories of Development.* By the Rev. T. R. BIRKS. London: The Christian Evidence Committee of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1872.

IN this little volume (which we notice partly on account of the magnitude of the interests involved, and partly as a fair sample of the manner in which the conflict with unbelief is being carried on by its non-Catholic opponents) the Author, the fact, and the manner of creation are treated of, the speculations of Mr. Herbert Spencer being attacked under the first two heads, the Darwinian theory and the hypothesis of creation by law under the third. As Mr. Spencer also holds the Darwinian theory, and as it is in the form in which it is propounded by him that it is attacked in "The Scripture Doctrine of Creation," we may indeed say that it is to certain of Spencer's speculations as are dangerous to religion that the volume before us purports to be a popular answer.

To begin with, why does Mr. Birks take the Scripture doctrine of Creation as the keynote of his opposition to Herbert Spencer? This he himself explains at the commencement of his fourth chapter:—

"In the beginning God created heaven and earth. These words are the simple and sublime fountain-head of the mighty river of divine revelation. They claim, then, the deepest attention and the most careful study from every thinking Christian. In their original order they teach in succession four great truths, a beginning, an act of creation, a Divine Creator, and the reality of a created universe. And they exclude five speculative falsehoods: that nothing can be known of God or the origin of things; that there is nothing but uncreated matter; that there is no God distinct from His creatures; that creation is a series of acts without a beginning; and that there is no real universe; or, more briefly, Nihilism, Materialism, Pantheism, Evolutionism, and Negative Idealism." (p. 78.)

But Herbert Spencer's speculations can be called Nihilism only if an extremely odd signification be given to the word *Nihil*. He does not, any more than any one else, deny that anything exists; and therefore Nihilism is not a fitting term whereby to designate either his speculations or those of any other person. What he asserts is that clear and definite knowledge, know-



ledge properly so called, is of the phenomenal alone, and that although a dim, underlying, all-mysterious something manifests itself to us in all phenomena whether of our own minds or of the material universe, this something is, strictly speaking, unknowable, inasmuch as only a vague and indistinct apprehension of it, which cannot properly be called knowledge, is attainable. The whole bearing of these declarations manifestly depends on the sense in which the word phenomenon is taken. Derived from *φαῖνω*, its natural meaning would seem to be that which shows or reveals itself, a premiss, a *datum*, a material of knowledge. In this meaning of the word it is plain that we can know only phenomena, i. e. things appearing, and whatever can be legitimately concluded from them; and it is also evident, not only that we can have no knowledge of the ultra-phenomenal, but also that we can have no reason for asserting that anything beyond the phenomenal exists. But then in this sense the Divine Nature would be mediately a phenomenon; which everyone would feel to be a strange way of speaking. And in this signification phenomenon is not so commonly used; it is usually taken to denote quantities, qualities, and relations, as distinguished from the substance or substances in which they inhere. It is in this second sense that the term is employed by Herbert Spencer; and the gist of this part of his philosophy therefore is that our knowledge extends only to quantities, qualities, and relations, and that although a mysterious something lies beyond these, it lies also beyond the limits of our knowledge. In other words, his philosophy is a philosophy of knowledge of the phenomenal and nescience of the ultra-phenomenal, and may, therefore, with reference to the distinctive part of it, be called a Philosophy of Nescience.

Mr. Birks's little book consists of three parts. In the first, which is composed of three chapters, two on "Religious Nescience," and a third on "The Alleged Law of Scientific Progress," he attacks the position that God cannot be known. By the alleged law of scientific progress he means Auguste Comte's celebrated fancy that every science starts from a theological stage in which it supposes that the phenomena with which it deals are effects of the volitions of some conscious being or beings; passes through a metaphysical stage in which it refers them to metaphysical abstractions such as force, the powers of nature, etc.; and rests in a positive stage, in which it confines itself to the phenomena themselves, and declares it unscientific to refer them to any non-phenomenal cause whatsoever. This idea he supposes to be held also by Herbert Spencer; but erroneously; for Mr. Spencer has in his essay on the classification of the sciences condemned it as a faulty generalization, and given some very excellent reasons for dissenting from it. However, in the latter part of the chapter he successfully attacks Herbert Spencer's own hasty and equally faulty generalization that the religious history of man is the history of a progress towards complete recognition of the fact that the office of religion is to contemplate "the Unknowable." But the value of his criticisms is considerably diminished by the circumstance that he has not used the last (third) edition of "First Principles," in which some of the passages he objects to are suppressed.

What Mr. Birks calls Religious Nihilism we should prefer to call

Religious Nescience,—meaning by Nescience a dim and vague apprehension as distinguished on the one hand from entire and complete ignorance, and on the other from knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Mr. Spencer's "Unknowable" is the nearest approach he ever makes to the idea of a God, and, in fact, his opinion as to this Unknowable in parts remind one of the opinions held by some of the less orthodox Scholastics, that our concepts of the Divine Attributes in no wise resemble the Divine Attributes themselves [*conceptus æquivocus Dei*], e.g., that we call God wise not because there is in Him anything in any way corresponding to the most perfect wisdom which can be conceived by us, but because He produces the effects which would be produced by the most perfect wisdom. Nay, some of the arguments which Mr. Spencer employs are even the same as were formerly used by these Scholastics,\* whose opinion has long ago been exploded. And the state of mind in which his speculations about this "Unknowable" would leave a perfectly docile disciple, is one very far removed from a state of entire and complete ignorance. Such a condition would be, for instance, that in which a person would find himself, who, for the first time, and without any knowledge of Latin, beheld the word *homo*. In the first place, he would not know whether it meant anything at all; and in the second place, supposing it to mean something, he would have not the slightest idea what it did or did not mean: it might signify, for anything he knew to the contrary, dirty water, first love, howsoever, or a bean-stalk. In like manner complete ignorance about the Unknowable would be not to have the least notion whether it existed or not, or, if it existed, what it was like. But according to Mr. Spencer, we know of this Unknowable at least that it exists; and this, if not much, is at any rate something; we also know that it is mysterious, which is something more; and we are told† that the contemplation of it is an essentially religious act, so that whatever its nature is, its nature must be such that it is religious to contemplate it. We learn‡ from the same teacher that it is "the Absolute," "the Ultimate Reality," "the Ultimate Cause," an "Incomprehensible Power," to the presence of which we are unable to think of limits,§ and that if it does not possess personality, the assumption that the choice is between personality and something lower is erroneous, for the choice is rather between personality and something higher.|| It would also appear that if what we call consciousness is not predicable of it, the choice is in like manner not between consciousness and something lower, but rather between consciousness and something higher; for Mr. Spencer informs us that it puts thoughts into people's minds, and more than that, that "when the unknown cause produces in" a man "a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief."¶ And if he said, in his "Principles of Biology,"\*\* that an enormous mass of the provisions of organic nature "imply malevolence rather than benevolence," we are happy to say that he

\* Compare "First Principles" (Williams & Norgate, 1870), pp. 109-113, with Occam, *In Sententias*, l. 1, d. 3, &c.

† "First Principles," p. 99, &c. ‡ "First Principles," p. 96, &c.

§ "First Principles," p. 99. || p. 109. ¶ p. 123. \*\* p. 344.

has apparently changed his opinion, for he tells us in his "First Principles" \* that he is "convinced that all punishment, as we see it wrought out in the order of nature, is but a disguised beneficence:" which is obviously enough a sufficient basis for the ordinary argument for the continuance of our existence in another life. Now, whatever this theory may be,† it is certainly most inappropriate to call it Religious Nihilism; and if it is called Religious Nescience, and the Being of whom Mr. Spencer makes the declaration which we have quoted is denominated the Unknowable, it must not be forgotten that Nescience is not taken to mean absolute ignorance, and that knowledge is used in a special and peculiar sense in which it signifies a knowledge more clear, exact, and complete than these declarations imply.

The conclusion, that the ultra-phenomenal somewhat of which so much is made in the Philosophy of Nescience is unknowable, is arrived at by means of two lines of argument, of which the first is that knowledge is only of the relative,‡ and that the Ultimate Cause is absolute. But if the validity of this argument, which is in reality only a jumble of words, be conceded, much more than the Ultimate Cause will have to be excluded from knowledge; for we must hold ourselves incapable of knowing not only the supposedly non-relative Ultimate Reality,§ but also anything else which may be absolute. This, consequently, Mr. Spencer admits; and supports his conclusion by a second line of argument, that whenever we attempt to realize the non-relative in thought we fall necessarily into insoluble contradictions.

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\* "First Principles," p. 120.

† Mr. Spencer's "Unknowable" which he prints with a capital letter, as he does its congeners, "the Ultimate Reality," etc., often reminds us of the *Tò Ἐν καὶ Πάν* of the Pantheists, which underlies all phenomena: e.g., "First Principles," p. 113, speaks of the "indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence."

‡ "The relativity of human knowledge," says Mr. Mill in his "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," chap. ii, "like most other phrases into which the word relative or relation enters, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings. . . . When, therefore, a philosopher lays great stress upon the relativity of our knowledge, it is necessary to cross-examine his writings and compel them to disclose in which of its many degrees of meaning he understands the phrase."—An observation very useful to anyone who should undertake an examination of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy. It may be added that while Mr. Spencer declares that we have definite consciousness only of the relative, he admits a vague and indefinite consciousness of the non-relative also.—(F. P. p. 87.)

§ The "Ultimate Reality" will often remind the reader of *Substance*; and the assertions about its unknowableness of the declarations which have been current since the time of Locke respecting the unknowableness of substance. As a matter of fact, however, we know substance just as much as we know attribute, as any one may convince himself by a little reflection. It is true we cannot know substance apart from attribute, but then just as little can we know attribute apart from substance; we know both only in conjunction, and so we know both. But although we cannot know the one aloof from the other, yet when the two are presented together in apprehension we can attend to the one while we pay but little attention to the other, although we are conscious of its presence. And if we thus isolate some simple attribute,

According to Mr. Spencer, for instance, we can have an idea of a relative beginning of existence, a beginning, that is relative to this or that existence ; but an absolute beginning, a beginning, that is, of all phenomenal existence, creation, and the absence of an absolute beginning, are alike, to use a favourite word of his, *unthinkable* by us. This is only one out of many alleged necessary and insoluble contradictions which he brings forward, and which Mr. Birks attacks with more or less good fortune ; the more difficult of solution among them are merely borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel ; those which are original to Spencer himself are plain and therefore somewhat contemptible fallacies, and if they were as impregnable as he imagines them to be, their effect would be to destroy his own theory, by leaving no room for the positive statements respecting "the Unknowable" which we have quoted above.

Herbert Spencer's position that an absolute beginning of the universe and its existence through infinite past time are equally unthinkable, brings us to the second part of Mr. Birks's book, in which he treats of the fact of creation attacking the opinion that nothing can be known respecting the origin of things. This part, which consists of four chapters, completes the treatment of "Religious Nihilism." The first of these chapters is entitled "The Beginning"; its object is to prove that not only is it not inconceivable that there should have been an absolute beginning to the whole series of changes which the universe presents to us, but also that science favours such a supposition, while it is metaphysically impossible that past time should have been infinite :—an assertion better left out, and savouring too much of the system of thought contended against. The three succeeding chapters are on "The Creation of Matter," "Infinite Space," and "Force, Law, and Necessity." "Materialism, in its naked form, hardly deserves a formal refutation." It is "a maggot theory of the universe," a "dirt philosophy," as one might

*e.g.*, a red *minimum visibile*, we are conscious only of three things respecting it : that it exists ; that it is known by us ; and that it has, or is, a peculiar *talitas*, if we may so speak, which is commonly to be expressed only by the name of the attribute, and is in the above case redness. If, however, we in like manner isolate some particular substance, *e.g.*, the *Ego*, we find that we are here also conscious of these three things, and neither more nor fewer : that it exists ; that it is known by us ; and that it has a peculiar *talitas*, which, when we compare it with other objects of thought, we find not to exist in them. So that what we know of attribute, that we know of substance ; and if we say that we know more of attributes than we do of substances, this is because there are more attributes than there are substances, and because a multitude of relations arise in thought when we compare attributes together. The *Ego* itself, for instance, is but one, while it has for attributes an infinity of emotions, volitions perceptions, &c. ; and therefore we know more of these than we do of it, just as we know a greater number of facts concerning a particular branch of study, *e.g.*, mathematics, than we do concerning any one single part of it, *e.g.*, the properties of the straight line. And this appears to be the true reason of the misapprehension that we have no knowledge of substance. Besides, to know that a thing is a substance is of comparatively little use ; to know what its attributes are is practically all-important ; to that we pay more attention to this second head of knowledge than to the first.

say. It therefore naturally has recourse to "Nihilism," in order to conceal a little of its shame; for "God may perhaps be only matter, and matter may perhaps be the only God, if the true nature of God and of matter is equally inscrutable, and veiled from us for ever in total darkness." So, in order to refute Materialism, our author attempts to determine what the real nature of matter is; the theory adopted being that of Boscovitch. The argument against Materialism and for Theism, which can now be securely brought forward, is thus seen to rest on two simple premises, that "it is impossible to avoid making the assumption of self-existence somewhere," and that "this conception wholly disagrees with the known characters of material atoms, their almost inconceivable number, their minuteness, unconsciousness, and dependence." The creation of matter was the endowing of positions with force (p. 126), as indeed anyone who follows Boscovitch must hold. But if we would to the best advantage maintain the createdness of matter, we must reject certain errors about infinite space: whence the chapter on that subject. "The conception of space as a real existence, prior to matter, and independent of the Divine will, seems often to be a covert defence of Atheistic Materialism. If this mighty void,—Infinite Space,—has a real and necessary existence before any creation, and wholly independent of the Creator, is it much harder to conceive that matter, the shifting and variable contents of this Infinite Space, may also be uncreated, and exist from all eternity?" The difficulty is met by a conclusion (p. 137) which differs only verbally from the Scholastic thesis that space (*Spatium imaginarium*) is the possibility of extended substance, and to this is tacked on a fanciful speculation that the fact of space having three dimensions strengthens the Theistic argument, for that these three dimensions typify the three persons of the Blessed Trinity. Force, Law, and Necessity are then considered, because on the view taken of them "the main contrast between the Scripture doctrine of creation and the theories of modern scepticism turns."

The third part, which deals with the theory of evolution, and treats of the manner of creation, consists, like the second, of four chapters, an introductory chapter on "Creation and Life" being followed by three chapters on "Creation and Evolution," "Evolution as an Inductive Theory," and "Creation by Law." The burden of this last chapter is that creation by law is, in reality, a contradiction in terms (p. 249), which is a good verbal criticism; and the main positions assailed in the second and third are set forth in the following passage from Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Biology":—

"The belief in special creations of organisms is a belief that arose among men during the era of profoundest darkness, and belongs to a family of beliefs which have nearly all died out as enlightenment has increased. It is without a solitary established fact on which to stand, and when the attempt is made to put it into definite shape, it turns out to be only a pseudo-idea. The mere verbal hypothesis, which men idly accept as real or thinkable, is of the same nature as would be one based on a day's observation of human life, that each man or woman was specially created, an hypothesis not suggested by evidence, but by lack of evidence, formulating absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive knowledge. This hypothesis, wholly

without support, essentially inconceivable, and thus failing to satisfy men's intellectual need, fails also to satisfy their moral sentiment. It is quite inconsistent with those conceptions of the divine nature which they profess to entertain. *If infinite power was to be demonstrated, then either by the special creation of individuals, or the production of species after a method akin to that of individuals, it would be better demonstrated than by the two methods the hypothesis assumes to be necessary.* If infinite goodness was to be demonstrated, not only do the provisions of organic structure, if specially devised, fail to demonstrate it, but there is an enormous mass of them which imply malevolence rather than benevolence.

Thus the hypothesis of special creations turns out to be worthless ; worthless by its derivation, worthless in its intrinsic incoherence, worthless as absolutely without evidence, worthless as not supplying an intellectual need, worthless as not satisfying a moral want. \*"—p. 344.

We conclude by extracting two passages, which contain Mr. Birks's reply to the sentence we have underlined. The first is the answer to that part of it which concerns special creation of each individual ; the second the answer to that concerning the evolution of species :—

"The first maxim of Christian Theism is that the design of creation is to glorify the great Creator by the wonderful works of His hands. This end must be secured, in the largest degree, by every increase in the fulness and variety of the gifts He bestows ; but subject to this one condition,—that the mode of their bestowment shall not wholly conceal their true source, and make it easy and natural to rest in second causes, and ascribe to them an origin independent of the Creator's will and good pleasure. The creation of plants and animals, with an imparted power to increase and multiply in successive generations without limit, plainly magnifies the power, wisdom, and foresight of the Creator in a very high degree. The gift of parentage, in every case, amplifies and redoubles the simpler gift of being. Nor is this the only gain. That scheme of nature, over which man is gifted with sovereignty and large control, is vastly extended, compared with a constant creation of individual plants and animals, by which all the higher arts of human life would at once expire. Human existence is enriched and ennobled by various ties of race, brotherhood, conjugal and parental love, and filial honour and obedience, far beyond what a scheme of mere individualism could attain."—pp. 212, 213.

"Its disciples [*i.e.*, the disciples of the evolution system] maintain that it

\* The modesty of these assertions, remarks Mr. Birks, needs no comment Undoubtedly ; for it is idle to comment on the non-existent. The first head worthless by derivation, would considerably enlarge the field of discussion ; for it would array against Mr. Spencer the evidences for Revelation, as, if special creations are supported by Revelation, it is beside the mark to urge that the revelation was made before Mr. Darwin's speculations became popular with a certain class of persons. The second, that special creations are inconceivable, is merely an example of a bad habit of Mr. Spencer's, to call things inconceivable which are not inconceivable at all. The third, that they are without evidence, begs the question. As to the last, infinite goodness, wisdom and power, must have foreknown the consequences of the evolving process which it nevertheless set agoing ; so that if anything—*e.g.*, the existence of venomous animals—would on the hypothesis of special creations imply malevolence, it would on the hypothesis of evolution imply the same thing. We cannot, however, agree with Mr. Birks that evolution weakens the argument from design by spreading the design over a longer tract of time. For the quantity of design remains the same.



is unworthy of the Divine Workman to construct the machine of the universe in such a way as to need repeated repairs from His more immediate hand; and that it would be a nobler triumph of wisdom and power to construct it from the first as complete and perfect in its own latent powers, as to need no corrective or interference whatever. The reasoning would be sound, if we were at liberty to assume that the whole aim of the Creator is to form a wonderful piece of machinery, and not to reveal Himself to intelligent moral creatures, made in His own image. It is a scheme of providence, which implies that God is only the Supreme Carpenter of the universe, but not the Supreme Lawgiver, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords. To reveal a more perfect and wonderful mechanical skill and physical foresight, by throwing back every act of creative power to innumerable ages before the birth of man,—to hide Himself wholly from view by the very depth of His engineering skill, and leave mankind nothing within their reach to gaze upon but self-evolving powers of matter alone, might be a wise scheme of providence, if the purpose of God were only to develop a race of self-satisfied atheists. But certainly it is not the likeliest plan to weaken the notes of that celestial song from the dwellers upon earth; 'Thou art worthy to receive honour, and glory, and power; for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created.'"

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*Hints and Facts on the Origin, Condition, and Destiny of Man.* By PIUS MELIA, D.D. Second edition.

IN this edition (pp. xiv.-xxii.), Dr. Melia replies to the comment on his first edition, which we published in April 1872 (pp. 459, 460). We understand the respected writer to disavow one opinion, which we had thought not sufficiently repudiated by his language; and we will therefore do no more than express more at length what we urged in reference to that opinion.

Dr. Melia had said that social teaching is absolutely necessary to the first development of the faculties of speech and reason, as it is clearly proved that when social teaching has not been afforded, no speech is acquired nor the faculty of reason awakened. On this we remarked—

"We wish he had explained where lies the precise difference between what he here intends to express and the disapproved Louvain traditionalism. Our readers will find the doctrine of the four Louvain professors, as put forth by themselves, in our number for April 1869 (pp. 532-536). And in regard to the authoritative disapproval of this doctrine, we would refer to the documents published by us in January 1868." (pp. 281-288).

We will here add that doctrine of the Louvain professors to which we referred, as expressed by themselves. The italics also are theirs:—

"Mens humana vi pollet internâ sibi que propriâ; per se et continuo actiosa est; attamen, ut homo hâc mente præditus perveniat ad expeditum usum rationis, opus habet externo aliquo intellectuali auxilio. Itaque opinamur, principia veritatum rationalium, metaphysicarum ac moralium, a Deo conditore humanæ menti indita esse; at simul arbitramur, hanc esse mentis nostræ legem naturalem sive psychologiam, ut homo *indigeat institutione*

aliquâ *intellectuali* ad obtinendum eum rationis usum, qui illi sufficiat ut distinctam Dei et veritatum moralium cognitionem sibi comparare possit. Non negamus, humanæ menti absque illâ institutione inesse confusum quemdam harum veritatum sensum, et vagam quamdam apprehensionem; sed loquimur hic de verâ cognitione, hoc est, de clarâ et certâ illarum veritatum notitiâ acquirendâ. *Institutionem* autem intelligimus externam quodvis intellectuale auxilium, sive de industriâ, sive non datâ operâ præstitum, idque sive voce, sive scripto, sive gestu, sive alio quovis modo, quem sociale commercium suppeditat. *Indigentiam* porro intelligimus *absolutam*; at non eo sensu, ut putemus, Deum non potuisse aliter condere hominem, sed eo sensu, ut putemus, esse eam indigentiam omnibus hominibus, quales nunc nascuntur, communem. Hanc vero absolutam institutionis indigentiam extare affirmamus, si sermo sit de expedito rationis usu acquirendo; minime vero dicimus quod e contra falsum putamus, singularum veritatum ordinis naturalis cognitionem ope institutionis esse comparandam: nam ubi homo jam usu suæ rationis reapse fruitur, ipse suâ solâ ratione quamplurimus veritates detegere atque cognoscere potest. Præterea notamus institutionem illam, quam dicimus ex nostrâ sententiâ, non esse habendam tamquam *efficientem causam per quam* homo perveniat ad expeditum rationis suæ usum, sed tamquam *meram conditionem sine quâ* non possit ad expeditum illum usum pervenire; quemadmodum, verbi gratia, aer, calor, humor requiruntur tamquam *conditio sine quâ* non possit manifestari vita, quæ in aliquo grano seminis reapse inest, sed involuta ac latens."

It will be seen by any one who reads the documents published by us in January, 1868, that, according to a response given by Cardinal Patrizi in the Pope's name, this doctrine has been theologically condemned by the Holy See; and we are very glad to record that Dr. Melia disavows it (p. xvii.).

*Etruscan Inscriptions analysed, translated, and commented upon.* By ALEX. EARL OF CRAWFORD and BALCARRES, LORD LINDSAY, &c. London: Murray. 1872.

THE object of this book, we are told, is not so much to give an accurate interpretation of Etruscan inscriptions, as to show that the language employed in those inscriptions is an ancient form of German, and thus to corroborate another argument derived from independent sources; namely that the Etruscans are a branch of the Teutonic race. The present volume was originally intended for private circulation only, but it has now been given to the public in order to prepare the way for a still more important work, in which the ancient German is employed as an instrument of etymological and mythological comparison and analysis. For, to employ the ancient German in this way, as the author points out, it is first of all necessary to prove "that it stands upon a par in point of antiquity with Greek and Latin, Zendic and Sanscrit, and that its written, or rather engraved monuments are centuries older than the Gospels of Ulphiles."

The Earl of Crawford and Balcarres is not the first to point out that the Etruscan is an Indo-European or even a Teutonic language, Dr. Pritchard, Mr. Bunbury, Dr. Donaldson, and others, having preceded him in more or

less definitely maintaining the same theory. Thus Dr. Pritchard, in his "Physical History of Mankind," although confessing that researches into the history of the Etruscans have hitherto failed, admits that "all that can be inferred as tolerably well established respecting the Etruscan dialect is, that it belongs to the class of Indo-European languages." Mr. Bunbury also, in his article on Etruria in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, is of opinion that so far as we are able to form a judgment in the present state of our knowledge, although distinct from the Pelasgic or Greek family of languages on the one hand, and from that of the Umbrians, Oscans, and Latins on the other, there are good reasons for believing the many ingredients of the Etruscan to belong to the same great family, or to the class of languages, commonly known as the Indo-Teutonic." Dr. Donaldson indeed in his "Varronianus" goes still further, and connects the Etruscans with the Low-German and Scandinavian race, after a comparison of their language with the Scandinavian or Icelandic as existing in the ninth century. (Etruscan Inscriptions, note pp. 7, 8, 9.)

In the present volume, however, the learned author has approached the subject from a different point of view, "having resorted to a more remote and comprehensive field of general Teutonic antiquity, and having also, as he himself believes, "arrived at a distinct ethnological inference, and, indeed, specific conclusion as to the origin" of the Etruscans.

"Dr. Donaldson's argument," he tells us, "was, in fact, derived exclusively from comparison of language, leaving all other prior arguments from the patronymic 'Tyrrheni' or 'Thoringa,' from the correspondence of religious sympathies and usages, and from national character and institutions, untouched. The fact appeared to me that we had approached the subject from different points of view, from two opposite poles of the compass; he from the South, as a professed scholar, laying siege in due form to the walls and traditions of Tarquinii, with classical erudition and philological learning to which I could make no pretensions, and upon which he appeared to me in many instances to draw too readily and exclusively, when illustrations far more close and to the purpose—under one's very nose indeed—were to be found in the oldest Teutonic speech; but I myself from the North, as a roving Viking, ranging in my galley from shore to shore, seeking out our ancient kinsmen, and perhaps too rash and precipitate in the first instance in grasping by the hand, when I thought that I had recognized them, but with the advantage of starting from the cradle from which they also started in times of old, and of being preoccupied with the speech and traditions of our common Thoringa and Teuton forefathers rather more than with those of more polished races, whose claims could not have a more learned or more accomplished advocate than Dr. Donaldson." (Note, p. 9.)

Again:—

"Thus much I have been obliged to say in justice to myself with reference to the general theory I advocate [the author is alluding to instances in which Dr. Donaldson and others may have anticipated him]; but as regards the special application of this theory, I need fetter my lips by no such explanation. It has been allowed on all sides that it could not be asserted with absolute confidence that the Etruscan language was really and truly German till a sufficient number of the inscriptions had been analysed and found to render a clear and unmistakable response in that sense to the test applied

to them; and this test has now, I venture to say, for the first time, been effectually, however inadequately applied—but only as the last link in a long chain of previous induction." (*Ibid.*)

Some years ago the author, as he tells us (p. 3), had traced out and established "the links of descent in the Aryan race as represented by the three great families, which he styled, after the names of their respective eponymy in the ascending chain, the Thoringa, the Hruinga, and the Totinga. It was in the course of these investigations that he became convinced, "by the convergence of almost every description of historical evidence, that the Tyrrheni or Etruscans belonged to the Thoringa family, and must consequently have been closely akin to the Tervingi, Thuringi, Tyrki (or pre-Odinite Northmen), and other Teutonic tribes, although come off from the common stock, bearing the Thoringa name at an extremely remote period. The Rhæti or Rasenic branch of the great stock known to the ancients as Etruscan similarly belonged,—so I inferred,—to the Hruinga family, and the general result I came to was, that the Tyrrheni and the Rhæti were the representatives, especially in the South, of the Tervingi and Grutingi, latterly known as Visigoths and Ostrogoths, in the North and West of Europe."

It became therefore a most important question, whether the Etruscan language bore out this induction or contradicted it. In order to determine this, the author began with the single words "transmitted to us by the ancients as Etruscan, and of which they have given us the interpretations in Greek or Latin." The result, we are told, proved that they all had a corresponding sense, not only in the Aryan and Japhetan tongues generally, but also more particularly in ancient German. The next step was to test the names of the Etruscan Gods, and of the old cities of Etruria. The result again proving that in repeated instances the latter more particularly corresponded "with the natural features of the country, and with the symbolism of coins, and other *indicia*, as reflected in the same Teutonic idiom." The same process was also applied "to the words connected with those Roman institutions which the classical writers especially inform us were derived from Etruria, the result being still the same. Lest, however, such words might have incurred disguise and corruption in transmission and transcription, the author determined to examine in like manner "the inscriptions written in the unmistakable original dialect." These then were accordingly tested, with a no less gratifying result; and having been re-examined are, together with others similarly tested, now given to the public in the handsome volume before us.

It is only fair to the author to add, that he himself wishes it to be understood that he has no pretensions to speak with authority in linguistic matters. He has, he thinks, but discovered and opened the door into the treasury of the Etruscan language, and he leaves it to "the Great Masters of the Linguistic Science . . . to enter in and take possession, to reduce the language to its grammar, to elaborate its lexicon, and to determine its exact place on the genealogical tree of German speech, preparing the way for inquiries in which jurists, mythologists, and the leaders of kindred schools of study in Comparative Archæology will have to take part."

The inscriptions chosen for analysis are as follow:—1. Two very ancient

ones—the first of them discovered at Cære, and both of them generally looked upon as Pelasgian, but which the author believes to be likewise fundamentally Teutonic; also one or two more from Cære. 2. An archaic inscription, purely Etruscan, found near Tarquinii. 3. An inscription painted on an *amphora*, representing the parting of Alcestis and Admetus. 4. A series of inscriptions on votive offerings. 5. A selection from sepulchral inscriptions, some of them bilingual. 6. Two inscriptions relating to land tenure, found one of them at Volterra, the other at Perugia.\*

To the reader unacquainted with philology some of the interpretations will, no doubt, appear arbitrary enough, nor will his scepticism be lessened when he discovers how very much the various interpretations offered for the same inscription differ from one another; as, for instance, in the following purely Etruscan inscriptions on the Alcestis and Admetus *amphora*, discovered at Vulci:—

EKA : ERSKE : NAK : ACHRUM : PHLERTHRKE :

which reads, according to our author, "I pursue, or attack, the guarantor "[Alcestis]" through breach of engagement [on the part of Admetus, the principal] to appear at the fixed time of citation;" but, according to Dr. Donaldson, "This earthen vessel in the ground is a votive offering of sorrow" (Varronian, p. 209); while, if Mr. Dennis is to be trusted, it reads, "Lo! she saves him from Acheron, and makes an offering of herself!" (Cities of Etruria, vol. i. p. xc. quoted by Earl of Crawford, &c., p. 40).† Still, we

\* Etruscan being exclusively a monumental language, it labours under a great disadvantage as to specimens of grammatical structure, but this notwithstanding, sufficient proofs are given in the Appendix (pp. 311, 312), that it was similar to that of the Teutonic languages.

† The inscription is thus analysed by the author. EKA : ERSKE : NAK—EKA-NAK, a compound, answering (whether, as the first person singular of the present tense of a verb, or as a derivative noun, is uncertain) to *nach hangen*—to pursue, hang upon,—but with the elements of the compound in the reverse order to that we are familiar with in German. The root *hang* might be traced further back, *e.g.* to *ag*, as in *ago*. II. ERSKE formed from *wer*, "cautio, vades," in modern German *gewähr*, akin to *wardscipe* (A.S) *werschaft*, and derived from *waren*, "cautionem adhibere."

THRKE, although written after PHLER without break, is a distinct vocable, as shown by many other examples. Compare *durch*, "per, through." TURKE, written also TRKE, constantly occurs in connection with some specified sin or penalty, and thus is not identical with *turge*, "fraus, dolus," still less with the Icelandic *tregi*, "dolor," as urged by Dr. Donaldson, who founds perhaps his strongest plea for the affinity of the Scandinavian and Etruscans on the argument "that the words *three* and *suthi*, constantly occurring on Etruscan monuments of a funereal character, are translated at once by the Icelandic synonyms *tregi* and *sut*, both signifying "grief," or "sorrow."

PHLER a word constantly found, like THRKE TURKE in the inscriptions upon votive offerings in atonement for guilt. It corresponds with *vlur*, equivalent to *verlust*, "damnum." Here, perhaps, it means loss in the sense of forfeiture.

ACHRUM, to be read ASCHRUM, and divided as ASCH-RUM.—I. ASCH, corresponds with *aischen*, *heischen*, "expetere, citare," *heischung*,

believe that the author, although perhaps he may not as yet have succeeded in opening the door to the treasury of Etruscan inscriptions, has at least found the key. At any rate, if it be once admitted that the Etruscan belongs to the Indo-Teutonic family of languages (and certainly the amount of evidence brought forward in support of this theory is very great; nay, it is the only theory which is *throughout* consistently satisfactory), we have little hesitation in saying that the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres is right in connecting it rather with continental Germany than with Scandinavia.\*

Nor does the wide difference to be met with in the interpretation of Etruscan inscriptions prove anything against this view. "For that an inability," says Dr. Donaldson, "to interpret ancient monuments may be consistent with a knowledge of the class of languages to which they belong is shown not merely by the known relationship between the language of the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Coptic dialects more recently spoken in that country, but still more strikingly by the fact that, although we have no doubt as to any of the idioms spoken in ancient Britain, no one has been able as yet to give a certain interpretation of the Runic inscriptions on the pillar of Bewcastle, and on the font at Bridekirk, which are both in Cumberland, and which both belong to the same dialect of the Low German language." (Varronian, pp. 215, sqq.) Dr. Donaldson, indeed, as we have seen, connects the Etruscan with Scandinavia; but, as the Earl of Crawford points out (note, p. 204), such affinities as really exist may be accounted for by the original unity of the various branches of the Thoringa or Thuringian family.

*aischung, aisch*—*e.* 'citatio,' this last word being almost identical with the Etruscan AISCH. II. RUM, answers to an ancient Teutonic word, *ram*, *rahm*, implying terminus, scopus, *gesetztes ziel*, prescribed limit (*up den ram*, signifying "tempore definito"), but including, in understanding and practice, the intervening *raum* or space of time and opportunity allowed to the person summoned, and constituting the *quernacht dwerchnacht*, or *zwerchracht* of old Teutonic law.

The author at one time connected NAK : THRKP with the *dwerchnacht* and only gave up this view with great reluctance. By similar understanding and practice this *ram*, "terminus," seems to have acquired the additional sense of pledge, or plight to appear, confirmed by the hand *ram*, "manus."

The above is, of course, only an abridgment of the author's analysis.

In reading this note the reader must bear in mind that it is not proposed to derive the Etruscan words from the Teutonic or German language proper, but from roots and verbal formations which, it is inferred, have existed in the mother Teutonic tongue, from which both German and Etruscan are descended (p. 241). At the same time the author is of opinion that, "in very many instances German (in the broadest sense), even as spoken at present, preserves the primitive forms of Aryan and Japhetan speech, with a purity and precision which are entirely abraded and worn down, even in the Sanscrit," and that therefore, "to say the least, German is the contemporary and sister of Sanscrit, Zendic, Latin, and Greek."

\* Thus, for example (inter alia), the word *pfaud* was used rather than *wad* for "pignus," and the god worshipped as Thor in Scandinavia, and as Donas and Thunaer by the ancient Saxons and Thuringians, appears as "Tunur" in the Etruscan inscription of S. Manno, near Perugia.—See p. 26.



In conclusion, we have to thank the author for the light he has thrown on a most interesting and important subject, hoping that what has now been done for the Etruscan tongue may also soon be done for the Basque, which has so long remained an outcast from every known family of languages.\*

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*Lives of the Saints.* By Rev. S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. March. London : John Hodges, 1872.

THE March volume of Mr. Baring-Gould's "*Lives of the Saints*" is now before us, and, like the preceding volumes, fully carries out the original intention of the author. In its own line, as a *compendium of valuable information about the Saints*, beautifully, simply, and reverentially written, this edition of the "*Lives of the Saints*" cannot fail to be productive of immense good ; and we wish it the widest possible circulation. We are bound, however, to confess that in this work, as indeed in most of Mr. Baring Gould's writings, there seems to us to be a certain want of depth of earnestness and holy unction, the presence of which, far from interfering with its beauty and simplicity, would greatly enhance its value. This does not arise in any way from want of reverence, but, as we believe, from the tone of the author's own mind, and still more, perhaps, from his inability as an Anglican, to realise the *fulness* of Christ as manifested in the holiest of His members.

We have an example of this in the way in which he treats the life of S. Joseph, the foster-father of our Lord, and the spouse of our Blessed Lady. Of course we all know that very little is told us in the Scripture about S. Joseph, but that little is so pregnant with suggestion, especially when looked at in the light of the Church's devotion to Him, that no Catholic writer could, we think, have been content with the meagre page which Mr. Baring-Gould devotes to his life. The saints of God live not only in their lives, but they live again in the life of the Catholic Church, reigning with

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\* We are sorry to be obliged to add that the author, who has shown himself so painstaking in all his researches, should in one short sentence have given utterance to three inaccuracies—to call them by no stronger term. Thus, in the concluding chapter, he says (p. 228),—"The first occasion of our visit to Volterra was in very early days—before Pio Nono had raised the cry of revolution in Europe, when he was still a simple monk in his cell at Imola, and when Gregory XVI. slumbered in S. Peter's chair at the Vatican." Now, to say that Pius IX. raised the cry of revolution in Europe is simply a calumny, betraying utter ignorance of contemporary history, while we need hardly remind our readers that the present Pontiff has never been a monk at all. As for Gregory XVI. slumbering in S. Peter's chair, the assertion is contradicted by the whole pontificate of that most vigilant and prudent Pope, who knew how to keep back with a firm hand the outburst of the revolution ; and at the same time—as in the case of the Emperor of all the Russias—to withstand the tyranny of the mightiest monarchs of the world. Anything but a "slumbering" Pontiff was Gregory XVI.

Christ and God. Hence it is that a Catholic mind, resting upon the Scripture narrative of S. Joseph's life as upon a sure foundation, naturally builds up upon it that second life of his, the result of which shows here to us how, eighteen hundred years and more since he fell asleep in the arms of Jesus and Mary, in his awful and yet most tender office as protector and pattern of the Universal Church. At the end of his brief notice, Mr. Baring-Gould tells us that the girdle of S. Joseph is said to be preserved among the sacred treasures of the Church at Joinville, in the diocese of Langres, and it is well. But it is something more to know, as every Catholic knows, that the mantle of S. Joseph is even now encircling the mystical body of our Lord in this its moment of bitter trial, as really and as truly as when once he wrapped it round His real body in the hour of cruel persecution. No Catholic life of S. Joseph can be complete without, at least, some account of the rise and development of the Church's devotion to him.

Again, Mr. Baring-Gould's position as an Anglican casts him off from the privilege of receiving certain facts, which every Catholic receives with loving trust. If we turn to the life of S. Joachim (March 20, p. 336), we shall find an instance of this:—

"Nothing whatever is known of S. Joachim," writes our author, "except what is related in the Apocryphal Gospels, whence the name is derived. It is probable, however, that his name was traditionally preserved and adopted by the author of the Apocryphal Gospels."

In the note also which precedes this short notice, we read that the Roman Breviary of 1522, published at Venice, contained it (the name) with special office, but this was expunged by Pope Pius V.; and in the Breviary of 1572 neither name nor office is to be found. Now, surely Mr. Baring-Gould cannot be ignorant that both the name and office are contained in the Roman Breviary at present in use, and that the Feast and Mass of S. Joachim are now celebrated on the Sunday within the octave of our Lady's Assumption. This fact ought not to have been held back. But to come to the notice itself. We ask, first of all, if it be probable that the name of S. Joachim was traditionally preserved, and adopted by the author (Why author? There were many authors) of the Apocryphal Gospels, why may not this also be true with regard to the facts of the Church contained in the writings of S. Epiphanius and S. John Damascene, and received into the lessons of her present Breviary. The Apocryphal Gospels are to some minds a perfect stumbling-block, yet really there is no difficulty with regard to them. No doubt they are not the true Gospels of Jesus Christ inspired by the Holy Ghost; no doubt also many errors and fables are contained in their pages; yet it by no means follows from this that they may not also contain many facts perfectly true handed down by tradition. Nay, it is almost impossible that it should be otherwise; for if S. John tells us that if all the things "which Jesus did were written every one—and this is no less true in their measure of the things connected with the Incarnation and the Gospel of Jesus,—the world itself, he thinks, would not be able to contain the books that should be written;" and if, S. Luke says, that "many have taken in hand to set forth a narration of the things that have been accomplished among us, according

as they have delivered them unto us, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word," it is simply impossible that a vast number of facts relating to our Lord's Incarnation—not contained in the inspired Gospels, which were written for a special purpose, and from which therefore only such facts were selected as seemed good to the Holy Ghost and the Apostles—should not also have been floating in the tradition of the Church from the very earliest times. Just as it is the Church alone that can determine the Canon of Holy Scripture; and as, according to S. Austin, we would not believe the Gospel were it not for the Church; so it is the Church alone that can determine which of the traditions handed down from the beginning are such as should be set before her children. Nay, to reject some facts,—such for instance, as the presentation of our Lady in the Temple, or her assumption into heaven, the latter of which many hearts are looking forward to see one day ruled as of faith, because it happens to be also contained in some Apocryphal Gospel,—would be almost as unreasonable as to reject some Gospel fact for the same reason. Both the Canon of Holy Scripture and tradition depend upon the judgment of the Church, and both alike must be determined by her authority. But then, alas!—would it were otherwise; we pray that it may soon be otherwise—our author does not recognize the authority of the *living Church*, with whom alone in this world belong the words of *Eterna Life*.

We observe that the life of S. Francesca Romana has been condensed from the admirable life of that saint by Lady Georgiana Fullerton, and that in treating of the birth-place of S. Patrick, the author follows the opinion which has been advocated in a past number of this Review.

Looked at from a literary point of view, one of the most beautiful lives is that of S. Euda of Orammore-Aran, the "home of pilgrims," and the resting-place of saints. It is taken from the Bishop of Ardagh's touching description of his visit to the holy island. We extract the following account of his celebration of the Holy Mass:—

"With the permission of the excellent priest who has charge of the island we resolved, on the last morning of our stay at Aran, to celebrate mass in the ruined church of Tiglash-Euda, where in the year 540 or 542, S. Euda was interred. The morning was bright and clear, and the rigid outlines of the rocks were softened by the touch of the early sunshine. The inhabitants of Killarney, exulting in the tidings that the holy sacrifice was once again to be offered to God near the shrine of their saint and patron, accompanied or followed us to the venerable ruins. The men, young and old, were clothed in decent black, or in garments of white stuff, with sandals of undressed leather, like those of the peasants in the Abruzzi, laced round their feet; the women were attired in gay scarlet gowns and blue bodices; and all wore a look of remarkable neatness and comfort. The small roofless church was soon filled to overflowing with a decorous and devout congregation. We can never forget the scene of that morning: the pure bright sand, covering the graves of unknown and unnumbered saints as with a robe of silver tissue; the delicate green foliage of the wild plants; on one side, the swelling hill crowned with the church of S. Benignus, and on the other the blue sea, that almost bathed the foundations of the venerable sanctuary itself; the soft balmy air that hardly stirred the ferns on the old walls; and the fresh, happy, solemn calm that reigned over all.

"The temporary altar was set up under the east window, on the site where

of old the altar stood; and then, in the midst of the loving and simple faithful within the walls which had been consecrated some twelve hundred years before, over the very spot of earth where so many of the saints of Ireland lay awaiting their resurrection to glory, the solemn rite of the Christian sacrifice was performed, and once more, as in the days of which S. Columba wrote, the angels of God came down to worship the Divine Victim in the churches of Aran." (Pp. 386-7.)

Most earnestly do we hope and pray that, before he has ended his holy labours, the author may be permitted to enjoy a still closer communion with the saints of heaven, by entering into communion with the one Church of Christ which is alone the mother of saints.

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*Life and Times of Sixtus the Fifth.* By BARON HÜBNER. Translated from the original French by JAMES F. MELINE. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1873. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS little work cannot in any sense be called a translation of Baron Hübner's admirable history; for not only, as we are told in the pre-fatory notice, are the purely political portions of the original—the minute relation of the intrigues and struggles of the foreign ambassadors at the court of Rome, and the details of minor ecclesiastical reforms almost wholly omitted, but even the biographical incidents are to a very great extent condensed. Nor can we give the same praise to Mr. Meline in the present instance which we so gladly gave to his life of Mary, Queen of Scots; for although he himself pleads that "the necessity of condensing whole chapters into a few paragraphs, and entire pages into as many lines, has compelled him not only to paraphrase, but in some cases to substitute his own language for that of Baron Hübner," and that "abridgment has also necessitated a fresh arrangement of chapters," yet the condensation is carried out on so large a scale that almost all trace of the original is lost, and the result is meagre in the extreme. There is, in consequence, too often a "jerkiness" about the sentences which is far from pleasant. We have no doubt, however, that those who are unable to read the original work, or the somewhat expansive, but most excellent, translation of it by Mr. Jerningham, will feel grateful for this little sketch of the great Franciscan Pontiff and of Rome in his day. We extract the following description of Cardinal Montalto at the moment of his elevation to St. Peter's chair:—

"At this moment Montalto did not look his sixty-five years. Of ordinary height, but somewhat bent, he appeared smaller than he really was. His head, comparatively large, sank somewhat between two broad shoulders; a forehead high and wrinkled, and arched; and tufted eyebrows shaded two small but brilliant eyes. There was a play of expression in his face, but none of features, which seemed rigid. A swarthy complexion, high-coloured cheeks, and prominent cheek-bones plainly bespoke his Slavonian descent, and his hair and long, auburn, and bushy, Franciscan beard were rapidly growing gray. His appearance was neither majestic nor attractive, but he deeply impressed every one who looked at him." (P. 37.)

When the newly-elected Pope was carried to S. Peter's, a Mass composed for the occasion by Palestrina, but hardly worthy of the great master, was performed by the Papal choir.

"The Pope perceived it. Even at that moment so full of emotion, Sixtus was sufficiently calm to listen to the music. 'Pierlingo,' said he, 'has forgotten Pope Marcello's Mass.'

"This biting criticism deeply hurt Palestrina, but it has since been ratified by competent judges. It was the first word uttered by the new Pope—just severe, and pitiless, as he was to his pontificate." (P. 38.)

*Mr. Lecky's Criticism of Mr. Froude's "English in Ireland."* (Macmillan's Magazine for January, 1872.) London and Cambridge: Macmillan.

WE hope in our next number to review carefully Mr. Froude's volume; meanwhile we heartily recommend Mr. Lecky's strictures on it to our readers' earnest attention. The author has in this paper displayed very few, if any, of those characteristics of his, which every Catholic regards as so objectionable; while his good qualities appear in the most favourable light. We quote a passage on the Irish character:—

"To the long night of trial through which [Irishmen then] passed, we may probably ascribe a great part of their noblest characteristics: a deep and fervent attachment to their creed, which no threats and no blandishments could shake; a spirit of reverence and simple piety, of cheerful content and of mutual charity under extreme poverty, such as few nations in Europe can equal. In this period, too, was gradually formed that high tone of female purity, which is their distinguishing and transcendent excellence, and which in the words even of this bitter enemy, is 'unparalleled probably in the civilized world.' To writers who [like Mr. Froude] judge the moral excellence of a race by its strength and by its success, all these qualities will rank but low in the scale of virtues. A larger and a wider philosophy will acknowledge, that no others do more to soften and purify the character, to lighten the burden of sorrow, and to throw a consoling lustre upon the darkness of the tomb." (p. 261.)

*The Gallican Church.* A History of the Church of France, from the Concordat of Bologna, A.D. 1516, to the Revolution. With an Introduction. By the Rev. W. HENLEY JERVIS, M.A., Prebendary of Heytesbury; Author of the "Student's History of France." 2 vols. London: Murray, 1872.

MR. JERVIS in beginning his history—and it is due to him to say that he has written a most interesting history—tells us, and most truly, that "religion in a shape peculiar to one section of the human family, or one territorial circumscription of the globe, is, *prima facie*, an idea foreign to the genius of Christianity." This is certainly a condemnation of Gallicanism; and though we think he forgets it occasionally, the author has drawn up a

formidable indictment against the peculiar opinions which so many Frenchmen once regarded as the glory of their country, but which is now irretrievably lost.

Mr. Jervis admits, and we see no reason for disputing his admission, that a certain nationalism is not only permissible, but inevitable, provided it be limited according to the rule he lays down, namely, that the "field of essential theological doctrine" be not touched. It is a safe and reasonable limitation, for it includes more than the actual definitions, and people who observe the rule will hardly ever err, because the extent of that "field" is to be determined not by private caprice, but by the declaration of him who is the ruler and teacher of the Church.

But the principle laid down by Mr. Jervis, we find interpreted in a way which includes within it the peculiar opinions known as Gallicanism. He thinks that the opinions which once prevailed in France were perfectly innocent and lawful; but as the reader of his book, by his help, is able to trace the course of those opinions, and to observe their effects, we do not think that he will be able to convince many that there is nothing radically wrong in them; seeing that they led to, and brought forth the great revolution in Church and State from which France has not yet recovered.

The French "opinions" according to Mr. Jervis—and here also we agree with him—"belong to the domain of ecclesiastical polity; relating chiefly to the nature and extent of the authority vested in the Apostolic See, and in the individual person of its Bishops." (P. 2.)

Now, we believe that Mr. Jervis here, has not quite ascertained the character of his own opinions. He holds and says that "the Kingdom of Christ is world-wide" (p. 1). He admits that the French Church is a part of that kingdom, and yet says that the French opinions on "the nature and extent of the authority" by which that kingdom is ruled, are innocent. It is difficult to conceive that doctrines about the authority of the Queen should prevail in one county of England which are not accepted in the others. The inhabitants, say of Essex, maintain that no appeals from their magistrates may be decided in Westminster Hall, and that no decisions of the Courts, or even Acts of Parliament, are of any value in Essex till the magistrates in Quarter Sessions allow them. This is a state of things that Mr. Jervis would hardly justify unless the inhabitants could show a privilege to that effect granted by the Crown. The French opinions resembled the supposed doctrine of Essex, but nobody ever showed any ground for them, and no privilege was ever produced.

Though Mr. Jervis sees clearly enough that the Christian religion is a whole and perfect substance that is not to be tampered with, and that the Church is universal, and therefore must be the same in all lands, he does not see that the Gallican opinions were the principles of schism, and that they were used to foster one of the most insidious heresies that ever troubled the peace of the faithful. It is possible that Mr. Jervis has his own views about "essential theological doctrine," and that with him those words mean less than they mean in the mouth of a Catholic. That we believe to be the explanation, for he writes thus of the French opinions:—



"They may be said, also, to comprehend many collateral issues, radiating from this central point—issues affecting jurisprudence, legislation, discipline; the status and rights of the episcopal order in general; the legitimate terms of alliance between a national Church and a Christian State.

"Now, these are questions, doubtless, of considerable magnitude; but they are not of fundamental or indispensable moment. They are not questions *de fide*. The systematic exaggeration of their importance by the extreme partisans of Rome is one of the most unfortunate features of modern controversy. It is difficult to see how the cause of religion can be served by insisting on the dogma of Papal absolutism as if it were the corner stone of the whole Christian fabric—the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*. Such a theory clashed with incontestable facts. If this be an article of necessary faith, how is it that it has never been imposed upon the conscience of Christendom by the authority of any one undisputed Œcumenical Council? How is it that no such definition is to be found among the decrees of Trent? How is it that those who reject it have never in any age been branded with the anathemas incurred by formal heresy?" (Pp. 2-3.)

This extract shows accurately the precise point on which Mr. Jervis stands. He does not think that the government of the Church is equally divine with the dogmas of the Faith, as though the revealed truth on Church government were not itself a dogma. He thinks a General Council is above the Pope, so he asks why the Papal prerogatives have not been defined by a Council. He does not regard the Council of Florence as general, and he considers the Council of the Vatican as disputed. In a note he adopts the explanation of the last clause in the Florentine definition which has been ignorantly or unscrupulously maintained by modern heretics after the old Gallicans of the seventeenth century.

If Mr. Jervis could be patient with "the extreme partisans of Rome" he would ask fewer questions; for perhaps these have something to say for themselves after all. If Mr. Jervis is surprised that the definitions of the Papal rights made in Rome in 1870 have come so late, it is possible enough that heretics of the Arian type might in the fourth and fifth centuries have wondered also how the definition of Nice could have been so long delayed.

Mr. Jervis says the Church is "the Kingdom of Christ, but he means something else. With him the Church is not a real monarchy, but a republic, the members of which have a jurisdiction really over their rulers. Thus he writes:—

"The remedy proposed was that of appeal to a General Council, as the supreme tribunal of Christendom; competent, should the necessity arise, to pass judgment even on the Pope himself. This is commonly quoted as one of the peculiar principles of Gallicanism; but in point of fact it is an original constitutional law of the Church Catholic." (P. 82.)

This is what makes Mr. Jervis sympathize so much with a national Church which would not admit him to its communion, and which would look upon him as a layman. This "root of bitterness," common to both, resistance to the Holy See, makes friends of enemies, and reconciles Pontius Pilate with Herod.

Mr. Jervis traces all the evils of France to the Concordat of 1516, by which the rights of Metropolitans were suppressed, chapters of cathedrals

deprived of the right to elect bishops, and monks to elect abbots. But Frenchmen themselves, Gallicans of unspotted reputation, tell us that the Concordat was a great boon ; that it put an end to the intrigues of ambitious clerics, to simony, to the oppression of chapters and monasteries by powerful men living near them, and, not least, to brawling, fighting, and even shedding of blood.

The Concordat brought peace in its train, and put an end to a condition which De Maria stigmatizes as schism ; but it did not bring all the blessings it might have brought, because the Gallicanism of D'Ailli and Gerson had taken root, and because the lawyers entered into the sanctuary.

Mr. Jervis prefers the Pragmatic Sanction to the Concordat which superseded it, so for many years did those men who boasted of the Gallican liberties, of which the Pragmatic Sanction was the most conspicuous monument. But its maintainers were inconsistent men. Gallicans hold that a general council is above the Pope, and that no Pope can dispense with any canons it may make. Well, it is hardly creditable, but it is the fact, the French Church, with the king at its head, did, in its famous assembly at Bourges, in A.D. 1438, modify the decrees of what it held to be a general council, and instead of accepting those decrees as the council passed them, accepted them only as amended by itself. Thus, not only is a general council, according to Gallicans, above the Pope, but the French Church is also above them both.

The truth is that the Concordat was an immense boon to the French nation and in particular to the bishops. Before the Concordat the election to the bishops and abbots were generally tumultuous, and few unsuccessful candidates were unable to discover some flaw in the process. The election then became litigious, and the question had to be argued in Rome at grievous expense to the chapters and monasteries, and, as the enemies of the Holy See say, to the great gain of the Pontiff. We may admit that the lawyers gained, but the Pope certainly gained nothing but trouble ; and people who thus talk might as well say that the Lord Chancellor gains by the multitude of suitors in his court. If we accept the principle of these men we have another proof of the disinterestedness of their great bugbear the Roman Curia. It would have been a perpetual source of profit to the Roman lawyers to retain the Pragmatic Sanction, for out of that document they would have drawn reasons for endless litigation, and consequently would have drained France of its money.

The two men who are commonly regarded as the founders of Gallicanism, D'Ailli and Gerson, were once of another mind ; at least the former was, by whom the latter was trained. Pierre D'Ailli, at least in A.D. 1388, held the Supremacy of the Sovereign Pontiff, and Gerson tells us that in his early days any one who denied it would have been regarded as a heretic. Well, these two men prevailed in France, and the new opinions which they taught crept into schools and universities, and chapters and monasteries, and even into the assemblies of the clergy, till at last the French people were generally persuaded that they were more or less independent Christians, and could treat on terms of equality with the Pope. The popular doctors of the nation invented the Gallican liberties, and the lawyers

then took charge of them to the ruin of the very Church they were supposed to defend.

Mr. Jervis very naturally likes these liberties, and especially the opposition to the Sovereign Pontiff; but then this liking leads him to be very gentle with the Jansenists, and to believe a good many stories for which there is no proof. He accepts the writings of Dorsanne, and looks on Guetter as an authority on whom he can safely rely; nor is he at all sceptical about the lies which have been told of Cardinal Dubois. The Jesuits of course must be sacrificed, and of the persecution they underwent in France under the Duke of Choiseul and the provincial parliaments in 1763, Mr. Jervis says, "none could deny that they were the victims of a righteous retribution." (Vol. ii. p. 357.)

We read this with some surprise, for Mr. Jervis is not under the dominion of all the prejudices of his sect. He is on the whole a very fair man, and we should refuse to believe of him that he has wilfully distorted facts or deliberately made an inaccurate statement. Still he thinks the violent suppression of the Jesuits in France lawful and just, and that the Jesuits deserved it.

His sympathy with the Jansenists is not unnatural, for they are enemies of the Holy See, and no doubt, on the same principle, the Jesuits are hateful because they are faithful to that See. Therein we think lies the key to the book which Mr. Jervis has written; it is the record of a long struggle, and of a deadly hate more or less disguised. Gallicanism set itself up as the rival of Rome, and fought for the supremacy. During the troubles caused by the French cardinals, who revolted against Urban VI., the principles which were at a later day known as Gallicanism laid the foundations, and in the Councils of Constance and Basle we saw the building completed; the French took it now into their own safe-keeping, and furnished it with the Pragmatic Sanction, and set the lawyers to keep guard over it and keep it.

The result frightened even the French Court, so the king consented to the quashing of the Pragmatic, and the Concordat was granted. But the evil spirit was not exorcised out of France, and erroneous doctrines were maintained. The Sorbonne yielded to the general corruption, and the fountains of learning were poisoned. The law-courts, filled with judges and advocates who held the Gallican opinions, interfered with the discipline of the Church, proscribed true doctrines, and finally insisted on directing the administration of the last sacraments, in defence of the Gallican liberties. In the reign of Louis XIV., so complete was the subjection of the Church to the civil power, that Bossuet, the great defender of the "liberties," found himself under the control of the royal censor of books. The pastorals of the "Eagle of Meaux" had to be corrected and allowed by the king's officer, who had become by this time a more correct theologian than the "orthodox" Bossuet. The Gallican liberties were wonderful things, for they seem to have made wise men foolish. The Abbé Le Dieu, in his "Journal," vol. i. p. 212, says of his master, Bossuet, that he, Bossuet, on one occasion thought that he had found an important opportunity for suggesting to the Pope what should be believed, and what should be proposed for Protestants to believe, on this matter of infallibility and the deposition of kings; for what he had written

intended for the instruction of German Protestants he wished to put forth for the instruction even of the Pope and the Cardinals.

Bossuet is, of course, a sort of hero in the eyes of Mr. Jervis, but he is obliged to say things of him that reduce his heroism to very pitiful proportions. Bossuet was a favourite at court, and was more or less indulged; he therefore had an air of independence about him which might deceive some people, and help them to think that the bishops were not the slaves of the crown that they really were. Bossuet was very respectful to the king, but he was not respectful to the Pope. He did not use bad language, that is true; but he was thoroughly disobedient, and dealt with the Holy See as with an enemy.

Gallicanism is gone now the way of all heresies, and Mr. Jervis must regret it in vain. His history of it is well done, and we can hardly find fault with him. He has traced that history down to the civil constitution of the clergy. We can wish for no better refutation of the principle, no clearer light than that which he gives us. He is not pleased, with the Council of the Vatican, but he justifies it all the same. His Holiness now reigning has in one sense done no more than Mr. Jervis. The latter has drawn up the indictment and proved it, the Pope pronounced the sentence. These two volumes furnish the very best reasons that men can desire against Gallicanism, and they come with the more force because they are arrayed by one who thoroughly approves of the Gallican positions. In this sense, we say it heartily, Mr. Jervis has done us a real, and we think a lasting, service.

*Mary, Queen of Scots, and her latest English Historian.* By JAMES F. MELINE. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THE Memory of Mary, Queen of Scots, is dear to the heart of every Catholic, and every fresh effort therefore to clear up any difficulties that may have arisen as to her life, or the cause from which she suffered, cannot fail to be most welcome to all who love the truth. Mr. Meline therefore has done good service in exposing and refuting the errors of her latest English historian, who has done more perhaps than any other historian to darken the beauty of her character, and to cast a stain upon her fair name.

Mr. Froude has himself told us confidently, in his "Short Studies upon Great Subjects," "that it has often seemed to him as if history was like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please" (p. 7); and certainly he has done his best to put this view of his into practice, for in his own History of England he has spelt whatever word has seemed good to him. Henry VIII., Elizabeth, and Mary, Queen of Scots, are in his pages no more the Henry, Elizabeth, and Mary of history than he himself is an historian. We need not wonder then that in the present volume this author

should charge him with gross impartiality ; with sublimity of impudence in paradox ; with defective knowledge of all history before the sixteenth century, with errors in general and in details, in geography, jurisprudence, titles, offices, and military affairs ; with want of grasp of his materials ; with inability to discover the value of different state papers, and indiscriminate acceptance of written authorities of a certain class ; with being in matters of state a pamphleteer, and in personal questions an advocate, holding a brief *for Henry against Mary Stuart* ; with inserting language of his own between quotation-marks, which are usually supposed to convey to the reader the conventional assurance that they include the precise words of the text with manipulating documents, either by joining together two distinct passages, thus entirely changing their meaning, or by connecting two phrases from two different authorities and presenting them as one, or by tacking on irresponsible or anonymous authorities to one that is responsible, and concealing the first while avowing the last ; with insidious insinuations, dropping an allusion or remark, in apparently quite a careless manner, to build upon it afterwards a regular system of attack ; nay, with ignorance even of that very sixteenth century of which Mr. Froude tells us, with no little satisfaction in his "Short Studies," that "he might say that he knows more than about anything else." (Mary Queen of Scots, pp. 2—17.) These are grave charges, as the author owns, but are bound to say that he establishes them.

Mr. Meline does not of course profess to follow every step which Mr. Froude has taken, or to spell over again correctly every word which the latter has mis-spelt with his "child's box of letters ;" for, as he observes, "proper historical treatment in the case is difficult, not to say impossible, for the reason that he has produced, not so much a history of Mary Stuart as a sweeping indictment in terms of abuse, which few prosecuting attorneys would dare present in a criminal court, and in which he showers upon the Queen of Scots such epithets as "murderess," "ferocious animal," "panther," "wild cat," and "brute" (p. 21). Nor can we ourselves in a short notice attempt to follow Mr. Meline through all his refutations of Mr. Froude. We must content ourselves with placing a few of the most remarkable of them before our readers, first of all, however, calling their attention to the very striking passage which immediately precedes the words last quoted :—

"Our historian's views of the philosophy of history, of the agency of fate, and of the subordination of morality to the 'inevitable,' all undergo a radical change after leaving Henry VIII. His partisanship culminates in reaching Mary Stuart, when it comes out with more elaborate machinery of innuendo, more careful finish of invention, unscrupulous assertion, wealth of invective, and relentless hatred. Events, cease to be inevitable. The historian's generous supply of palliation and justification (usually, 'by faith alone') has all been lavished on Henry, or reserved for Murray.

"In no one instance is there 'fatal necessity of mistake' for Mary ; and her sorrows, her misfortunes, her involuntary errors, and the infamous outrages inflicted upon her by others, are, we are told, all crimes of her own invention and perpetration. Authorities cited are mainly her personal enemies, or her paid detractors. Of what she herself wrote there is rigid economy, and nothing is allowed to be heard from what is called 'that suspected source.'"

Mr. Froude's whole view of the character of Mary may be said to rest

upon the conception he has formed of her early education. "She was brought up," he tells us, "amidst the political iniquities of the Court of Catherine de Medicis" (vii. 164). Upon this foundation, as Mr. Meline remarks, "an imposing superstructure is raised, and in all the succeeding volumes every pretext is seized for reference to the discovery that the education of the child Mary Stuart was entrusted to Catherine de Medicis. Worse than this, the reader is forced to suppose that such education had nothing to do with useful knowledge, but was confined exclusively to lessons in moral and political wickedness" (p. 25). Yet what is the truth? There is absolutely no foundation for Mr. Froude's statements and insinuations, for, according to the clearest evidence, as brought forward by Mr. Meline, during the whole of "Mary's sojourn in France, there was no such thing known as the Court of Catherine de Medicis. True, she was the wife of Henry II., and the mother of Francis and Charles, but this court was the court of the reigning king, and was so far from being even nominally that of Catherine, through personal or political influence that, although Queen Consort and Queen Mother, she was a mere cipher until she governed in the name of Charles IX.," when Mary had already left France for Scotland.\* The "political iniquities" therefore spoken of by Mr. Froude had not then begun. As to the personal relations between Mary and Catherine, it is notorious that on the one side there was "invisible repugnance," and on the other "hatred as intense as that of Elizabeth." Even Mr. Froude is very nearly correct in saying (vii. 310) that Catherine, who in the reign of Francis had seen the honour of the throne given to the Queen of Scots, and the power of the throne to the Duke of Guise and his brother, had wrongs of her own to avenge.

"And yet," continues our author, "full well knowing that her uncles, the Guises, held the power," Mr. Froude "continually misrepresents this innocent girl. Mary is the originator and executor of all their political crime and combinations, such as the assumption of the arms of England, and the refusal to ratify the treaty of Leith. He describes her as solely occupied with ambitious projects, of which she had no conception, and desirous of reaching Scotland rapidly, "with a purpose as fixed as the stars." The historical fact is that she had neither intention nor wish to go to Scotland. Even Martin admits that she went less from "choice than from necessity. Her mother was dead, and now all her affections, all her hopes, were in France. . . . Not long was she allowed to remain, for her uncles forced her to go to Scotland, and she embarked, broken-hearted and in tears."\* (p. 28.)

As another example of the way in which Mr. Meline deals with the crafty assertions of Mr. Froude, we extract the following :—

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\* "Son mari l'avait laissé sans crédit et sans pouvoir."—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, vol. xviii. p. 101. "Catherine de Medicis, qui depuis vingt-sept ans qu'elle était en France, avait toujours été écartée du pouvoir, loin d'être reconnue comme ayant droit à la régence de son fils, se voyait comme femme et comme étrangère l'objet d'une violente jalousie."—*Ibid.* vol. xviii. p. 185. Quoted by Mr. Meline.

† "La pauvre Marie partit avec desespoir ?—Martin, *"Histoire de France,"* vol. x. p. 177.



"The alleged participation of Mary in the so-called Catholic league has always been one of the most serious accusations against her. Tytler regards it 'as one of the most fatal errors of her life;' and 'to it,' says Robertson, 'may be imputed all her subsequent misfortunes.' Mr. Froude has means of information which were not accessible when these historians wrote, and yet states the matter thus :—'A copy of the bond had been sent across to Scotland, which Randolph ascertained that Mary Stuart had signed.' And in this positive assertion he perseveres to the end. We have already had occasion to see that in any question touching Mary Stuart there is unrelenting war between Mr. Froude and respectable historical authority. In this case the result obtained from examination of the authorities is that—1st, Mary Stuart never signed the league; 2nd, she distinctly refused to sign it.

"Our English historian's sole authority is Randolph. It would doubtless have been gratifying to him to have been able to cite Camden, De Thou, or Holinshed, or even Knox or Buchanan, but they are all silent upon this point. Failing these, he says that he quotes Randolph. But he misquotes him. Randolph did not say that he had ascertained that Mary had signed. He said, 'She has signed, *as I hear.*' His despatch is dated February 7, 1566, and it is contradicted by a later one from Bedford of the 14th. It was not then signed, and there is no pretence that she signed it afterwards" (p. 70).

So, again, the historians of the period state distinctly what sovereigns signed the league, and the name of the Queen of Scots is not mentioned. Moreover, we know, on the authority of a letter of the Bishop of Moldovi (16th March, 1567, original in the Medici Archives), that if the Queen had signed the league she "would then have been wholly mistress of her kingdom, in a position to establish fully the holy Catholic faith. *But she would never listen to it,* though the Bishop of Durham and Father Edmund (Jesuit) were sent to determine her to embrace this most wise enterprise." (*Ibid.*) That Mary never signed the league is also maintained by Mr. Hosach in his well-known work, to which our author professes himself to be under great obligations.

We are obliged to pass over almost without notice the chapter on Randolph's letter quoted by Mr. Froude, in which he makes Mary say "she could have no peace till she had Murray's or Chatelherault's head" (vol. viii. p. 211), is shown not to have been written by Randolph at all, but by Bedford, who however wrote no such thing, merely remarking that a certified copy from the English Record Office has been obtained by the author, and is given in full. In this letter the words indeed are found :—"There is no talk of peace with that Queen, but that she will first have a heade of the Duke or of the Erle of Murrey." But this evidently refers to the "talke" of the rebel lords and of their own invention, and should never have been put in Mary's mouth, much less brought forward as his authority for his statement that "at least she would not lose the chance of revenge upon her brother." Nor have we time to follow our author at any length in his exposure of Mr. Froude's blunders about Mary's letter to Elizabeth dated April 4th, 1566,—a letter which he thus himself describes :—"The strokes thick, and slightly uneven from excitement, but strong, firm, and without sign of trembling:" but which we know from the letter itself was not written by Mary, but merely signed by her,—a letter too in which Mr. Froude inserts passages which have no existence in the original! Truly we may say with the "Saturday Review"

that Mr. Froude does not seem to have grasped the "nature of inverted commas," and may ask with our author what prospect is there of reaching any solution of a question which for three centuries has been a vexed one among historians, and the never-ending theme of acrimonious controversy, if the subject continues to be treated as we find it in the work before us?"

The murder of Darnley and Mary's marriage with Bothwell are treated with the greatest clearness, and Mr. Froude's distortion of history carefully exposed. From the moment of the debauched and vicious Darnley's departure from Stirling, Mr. Froude takes up his brief for him with greater warmth. "He is now," says Mr. Meline, "the poor boy. In these pages every one from Murray down to 'blasphemous Balfour' is good, virtuous, or pious, just in proportion as they are useful to him against Mary Stuart; and Darnley begins from this moment to be more and more interesting, up to the scene where historical romance places him 'lying dead in the garden under the stars,' in the odour of sanctity, with the words of the Fifty-fifth Psalm expiring on his lips."

With regard to Mary's threat of revenge in connection with Darnley's death, attributed to her by Mr. Froude, the following will be read with interest:—

"As she left the room, she said, as if by accident, 'It was just this time last year that Rizzio was slain.' The authority given for this statement is Calderwood. Calderwood! Who is Calderwood? queries the reader. Was he a servant of Darnley? Was he present at Kirk o' Field? and did he hear the Queen say those words? Or, perchance, was he a contemporary who received the statement from a reliable source? No information is given concerning him by our historian but the bare name of Calderwood. We find on examination that Darnley had been dead twenty years when Calderwood was born, and that about half a century thereafter he wrote a 'Historie of the Kirk of Scotland.' With its merits as a history of the Kirk we have nothing to do, but in so far as it undertakes to chronicle secular matters—which it does at some length—it is the merest trash, made up exclusively of Buchanan and the verbal gossip current among the enemies of the Queen of Scots. . . . No serious historian quotes him. But it is written that Mr. Froude shall not cite anything correctly, not even poor Calderwood, who wrote not what the historian puts into his mouth, but—'Among other speeches, she said that about the same time a bygone a yeare, David Rizzio was slain.' " (p. 156).

Later on, when speaking of the second deposition of Paris (Nicholas Hubert), implicating Mary in the murder, which was not made public till 1725, Mr. Meline contrasts Mr. Froude's readiness to believe everything ill of her, with his remarks upon the accusation brought against Leicester of the murder of his wife, Amy Robsart. "The charity of later years," says the historian, "has inclined to believe that it was a calumny invented, &c. &c.; and as it was not published till a quarter of a century after the crime—if crime there was—had been committed, it will not be replied upon in this place for evidence" (vii. 288). Justly does our author add: "You see we must draw the line somewhere. Against an edifying English gentleman like Leicester, we cannot admit testimony after, say twenty years; but it will give us great pleasure to receive any evidence against Mary Stuart to the end of time" (p. 162).

So, too, with regard to Mary's marriage with Bothwell, the ground upon which Mr. Froude attempts to build his argument is utterly cut away from under him. To take but one example :—

"How profoundly," writes Mr. Froude (ix. 75, note), 'was she attached to Bothwell appears in the following letter, one of the two of which I have recovered her original words. It was written just before the marriage.' A very rash assertion, continues our author. Not a single day was Bothwell absent from her from April 24 (abduction) to May 15 (marriage). . . . The writer's '*I have recovered her original words*' is a remarkable piece of cool presumption ; for the letter (State Papers, 1568, vol. ii. No. 66) has for long years been accessible to all and sundry who chose to examine it, and was repeatedly copied and commented upon before Mr. Froude was born. If the letter was written to Bothwell, how is it that Mary refers to two marriages—the one private, the other public ; the first as past, the second to come ? How is it that not yet being married to Bothwell, she describes herself as his 'obedient and lawful wife'—words which, together with the last lines of the letter, are suppressed by Mr. Froude—'and refers to his neglect and absence'?"

The important question of the "casket letters," the authenticity of which Mr. Froude promised in his eighth volume to discuss, but which still remains undiscussed by him notwithstanding, and especially their external history, which according to Mr. Meline is sufficient to consign the plated chest to oblivion. . . . "as well as to render superfluous any argument on the internal evidence, which is if possible still more overwhelming," are most clearly, skilfully, and thoroughly treated in this volume.

We can only touch upon two points : 1. The refutation of Mr. Froude's assertion, which he rests upon the authority of Throckmorton, that Mary herself admitted the existence of the casket letters in August, 1567. 2. The discovery at Simancas by M. Jules Gauthier, of a letter from De Silva to Philip, which reveals the important fact that the casket letters were already discussed in England, and *known to Elizabeth*, before the Scottish lords had made any public allusion to them.

1. Throckmorton writing to Elizabeth about the interview at Lochleven between Mary and Murray, is represented by Mr. Froude not only as repeating Murray's account of the interview, but also as asserting Mary's admission of the existence of the casket letters. The value of Mr. Froude's argument will be seen from the following extract, in which a part of Throckmorton's letter, and what Mr. Froude represents him as writing, are given in parallel columns :—

Throckmorton writes :—  
"They began where they left over night, and after those his reprehensions, he used some words of consolation unto her, tending to this end that he would assure her of her life, and as much as lay in him, the preservation of her honour."

Mr. Froude represents him as writing :—

"He had forced her to see both her ignominy and her danger ; but he would not leave her without some words of consolation. He told her he would assure her life, and if possible would *shield her reputation, and prevent the publication of her letters.*"

"The words in italics," says Mr. Meline, "are not in Throckmorton, the

idea conveyed by Mr. Froude is not there, nor is there in all of Throckmorton's letters anything to warrant Mr. Froude's assertion. *It is all invention.* We know whereof we do affirm. There need be no question of conflict of reference in this matter. Mr. Froude cites 'Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Aug. 20, Keith,' and by that authority we stand." (Pp. 225-6.)

2. De Silva's letter discovered by M. Jules Gauthier, who was at first a firm believer in Mary's guilt (*Histoire de Marie, Stuart*), by which it is clear that the casket letters were *known to Elizabeth* before the Scottish lords had publicly alluded to them. On the 21st of July De Silva writes to Philip—we translate:—

"I told the Queen (Elizabeth) that I had been informed that the lords were in possession of certain letters, from which it appeared that the Queen of Scotland was knowing to the murder of her husband. She answered me that it was not true, and moreover that Lethington was therein badly employed, and that if she saw him, she would say a few words to him that he would find far from agreeable." (*Archives of Simancas*, leg. 819, fol. 108. Gauthier, vol. ii. p. 104).

"Mr. Froude's labours," continues our author, "have been referred to by his admirers as one of the triumphs of modern historical research. But although, as he states, he had 'unrestricted access' to that important collection, he does not seem to have made himself acquainted with this important letter. It appears that Elizabeth manifested no surprise at the ambassador's announcement, and this goes far to show that the forged letters were already under consideration in England as a means of inculcating the unfortunate Mary Stuart. It is equally evident that Elizabeth herself looked upon the letters as forgeries perpetrated by Lethington."\* (Pp. 231-2.)

Through the rest of the volume the author continues to pursue Mary's relentless historian up to the very scaffold, where according to the death warrant, "execution was done against her person, *as well for the cause of the gospel and the true religion of Christ*, as for the peace of the whole realm." But we have already far overpassed our limits, and will only conclude by renewing our thanks to the author for this most valuable contribution to Catholic literature. The work is written in a lively and agreeable style, and with not a little of the humour so peculiar to American writers.

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\* This agrees, adds the author in a note, with the intimation given by Camden, who evidently knew more of Cecil's secrets than he consigned to his pages, that Lethington (Maitland) was no stranger to their fabrication. It also accords with the frequently expressed suspicion of Mary herself, and with the opinions of several historians. Elizabeth's answer leaves but little doubt that the directing hand in the forgery was Maitland's, and we know that next to Murray and Morton he had the greatest interest in fixing upon Mary the odium of Darnley's murder.

*An Easy Demonstration and Catechism of Religion.* Translated from the Spanish of the Rev. JAMES BALMES, by the Rev. J. NORRIS. Second edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE second edition of this useful little work will be gladly welcomed. Anything from the thoughtful mind of Balmes is sure to be good. The work is divided into two parts. We are told in the advertisement to the "Easy Demonstration" that it was not the author's intention to write a catechism of Christian doctrine, or a compendium of the history of religion, but simply to fill up a void which exists in the education of children. The author is of opinion that "sufficient attention is not paid to the foundation of the truths" which our children learn at school; "and as it happens that when they leave school, and mix in distracted and dissipated, if not infidel or *indifferent* society, they do not carry with them the knowledge which may serve to sustain them in the faith of our holy religion. And what arms have been supplied to our youth during their education and training to enable them to defend their faith, if not in conversation, at least in the sanctuary of their own conscience. . . . And is not this department of instruction much more important and necessary than the teaching of arithmetic, geometry, drawing, &c., with which the minds of children are stored, in order that they may enter with profit and honour upon their respective careers?" (pp. iii. and iv.)

Again:

"Lamentable are the ignorance and neglect in these matters. Everything is taught, everything is learnt, except the grounds of our faith. And this is one of the causes why faith lies in so many hearts like barren seed, if, what is far worse, it be not carried away by the first breath of wind." (p. 10.)

In the midst of our educational crisis, when men are trying their utmost to separate religion from education, we consider the republication of this sterling little work as most opportune. It is a short but complete treatise on the grounds of our faith. The second part consists of a Catechism, in which the principal portion of the first part is compressed into a short space. We extract the following from the chapter "On the Existence of a true Religion."

"To say that all religions are equally good, that it matters not whether we be Christians, Mahometan, Jew, or Pagan, is to deny the providence of God, to assert that after He created the world He ceased to care for it, and that the human race walk onward the sport of chance, without object or end, as sheep without a shepherd. It will be said, perhaps, that a God infinitely great does not care about such tiny beings as we are, and regards our worship with indifference. Why, then, did He make us out of nothing (the existence of a God has already been proved) if He was not to take care of us afterwards. . . . For what object could a God who is infinitely just propose to Himself, in making out of nothing a creature which He would immediately abandon, without giving ear to his prayer, or accepting his offerings; indifferent as to whether he would follow this or that law, pay Him this or that worship, and leaving him alone and forlorn in the most horrid darkness? Who could ever conceive such absurdities as these? It would be equivalent to the denial of the goodness and wisdom of God; and a God without wisdom or goodness would not be God." (ch. ix. pp. 11 and 12.)

As far as we are able to judge, the translator has done his work well.

*Passion Flower.* A Novel. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

WE have been charmed and delighted with this novel. The contrast of character throughout is admirable ; and although the author—or shall we say authoress ?—has not been quite so successful in the handling of the incidents, yet the work is unquestionably one of real merit. The lights and shades in the characters of Beatrice and Agnes, the unselfish Johnny Carewe, and his unfortunate cousin Garrett, but especially of Lord Lyffton, which must have been the hardest, we think, to draw, are skilfully brought out, while Lord and Lady Mount Alton and Lady Margaret are natural in the extreme. It is, above all, in the knowledge of mind and heart that the writer excels. We have marked the following passages :—

“He” (Johnny Carewe) “was very fond of giving pleasure, but more so of doing good ; but, what is very rare with kindly people, he always kept possibility in view.” (P. 30.)

How true is the following :—

“Enviably ! Why which of us can fairly be considered to be so happy that other mortals should wish their destiny to resemble ours ? What we make shift to bear might to them be intolerable, what we enjoy they might not relish. So many people are happy in spite of circumstances that I think the word enviable one of the most foolish ever coined. If people only thought of what they say, how many words would go out of use !” (P. 61.)

And this again :—

“The next morning he” (Lord Lyffton) “breakfasted *tête-à-tête* with Lord Mount Alton. Beyond the ordinary civilities of the breakfast-table, little was said by either of them. It is only when we are alone with a person that we feel how much or how little we have in common with him ; and between these two there was very little in common. After all, perhaps, solitary companionship (if we may use such an expression) is the true test of friendship instead of separation, as has been so often asserted. Our dearest friends are those with whom we are happiest alone.” (P. 100.)

And this too :—

“So it ever is. We criticize our past selves as inexorably as we do our neighbours, and for the same reason—because it puts us in good humour by the contrast, real or supposed, with our actual present self.” (P. 224.)

Yet one more extract :—

“It is strange how in this chequered life of ours ‘one care doth tread upon another’s heel.’ It is seldom that a sorrow comes unattended. And surely it is wisely so. When our heart is worn out by its own vain wishes, with hopes and fears, shadows inconsistent, feverish, with all the changeful anxious world that is pent within a human breast, it seems almost like a relief to be brought face to face with some real, positive calamity—the severance of some old tie, or the hard cold features of want.

“There are moments when men think they have reached the extreme point of mental suffering, when they seem to have fallen into the ‘pit of misery and the mire of dregs.’ Then they fancy themselves familiar with sorrow in every guise, and say in their hearts that nothing can touch them farther. Vain illusion ! Behold them presently plunged into a lower lowness, a yet blacker desolation. What mortal has ever known the length and



breadth and height and depth of human woe? Who can look around over the world, and cry out, 'Is there any sorrow like unto my sorrow?' Ah, who, my brother, save He who became for us a Man of Sorrows,—who tasted in one bitter chalice of all the bitterness that earth can yield?" (Pp. 244—245.)

We sincerely trust, for the sake of our lighter Catholic literature, with which we are so ill provided, that "Passion Flower" will not be the only work we shall have from the pen of this accomplished writer.

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*The Merchant of Antwerp*: a tale, from the Flemish of HENDRICK CONSCIENCE. Translated by REVIN LYLE. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet, and Co. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE tales of Hendrick Conscience are so well known that their author requires no introduction to our readers. If we were asked in what the charm and merit of his tales consist, we should answer that their charm lies in their simplicity and truthfulness to nature, while their merit—a rare merit in these days—is to be found in their freedom from anything that might taint the hearts of the young. Not that in these tales love is excluded; far from it. The tale now before us may almost be said to be a love-tale. But the love, although strong and earnest, ready to undergo and suffer all things, is not the unholy passion of our modern sensational novels, which are eating away the hearts of so many of our English boys and girls; it is always kept in check by higher motives. So, too, we shall find that in the description of the world, and its pleasures, and its money-getting—its grosser vices are of course not touched upon—the author so contrives his plot as to make the reader feel that true happiness lies not with the world. At the same time there is no Puritanism, no sourness; while God and religion are never introduced at the wrong place, but just where, if they were to be omitted, we should feel the want.

In the "Merchant of Antwerp" we have the story of a young man, Raphael Banks, who, brought up in the house of his employer, where he has been treated as a son ever since his mother's death, to whom great kindness had been shown, both by his employer and his wife, constantly keeps the thought before him of one day repaying all their goodness. This, however, does not prevent him from secretly falling in love with his master's daughter, Felicité. Still, he knows his position too well to disclose his feelings; his only hope is one day to make a fortune, and then, to repay his master, and claim his daughter's hand. It is only when a rich young Antwerp merchant becomes her accepted lover, that he can bear it no longer, and leaves for America, still, however, bent upon repaying his master's kindness. His whole fortune consists of a few thousand francs recently left him; but although his heart is well-nigh broken, gratitude to his master bears him up. Meanwhile things begin to go badly with his master, M. Verboort; indeed grave difficulties had already arisen before Raphael's departure, which M. Verboort puts down as the chief cause of his leaving. Gradually matters get worse and worse with the old man; a large American house becomes fraudulently bankrupt, and

M. Verboort is unable to fulfil his engagements. In vain does he apply to the father of his future son-in-law ; far from receiving any assistance, the intended marriage is broken off, and the ruined merchant, reduced to great poverty, becomes insane. After a few years Raphael comes back from America the owner of a large fortune, with the intention of repaying his old master's kindness, but utterly ignorant either of his misfortunes or of the breaking off of his daughter's marriage. Informed of the true state of things, Raphael succeeds with great difficulty in obtaining an interview with M. Verboort during one of his lucid intervals, but all offers of assistance are indignantly rejected. Nothing baffled, Raphael consults the best physicians as to the possibility of a cure, and is told that the only chance is to cause a sudden shock to the old man by the communication of good news. He therefore makes arrangements with some London and Antwerp merchants, who write to M. Verboort to tell him that the son of the head of the bankrupt firm in America has determined to pay his father's debts, and that they therefore forward him the first instalment of the money. We need not say that all this is a *ruse*, and that the money comes from Raphael ; but the *ruse* proves successful. The old merchant recovers, and finding out the deception that has been put upon him for his good, bestows his daughter's hand on Raphael, who in his turn enables his old benefactor to end his days in comfort.

Such is a brief sketch of the simple tale ; yet simple as it is, it is full of interest. The description of the insanity and recovery of the old man is admirably drawn. We give the following extract, begging our readers to remember that four years have passed since Raphael Banks's departure.

"Mr. Verboort no longer listened, but talked to himself and rubbed his forehead, like some one endeavouring to remember something.

"'Yes ! that is it,' he cried joyfully. 'I knew very well I had forgotten something. A pleasure-garden without a dwelling ! How absurd ! There will be a château with a carved front, large marble steps before the door, and a portico with high columns on both sides. A princely palace ! That is pride, is it not ? Yes ! but when one is rich, worth millions. Ah ! what is there on earth too beautiful for my *Félicité* ? Time is short, we must take the chance that offers ; for we are rich to-day and poor to-morrow. I must decide at once. Banks does not come. I ought to consult him about the plan. He promised to be here at nine o'clock. Where can he be ? Do you know *Félicité* ?'

"Suddenly he was seized with a violent attack, his features contracted, and he cried furiously :

"'Banks, Banks. He has abandoned and betrayed me, because misfortune has befallen me. Thou, O God, wilt demand an account of his ingratitude. . . . Poor, ruined, dishonoured ! Raphael, Raphael, what have you done ? There they are, there they are, the phantoms which pursue me, the death which threatens me ! Let me fly. The notes, the notes.'

"*Félicité* sadly followed her father, but his imaginary fear caused him to run so rapidly, that the poor girl could not overtake him till he was entering the house." (p. 156.)

The anxieties, uncertainties, and risks of a merchant's life are also vividly depicted.

The translation is on the whole fairly good, although we have noticed in several places the misuse of "will" and "shall." At p. 147 we were also

stopped short by the following sentence :—" I felt like kissing her hands for the remembrance."

As for the American spelling we suppose it is hopeless to say anything, as the work has been published in America; but when we meet with "traveling" and "travelers" it is enough to make readers in the "old country" throw down the book in despair.

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*Life of Monseigneur Berneux, Bishop of Capse, Vicar-Apostolic of Corea. By M. L'ABBÉ PICHOU. Translated from the French, with a Preface, by LADY HERBERT. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.*

THIS is another volume of the "Missionary Series" from the pen of Lady Herbert, which seems never to rest from its labours in the cause of God's Church, and of His poor. We need hardly remind our readers that, like all the volumes of the same series, it is published for the benefit of the new Missionary College at Mill Hill, and it is indeed a beautiful offering to a beautiful cause. This work, we feel sure, will be productive of a twofold influence. Not only will it stir up all who read it to aid in sending forth fresh labourers to the harvest of souls in distant lands, but it will also quicken the spirit of self-sacrifice at home. Few fathers will be able to read the book without feeling how little *they* are doing for the Church of God, and how less than nothing are *their* mortifications compared with those which this martyred bishop underwent for his Master's cause.

Simeon François Berneux, Bishop of Capse in partibus, Vicar-Apostolic of the Corea, was born May 14, 1814, at Château-sur-Soir, in the diocese of Mans, and was beheaded for the Faith on the 8th of March, 1866. Most interesting is it to trace the spirit of martyrdom working within him even from his earliest years. It shows itself while still a boy, and although natural affection had a strong hold upon his heart, in his desire to study for the priesthood. At the age of twenty-one, still yearning after a more perfect life, he seems to have been strongly drawn towards the monastic life, and the sacrifice of his own will under the rule of S. Benedict; but God had another work for him to do. Three years later he felt that it was to the heathen that he had been called. So strong was the desire to offer himself for the work, that we are told his health gave way under it.

How touching is one of his letters to his mother after he had made up his mind!

"God is my witness," he writes, "that to save you from this sorrow I would willingly shed the last drop of my blood. There is but one sacrifice that I cannot make—I dare not sacrifice my soul. I must fulfil the will of God. And you would not desire it! You would, I know, rather see me dead a thousand times than permit me to be unfaithful to my vocation. For if the separation of a few years be so great a grief to us, what would it not be to be parted for ever! Let us offer the bitter sorrow we feel to our good God, and he will soften it, and help us to bear it. And as for me, it will double the weight I already bear if you continue to grieve so much." (P. 9.)

Here was, indeed, one who had laid to heart, and not merely heard, our Lord's words, "He who loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy

of Me." And so the whole of his beautiful after-life, what was it but one constant passing from martyrdom to martyrdom, until at last, "torn and scourged, and bruised," "his legs broken in the torture," "his whole body one wound," weeping, not for himself, but for the poor pagans around him, he gave his soul to God, and his blood for the conversion of the Corea. We purposely abstain from giving any further extracts, for we would wish all our readers to obtain the work for themselves, for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the poor heathen for whom the servant of God laid down his life. We may point out, however, that his letter, written when in Tonquin, at the command of his superiors, in which he describes his arrest, interrogations, and imprisonment, is said by Mgr. de Carcassone, who pronounced his funeral eulogy in his native place, to be "one of the grandest and most touching pages in the history of the Church." Nor can we refrain from quoting the following from Lady Herbert's preface :—

"Throughout, the servant of God seems to be fearful of robbing God of the honour which is His due, by attributing to himself the least of the extraordinary graces he received. God alone, indeed, could have given our poor human nature the strength and the courage to bear without a word an amount of physical agony the very recital of which makes one shudder. The executioners being at last weary of tormenting him, he was thrown into a horrible dungeon, where he remained for months, exposed alternately to intense cold and heat, without shelter, without clothes, and nearly dying of hunger, What does he do ? He composes a hymn of praise, of which the refrain is,

'Vive la joie toujours,  
Vive la joie quand même.'

'*Hilarem datorem diligit Deus.*' 'God loves those who give themselves with joy.' Such was eminently the spirit of this great servant of God." (Preface, pp. iv.—v.)

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*The Crusade, or Catholic Association for the Suppression of Drunkenness*  
London : Washbourne. 1873.

**T**HIS Crusade, placed as it is, with the approbation of His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, under the protection of our Blessed Lady of the Immaculate Conception, can hardly require any further recommendation in our pages. We may perhaps, however, be allowed to say a word or two upon the little work which contains and explains the rules of the "Crusade." This most useful little book has a twofold merit. First, it is entirely free from the exaggeration so frequently met with amongst the friends of total abstinence outside the Church. Secondly, it contains rules for partial as well as total abstainers. Amongst non-Catholics there are some who hold that to take any alcoholic drinks at all is a sin. This of course is simple Manichæism, condemned by the Church. But there are others, who without going so far, maintain that all alcoholic drink is poison. This, too, no Catholic can hold, except with regard to cases where such drink cannot be taken without danger of intoxication, because then it becomes a real poison—for the inspired Scriptures, in the midst of its most solemn warnings against drunkenness, is careful to point out that "wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men ; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober. . . . Wine was created from the beginning to make men joyful, and not to make them drunk. Wine taken with moderation is the joy of the

soul and the heart. Sober drinking is health to soul and body." (Eccles. xxxi, 32—7.) These passages, coming as they do from a Deutero-Canonical book, will be of no authority to Protestants, but to Catholics they are the words of God. The "Crusade," therefore, in no way interferes with those who can safely take alcoholic drinks in moderation, although even *they* are invited, for the sake of their weaker brethren, or for self-justification, to embrace its rules for partial abstinence, and thus "to deny themselves something, either in quantity or quality, or place or time."

But how many are there who cannot take a little without being led on to take too much? The simple fact that drunkenness is perhaps one of the greatest evils of the present day is the sad, but too-convincing answer. To all such there is but one course open, and that is to abstain altogether, not trusting in their own strength, but placing their good resolutions under the guardianship of the Mother of God, and strengthening them by the Sacraments of the Church. We earnestly trust, therefore, that the "Crusade" will under the Divine blessing become a powerful means of lessening the fearful evil which is destroying so many thousands of our people.

But the Crusade must not be allowed to work alone. Every earnest-minded Catholic must aid it by every means in his power; by our prayers, by tender and considerate treatment of all who have fallen under the influence of the fatal habit, by trying to remove, so far as lies within his reach, the anxiety, and misery, and poverty, and degradation, which too often are the causes of drunkenness. We do not believe that any drunkard was ever yet reclaimed by harsh words about his having "fallen below the level of the brute," or other similar expressions. We have seen many instances in which words like these have hardened men in their drunkenness. We should bear in mind that it is not true that it is always men of the lowest natures or the most sensual, but very often men—yes, and if we may believe recent statements, women too—of the most delicate organization and refined character, who out of love of excitement give way to the excessive use of stimulants. Nor should we forget that in many more instances a craving for drink is hereditary, and therefore inborn, handed down to them, perhaps, from father and grandfather, and that this craving can only be distinguished by something higher than nature. In such cases contempt and harsh words are altogether out of place. So in like manner we must aid each one in his own sphere. The efforts of the Crusade, by endeavouring to provide happier, and brighter, and more inviting homes for the poor of Christ, to raise their social position, and to drive away anxiety, and want, and misery, and temptation far from their doors. We must try to bridge over the fearful gulf between the very rich and the very poor, which is the hateful inheritance bequeathed to us by Protestantism, and which is so utterly contrary to the spirit of Christianity. Not until we are thoroughly in earnest in all these respects shall we succeed in stamping drunkenness out of the land.

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*The Illustrated Catholic Magazine.* November and December, 1872. New Series. London: S. Joseph's Press.

**W**E are sorry to say that we cannot praise the present number of our only illustrated Catholic magazine. Three at least of the illustrations

are "sensational" in the extreme ; indeed, on first opening the number, we thought that some penny illustrated work had taken shelter by mistake under a Catholic cover. One of the illustrations, representing an escape from a prison at Toulon is worthy of the "Life of Jack Sheppard." We need hardly point out that of all those into whose hands this magazine may fall, by far the greater number will look at the engravings without reading the story, which might perhaps be supposed to qualify their bad effect. In the present instance, however, the chief illustrated story is itself objectionable, for in the five short chapters contained in this number we are entertained with such matters as forgery, suicide, seduction—not dwelt upon, it is true, but hinted at—murder committed in will, if not as yet in deed ; and the conversation is of as thorough a ruffian as ever succeeded in making a highly sensational escape from prison. Surely this is not a story to be placed in the hands of our Catholic boys and girls.

We are grieved indeed to speak so severely of one number of a magazine to which we wish all success, as having a great work to do, especially amongst the young, and which in many ways has done important and valuable service. Would it not be also possible, we may ask, to introduce a little more instruction and distinctively Catholic information in this magazine ? Certainly this can be done without making its pages either uninteresting or heavy.

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*The Catholic Family Almanack, 1873*. New York : The Catholic Publication Society.

**T**HIS is a very neatly got up illustrated almanack, containing valuable information about the Church in the United States, as well as sketches of the lives of Bishop Milner, Archbishop Hughes, Archbishop Spalding, Father Mather, Mother Seton, and others. The illustrations of the Rock of Cashel, and of the Cathedrals of Vienna, Cologne, and Chartres, are especially good. There are at present seven Archbishops and fifty-five Bishops in the United States.

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*S. Helena ; or, the Finding of the Holy Cross.* A Drama for Girls, in Three Acts. Translated and Re-arranged from the German by the Rev. T. A. BERGRATH. Baltimore : Kelly, Piet, & Co.

**W**E have no doubt that in the original German this little drama is well adapted for the purpose for which it has been written. We cannot, however, say the same for the translation, and are therefore unable to recommend it, at least in its present form, for the use of our convent-schools. Take, for example, the following (act iii., sc. iii.), where a dead woman (Claudia) has been raised to life by means of a towel which has touched the Holy Cross :—

"LYDIA (Claudia's daughter) (takes her mother by the hand, and leads her up to the Empress).—Fear not, my lady. It is my mother, well and strong. Our Lord has given her back to us again in honour and by virtue of His holy Cross !

"HELENA.—His name be praised for that. It helps to make our joy more perfect, and adds a special crown to grace this day. *Allow me, Claudia, to offer my congratulations.*

"CLAUDIA.—*I thank you very much indeed !*"



We pity the audience, and still more the young ladies who may have to listen to or utter the words we have placed in italics; words suitable enough, perhaps, on the lips of young ladies when congratulating one another upon their approaching marriage, but ludicrously out of place at such a solemn moment as that of raising the dead to life.

The English also is in some places very faulty. What, for instance, are we to think of the following:—"The likes of you certainly should not trouble me much in that case"? (Act i., sc. v., p. 16.)

*Fleurange.* By MADAME AUGUSTUS CRAVEN. Translated from the French by M. P. T. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1872.

AN American translation of Madame A. Craven's beautiful story, although hardly, we think, worthy either of the original or of the excellent magazine in the pages of which it first appeared (the "Catholic World"). Madame Craven's works are of such a kind that, even in a good translation, although their essential qualities are preserved, the exquisiteness, so to speak, of their bloom is lost. How much more then is this the case, when the translation is but an indifferent one? We feel it however only just to state that in the present instance the translation improves as it goes on.

The circulation amongst us of such purifying and elevating works as "Fleurange" can be productive only of unmixed good, teaching as they do the merciful tenderness of God's providence through all the changing scenes of life, and how all human love not founded upon Him, and therefore unsanctified by Him, must sooner or later bear bitter fruit.

*Whither shall We go?* From the German of Dr. ALBAN STOTZ. London and Derby: Richardson & Son. 1872.

ANOTHER pamphlet from the pen of the same author, in defence of Papal Infallibility.

"I did not take part in the war with the French, because it is not in my line to shed blood, and exterminate Frenchmen. But I should like to have a share in this spiritual war, not only because my pen is accustomed to contention, but because it could not be altogether honourable if, in this loud tumult about matters of faith and the affairs of souls, I were to sit quietly behind the bush and look quietly on. Indeed, I have been told that readers and lovers of my writings would like to know what my opinions are respecting Papal Infallibility; nay, it has already reached my ears that I am suspected of being an opponent of this article of faith." (P. 5.)

The little work must have done a great deal of good amongst German readers, and we have no doubt that it will also do good in England.

*Filiola*: a Drama in Four Acts.

*Earncliffe Hall*: a Drama in Three Acts.

*The Reverse of the Medal*: a Drama in Four Acts.

London: Washbourne. 1873.

} For Young Ladies.

OF these three little dramas the last is decidedly the best, although a certain stiffness is observable in all of them, a fault which seems to us to cling in a hopeless manner about almost all plays intended for young ladies.

*The Heart of Myrrha Lake ; or, Into the Light of Catholicity.* By MINNIE MAY LEE. New York : Catholic Publication Society. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

A BRIGHT, sparkling, clever little tale, brimful and running over with what we once heard a good Roman priest describe as the "*gaudium Catholicum*." It is simply the story of the passing of a young girl from the gloom of Puritanism and education at "Science Hall," into the light of Catholicity and the joy of the cloister, as well as of the conversion of her mother, lover, and old Methodist uncle ; and all this brought about by the religious practices, sound Catholic sense, and good example of a poor Irish servant. Yet everything happens so naturally, and the controversy is introduced so pleasantly, that the reader's interest in the tale is maintained to the end, without his ever finding it either extravagant or wearisome. This is a rare merit in a controversial story. We heartily recommend the work, and consider it well suited for distribution.

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*Maxims of the Kingdom of Heaven.* Second edition. London : Washbourne. 1873.

THIS is simply a collection of maxims taken entirely from the Holy Scripture, most suitable for meditation and reference. They are classed under different heads, alphabetically arranged. The work seems to have been appreciated, and has already reached a second edition. To the first edition a note was prefixed with the well-known initials "J. H. N.," in which we are told that the writer gladly availed himself of the opportunity which a friend had presented to him, of having a share, however small, in a work directed in so pious a spirit towards the promotion among Catholics of a habitual reverent meditation upon the sacred words of Him who spake as "man did never speak."

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*The Confessional Unmasked ; or, the Revelations.* A Farce in two Acts, adapted from "Shandy Maguire," by Sen Columbeus. London : R. Washbourne.

NOT devoid of a certain degree of Irish humour, but to our mind the subject of the Confessional is far too sacred to be treated, however innocently, in the form of a farce. We doubt whether such works are not more productive of harm than good. The best that we can say for the work before us is that it is well intended.

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*The Witch-Mania of the Learned World.* By DR. ALBAN STOTZ. London and Derby : Richardson & Son. 1872.

WE never read any of Dr. Stotz's writings without being reminded of William Cobbett. The present little pamphlet is, in fact, a defence of the Society of Jesus, which will prove most useful at the present time when more perhaps than they have ever done since their temporary dissolution, the fathers of the illustrious Society are suffering persecution for justice sake.